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Ethnonationalism versus Political Nationalism in Ghanaian Electoral Politics 1996-
2000

A thesis submitted to Middlesex University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

In a nation-state, ethnonationalism and political nationalism equate with each other in both theory and practice. In a multinational state, the mutual antagonisms between the two forms of nationalism demonstrate. In multinational states such as Ghana where “politics of the belly” prevails, ethnonationalism is the political nationalism, and more the substance rather than style of politics. This is the paradox within the rationality of Ghanaian politics. Owing to the modernising and integrative factors associated with urbanisation, urbanites are notioned to be detribalised and more prone towards political nationalism than ethnonationalism. A survey on the political attitudes of supposedly detribalised Ghanaian urbanites would reveal that urbanites, although geographically detribalised, are not so attitudinally, and for most, association with their ethnonational roots grew stronger with length of urban experience, even if there is no proof of a direct relationship between the two, or between association with roots and ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism results from “politics of the belly”, and subsequently, the postcolonial nation-state project, which seeks to integrate a heterogeneity of ethnonational identities submerged under single statehood, becomes a chore as a result.

The thesis argues that identity perceptions among Ghanaians, vis-a-vis fellow multinational citizens, are influenced by the immediate political history as well as distant myths of origin, and that, an accentuation of current enmities between various ethnonational groups enhances the invocation of myths of origin to explain the present. The anthropological proof that majority of Modern Ghana are traceable to Ancient Ghana, except Ewes and CTMs¹, offers an explanation to: (a) modern heightened animosities between Akans and Ewes, even though there is no evidence of enmity between the two groups in the distant history, and; (b) the perception by some, that Ewes are not “native” Ghanaians. The thesis highlights the overall effects of citizens’ identity perceptions on political actions and trends in Ghana. The thesis contributes that, there is a wider, more inclusive Guan ancestry and perception for the majority of Ghanaians than any current, exclusive, “latter-day” Guan identity, and that, the adoption of the name “Ghana” for the postcolonial state has more to do with anthropology than political fantasy. Both the Ghana hypothesis and Guan controversy are thereby explained. The thesis also discusses past agitation by non-Ewe groups in the Volta Region of Ghana for a separate Region, as well as the case for pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region. The scope of the thesis is broad, encapsulating theorising on the doctrine of nationalism, and assessing the extent of its global applicability. The essential Eurocentricity of the doctrine is exposed, as well as its subsequent inapplicability to several pre-18th century nations in Africa, for example the Fanti and Ashanti.

The thesis further contributes that Ghanaian spouses tended to conceal their political views from each other, the ratio weighing against the female gender. The research involved methodological innovation, utilising a computerised technique to circumvent the ‘culture of silence’² and potential negative response to postal questionnaire method. The innovative strategy ensured anonymity, confidentiality and express delivery, and has positive application for societies with limited freedom of political expression.

¹ Paul Nugent (1997) describes the other groups in the Volta Region apart from the Ewes as “Togo Remnants” or “Central Togo Minorities” - CTMs. For a fuller discussion of this, see sections 2.1 and 2.12 of the thesis, or Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000.

² See sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.6 of the thesis.

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CONTENTS

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	ii – iii
Contents.....	iv – vii
List of Tables.....	viii
Introduction.....	1 - 14
1 The Invention of a Doctrine.....	15 - 63
1.1 Tribe and nation: the checklist.....	16 - 21
1.1.1 Tribe and ethnic group.....	16 - 18
1.1.2 Nation.....	18 - 21
1.2 An invented doctrine.....	22 - 25
1.3 The debate on nationalism.....	26 - 44
1.3.1 Modernism.....	29 - 32
1.3.2 The antithesis of modernists.....	33
1.3.3 Primordialism and perennialism.....	34 - 35
1.3.4 Instrumentalism.....	35 - 39
1.3.5 More pre-“threshold” flaws of the modernist argument....	39 - 41
1.3.6 Evidence of “ideology” of leadership.....	41 - 44
1.4 Pre-“threshold” model nations.....	45 - 53
1.4.1 The Fanti nation.....	45 - 50
1.4.2 The Ashanti nation.....	50 - 53
1.5 Secessionism/separatism, irredentism and inter-“nation”-alism.....	54 - 57
1.6 The African context of nationalism.....	58 - 63
2 The Traditions of Origin.....	64 - 141
2.1 Overview.....	65 - 70
2.2 Origination of the “Ghana” hypothesis.....	71 - 72
2.3 Introduction to the ethno-geographic origins of Modern Ghana.....	73 - 79
2.4 The Guan controversy.....	80 - 83
2.5 The Bono kingdom and the Brong-Ahafo Region.....	84 - 88
2.6 The Gonja kingdom and the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions	89 - 98
2.6.1 “Northerners” versus “Southerners”.....	94 - 96
2.6.2 The “Northern” vote.....	96 - 98
2.7 The Central Region.....	99 - 104
2.7.1 The Fanti vote.....	103 - 104
2.8 The Western Region.....	105 - 106
2.9 The Greater-Accra Region.....	107
2.10 The Eastern Region.....	108 - 112
2.10.1 The Krobo vote.....	112
2.11 The Ashanti Region.....	113 - 114
2.12 The Ewes and the Volta Region.....	115 - 124

2.12.1	The Partition versus Ewe irredentism.....	120 - 121
2.12.2	The climax of irredentist, secessionist and territorialist claims....	122 - 124
2.13	A critique of the traditions of origin.....	125 - 141
2.13.1	Vansina and Owusu.....	125 - 127
2.13.2	Herskovitz versus Ellis.....	128
2.13.3	Levtzion.....	128 - 129
2.13.4	Wilks.....	130 - 133
2.13.5	Manoukian.....	133 - 134
2.13.6	Daaku.....	135 - 136
2.13.7	Wilson.....	136
2.13.8	Nugent.....	137 - 138
2.13.9	Kwamena-Poh.....	138 - 139
2.13.10	Gilbert.....	139
2.13.11	Ephirim-Donkor.....	140 - 141
3	Research Design and Methodology.....	142 - 177
3.1	Theoretical and conceptual formulation.....	143 - 168
3.1.1	Politics of the belly”.....	143 - 146
3.1.2	Ethnonationalism versus political nationalism.....	146 - 148
3.1.3	Tribalism versus ethnonationalism.....	149 - 157
3.1.4	Integration, urbanisation/detribalisation.....	157 - 168
3.2	Aims of the research.....	169
3.3	Methodology.....	170 - 172
3.3.1	The questionnaire.....	170 - 171
3.3.2	Assumptions underpinning the questionnaire.....	171 - 172
3.4	Previous research on Ghanaian electoral and political attitudes.....	173 - 175
3.5	Tema.....	176 - 177
4	Fieldwork, Analysis and Interpretation of Data.....	178 - 229
4.1	Fieldwork.....	179 - 184
4.1.1	Methodological innovation to surmount the ‘culture of silence’	179
4.1.2	The ‘culture of silence’.....	179 - 180
4.1.3	Problems to initial data-gathering strategy.....	180 - 181
4.1.4	Innovative research strategy.....	181 - 182
4.1.5	Sampling.....	182 - 183
4.1.6	Problems to innovation.....	183 - 184
4.2	Analysis and interpretation of fieldwork data.....	185 - 229
4.2.1	Introduction.....	185
4.2.2	Gender (q1).....	186
4.2.3	Age distribution (q2).....	186
4.2.4	Tribal (ethnonational) distribution (q3).....	187
4.2.5	Occupational distribution (q4).....	187 - 188
4.2.6	Education (q5).....	188
4.3	Hypothesis/aims.....	189 - 190
4.4	Party orientation.....	191 - 193
4.4.1	Traditional party orientation of respondents’ families (q6)....	191
4.4.2	Traditional party orientation of respondents (q7).....	191 - 192

4.4.3	Current party orientation of respondents (q8).....	192 - 193
4.5	Political participation.....	194 - 197
4.5.1	Are you a registered voter (q13)?.....	195 - 196
4.5.2	What is your level of political participation (q18)?.....	197
4.6	Freedom of expression.....	198
4.7	Votes.....	199 - 202
4.7.1	1996.....	199
4.7.2	2000.....	200 - 202
4.8	The influence of ethnonationalism on voting habits.....	203 - 205
4.9	Stability of supporters.....	206 - 210
4.9.1	The Ga-Adangbe factor.....	206 - 210
4.10	Nature of voters.....	211 - 216
4.10.1	Type of voter.....	211 - 215
4.10.2	Level of ethnonationalism.....	215 - 216
4.11	Association with roots.....	217 - 221
4.12	Gender and political attitudes.....	222 - 223
4.13	Age and political attitudes.....	224 - 225
4.14	Occupation and political attitudes.....	226 - 227
4.15	Education and political attitudes.....	228 - 229
5	Conclusion.....	230 - 250
5.1	Ethnonationalism and political nationalism.....	231 - 235
5.1.1	Extremes of ethnonationalism and ethnonational resentment...	231 - 234
5.1.2	The Ga-Adangbe factor.....	234
5.1.3	The religious factor.....	235
5.1.4	Political participation.....	235
5.2	Urbanisation/detribalisation and association with roots.....	236 - 237
5.3	Ethnonationalism and association with roots.....	238
5.4	Gender and politics.....	239 - 241
5.4.1	Other demographic factors and politics.....	241
5.5	The nation-state project.....	242 - 247
5.5.1	Latent sub-regional secessionisms and irredentisms.....	244 - 247
5.6	Conclusion.....	248 - 250
6.	Postscript.....	251 - 264
6.3	The 2000 elections and trends in ethnonationalism versus political nationalism.....	252 - 259
6.2	Update on the “politics of the belly”.....	260 - 262
6.3	Update on pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region.....	263 - 264
B	Bibliography.....	265 - 276
B.1	Primary sources.....	266 - 268
B.1.1	E-mail, discussion lists.....	266
B.1.2	Online-internet/electronic news sources.....	267 - 268
B.1.3	Official publications.....	268
B.2	Secondary sources or published works.....	269 - 276

Appendix I.....	Maps of Ghana and West Africa
Appendix II.....	Glossary of Currently Registered Political Parties
Appendix III.....	Letter from University of Ghana to Middlesex University
Appendix IV....	Letter of Introduction from University of Ghana for my Fieldwork
Appendix V.....	Letter from Martha Clerk to Middlesex University
Appendix VI(a)	List of Schools in Tema
Appendix VI(b)	Complimentary Cards
Appendix VII.....	Okyeame Discussion
Appendix VIII.....	Results of 1996 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections
Appendix IX	Transcript of Interview with Tema MP
Appendix X.....	Questionnaire
Appendices XI - XXI.....	SPSS data.
Appendix XXII.....	Appointees and Nominees of the Kufour Administration

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Major tribes of Northern Ghana in their current politico-administrative Regions:
Table 2: Gender distribution
Table 3: Age distribution
Table 4: Tribal (ethnonational) distribution
Table 5: Occupational distribution
Table 6: Educational distribution
Table 7: Traditional party orientation of respondent's families
Table 8: Traditional party orientation of respondents
Table 9: Current party orientation of respondents
Table 10: Voter registration
Table 11: Reasons for non-registration to vote
Table 12: Party registration
Table 13: Distribution of registered party membership
Table 14: Reasons for non-party registration
Table 15: Level of political participation
Table 16: Familiarisation with politics
Table 17: Freedom of political expression
Table 18: Political confidence
Table 19: Respondents' votes for 1996 Parliamentary elections
Table 20: Respondents' votes for 1996 Presidential elections
Table 21: Respondents' tentative votes for 2000 parliamentary elections
Table 22: Respondents' tentative votes for 2000 presidential elections
Table 23: Extreme negative ethnonationalism
Table 24: Type of voter
Table 25: Type of voter by group
Table 26: Level of ethnonationalism
Table 27: Association with roots
Table 28: Summary of 2000 presidential results – first round
Table 29: 2000 first round presidential ballot (selected results)
Table 30: Summary of 2000 presidential run-off
Table 31: Selected run-off results by constituencies: (Eastern Region)

Introduction

This research aimed at: (1) conducting a survey of Ghanaian urbanites in order to measure the current trends of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism¹, by investigating their voting attitudes and intentions, in order to establish the extent to which proneness towards political nationalism by supposedly detribalised urbanites, is imagined or real, of style or substance; (2) critically examining patterns in Ghanaian voting behaviours by analysing the distinctive patterns between ethnonational and state attitudes. Briefly, ethnonationalism is the form of nationalism demonstrated in solidarity with, or towards one's ethnonational identity group, and political nationalism is patriotism towards the state institution (Hutchinson 1994, pp. 42 & 43; Kellas 1991, pp. 51 & 52). Where there is a nation-state, ethnonationalism is equated with political nationalism at both the theoretical and practical levels. But within a multi-national state such as Ghana, a paradox exists whereby, although the two political attitudes are theoretically mutually antagonistic, they almost equate with each other within the realities of the local political rationality.

The research therefore examined the hypothesis that ethnonationalism and political nationalism are mutually antagonistic phenomena, the primacy or growth of one signifying the decrease of the other, *ceteris paribus*, and the extent to which this theory holds in reality, using Ghana as a test case. It would appear that the conflict posited between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, is not universally demonstrable, and that, within the rationality of the context of African politics, and Ghanaian politics in particular, ethnonationalism and political nationalism sometimes equate, rather than

¹ The terms ethnonationalism and political nationalism are fully explained in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of the thesis. Briefly, ethnonationalism is the form of nationalism demonstrated in solidarity with, or towards one's ethno-national identity group, and political nationalism is patriotism towards the state institution. Where there is a nation-state, ethnonationalism becomes automatically equated with political

stand at odds, with each other. This paradox has arisen as a result of: (a) the notion that the modernising and integrative effects of social mobilisation, resulting for example, from urbanisation, could result in the transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnonational group to the cosmopolitan state (Connor 1994, p. 35), and; (b) the conceptual synonymy that urbanisation is detribalisation (Wilson 1941, pp. 12 & 16; Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6; Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 13-46, 53). Hence, detribalised urbanites should be more prone towards political nationalism than ethnonationalism. But detribalisation may only be geographical and not attitudinal (Agyeman 1988, pp. 35-6; Mair 1965, pp.11-2; Watson 1958, p.5), or may provide conditions for the rejuvenation of primary ethnonational allegiance (Morrison 1982, p. 186). This research therefore examined the notion that urbanites are detribalised, by investigating geographical vis-à-vis attitudinal detribalisation among Ghanaian urbanites, and the extent to which they maintain association with their ethnonational roots, and subsequently, the extent to which proneness towards political nationalism is real or imagined. The research also explored the patterns of ethnonationalism and political nationalism. As voting behaviour is one indicator by which the two political attitudes can be tested, the research aimed at investigating the voting intentions of Ghanaian urbanites in order to find out the patterns of ethnonationalism and/or political nationalism. In the event, the research results offered an indication of the possible voting patterns for the December 2000 multi-party elections, although this was not a prime intention. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, and the often false impression given, that ethnonationalism is not a consideration when it comes to voting, the opposite is rather the case, and for most people, it is the main issue. The potential

nationalism, but in a multi-national or multi-ethnic state, the distinction between the two automatically surfaces as well.

for this form of nationalism remains high, as well as its future prospects, within the Ghanaian political milieu.

It would appear, that the rational response to the “politics of the belly”² by the majority of Ghanaian citizens, and urbanites in particular, is more of ethnonationalism rather than political nationalism, and for them, being ethnonationalist is the true way of being a political nationalist (or demonstrating one’s patriotism towards the Ghanaian state). In contrast therefore with the implicit supposition that urbanites should be political nationalists, the research exercise envisaged that the findings should reveal the extent to which any of the two political attitudes (ethnonationalism and political nationalism) is of substance or style, and how this affects politics in Ghana. The research revealed that, contrary to the ideals of political nationalism, as espoused by Hutchinson and Kellas (Hutchinson 1994, pp. 42-7; Kellas 1991, p. 52), in practice, most Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists, and that, generally-speaking, political nationalism is more of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics. The research also revealed that the longer Ghanaian urbanites experienced urbanisation, the higher the association with their ethnonational roots became. But the thesis does not prove, or offer the view, that association between urbanites and their roots influences ethnonationalism. Rather, ethnonationalism is as a consequence of the “politics of the belly”. It is also worth stating that, although the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest levels of association with roots, the data does not reveal any direct relationship between the two, and therefore the thesis does not offer a view that there is a relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots.

It must be noted, that never in the history of elections in Ghana has the voters' register required any individual to indicate their ethnonational identity. It has therefore been difficult to have a pinpoint idea of the ethnonational patterns in political attitudes. Thus, one uniqueness about this research is that, not only did it derive data on the ethnonational identities of individual respondents, but also provided an analysis of the patterns of political attitudes so derived from these identities, as well as their implications for Ghanaian politics as a whole. None of the previous research conducted on Ghanaian political attitudes: either by the International Federation of Electoral Systems (in conjunction with the Electoral Commission of Ghana) in 1997, or; Research International, or; the University of Ghana's Department of Political Science on the 1992 and 1996 elections, investigated the specific linkages between ethnonational identities and the patterns of nationalism, as this has done. It is also worth pointing out that this research was not necessarily about which candidate or party would win or lose the December 2000 elections, but rather an investigation into the attitudes of nationalism among Ghanaian urbanites, using voter attitude as an indicator. As potential voters were not required to indicate ethnonational identity at registration, election results can only offer general patterns of nationalistic attitudes. Although this research was not conducted because of the elections, posterity would reveal that the election results, as well as the pattern of the immediate post-election governmental appointments, would confirm the themes, concerns and conclusions discussed within the thesis.

² "Politics of the belly" is briefly explained as the politics surrounding the state supervision of the distribution of opportunity and wealth (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55). A fuller discussion on this can be found in sections 1.6, 2.1, 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the thesis.

The research also included a thorough evaluation of the theories of nationalism by delving into the debate on the invented doctrine or ideology of nationalism, and discussing the issue of whether or not, nations existed, and nationalisms occurred before the modernist and Eurocentric 18th century threshold. The discussion reveals the live processes and reasoning behind the invention of the doctrine, as well as the corresponding positions of the varying authorships. It would appear that the two main sides of the debate constitute primordialism and perennialism on one hand, and modernism and instrumentalism on the other³. Briefly, primordialism is the natural or organic view that nationalism has existed since antiquity, that all nations since antiquity, have originated from, or been founded on tribe or ethnic group. Perennialism, like primordialism, also holds the view that nationalism is perennial, a natural given which has been in existence since humanity (or antiquity), but differs from primordialism, with the view that not all nationalisms before the 18th century threshold were organically inspired - for example, the French Revolution of 1789 although staged by a largely homogeneous national group, was economically-inspired, and not based on ethnonational sentiments. Modernism is the view that both the doctrine and practice of nationalism began with modernity, using the 18th century as a threshold, and nations such as France, England and Spain, as model examples on which the doctrine has been

³ The terms primordialism, perennialism, modernism and instrumentalism are fully explained in sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 of the thesis. All four terms indicate theoretical positions in the broad debate on nationalism, with primordialism and perennialism belonging to one end of the spectrum, and modernism and instrumentalism on the other. Briefly: primordialism is the natural or organic view that nationalism has existed since antiquity, that all nations since antiquity, have originated from, or been founded on tribe or ethnic group; perennialism, like primordialism, also holds the view that nationalism is perennial, a natural given which has been in existence since humanity (or antiquity), but differs from primordialism, with the view that not all nationalisms before the 18th century threshold were organically inspired - for example, the French Revolution of 1789 although staged by a largely homogeneous national group, was economically-inspired, and not based on ethnonational sentiments; modernism is the view that both the doctrine and practice of nationalism began with modernity, using the 18th century as a threshold; instrumentalism is the view of modernism which holds that identity expressions are instrumentalist or situational, that is, based on the situation in which people find themselves, and on any such identities as gender, class, religion, etc.

drafted (Kedourie 1966, p. 9; Kohn 1940; 1946, pp. 1 & 4; Seton-Watson 1977, p. 6; Smith 1991, pp. 43-4; 1995, pp. 29 & 35). Instrumentalism is the view of modernism which holds that identity expressions are instrumentalist or situational, that is, based on the situation in which identity groups find themselves, and on any such identities as gender, class, religion, etc (Smith 1986a; 1991; 1995, p. 30). The discussion includes a critique of the theoretical arguments. It commences with an in-depth evaluation of the meanings and usages of the terms “tribe”, “ethnic group” and “nation” and how the terminology have been derived. This discussion leads into the compilation of a checklist for the attributes of a tribe (or ethnonational group) and a nation. Subsequently the checklist is used as a “plumbline” against two Ghanaian examples (the Fanti and Ashanti). The exercise reveals that the checklist is not peculiar to the so-called “model” nations, and therefore not universalistic, but instead Eurocentric.

The thesis also discusses secessionisms, separatisms and irredentisms, and their implications for global inter-“nation”-alism, especially for postcolonial Africa⁴. Briefly, secessionism and separatism revolve around claims of a group to a homeland and the withdrawal of such territory from the jurisdiction of a larger state to which it belongs. Irredentism revolves around the redeeming of a known or targeted territory, and/or identity group, on the basis of shared identity or history. All three forms of nationalism denote an attempt at national self-determination, and subsequently to gain international legitimacy (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 97; Mayall 1990, p. 50). The discussion on separatism and irredentism sets the context for the discussion of Ewe irredentism in Chapter 2.

⁴ A full discussion on the terms secessionism, separatism and irredentism can be found in section 1.5 of the thesis. Briefly, whereas all three forms of nationalism denote an attempt at national self-determination, and subsequently to gain international legitimacy, secessionism and separatism revolve around claims of a group to a homeland and the withdrawal of such territory from the jurisdiction of a

Chapter 1 therefore demonstrates a grip on how theorising on the subject of nationalism has evolved and discusses the extent to which the theories of nationalism are globally applicable. The research was subsequently placed within the African context and dimension of nationalism, highlighting the continent's Partition and its implications for nationalism, and thereby setting a framework for the nature of African politics within which to discuss Ghanaian politics. The research has examined the feasibility of the postcolonial Ghanaian nation-state project, by which a heterogeneity of ethnonational identity groups have been placed under the umbrella of single statehood, with the hope that they should integrate (Smith 1991, p. 59) over time. But the prevalent nature of the "politics of the belly" would seem to be grooming citizens in the opposite direction. The tension or conflict between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, as demonstrated by the survey data, proves that the attempt of the colonial legacy to subjugate separate national identities under a single state, which should then act as an incubator for the gestation of new nationhood (Ibid), is only achievable within the understanding that whereas ethnonational homogeneity is a tall order for any new multi-national state, ethnonational heterogeneity is not a problem for the attainment of national identity for, as well as nationality within, the postcolonial state. The rationalization of ethnonationalism by the majority of citizens, in response to the pervasive "politics of the belly", seems an indirect nod of approval to the latter, and the scenario clearly indicates, that the state does not have a smooth ride in creating 'the necessary condition and matrix for the gestation of national loyalties' (Ibid). It follows therefore, that the prospects of national integration for a state with subject groupings sharply antagonistic towards each other, and where the state system perpetuates these

larger state to which it belongs, and; irredentism revolves around the redeeming of a known or targeted territory and/or people on the basis of shared identity or history.

antagonisms through unfair political arithmetic motivated by ethno-sectarian interests, are very bleak. Despite its jurisdictional authority over the modern Ghanaian territory, the state has somewhat failed to live up to egalitarian expectations. The research concludes, that the rationalization of ethnonationalism and the “politics of the belly” militates against the potential for an integrated Ghanaian nation, or accentuates ethnonational heterogeneity, should state power be utilised as motivated by ethnonationalism. In reality, the Weberian ethos of the state has been rejected by Africa in general, and Ghana in particular, and it would take a strong political will from both politicians and the rest of citizenry to transform the political game from ethnonationalism to political nationalism in Weberian terms. The Ghanaian nation-state project, and by extension, that of most African countries, has not prospered on the infertile ground of multiple national identities boxed under a single state.

The research also investigated the traditions of origins of the various ethnonational identity groups in Ghana and the influence which these myths of origin have on citizens’ perceptions vis-à-vis fellow identity groups, as well as the overall effects of such perceptions on political actions and trends in Ghana. The various ethnonational groups have been historically and anthropologically traced to their current ethno-geographical locations in Modern Ghana (see maps of Ghana and West Africa in Appendix I). The thesis argues that a combination of the political processes of the immediate, as well as distant past, are responsible for the perceptions and political actions of Ghanaian citizens, and that an accentuation of current mutual antagonisms between identity groups, enhances the invocation of the myths of origin to support the present. For example, although there is no historical enmity between Akans and Ewes (Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8), explanations for the current heightened political enmity

between the two groups can also be sought from such seemingly far-fetched reasons as Akans and Ewes having separate anthropological backgrounds. The research therefore traced the anthropological origins of the various ethnonational identity groups and linked them with the current politics. It would appear that a wider, more inclusive Guan ancestry and perception exists for the majority of Ghanaian citizens than any current, exclusive, “latter-day” Guan identity, and that the adoption of the name “Ghana” for the postcolonial state has more to do with the fact that majority of Modern Ghana, with the exception of the Ewes and “Central Togo Minorities”⁵, are traceable to Ancient Ghana. The origination of the “Ghana” hypothesis is explained in section 2.2. The thesis also took up the challenge in explaining the Guan controversy (section 2.4). In addition, the thesis discusses the current politics surrounding the wishes of the CTMs and other groups in the Volta Region of Ghana vis-a-vis their neighbouring Ewes, as well as the latent pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region. The research concludes that the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, as opposed to that of other African countries where inter-ethnic issues have been highly explosive, can be attributed to a number of factors including: the presence of a predominant core *ethnie* (the wider Guan ancestry); the Akan factor; a rationalization of ethnonationalism, as well as; the nod of approval given to the “politics of the belly”.

The thesis also provides commentaries on demonstrations of ethnonationalism and/or tribalism with regard to the ensuing political processes, for example, how the Northern, Fanti and Krobo votes were likely to be influenced by the political context leading to

⁵ Paul Nugent (1997) describes the other groups in the Volta Region apart from the Ewes as “Togo Remnants” or “Central Togo Minorities” - CTMs. For a fuller discussion of this, see sections 2.1 and 2.12 of the thesis, or Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000.

the 2000 elections. It is important to state that the political complexion of the Ga-Adangbe ethnonational group was difficult to decipher.

The research also yielded findings on the relationship between the other main demographic factors and politics, apart from ethnonational identity (or tribe). Although, the research did not set out mainly to investigate the relationship between gender and politics, the findings reveal that compared between the two sexes, there has been a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions, and this not being an effect of the researcher's gender on interviewees. With the remainder of the demographic factors, it would appear that as far as Ghanaian politics is concerned, it is not so much age, occupation, or education which matter as the ethnonational considerations.

Tema was chosen as the city for the fieldwork and the reasons for the choice are outlined in section 3.5. The fieldwork included a survey and an unstructured interview with the Member of Parliament for Tema. An excerpt of this interview is provided in Appendix IX. The questionnaire used for the survey is in Appendix X. The survey data is analysed using SPSS, and all statistical information from the SPSS data editor are in Appendices XI - XXI. The thesis provides justification for the methodological choices made at all stages of the research process. Chapter 4 discusses the fieldwork process, its associated problems and how they were surmounted. The thesis provides a methodological discussion of the practicalities which ensued in the choice of data gathering strategy within the "culture of silence"⁶ which had prevailed in the Ghanaian

⁶ The term "culture of silence" is fully explained in section 4.1.2 of the thesis. Briefly, it denotes a political culture within which freedom of expression is limited.

socio-political context. Despite any difficulties, the aims of the research were not compromised for an inefficient data-gathering strategy. In the relatively inhibiting political culture of Ghana, the originally intended research strategy of a postal survey, or house-to-house questionnaire-based interviews, had to be shelved. However, the use of a laptop and a computerised interview process resulted in overcoming research problems.

The fieldwork conducted from 25 January to 22 February 1999, followed an initial agreement by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana⁷, to supervise it. Subsequently, the letter of introduction from the University of Ghana⁸ served the very good purpose of giving me access to interviewees. The most cooperative of interview sites were the Cocoa Processing Company (CPC) Ltd, where a special notice was put on all bulletin boards at the factory site to ensure maximum awareness of my research exercise, and the Ghana Textiles Printing (GTP) Co. Ltd, where I was given a letter by the management to confirm that I had interviewed their employees⁹. Employers who gave me their complimentary cards have them displayed in Appendix VI(b), including the Management of Tema Oil Refinery who seemed overly politically sensitive and therefore granted me only 2 interviewees, and ALUWORKS, whose management officially refused me interviewing rights on the basis of not wishing to be seen by the ruling government as cooperating with a research construed as rather revealing and provocative. A list of schools and their respective heads in Tema, who

⁷ See letter from Professor Joseph Ayee, Head of Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, to Middlesex University, dated 31 July 1997, in Appendix III.

⁸ See introductory letter, dated 22 January 1999, which I took on all my interview rounds, in Appendix IV.

⁹ See letter from Ms Martha Clerk to Middlesex University, dated 10 February 1999, in Appendix V.

are willing to be publicly documented as having taken part in the fieldwork exercise, is provided in Appendix VI(a).

A glossary of political parties registered for the election is provided in Appendix II. This is aimed at giving the reader an initial feel of the Ghanaian political landscape, and also serves as a key to understanding the political behaviours and themes discussed in the thesis. It will be advantageous for the reader to browse through this glossary before reading chapter 2, and peruse it before chapter 3. There were nine political parties campaigning for the elections, but the main competition was between the ruling National Democratic Congress - NDC and the main Opposition New Patriotic Party – NPP. As of 31st July 1999, all nine parties had registered with the Electoral Commission and had been issued with certificates. The remaining registered political parties include: The People’s National Convention - PNC; The Convention People’s Party – CPP; The National Reform Party – NRP; Democratic People’s Party – DPP; Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere – EGLE – Party; Great Consolidated Popular Party – GCPP, and; The United Ghana Movement – UGM. Full details of each party are given in the glossary.

The thesis was completed before the December 2000 multi-party elections in Ghana. However, as bureaucracy would delay its submission, and more importantly, as results of the 2000 elections and the immediate post-election political drama would strongly support the thesis, a Postscript is provided as a final chapter to substantiate the arguments. Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the Postscript offer an analysis on the results of the elections, and updates on the “politics of the belly” as well as pan-Eweist irredentism within the West African sub-region respectively. All three sections confirm

the thesis, and substantiate the argument that within the contextual and prevalent “politics of the belly”, ethnonationalism, rather than political nationalism, would continue to dominate the substance of Ghanaian politics as evidence of the rationality within the local political reality. Appendix XXII provides a picture of the ethnic arithmetic in the new administration of President Kufour.

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Chapter 1

The Invention Of A Doctrine

1.1 TRIBE AND NATION: THE CHECKLIST

1.1.1 Tribe and ethnic group

Several definitions, descriptions and explanations have been given for the term tribe.

Piddington defines it as:

A group of people speaking a common dialect, inhabiting a common territory and displaying a certain homogeneity in their culture. The tribe is never exogamous; in fact, its members marry fellow-members more often than they marry outsiders. The tribe is not primarily or usually a kinship group, but in certain cases all members of a tribe claim descent from a common ancestor. The tribe is frequently a political unit for purposes of the internal administration of justice and external relations, such as the prosecution of war (Piddington 1950, p. 164).

An analysis of the manifestations and characterisations of the term tends to portray the following fundamental features or attributes: (1) a collective proper name; (2) a myth of common ancestry; (3) shared historical memories; (4) one or more differentiating elements of common culture; (5) an association with a specific ‘homeland’; (6) a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (Smith 1991, p. 21). As a checklist, not every tribe would exhibit all of these attributes at every one time. However, any one of the above could be demonstrated by any tribe or *ethnic unit*, for example, the English.

It is important to state that the synonymous usage of the terms “tribe” and “ethnic group” in the social sciences and humanities have contributed to some of the confusion that occurs when an attempt is being made to explain tribal and ethnic phenomena. It would appear that the identification of “tribe” is first to be located in the aspects of birth, blood relations, endogamy and kinship as the items of most significance, with any allusions to culture being peripheral (Piddington 1950, p. 164). Although through

endogamy common blood results, kinship is not always derived from common blood, but also by law, as for example a spouse being the “next of kin”. Lucy Mair states that, ‘it is not the biological calculation of the proportion of “common blood” – actually genes – that measures nearness of kin; it is the law of any given society’ (Mair 1965, p. 62). On the other hand, the phrase “ethnic group” is defined in terms of social behaviour. Since some people can be ‘socially defined as belonging together by virtue of common descent’ (Francis 1976, p. 6), it would appear that, the term “ethnic group” can suffice in certain respects for “tribe” but not vice versa. Thus, an *ethnic unit* (or ethnic group) is defined as ‘any major collectivity that is socially defined in terms of common descent’ (Ibid). Perhaps this is where due to loose application, the grey areas of synonymity creep in. It must be noted that “common descent” is not only of blood, but merely of any forms of orientation or traceability, for example, religion, occupation or peer group. Francis claims that, ‘ethnicity may be said to be dominant if it is salient in the orientation of social action, especially in determining the personnel of a social unit as well as the rights and obligations of the people involved’ (Ibid). Thus, whereas a tribe is more or less genetically defined, the *ethnic unit* is socially defined. The latter therefore covers aspects of “common descent” which may not necessarily constitute traceable blood relations or kinship, for example the development of a common native culture forged as a result of the residing together of peoples of different kinship, blood backgrounds or common ancestry on the same geographic territory. In this case Smith’s phrase ‘a community of native birth and culture’ –(Smith 1991, p.11) can suffice for an *ethnic unit*, as can also be said for emigrants from a particular country, say “Italians in Australia” (Mair 1965, p. 13).

Francis goes further to describe the formation of secondary ethnic groups. According to him:

Our discussion will furthermore reveal that societal units that are ethnically quite heterogeneous and actually based on territorial, economic, or political principles of social organisation may be reinterpreted and socially defined as if they were based on shared ethnicity. We shall call such units *secondary ethnic units* (Francis 1976, p. 6).

It is easy to deduce therefore, that by way of other competing loyalties in society which could be through class, political party, neighbourhood and peer groups, professional and business groups, or even trade unions and religion, an ethnic group could crystallise or form over and above tribal identity (Hutchinson & Smith eds. 1994, pp. 32 & 98). In all the mixed characteristics however, Pierre Van Den Berghe states that ‘nevertheless, in their ideal-typical form, each kind of group has a clearly distinct basis of solidarity: kinship and interest respectively’ (Ibid, p.98),

1.1.2 Nation

Many authors have also severally defined the term nation. According to Seton-Watson:

A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness . . . no “scientific definition” of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has existed and exists . . . a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole population should feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possess “national consciousness” . . . (Seton-Watson 1977, pp. 1 & 5).

According to Elie Kedourie, ‘ . . . nations by definition, are composed of citizens who are at one with each other, among whom there is neither conqueror nor conquered,

neither ruler nor subject, but are all animated by one general will, willing the good of the nation, which is also that of the individual' (Kedourie 1966, p.120). Also, according to Walker Connor, a ' . . . nation connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related' (Connor 1994, p. xi). The above are reinforced by Naomi Chazan's view which presents the nation as relating to ' . . . the psychocultural phenomenon of a group of people possessing a common symbolic referent and joint aspirations and who desire to give political expression to these identities' (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1). J. V. Stalin, in dealing with the national question, states that 'a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of people which arose on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' (Kammari 1951, pp. 12-3). According to Smith 'the nation is a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict' (Smith 1983, p.175). Hans Kohn, in dealing with the fundamental conditions for the growth of modern nationhood lists the following: national homogeneity as a result of the breakdown of class and gender barriers; internal and external peace and security; growth in economic and political life resulting in the erasure (eradication) of feudal power; the emergence of the middle class – shift in social prestige (Kohn 1940, pp. 69-85); literary activity and research into the national past; a doctrinal or standard text, for example the Bible, poems, etc; the emergence of a recognised national language; citizenship rights and liberty (Kohn 1946, pp. 69-91 & 156). A discussion of nationhood cannot be done without a discussion on the state. The most notable definition of the state is given by Weber as 'a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given

territory' [Camilleri et al (ed.) 1995, p. 22; Pierson 1996, p. 8; Smith 1983, p. 178; Weber 1970a, p. 78]. Naomi Chazan affirms the above by defining the state as 'a legal-territorial concept . . . that set of structures and institutions that seek to maintain effective control over a given population within a specifically defined geographical area' (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1). Smith also affirms both definitions and makes a further distinction when he claims that, the state refers 'exclusively to public institutions, differentiated from, and autonomous of, other social institutions and exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction within a given territory' (Smith 1991, p. 14). It becomes clear that, as has been the obfuscation by common usage, of the distinction between the terms "tribe" and "ethnic group", so have the distinct relationships between "nation" and "state" been confused (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 1). Seton-Watson makes the distinction clearer. According to him:

States can exist without a nation, or with several nations, among their subjects; and a nation can be co-terminus with the population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or be divided between several states. There were states long before there were nations, and there are some nations that are much older than most states which exist today. The belief that every state is a nation, or that all sovereign states are national states has done much to obfuscate human understanding of political realities. A state is a legal and political organisation, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 1).

It seems that some of the attributes of a nation overlap with those of a tribe or *ethnic unit*. However, as a result of many developments over the centuries, coupled with the simultaneous development of an international community, several other in-organic characteristics have assumed in the conditions for nationhood. An analysis of definitions, characterisations and descriptions of the term "nation" tends to portray the following attributes to a nation: (1) A large centralised government; (2) a common territory; (3) a collective proper name; (4) common myths of ancestry or origin or

shared historical myths; (5) a common language; (6) a common economic life and policy; (7) common citizenship rights for all citizens and a common mental make-up (that all citizens belong to the same nation/territory/state); (8) evidence of some sort of ideology or doctrine serving as guidance to leaders of the nationalist movement and leading to the emergence of the nation; (9) evidence of cohesion between the masses (people) and the aristocracy – (no class barriers in politics); (10) a public education system. As like tribe (in Section 1.1.1), this checklist means that any nation would manifest any combination, or all of these attributes.

1.2 AN INVENTED DOCTRINE

Just as there are several authors on the subject, so are there several explanations of nationalism, some essentially doctrinal and others definitional, some tirelessly attempting to explain a phenomenon that seems in their opinion natural to humanity, even if in different forms and manifestations over different epochs, and others trying to explain an unnatural doctrine imposed on humanity. In all this, others also try to explain/expose what the agenda of the doctrine or definition is. In this last respect, and perhaps in the others as well, Elie Kedourie seems to have hit the mark in his description of the whole scenario. According to him:

nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics, which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. Not the least triumph of this doctrine is that such propositions have been accepted and are thought to be self-evident, that the very word nation has been endowed by nationalism with a meaning and a resonance which until the end of the eighteenth century it was far from having. These ideas have become firmly naturalised in the political rhetoric of the West, which has been taken over for the use of the whole world (Kedourie 1966, p. 9).

The problem about: (a) the invention of the Eurocentric doctrine or ideology of nationalism, and: (b) the fixation of the advent of nationalism around the 18th century - with the French Revolution as a key exemplary event (Smith 1991, pp. 43-4; 1995, pp. 29 & 35; Seton-Watson 1977, p. 6; Kohn 1946, pp. 1 & 4), revolves around the formation of three European nations, specifically, England, France and Spain as “examples” or “models” of the processes of nation-formation. Thus the doctrine has derived its ethos from the patterns associated with the political processes by which these “model” nations have so emerged. The emergence of England as a nation

coincided with the emergence of the modern state both of which took place in the period from the 16th to the 18th century (Kohn 1940; Kohn 1946, p. 4). This event, coupled with the experience of France, have each been constituted as a “perfect” example of what has been described as a nation being ‘co-terminus with the population of one state’ (Seton Watson 1977, p.1).

As far as the threshold for the advent of nationalism is concerned, the list of dates usually singled out to signal or typify the 18th century includes: 1789 and 1792 - first and second phases of the French Revolution; 1775 - First Partition of Poland; 1776 - American Declaration of Independence, and; 1807 - Fichte's addresses to the German Nation (Hutchinson and Smith eds. 1994, p. 5). The period spanning the 18th to 20th centuries has been noted generally as one of formation of nations in Western Europe, with their populations not necessarily being co-terminus with their governing states, since in a few multi-national situations, more than one nation have emerged under one state, and in some cases what used to be one nation has eventually emerged under different states, for example the former Yugoslavia. Within this time span, scholars of modernism would dare to propose that all “less fortunate” and aspiring nations were imitating the “success pattern” of the successful “models” who had already “arrived” as nations by the 18th century as a result of a “more fortunate” history of military power and prowess which burgeoned during the 16th and 17th centuries (Smith 1991, p. 59). This “bloc” of a time-span was not uneventful. The role of the state in creating nationhood was phenomenal. Through its managerial role, geographical and jurisdictive powers, the supervision of such activities as taxation, conscription and employment, tended to require and develop a sense of bonding and loyalty from subjects or citizens. Additionally, the emergence of infrastructure that aided the co-

ordination and communication between classes and areas, thus facilitating the extension of citizenship rights, also tended to remove any geographical barriers within a territory. Thus, the view that the processes of nation-formation were baked by the state, acting as the engineer, political incubator and supervisor at the same time, has some credibility since it created ‘the necessary condition and matrix for the gestation of the national loyalties so evident today’ (Ibid). In the case of England, the state was the rulership of the Tudor Monarchs from the 16th century (Kohn 1940, p. 93).

However, Smith argues that the mobilising and penetrative powers of the state could not take the full responsibility for nation-creation and the bonding of citizens, in that, the state was largely a bourgeois organisation, and that ‘the lower classes were not politically incorporated until the end of the 19th century in France and England, and women not until the 1920s’ (Smith 1991, p. 60). Milton and Cromwell (both statesmen and intelligentsia at the same time) spearheaded the Puritan Revolution which rebelled against the Tudor Monarchy and sought the citizenship rights of civil liberty from “Custom and Authority” -(church and state-monarchy) - within the matrix of a Christian doctrine or ideology (Kohn 1940; Seton-Watson 1965, p. 5). In addition, the two colonising countries (England and France) had a much wider global influence, that is, an empire resulting from the incorporation of other peoples. This constitutes some evidence that the state had the ability to allow a fuller local integration of all classes if it so politically willed. Smith therefore argues that, the responsibility for nation-formation is a combination of state design and also two simultaneous evolving processes, which are: first, the capitalist revolution and the subsequent move towards a market economy; and second, a cultural or educational revolution. With the former, trade networks were established between these “model nations” and their colonies,

yielding, mercantile wealth to their bourgeoisie, rich benefits to the state and enabling it to raise larger and better-equipped armies and expert civil service staff. With the latter, the Reformation and its resultant upsurge of Protestant Churches led to the development of secular studies in both the humanities and natural science, alongside with the development of an intelligentsia, who despite their important roles in the universities, were still subordinate to the state. Thus, the administrative, economic and cultural revolutions resulting in a political socialisation through a public mass education and communication system within the period, also contributed their quota in the nation-building or nation-creation processes of the “model” nations. As an ethnicist, Smith furthermore argues that all this developed around a central core of aristocratic ethnies, from which the dissemination and transmutation of ‘myths, memories and symbols embodied in customs, traditions, codes and styles’ were effected (Smith 1991, p. 61).

1.3 THE DEBATE ON NATIONALISM

A debate on the doctrine or ideology of nationalism therefore ensues as the question looms up: were there no nations and nationalism before the French Revolution in the late 18th century? It is essential to spell out that the term “nationalism” stands for two basic things: one as ‘a doctrine about the character, interests, rights and duties of nations’ (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 3), and the other as; ‘an organised political movement, designed to further the alleged aims and interests of nations’ (Ibid) with the purpose of independence and/or national unity. The doctrine or ideology and its practical outworkings (nationalist movements) have been programmed to go together, such that, without the ideology there are no nationalist movements and vice versa. This presupposes the idea that, it was after the 18th century threshold (when the doctrine of nationalism was in place) that events towards nation-creation or nation-building became known as moves towards nationalism, or nationalist movements. Hence, there were no nationalist movements before the 18th century threshold, and furthermore, any attempts by any polity towards nation-building before this threshold were/are not to be considered as constituting nationalism. According to Seton-Watson, ‘once the doctrine had been formulated, it was used as a justification for creating nationalist movements, and then sovereign states to encompass the lands in which it was claimed that nations lived’ (1977, p. 6). Smith argues against this invention of a doctrine by debunking the mutual presupposition hanging between the doctrine and practice of nationalism. He claims that ‘for just as there are many nations without nationalisms, so there are as many nationalisms without nations. The term(s) “nation” and “nationalism” are analytically and empirically distinct. And where nationalism arises without a pre-existent nation, the “nation” for which it strives is only an embryo, a project, a “nation of intent”’ (Smith 1983, p. 175). The perennialists (like Seton-Watson) and

primordialists (like Kedourie) also agree that nations, and therefore nationalism have ever been, from time immemorial, albeit in different forms and variations of self-awareness and activism. They claim that the roots of nations:

stretch back into the medieval era, or even antiquity. There never was an age without its nations and nationalisms, even if the doctrine of self-determination was born in the modern epoch. Every human being feels in 'his or her bones' the enduring power of their nations, the almost timeless quality of the national character. Nations can be found from earliest antiquity, from the beginnings of records in ancient Sumer and Egypt, and they have dominated political life in every era since that time (Smith 1995, p. 35).

The perennialist argument is further supported by Seton-Watson who makes the definitive contribution that:

no "scientific definition" of the nation can be devised: yet the phenomenon has existed and exists . . . a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole population should feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population, which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possess "national consciousness" . . . (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 5).

Following from the above view given by Seton-Watson, another question looms: what exactly is a nation, whether real or of intent? Is it only when both the cultural and political units or boundaries are congruent (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1; Gellner 1983, p. 1)?

What term is given to situations where anti-colonial nationalisms lead to clearly-defined state boundaries. Would "national consciousness" derived from a united anti-colonial nationalism make a newly-carved, multi-national state, a nation-state?

Following from the ethnicist definition of a nation (Smith 1983, pp. 175-6) as reflected in the definitions given by Chazan, Kammari, Kedourie and Seton-Watson (above), it becomes clear, that perhaps most (if not all) African countries which gained independence from the Partition would not qualify to be called nation-states, as this

could only be possible when one adopts the statist definition of a nation where nationalism results into a territorial-political unit, as against a psycho-cultural and unified unit based on alleged descent and common culture (Smith 1983, pp. 175-6). It becomes easy to make the distinction that, where the anti-colonial nationalism was pursued by a people of alleged common descent and culture - in which case the nationalist movement was a cultural movement (Ibid), and at the same time the territory of independence from colonialism is inhabited strictly and solely by the said people, the country is a nation-state from the time it gained independence. With the fast-racing globalising trends of economics, government and multi-cultural melting pots, as well as the growing prominence of the term “globalisation” in academic literature - especially in the 1990s (Giddens 1998, p. 28), another questions looms into the frame: ‘is the nation-state becoming a fiction . . . and government obsolete?’ (Ibid, p. 31). Proponents of the dramatic effects of globalisation on the nation-state like Anthony Giddens, argue that globalisation deducts from some of the nation-states’ powers, particularly those which underlie Keynesian economic management, and also enhances the potential for regenerating local identities (Ibid, pp. 31-3). However, opponents of this view argue that despite the over-arching, supra-nationalist potential of globalisation, the nation-state identity would remain and become even more sharpened within the matrix of the increasing competition through inter-nation-alism.

1.3.1 Modernism

Contrary to the perennialist view is that of the “modernists” - a ‘modern generation of scholars’ (Smith 1991, p. 44), who claim that the occurrence of nationalism begins from the 18th century, and is contingent on the evidence of a nation-formation process similar to the “model” nation-formation processes of France, England, Spain, etc., and lining up with the elements of a definition of nationalism, which is, ‘ . . . an ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential “nation” like others’ (Smith 1983, p. 171). Although the modernists disagree on the timing of this “threshold” [some preferring the 18th century, and others preferring a 19th & earlier 20th century periods, with adherents to the latter periodisation basing their argument on the fact that this period witnessed both the “nationalisation of the masses” or their inclusion into the running of the state machinery, and the enfranchising of women (Smith 1991, p. 44)], their argument dwells within the “contingency” that ‘the conditions that brought the nation into being were absent in antiquity and the middle ages, and the differences between pre-modern and modern collective cultural identities are too great to be subsumed under a single concept of the nation. As “aptly” described by Smith, ‘mass “citizen-nations” can only emerge in the era of industrialism and democracy’ (Ibid), that is, ‘nations and nationalism are treated as products of the specifically modern conditions of capitalism, industrialism, bureaucracy, mass communications and secularism’ (Smith 1995, pp. 29 & 35). In addition to the fact that the modernist concept of a nation is itself subject to criticism, can one actually say that there was no democracy anywhere in the world in the pre-18th century period, or that there is democracy after it? It is more or less, as quite rightly described by Smith, an imposition of a ‘Western concept of a nation onto quite

different areas and periods' (Smith 1991, p. 44). But although Smith further adds that even a multi-dimensional concept of a nation would still not suffice for the wide cultural differences between areas and historical epochs, it is evident that as an ethnicist, a bias cannot be hidden, in that, he terms a strong example such as that of Ancient Egypt as a mere ethnic state and not a nation. He claims inter-alia, that Egypt had a national identity (and consequently national consciousness) yet Egyptians did not feel that they were citizens of Egypt, neither was there anything that constituted nationalism because there were class divisions in all sectors of society (politics, religion, economy, education, legal rights, etc.), and that a public culture of equal opportunities was not inculcated into the middle and lower classes (Ibid, pp. 45-6). This argument can be criticised in two ways: doctrinally and historically. First, according to Seton-Watson:

the formation of national consciousness does not necessarily lead to nationalism. A nation which has become conscious of itself, whose members are united within the same country, independent of foreign rule, does not need to be nationalist, to formulate nationalist doctrines or create nationalist movements. The English and the Spaniards are cases in point. But although you can have a nation without nationalism, you cannot have nationalism without national consciousness (Seton-Watson 1965, p. 4).

What remains to be tackled is the historical point, that is, the fact that the gap between the aristocracy and the masses, whether it be social or political, may not have been bridged yet. Most probably, that gap is not bridgeable. It all depends on whether the social boundaries constituted political boundaries. But additionally, using modern Britain as an example, one can see that despite a mass public culture and modern technological trends in mass communication and co-ordination both media-wise and geographically, and thereby linking up the polity as it were, there are still class

differences in the UK and a wide gap between the aristocracy and the people. There is the royal family, which owns large royal private property, with the Queen as President of the polity (to whom the Prime Minister of the public must submit his or her manifesto), and with several other royal sub-titles and offices e.g.; dukes, earls, barons, etc. spread over the country. Prospective heirs of the realm must not break their marriage vows or else cease to be head of the Church of England. Public recognitions such as MBE, OBE, QC, etc. are awarded only by the Queen. Attitudes of British citizenry to the royalty are periodically unstable, ranging from positive to negative. The royalty (just like of old) is absolutely devolved from both the lower and middle classes. Would this scenario of class division not constitute attributes of non-national identity as attributed to Egypt? Furthermore, Scottish and Welsh citizens of the polity have opted for devolution from the British Parliament. There is no such absolute thing as tribal or national homogeneity in Britain. It can be argued that Britain is ethnically heterogeneous, comprising of English, Scots, Welsh and Irish. Furthermore, isolating any one of them, for example England, from the British equation, would not equate the serious class divisions in each of the identity groups, for example the English. In terms of education, children of the nobility still attend special schools like Eton. Also, there is no longer free university education in England, thus making upward mobility and integration more difficult for the lower classes in their already-existing predicament of diminishing returns in socio-economic status. Furthermore, big business and the highest paid jobs are also run by the nobility and established families. In the “public” civil service, the highest jobs are reserved for the highly educated, with the ruling political party and its Ministers setting the political agenda. The state machinery has neither been “nationalised” to the level of the masses, nor to the universal and proportional inclusion of women, who are still occupationally dis-enfranchised in

English society. The lower classes are not easily integrating. There are still affluent sections of society by geographical demarcations - some geographical areas are visibly rich, and some poor. State religion (the Church of England) is highly organised with the Head of the Royal Family as its head (unless disqualified by marrying a non-royal). The legal system does not speak equal opportunity since legal aid is restrictive to some cases, and not others. Thus, one cannot say that a universal set of equal rights and opportunities exist for all citizens in England or Britain. This is a similar transposition of Ancient Egypt, despite differences in culture and epochs. Essentially, the very criteria which has been used in disqualifying Ancient Egypt from being a nation, ie; the failure of the state breaking 'free from its aristocratic and priestly bases unlike the French and British states' (Smith 1991, p. 46), ought to be the plumbline in current analysis. Going by the contingencies and criteria of the modernist scholars, the scenario of modern Britain, (or England in isolation) is still lacking, and therefore, neither polity should constitute a nation, two centuries after the French Revolution "threshold". It is evident that 'the chief actors (are) king [or queen], ministers and bureaucrats, with the middle classes appearing later, and the aristocrats and clergy often ambivalent' (Ibid, p. 68). The aristocrats and clergy have not been marginalized, their heritage and culture have, even in principle, not become everyone's, in the post-modern England or Britain they have not been by-passed, to counter Smith (Ibid).

1.3.2 The antithesis of modernists

It would appear that the modernist position is only a fashionable viewpoint around which modernist intellectuals romanticise, as the literature would reveal that some of the modernists do not actually believe what they say, for example, Anthony Giddens. A close examination of his writings betrays this antithesis. As a modernist, Giddens states that 'nationalism, like the nation-state, is a phenomenon generated originally from within Europe, and I think it is right to stress that it would not have emerged without the bourgeois idea of popular sovereignty that ushered in the modern phase of European liberalism' (Giddens 1987, p. 177). Somewhere else, Giddens posits an antithetical view which strongly lends support to primordialism and perennialism. Giddens states that '... nationalist sentiments relate to a myth of origins supplying a psychological focus for the unity of the political community; but any interpretation of origins that has concrete reference to the past is likely to stimulate as much tension as harmony, because of the diversity of cultural differences characteristically involved' (Giddens 1985, p. 273). Myths of origin, as a psychological element for uniting any people, constitutes one of the major cornerstones of the argument against the modernist position. Giddens' acceptance of the validity and potential of myths of origin as a driving force of nationalism, defeats his position as a modernist, in that, myths of origin are a phenomenon which relates from antiquity.

1.3.3 Primordialism and perennialism

Smith elaborates on the view that primordialism seems to be a more plausible explanation of nationalism. Primordialism in its extreme form holds that tribal identities exist just as speech, sight and smell, and that humanity, by nature, belongs to fixed tribal communities just as families. This organic version further connotes the view that nations have “natural frontiers”, ‘a specific origin and place in nature . . . a peculiar character, mission and destiny’ (Smith 1995, p. 31-2). This view, which equates nations and *ethnies* as being synonymous and part of the natural order of the processes of nationalism, is reminiscent of ‘a naturalistic attribute of humanity’ (Ibid), and synonymous with Gellner’s theory of the co-terminus existence of nation and state boundaries, an ideal which any attempt towards its attainment constitutes an expression of nationalism (Gellner 1983, p. 1). Inherent in primordialism, of course, is the concept of ‘ethnic origins of nations’, which is based on the position that modern nations have ethnic foundations or roots, usually a combination of predominant, pre-existing, core *ethnie* and other minor ethnic groups (Smith 1986a, pp. 13-8). Another view of primordialism – the historical evolution of tribal communities, despite its depiction of the geographical and political displacement of some of these communities, at least also supports their organicity. The socio-biologist version of primordialism as postulated by Badcock (Smith 1995, p. 32), additionally portrays ethnicity as being enhanced by genetic evolution, nepotism, kin-grouping, etc. However, this view seems to be mechanistic, in that it fails to explain broader, non-biological manifestations of cultural similarity and assimilation, and even biological assimilation. It is important to highlight the difference between primordialism and perennialism at this juncture. The former (in all of its forms), although lays emphasis on the avoidance of time specificity on any manifestations of nationalism, has its emphasis embedded in nature, that is to say, that

forms of primordialism constitute the “‘givens’ of human existence’ (Smith 1991, p. 20). Thus “organic” ethnicity (Ibid; Ibid 1995, pp. 31-2), has a strong place in primordialism. Perennialism on the other hand, also avoids any time specificity in categorising nationalisms and agrees to the inception of nationalism from antiquity, but does not emphasise the organicity or naturalisation of events. This connotes the view that there can be some instrumentalism in perennialism, and implies that not all forms of pre-“modern” nationalisms were organically or ethnonationalistically-inspired, that is, organised by an organic tribal or national identity group. The French Revolution, was basically economically-inspired although it was staged by a largely homogeneous national group. Situational ethnicities therefore have a place in perennialism since they cannot be consigned only to the period after the modernist threshold.

1.3.4 Instrumentalism

Definitely, the most potent argument against primordialism is instrumentalism (and especially the manifestations of “situational ethnicity”). The instrumentalist approach:

is one that regards human beings as having always lived and worked in a wide range of groups. As a result, people have a variety of collective identities, from the family and gender to class, religious and ethnic affiliations. Human beings are continually moving in and out of these collective identities. They choose, and construct, their identities according to the situations in which they find themselves. Hence, for instrumentalists, identity tends to be “situational” rather than pervasive, and must be analysed as a property of individuals rather than of collectivities (Smith 1995, p. 30).

The instrumentalist argument therefore holds the view that, ethnic identities are neither static nor fixed, and that owing to several factors, which could be socio-marital, political, economic, religious, and supported by contexts such as trade, urbanisation and employment or even conquest, human beings tend to assume a variety of collective

identities which are “situational” rather than pervasive. [Note that this is not the same as the historical evolution of core or organic tribes]. Such collective, non-tribal identities are sometimes termed as secondary ethnicities, as due to their “non-primary” nature and with regard to their inorganic, non-tribal reasons for formation. They seem to assume and occur over and above the primary organic identity of people, that is, the tribal identity. As echoed by Morrison, ‘dynamics and ecology operate such that ethnicity is always changing albeit around a base’ and that ‘ethnicity is the result of the complex series of changes in contemporary life which affect individuals on a daily basis. Several identities or a mix of identities can be seen among members of an assumed homogenous group’ (Morrison 1982, p. 90). Therefore, some kind of secondary ethnicity can be manifested, as tribal identity is influenced by several factors such as urbanisation, education, socio-economic status, ideology or religion, etc. As already demonstrated, the phrase “secondary ethnicity” or the term “secondary” has not been devised by mere inference. E. K. Francis, one of the sources of its academic usage, claims that ‘primary ethnic groups were transformed into secondary ethnic groups because of endogenous changes, such as modernisation, shifts in the balance of political power, transculturation, or loss of leadership’ (Francis 1976, p. 209). He further concludes that ‘economic factors are of paramount importance in secondary ethnic-group formation, whilst in primary ethnic group formation political factors take precedence’ (Ibid, p. 210).

However, these pseudo, quasi, ephemeral and secondary ethnic identities, and their supporting instrumentalist theories seem to overlook the feelings and sentiments that are associated with tribal roots, and the organicity of naturalistic groupings. They fail to explain an aspect of situational ethnicity, itself based on the organic sentiments of

primary tribal groups, which could be of irrational and explosive potential even in a modernising and increasingly interdependent world, where people sacrifice their lives for their tribal or national fatherland or motherland (Smith 1995, p. 39), in civil or military wars, or even in suicide bombings. This explosive and sensitive aspect of situational ethnicity can also be found in ‘the variety of ways in which ethnic members respond in a larger community to policies or actions, which have a bearing on the ethnic members’ (Morrison 1982, p. 139). For example, the foundation of the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM), which emerged from the Ashanti Region of Ghana, results from the fact that the colonial government of the Gold Coast had refused to respond positively to demands for an increase in the producer price of cocoa beans. Owing to the fact that most of the cash crop was being produced from the Ashanti Region, and those proceeds contributed largely towards the national exchequer, the Ashantis saw themselves as financing the rest of the country on their cheap labour and toil. A simple economic demand for more money had been tribalistically-inspired, and had actually led to the formation of what is currently the strongest political party in Ghana - the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – a more or less Ashanti-led and –dominated party (see section 2.11 and the Glossary of political parties in Appendix II). As duly summarised by Morrison, ‘whenever a group perceives discrimination, whether or not based on ethnic phenomena, the group will reassert its ethnic base and thwart national integration’ (Ibid, p. 186). Thus, it is clear that an aspect of instrumentalism, i.e., “situational” ethnicity, is not always inorganic. This supports Smith’s view, that the instrumentalist argument/approach (or instrumentalism) ‘fails to explain why people should choose ethnicity or nationalism as their vehicle of advancement rather than class or religion’ (Smith 1995, p. 39). Instrumentalism seems to concentrate on the dynamics of the elite or the intelligentsia’s manipulation of the masses instead of the very

dynamics of mass mobilisations. It seems to be more of a tree-top method of analysis as against grass-root (Ibid, p. 40). It also seems to take attention away from the popular power of nationalism – (the tribal base) - in order to ascribe it to superficial and superimposing influences. Essentially, it is the people that make a nation. Leadership and any extraneous conditions of context only shape the politics. Thus, Smith refers to the modernist doctrine of nationalism, and also instrumentalism, as the ‘myth of the modern nation’ (Ibid). It would appear therefore, that despite the role of elite leadership in “nationalist” movements, their instrumentalist agenda does not seem to be that well-meaning or sincere enough with regard to actual nation-formation, although their agenda would at least lead towards state-formation. In this case it would also appear that the motives of elite leadership may seem not to be “doctrinally” pure, - (that is, in terms of the 18th century doctrine of nationalism), and that their actions may not always match up with the doctrine of nationalism.

Smith highlights this in an explanation of the doctrine that:

nationalism holds that power emanates from only a “people” who form a seamless whole, an indivisible brotherhood which abolishes all existing ties, whether of family, neighbourhood or occupation. The only genuine identity is a national one, and every man, be peasant or worker, merchant or intellectual, can only rediscover self and freedom through that new collective identity. By sloughing off lethargy, passivity, ignorance, routine, tradition, and the burdens of rural backwardness, and by joining the nationalist movement, subjects become free citizens, and social divisions will be swept away through the unity created by a common struggle and purpose (Smith ed. 1976, p. 7).

Elie Kedourie also reiterates the seemingly usurping role of elites and intelligentsia. He states that:

. . . nations by definition, are composed of citizens who are at one with each other, among whom there is neither conqueror nor conquered, neither ruler nor subject, but are all animated by one general will, willing the good of the nation, which is also that of the individual. Historic boundaries present yet other difficulties, for they may not have been the same at different periods in history . . . (Kedourie 1966, p. 120).

These last two statements by Kedourie and Smith corroborates one of the main items on the checklist for nationhood, that is, that there must be some cohesion between the masses and the aristocracy, and that the state needs to break free from its aristocratic and priestly bases just as happened with the French Revolution (Smith 1991, p. 46).

1.3.5 More pre-“threshold” flaws of the modernist argument

The modernist argument is still flawed, in that, as echoed by Seton-Watson (1977, p. 5) there were several nations in existence before the modernist threshold, for example, the Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana (Beecham 1968; Giddens 1985; Hayford 1903; Meyerowitz 1952 & 1958; Wilks 1971). Therefore another main issue that needs to be dealt with is the argument of lack of “evidence” - (or processes of nation-formation similar to the English and French examples) - within certain polities of the world. This “evidence” is more explained by Smith when he states that ‘ideas and doctrines such as the cultural determination of politics, auto-emancipation, the primacy of the nation and popular sovereignty, had to wait until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for more than fleeting expression as did their translation into nationalist activities and movements’ (Smith 1991, p. 51). Smith further states that in most colonies ‘both cultural and political identities were lacking. Any identity or solidarity that a colonial population

possessed was initially the product of the incorporation and changes brought by the colonial power' (Ibid, p. 106). But it is important to note that nation-building and nationalism around the world goes much further beyond the modernist threshold and European examples. The Ashanti in Ghana were known to have been in existence as a powerful nation-state long before 1699 when trouble began to brew between them and the Dutch over the procurement of slaves (Yarak 1990, p. 96), obviously over a century before the 18th century threshold. Smith's criteria of "evidence" had already manifested in several places before the threshold. In addition, some of the pre-requisites stated in the doctrine of nationalism, for example a public education system, do not constitute a necessary precondition for the occurrence of nationalism. In certain societies the public education system was embedded in their social system of livelihood and not as bureaucratically organised as the Western European examples Smith would like to refer to. If a mass public education system and institutions of higher learning are to constitute a criteria for the occurrence of nationalism, then politics in Timbuktu, a city known to have founded some of the world's first universities and finest academic centres, should be classified as highly nationalistic. It is also interesting to note that Smith's definition of a nation is devoid of one of the crucial determining factors of nationhood, that is, language (Ibid, p. 14). Other definitions, (for example that given by Stalin when he dealt with the National Question in his document at the end of 1949), says that 'a nation must have four characteristics: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life and a common-mental make-up. No group which did not possess all four was entitled to be considered a nation' (Seton-Watson 1977, p. 4). In the case of England, language played a major role in the formation of national consciousness and nation-creation over the centuries. In 1362, the English Parliament replaced the French language with English on the basis that the former was partially

incomprehensible to the people of the land (Kohn 1940, p. 69). The English language had itself only emerged in the 14th century as a fusion of Saxon and French (Seton-Watson 1965, p. 5). Therefore, it would appear that Smith's definition is inadequate.

1.3.6 Evidence of "ideology" of leadership

Smith also concedes for the perennialist argument by saying that 'it is true that nationalism, the ideology and the movement, is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating from the late eighteenth century, but it is also possible to trace the growth of national sentiments which transcend ethnic ties back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, if not earlier, in several states of Western Europe' (Smith 1995, p. 38). Having jumped another major hurdle, it is clear that, national sentiments are perennial (at least if not always primordial), but the ideology is what scholars postulate as modernist. A huge question then looms: was there no "doctrine" or "ideology" of nationalism in existence before the 16th/18th century threshold?. The following statement made by Smith seems to highlight the necessity for this question. He claims that:

modern nations are legitimated through a universally applicable ideology, nationalism. As an ideology, nationalism holds that the world is divided into nations, each of which has its own character and destiny; that an individual's first loyalty is to his or her nation; that the nation is the source of all political power; that to be free and fulfilled, the individual must belong to a nation; that each nation must express its authentic nature by being autonomous; and that a world of peace and justice can only be built on autonomous nations. This 'core doctrine' of nationalist ideology emerged only in the eighteenth century, first in Europe and then elsewhere, although some of its components were foreshadowed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was unknown before 1500 in Europe or elsewhere, and therefore anything resembling the modern mass nation (underpinned by nationalism) was likely to be fortuitous as well as rare. Modern nations implicitly subscribe to this nationalist ideology, and frequently evoke elements of it to underpin various claims and practices (Ibid, p. 55).

Hans Kohn, in listing the fundamental conditions for the growth of modern nationhood, highlights among other things, the evidence that the nationalist leaders had some sort of “ideology” or “doctrine” that they followed as a guideline in the processes of nationalism leading to the emergence of the polity as a nation. He said that the doctrinal text could be some standard doctrine or some sort of laid down principles recognised by the society or the leadership. Citing the Bible and poems as examples of such standard “ideology” or “doctrine”, he claims that the nationalist movement which led to the emergence of England as a nation took shape in the Puritan Revolution led by Milton the poet and Cromwell the statesman and priest. He therefore claims that the English used the Old Testament as the guiding principle/document/doctrine/ideology in pursuing liberty of citizens from the State and the Church (Kohn 1940, pp. 79-94; Smith ed. 1976, p. 3). Although the premise for this development (England being God’s chosen nation) is highly debatable, the birth of English nationalism in a religious matrix in the 16th century, nevertheless led to the development and adoption of a biblically-based doctrine in the 17th century, and which subsequently led to the emergence of England as a nation in the 18th century. The birth and preparation in the 16th century was done under the Tudor Monarchs, and as a progression, this bore fruit in the 17th century with the emergence of the new classes, as a result of the “non-exclusive” opportunities in the expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth in the pursuit of capitalism. This seems to explain why Kohn adopts the modernist view that ‘nationalism is unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century’ (Kohn 1946, p. 4). What Kohn seems to have blatantly ignored is the fact that in centuries past, in antiquity, the Bible has been used by several peoples as a standard doctrine of guidance, the most glaring example being the Biblical Jews. As already stated, the Zealots of the 1st century AD in

Judea sought for an independent Jewish nation devoid of Roman domination but with a Jewish political Messiah as the ruler of Jews (Smith 1991, p. 49). It must also be said that not all religions are based in a Biblical matrix, and since all religions seem to have a set doctrine, it would appear that every society that experienced nationalism and were religious at the same time, had an ideology, so long as the nationalist leadership sought guidance from within the religious matrix of the said society. This fact is supported by Beecham, who made this very important observation about tribes in the Gold Coast or Modern Ghana, that 'among the causes which contribute to the formation of national character, a principal place is to be assigned to religion. Religion is indeed the mould of character, and never fails to give a peculiar expression to those distinguishing features of a people, which other causes may have originated . . . ' (Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1). Two very significant examples in Ghana can be cited. First, the Fanti in Ghana are known to have had an ideology strictly adhered to by their leaders in their nation-building, military and other nationalistic efforts. This ideology was based in their religion. According to Casely Hayford, the Fantis had a destiny which they consciously worked towards its attainment (Hayford 1903, p.80), and Beecham reiterates how religious guidelines were appropriated for military purposes, in that, 'the measures prescribed to ensure success in war afford a striking proof of the direful influence exerted by the national superstitions . . . ' (Beecham 1968, p. 206). The emergence of the Fanti as a nation took place sometime before the 17th century, and their religious matrix dates as far back as the 13th century, long before the 18th century modernist threshold of the doctrine of nationalism (Meyerowitz 1952). Likewise, the Ashanti religious doctrine dates as far back as the same period with the Fantis (since both nations are of common ancestry), but the Ashanti emerged as a nation in 1701 (Ibid). According to Beecham, throughout the history of the Ashanti, there was a closely and

conscientiously followed agenda to pursue and fulfil 'national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote antiquity' (Beecham 1968, p. 91). It is therefore clear that there were ideologies and doctrines (not all of which had a religious basis) in existence long before 1500 as stated in Smith (1995, p. 55). This therefore locates another major flaw in the modernist school of nationalism which postulates that nationalism (whether as a doctrine or occurrence) began with either the 16th or 18th century.

1.4 PRE-“THRESHOLD” MODEL NATIONS

It would be an important exercise to cross-check with the checklists at the beginning of this chapter, whether certain pre-18th century nationalisms actually led to nation-formation, and whether there were nations before the 18th century threshold. The Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana will be used in this case.

1.4.1 The Fanti nation

As an introduction, it is important to state that Anthony Giddens recognises the nationalistic endeavours of the Fanti in creating their own state without European influence (Giddens 1985, p. 273). However, Giddens fails to indicate: (a) that this occurred before the eighteenth century modernist threshold, and; (b) that the Fanti assumed nationhood before the threshold, as the following narrative would reveal. A close examination of the Fanti and Ashanti of Ghana in the light of the already discussed checklists for tribe and nation, would reveal that, not only were they nations before the eighteenth century, but also experienced nationalisms before this threshold.

The Fanti have undergone much evolution over the years. The current Fanti nation in modern Ghana, include some Eguafu, Djomo, Efutu, Djabi, Etsi, Agona and the original Fanti. They all have a common ancestry and belong to the Fanti sub-linguistic grouping of the Akan identity. The Central Region of Ghana is geographically a stand-alone Fanti territory although there are a number of *en bloc* Fanti residential enclaves in the bordering Western Region. A fuller discussion of the origins of the Fanti is done in section 2.7 of the thesis. However, a brief anthropological history of the Fanti reveals that the original Fanti are a group of Guan originating from the Djomo ruling class in

Timbuktu who moved southwards to join the Bono and eventually settled with them as sanctioned during the reigns of King Asaman -1295 to 1325 and King Ekumfi Ameyaw I -1328 to 1363 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 81; 1958, p. 8). The Bono, who formed the first Akan state in modern Ghana, originate from the 'Great White Desert' or Sahara. Their capital, Bono-Mansu was founded in 1295 and destroyed by the Ashanti in 1742 (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 29-33). The geographical site of the Bono state was located in current Northern Ghana, however, in the early years of its founding, the Eguafu, Afutu and some of the original Fanti deserted King Asaman in 1300 and moved southwards towards the coast. This resulted in the founding of the Efutu state by the Eguafu and Efutu in the fourteenth century under the leadership of the two brothers Bonde and Gyan. Kwaman was also founded around the shore-located Saltpond by the Fanti (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77 & 130). Kwaman became the capital of the Abuka Fanti state. A split from the Efutu led by Edwe and Etumpan resulted in the founding of Ogua (Cape Coast), which has become the overall capital city of the Fanti nation and the Central Region of Modern Ghana. Some citizens from Ogua left to found Dwemma near Mumford on the coast, and finally the Tumpa or Simpa state, which is now called Winneba (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-5). Ephirim-Donkor argues that Bonde and Gyan were not brothers, and also that Edwe and Etumpan were one and the same person (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 23-4). However these arguments neither discount traceability of the Fanti from Guan ancestry nor that of the Efutu to current Winneba. Some time at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Adminadze Fanti and some Djomo from Bono territory moved southwards to join the Etsi Fanti, resulting in the founding of the Mankessim state. Thus, the merging of the aforementioned constituent states and cities resulted in the emergence of the overall Fanti nation by the beginning of the seventeenth century, although the exact date is not fixed. Subsequent migrations

added to their number. For example, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Djomo and some of the original Fanti who had previously settled with the Bono, moved southwards to join their relatives who had made the first move in 1300. Some Djomos and Fantis also delayed their move until 1740 (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 81-2).

Much later, in 1870-1, an amended Fanti National Constitution was to become the Fanti nation's response to the political situation arising from the policies of the British colonialists who had come to settle. The amendments, which were made to protect the political and territorial interests of the Fanti nation in the colonial era, occurred several decades after the emergence of the Fanti states into nationhood. Prior to the amended constitution, the Fanti nation lived together in divisions of several states within the same territory, each with a chief and capital. Together, all these states were governed by a Paramountcy. The King or Paramount Chief had jurisdiction over all the Fanti states within the federated Fanti territory. The amendments to the existing constitution changed the polity into a Fanti Confederation of States or Fanti Confederacy, thus dealing with certain political, economic and social provisions which the Fanti bargained for under the new colonial arrangements (Hayford 1903, pp. 327-44). Prior to, and after the emergence of the Ashanti nation in 1701, the Fantis traded with the Ashanti, other neighbouring political entities, and the Europeans on the coast, and controlled most of the trade between the Europeans and the interior. Trade items included gold, ivory, gun powder, clothing, alcohol, salt and pepper. Citizens of the Fanti nation felt that they belonged. In addition to a common language, the same citizenship rights and customs were shared by all the Fanti states. Subsequent migrations of the remainder of the Fanti tribes from Northern Ghana to the coast during the seventeenth century further increased the sense of history of the Fanti folk and

enriched their myths of ancestry and origin. There was some sort of cohesion between the masses and aristocracy. Apart from kingship dynasties, public office was not restricted to any particular class. The Gold Coast “Emancipation Ordinance” of 1874 (which reflected the rights of the aborigines before colonialism) states that anyone who could trace their ancestry to the Fanti nation was:

eligible for any important office in the body politic, and he can always hold up his head among his fellows, however poor his condition. So dearly does the freeman prize his condition that, if by an act of folly on your part you call him a slave, he will bring you before a native tribunal, prove that he is a slave, and get you mulcted in heavy damages. The freemen formed the bulk of the people (Hayford 1903, p. 82).

The public education system was embedded in their social system of livelihood and not bureaucratically organised. This is explained by the intermittent migrations and constant warfare, which did not give room for long-term establishment of educational institutions. Timbuktu, their base of origin is well known for elaborate and formally organised educational systems as well as the home for some of the world’s most famous university systems prior to the Islamic onslaught which caused the Fanti to migrate.

The torchbearers of Fanti nationalism followed an ideology embedded in their religious system in which was enshrined the vision and destiny of the Fanti nation, guidelines for military action and the constitution (Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1; Hayford 1903, pp. 327-44). Hans Kohn, in listing the fundamental conditions for modern nationhood, highlights among other things, the evidence that the nationalist leaders had some sort of ideology or doctrine which they followed as a guideline in the processes of nationalism leading to the emergence of a people as a nation. Kohn claims the doctrinal text could

constitute standard doctrine or laid down principles of the society or its leadership. Citing the Bible and poems as examples of such standard doctrine, he explains that the nationalist movement which led to the emergence of England as a nation took shape in the Puritan Revolution led by Milton the poet and Cromwell the statesman and priest. Consequently, the English used the Old Testament as the doctrinal basis in pursuing the liberty of citizens from State and Church (Kohn 1940, pp. 79-94; Smith ed. 1976, p. 3). Although the premise for this development (England as God's chosen nation) is highly debatable, the birth of English nationalism in a religious matrix in the sixteenth century nevertheless led to the development and adoption of a biblically-based doctrine in the seventeenth century which subsequently led to the emergence of England as a nation in the eighteenth century. The birth or preparation in the sixteenth century which occurred under the Tudor Monarchs, progressed and bore fruit in the seventeenth century with the emergence of the new classes as a result of the non-exclusive opportunities in the expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth in the pursuit of capitalism. Not all religions are based in a biblical matrix, and since all religions have a set doctrine, it would appear that every society which experienced nationalism and was religious at the same time, had an ideology so long as the nationalist leadership sought guidance from their religious doctrine. This view is supported by Beecham who made a similar observation about certain polities in Ghana (especially the Fanti and Ashanti) that 'among the causes, which contribute to the formation of national character, a principal place is to be assigned to religion. Religion is indeed the mould of character and never fails to give a peculiar expression to those distinguishing features of a people, which other causes may have originated' (Beecham 1968, pp. 170-1). According to Casely Hayford, the Fantis had a destiny which they consciously worked towards attaining (Hayford 1903, p. 80). Beecham further reiterates how religious guidelines were

appropriated for military purposes, in that ‘the measures prescribed to ensure success in war afford a striking proof of the direful influence exerted by the national superstitions’ (Beecham 1968, p. 206). The emergence of the Fanti nation took place at the beginning of the seventeenth century and their religious matrix dates as far back as the thirteenth century (Meyerowitz 1952), long before the eighteenth century modernist threshold of the doctrine of nationalism. This confirms Smith’s view that there were ideologies and doctrines of nationalism in existence long before 1500 (Smith 1995, p. 55). As itemised therefore, the Fanti had satisfied the checklist for nationhood before the modernist threshold – before the goal posts were set.

1.4.2 The Ashanti nation

When the inhabitants of the area around the Niger Bend, roughly between Djenne and Timbuktu were routed and forced out by Islamized Saharan Berbers at the beginning of the eleventh century¹⁰ some of the refugees of the Dia (Dja), Libyan Berber and Gara tribes who fled from the Niger region managed to colonise aboriginals to the north-west and west of modern Ghana (the area in current La Cote d’Ivoire) and founded states including the Bona and Kimbu Kingdoms. After suffering defeat, these kingdoms

¹⁰ Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion give the zenith period of Ancient Ghana as the eleventh century, the same century in which it was over-run by Islamic invaders. Although the Islamic campaigns begin with the eleventh century (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17), it was not until ‘the middle of the eleventh century’, and precisely 1076, that the final conquest by the Arabic Almoravids occurred (Levtzion 1971, p. 127). The mid-eleventh century is also seen as the zenith and crucial period of Islamic campaign in the Western Sudan. Levtzion explains that Ghana of the mid-eleventh century ‘offered the example of resistance to Islam’ (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion claim to have obtained their information from the same source – the Sudanese Tarikhs or Tarikh-es-Sudan (Levtzion 1971, p. 122; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). Also, al Sa’di (one of Levtzion’s Islamic oral sources) was a native of Timbuktu (Levtzion 1971, p. 140). Levtzion maintains that a king of Ghana resisted Islamic conversion and stuck to his ancestral religion (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Meyerowitz also submits that a large number of the people of Ghana (including some of the kings) migrated southwards in order to avoid compulsory Islamic ‘conversion’ (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51).

subsequently moved further south into the tropical rain forest of modern Ghana resulting in the founding of the Akyerekere and Twifo-Heman kingdoms in AD 1500, the Akwamu kingdom around 1575 and Dormaa around 1600. Refugees from the Bona kingdom moved eastwards and northwards and settled in the Bono Kingdom, and their descendants subsequently founded the Ashanti kingdom in 1701 in the heart of the tropical forest. The *akyeneboa* or totem animal of the Ayoko clan of Dia descent was, and still remains the falcon (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 106; 1958, pp. 19-20). The kingdom became a large confederation of states as a result of conquests and annexations. For example, Kokofu, Nsuta, Juabin and Aduman states, which later became part of the Ashanti confederacy, were founded before 1600. Later on, Mampong, Adansi and Bekwai also became part of the confederacy. Ivor Wilks confirms the Meyerowitz account of the emergence of Ashanti as a nation in 1701, the date by which a number of tribes including the Denkyira had been conquered and their allegiance automatically transferred to King Osei Tutu (Wilks 1971, p. 370). Wilks maintains that by 1680, the national identity of the Ashanti kingdom had emerged (Wilks 1971, p. 373) however, given that there existed surrounding tribes who were competing with Ashanti for supremacy in the area, and especially that the war between Ashanti and Adansi in 1680 ended in a stalemate (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 109), it is understandable why the emergence of the Ashanti as a nation is fixed not at 1680, but at 1701, the year of overall conquest and subjugation of all surrounding enemy tribes by the Ashanti. The battle of Feyiase in 1701 in which the Denkyira were defeated is noted in history as the deciding factor. In addition to the conquest of the last opponent, this made way for the Ashanti to have access to the Gold Coast. Even the Dutch settlers sent an ambassador to King Osei Tutu of Ashanti in 1701 from their headquarters in coastal Elmina (Wilks 1971, p. 373).

Unlike the Fanti, the Ashanti nation had a much larger empire and territory as a result of the many successful conquests, and rightly so, a larger centralised government. Beecham claims that it was a kingdom of power, majesty and large geographical extent. Regarding the greatness of the Ashanti nation, Beecham states:

the empire of Ashantee is not so much one State placed immediately under one government, as an assemblage of States owing a kind of feudal obedience to the sovereign of Ashantee. According to Dupuis, the empire extends westward from the River Volta about four geographical degrees, and reckoning from the neighbourhood of the coast, four degrees of latitude; comprising an area of about sixty thousand miles. Over the whole of the countries within these limits, the King of Ashantee, he says, exercises supreme sway; all kings, viceroys, or caboceers, being his absolute and unconditional vassals, as tributaries or not; and most of them holding their governments by virtue of an appointment from the court (Beecham 1968, pp. 85-6).

The empire was also known for its great military might. According to Beecham, 'Bowdich calculates that Ashantee proper can alone send two hundred and four thousand soldiers into the field; and its disposable force, since the Ashantee invasions, has been estimated by old residents at upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand' (Beecham 1968, p. 108). The Ashanti had a very elaborate and vibrant economic life. In addition to Kumasi being a trade centre, their trade links (unlike the Fanti who controlled the coastal trade) stretched much further north and inland, even as far as Tripoli in North Africa (Beecham 1968, pp. 144-60). There was cohesion between the masses and aristocracy as well as checks and balances on the king. It is stated that 'the king was not an absolute ruler but was controlled to a certain extent by a council comprising the queen mother, chiefs of the most important provinces, and the general of the army' (Ajayi & Crowder 1976, p. 25). Thus, despite the pomp and majesty surrounding the throne, the political system of kingship ensured that the king had severe limitations.

According to Beecham:

the king of Ashantee, (As-hanti,) although represented as a despotic monarch, having the lives and property of his subjects at his absolute disposal, is not, in all respects, beyond control. He is placed in a situation somewhat similar to the ancient Medes and Persians; among whom it was a principle, that what had once passed into law, the power of the sovereign himself could not change . . . Now, the king of Ashantee is under a somewhat similar obligation to observe the national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote antiquity; and a practical disregard of this obligation, in the attempt to change some of the customs of their forefathers, cost Osai Quamina his throne (Beecham 1968, pp. 90-1).

Throughout Ashanti history, there has been a conscientiously followed agenda to pursue and fulfil 'national customs which have been handed down to the people from remote antiquity' (Ibid). An ideology with origins from remote antiquity was followed by the Kings of Ashanti as a guide for rulership and leadership (Ibid). A public education system was also in place largely through oral tradition (Ibid, p. 167). Therefore, judging from the checklist, the Ashanti were also not only a nation, but existed as long as almost a century before France and England emerged as nations. The modernist argument of the 18th century threshold is therefore flawed, and does not apply, at least to the Fanti and Ashanti nations of pre-modern and Modern Ghana. Thus, empirical evidence from Fanti and Ashanti history clearly indicate that nations and nationalisms had occurred in parts of the world other than Europe, and in countries other than England, France or Spain.

1.5 SECESSIONISM/SEPARATISM, IRREDENTISM AND INTER- “NATION”-ALISM

Secession and irredentism are two forms of nationalism revolving around the popular principle of national self-determination which ‘was advanced as the new principle of international legitimacy after 1918’ (Mayall 1990, p. 50). The doctrine of irredentism is derived from the Italian phrase *terra irredenta*, meaning “territory to be redeemed”. An essential presupposition of the doctrine is that there must be a redeeming state as well as a known or targeted territory to be redeemed (Neurberger 1991, p. 97; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 97). The term *irredenta* was first used to refer to those Italian-speaking territories, specifically Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste and Fiume, which were culturally Italian but had remained under Austrian and Swiss rule after Italian unification during the nineteenth century. The Italian movement to annex these Italian-speaking areas became known as an irredentist movement. Subsequently, the current political usage of irredentism refers to any territorial claim or political effort made by a sovereign state to annex or incorporate geographical territory within another state, the occupants of which the irredentist state claims to have commonality of background or purpose with, on the basis of past shared ethnicity or history. The irredentist aim is for geographical, ethnic and historical union with the related population segments in adjacent countries within a common political framework as proposed or presented by the irredentist state (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1; Mayall 1990, p. 57). In all irredentist claims, the elements within the combination of sheer territoriality and genuine ethnic or national sentiments vary from case to case. The Argentinian claim on the Falkands is deemed as irredentist since the Falkland islands or Malvinas do not contain an Argentinian population (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 3; Mayall 1990, p. 57). Mayall argues that, irredentist claims not supported by strong secessionist movements are likely to face defeat if the case is submitted to

international legal arbitration because there is no existing authoritative judicial ruling from either the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the United Nations to follow. The consistent refusal by Britain on one hand, and Argentina and Spain on the other, to submit the case of the Falklands/Malvinas to the ICJ's arbitration strongly suggests that both sides are not sure of what the outcome of the judicial ruling will be (Mayall 1990, p. 62).

Two distinguishing types of irredentism are: (a) 'the attempt to detach land and people from one state in order to incorporate them in another, as in the case of Somalia's recurrent irredenta against Ethiopia, and; (b) the attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state – a "Kurdistan", for example, composed of Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Both forms of reconstituted boundaries would qualify as irredentist' (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 10; Howoritz 1991, p. 10). Irredentism of the first type can be found in such historical examples as:

the Greeks in Albania and Turkey, the Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Croats in Austria and Yugoslavia. Contemporary cases abound: the Somalis in Ethiopia, the Muslims in Kashmir, the Swazis in the Republic of South Africa, or the Ewe in Ghana. It does not, however, refer to the efforts to reunite the two Germanies, Chinas, or Koreas, where political differences separate groups that view themselves as culturally or historically cohesive (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 2).

Irredentism of the second type includes such examples as:

the Slovenians in Austria and Yugoslavia; the Macedonians in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece; the Pushtans in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Armenians in the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran; the Tajiks and Uzbeks in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; the Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union and Iran; and the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. In such cases, the ethnic group may seek union with one of the countries, or it may call for independent statehood (and, indeed, the group is

frequently divided internally precisely on this question). A variant of this second type may be a situation in which components of multiethnic states have irredentist claims aimed at creating entirely new nation-states. The Kurdish demand for statehood falls directly into this category, as does the Armenian example. In both these instances, however, there is no parent state to press ethnic claims, and hence there is uncertainty regarding the classification of these states. Thus, although it is clear that not every border dispute is irredentist, the matter of recognition and identification of *irredenta* is not as clear cut as it might appear on the surface (Chazan ed. 1991, pp. 2-3).

Irrespective of any theoretical or practical difficulties in the classification of irredentas, a distinction needs to be made between irredentism and secessionism or separatism. Whereas irredentism is more or less 'a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders' (Horowitz 1991, p. 10; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 10), secession is any attempt by an ethnic group with claims to a homeland to withdraw its territory from the jurisdiction of a larger state to which it belongs (Ibid, pp. 9-10). An example of a secessionist or separatist bid is Biafra versus the Nigerian Federation between 1967 and 1970. Like irredentisms, not all secessions or separatisms are successful. Indeed, successful secessions are rarer than successful irredentisms, with few examples such as the creation of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) from Pakistan in 1971 (Mayall 1990, p. 61) and the very latest - that of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. As Mayall puts it, secession also refers to 'unsuccessful separatist rebellions against the state. Indeed it is frequently used to describe any attempt by a national minority to exercise its right to self-determination by breaking away either to join another state or more often to establish an independent state of its own, or at least an autonomous region within an existing state' (Ibid, p. 61). Secessionist or separatist demands may therefore range from autonomy to full independence (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1). It must be noted that the success of the latest case has depended very much on the authority and cooperation of

the United Nations. On August 30 1999, more than 90% of East Timorese voted in a UN-organised referendum to choose independence and autonomy from Indonesia since the latter forcibly took control of East Timor in 1975 (<http://www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/southeast/9908/30.etimor.05/>). Among a number of reasons, religion seems to be the most distinguishing driving force behind this move towards secession. East Timor's population is predominantly Catholic whereas Indonesia's is predominantly Muslim (<http://www.cnn.com/1999/ASIANOW/southeast/12/17/etimor.world.../index.htm>).

1.6 THE AFRICAN CONTEXT OF NATIONALISM

The Partition of Africa resulted in many ethnonational groups being divided by “international” boundaries, for example, ‘the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin; the Berbers in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi; the Afars in Djibouti and Ethiopia; the Khoi-Khoisan in Botswana and Namibia; the Hausa in Nigeria, Niger and Ghana; the Akan in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire; the Bakongo in Angola and Zaire; and many more’ (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 5). The long list of groups which were split up among several states continues with ‘the Somalis, Bakongo, Ewe, Zande, Fulani, Ngoni, Chewa, Lunda and Yao’ (Neurberger 1991, p. 98; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 98). Given the scale of ethnic separation across the African continent, irredentism is comparatively low. This is attributable to a general consensus by African governments, stipulated through the OAU, to respect the sanctity of the inter-“nation”-al borders created at independence. This consensus ideology is framed by the obligation of OAU member states to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in Clause III of the OAU Charter (1963), and reinforced by the Cairo Resolution of 1964 (Neuberger 1991, p. 107; Chazan ed. 1991, p. 107; I. M. Lewis ed. 1983, p. 91). But it must also be noted, that this consensus by OAU member states to accept the frontiers of the colonial Partition has not resulted in a successful containment of potential ethnic-related political problems and violence, as some have spilled over the borders of the Partition. The tension between the containment of these ethnic-related problems and their potential to spill over the borders of the Partition is, according to Basil Davidson, part of the institutional crisis the African continent is currently going through (Davidson 1987, p. 5). This underpins Davidson’s point, that perhaps efforts ‘to write into the early independence constitutions the notion that the colonial frontiers, now reborn as national frontiers, need not be immutable, unchangeable, traced as it

were by the hand of God' (Ibid, p. 6), should have been heeded to. Added to the incongruity between ethnonational units and state boundaries, is the dilemma associated with the imposition of a single statehood on multinational communities, both at the theoretical and practical levels. Fred Burke, in stating the practical dilemma which the nation-state project posed for Uganda, also mentioned the trickle-down effects which the colonial, incongruent, arbitrary, border demarcations had on local government as well, in that, 'in other areas of Uganda, however, the local government unit encompasses a number of small and antagonistic tribal groups' (Burke 1964, p. 1). At the theoretical level, Burke reiterated the wrestle against this dilemma in earlier scholarship by such academics as Lloyd Fallers, who wrote:

What, in this situation, is to be the unit of study? What, indeed, is the "real" unit, the unit which "matters"? Is it the tribe, because the colonial territory is simply an artificial boundary enclosing a congeries of people who feel no mutual loyalty or kinship, held together only by the superior force of a European power? Or is it in fact the colonial territory, because the tribes are too small and their institutions too foreign to the nation-state pattern to have a future . . . (World Politics, 9 (2), 1957; Burke 1964, p. vii).

This dilemma has translated itself into the conflict between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, which also holds at both theoretical and practical levels¹¹.

Contrary to popular perception and widespread commentary that the Partition occurred among the European colonial powers at the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-5 (Hargreaves 1974, p. 5), by 1884, many boundaries had already been set. The Berlin Conference was more or less convened as an attempt to reach 'some measure of agreed international control' (Asiwaju and Nugent eds. 1996, p. 21) over what to do with a

¹¹ This is discussed in the introductory chapter. A fuller discussion on the conflict between

colony once it had been formally claimed as so. There was a consensus among Conference participants that the economic exploitation of colonies would be open to participation by all parties regardless of the coloniser, thus ensuring free trade and neutrality, especially in the Congo and Niger basins. The Conference itself did not set any specific territorial boundaries. In addition, one main participant – Germany – proposed the establishment of a ‘clear criteria for international recognition of territorial claims’ (Ibid, 21-2). This criteria was never achieved, despite the developing myth that effective occupation, was to be a principle on which to validate a territorial claim. As set out in Chapter VI of the Conference’s Final Act, effective occupation was limited to the coasts, which in any case, had already been partitioned before the Conference. Although the Berlin Act did not justify the principle of effective occupation universally, some participants, particularly Britain, abused the principle to pursue their own subsequent interests far removed from the aims of the Conference. The principle therefore made room for spurious legality for the exercise of partitioning (Ibid, 22-3), springing mainly out of the immediate perceptions of economic, political and strategic interests to individual European powers. It is a certainty that the “validating” of territory was not based on the internationally approved principles which Germany sought to achieve through the Conference, but instead through ad hoc negotiated agreements between the European powers, hence the arbitrary boundary divisions and groupings plaguing the African continent today (Ibid, p. 31).

The scenario explained above serves as the reason for the paradox associating African boundaries with respect to the incongruence between the boundaries on maps and the reality of geopolitical frontiers, as well as the cultural homogeneity which these

boundaries have sought to divide (Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 1-17). However, as argued by Asiwaju, the phenomenon of artificially segregated national groupings or “transborder peoples” is not a feature restricted to Africa, but also common to Europe and other parts of the world. Asiwaju argues that empirical data does not support J. R. V. Prescott’s theory that the evolution of boundaries in Europe and the rest of the world, differs as a process, from the African experience. Asiwaju argues, for example, that there is no comparative difference, on one hand, in the experiences:

of the Catalans, an ethnic group, neither French nor Spanish, split into two by the Franco-Spanish border drawn through their homeland in the Cerdanya valley of the Eastern Pyrenees; and on the other, the Yoruba, also an ethnic group, neither English nor French, split into two by the Anglo-French colonial (now international) boundary between British Nigeria and French Dahomey (now Republic of Benin) drawn through the homelands of specific subgroups in Western Yorubaland (Ibid, pp. 255-6).

However, Asiwaju further argues that the boundaries instituted by the colonial Partition are obstructionsist to regional integration, and that there are advantages in Africa concentrating on the integrative aspects of the homogeneity of “transborder” peoples as against any artificial, divisive and inter-“nation”-al antagonisms and insecurities arising out of political boundary restrictions (Ibid, p. 260).

It would appear that, in the main, antagonisms revolving around colonial boundaries exist only between state authorities, and that border populations have little interest in the renegotiation of boundaries, due to the advantages they gain from a maintenance of the status quo. Boundaries as clearly indicated on maps are not as clear cut in geographical reality, and the fact that border zones have not been susceptible to rigorous and thorough surveillance has compounded the problem and increased their ambiguity, as well as making them havens of opportunity for both legitimate settlers

and fugitives. "Transborder" families and ethnic groups choose to live on whichever side of a border can be comparatively exploited in terms of tax credits, facilities and opportunities for smuggling (Ibid, pp. 268-9). Both Asiwaju and Nugent conclude that, as is already clear from African behaviour that borders are permeable, it would be functionally advantageous for the continent's boundaries to be recognised more as conduits than barriers. The way forward should be seen in the strengthening of regional cooperation such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the South African Development Community (SADC), if not an integral union of the whole continent (Ibid, pp. 269-71).

It becomes clear, that whereas there is a broad agreement on what the solution to the problem should be, that is, any strategy which will result in: (a) a reinforcement of the 'underlying unities of Africa, rather than its obvious disunities' (Davidson 1987, p. 6), and/or: (b) the integrative aspects of the homogeneity of "transborder" peoples as against any artificial, divisive and inter-"nation"-al antagonisms and insecurities arising out of political boundary restrictions (Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, p. 260), there seems to be different approaches to the goal. Davidson proposes a reorganisation of the whole continent into the natural frontiers of the various identity groups as should have been done during the colonial period (Davidson 1987, pp. 5-6), and Asiwaju and Nugent propose regional economic blocs of integration which obviously ignore ethno-cultural identities (Asiwaju & Nugent eds. 1996, pp. 269-71).

Irrespective of any potential for: redrawing boundaries along the lines of natural identities; regional economic integration; the advantages which "transborder" communities might be reaping from ambiguous loyalties to neighbouring countries;

irredentisms of subregional dimensions; the containment of different national groups under single statehoods; etc., the Partition has created a phenomenon of political competition among ethno-national identity groups, with the aim to control state power and resources along sectarian and clientellistic lines. This phenomenon, as briefly explained here, is termed as “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55)¹². Davidson attributes this problem to the European model of nationalism, and its associated imposition of a state upon a geographical territory. This has not profited Africa, especially where multiple national identities have been subjugated under single statehoods with the aim of forging an “all-embracing community” (Davidson 1994, pp. 259-60). In zeroing in on the Ghanaian example, Nugent states that ‘the legacy of the Gold Coast as a federation of “native states” is very obvious today’ (Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, p. 23). The general effect of the phenomenon of “politics of the belly” on African politics, and Ghanaian politics in particular, is the tendency for citizens to respond by adopting political attitudes and making political choices best suited to their calculative ethno-sectarian interests. A full discussion of the impact of this phenomenon on Ghanaian politics begins from Chapter 3. In the interim, Chapter 2 serves as a precursor, by exploring the traditions of origin of the various ethnonational groups in Modern Ghana, and relating them to the current identity group perceptions, as well as trends in ethnonationalism and political nationalism within the country.

¹² See footnote 2. A fuller definition of “politics of the belly” is given in section 3.1.1 of the thesis.

Chapter 2

The Traditions Of Origin

2.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter seeks to elaborate on the ethnonational configuration of modern and multinational Ghana, by tracing the ethno-geographic origins of identity groups to their current ethno-geographic locations in all the ten current politico-administrative Regions of the country (see maps of Ghana and West Africa in Appendix I). Overall, the chapter offers the view that the majority of modern Ghana have migrated from the area occupied by the Old Ghana empire which, in the height of its glory spanned the broad geographical area of the Western Sudan, a section of the Sahara, and the Djenne and Timbuktu regions. By exception, the Ewes and non-Ewe “Togo remnants” (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178), are not of Guan ancestry, and do not share the same traditions of origin with the majority of Modern Ghana. They are successfully traced to the geographical territory which spans the four countries of Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. A case is made for the Ewe irredentism that has existed in the West African sub-region since the Partition. The chapter engages in a lively discussion on the historical development of Ewe nationalism and how this relates to the current politics of the sub-region, especially Ghanaian politics. The chapter also explains the emergence of the identity of “Mabians” or “Northerners” (citizens from Northern Ghana), and how this relates to politics in Ghana.

A broad authorship is utilized in critiquing the chapter. The historical traditions from the several authorships largely compliment each other and seem to differ slightly only in terms of style and dating, but not substance. It is clear however, that in addition to providing the widest coverage on the traditions of origins of most of the country (except the Ewes and some CTMs), the works of Meyerowitz are the most detailed and comprehensive. The other authors including Vansina, Owusu, Herskovits, Ellis,

Levtzion, Wilks, Manoukian, Daaku, Wilson, Nugent, Kwamena-Poh, Gilbert and lately Ephirim-Donkor, do seem to have comparatively sketchy and patchy records of events, and for only one or two separate identity groups each. In order to present a coherent flow of events therefore, Meyerowitz's account is used as the main commentary, complimented by the others. In addition, the other accounts from complimentary authors have been used as a strong critique against the Meyerowitz account. Thus, the critique represents a lively discussion on authorships criticising, confirming and complimenting each other, interspersed with the occasional disagreement on dates. The critique also discusses oral tradition as a source of historical material, and the challenges associated with reliance on oral sources. The authorship of Nugent, Amenumey and Law are mainly utilised for the Ewe traditions of origin. All three authors share the common strand regarding the origination and migratory route of Ewes, that is, from an eastern location - a Yoruba-related area along the borders of Nigeria – westwards towards Benin, Togo and Ghana. But Law and Nugent disagree on the nitty gritty of the migratory routes and stop-overs.

This chapter has been necessitated by the simple fact of the relationship between ethnonational identities and politics, on one hand, and how this influences the “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55) in Ghana, and generally Africa, on the other. It has therefore become necessary to examine the traditions of origins and their associated influence on people's perceptions, (real or imagined), as a means of explaining the linkages between these traditions and the identity patterns in current Ghanaian politics. It is not so much the veracity or mythicity attached to these traditions of origin, as the perceptions and subsequent identity patterns which have developed from them, as well as their repercussions on the politics of Ghana. For example, Nugent makes the point,

that the suggestion of ancient enmity between Ewes and Ashantis, and any link of it to their political differences today is historically false, and rightly so, in that, pre-colonial Anlo-Ewes were Ashanti allies (Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8). However, it cannot be ignored also, that the current enmity between the two groups, revolves around the issue of a minority Ewe with different origination from the majority of Modern Ghana, currently sharing a single statehood as a result of the Partition. Whether or not this is of remote or immediate import to the post-colonial era and the current politics, is immaterial to the perception of enmity resulting from the historical and political processes that led to the creation of Modern Ghana. Whereas there was no enmity in the historical past between the two groups, enmity has currently assumed as a result of their histories. The following quote by Donald Rothchild perfectly encapsulates or sums up the link between group perceptions and the “politics of the belly”:

Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and compete effectively for state-controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts, awards and constitutional protections. *Ethnicity* as used in this context, refers to a subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and aspirations; *ethnic group* suggests organized activities by people who are linked by a consciousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to maximise their corporate political, economic, and social interests. Ethnicity, or a sense of peoplehood, has its foundation in combined remembrances of past experience and in common inspirations, values, norms, and expectations. The validity of these beliefs is less significant to an overarching sense of affinity than is the people's ability to symbolize their closeness to each other. The origins of the people may be imaginary, but as political memory interacts with the experiences of the past, new socially constructed identities emerge and become the basis of a consciousness that in some circumstances can prove very destructive (Rothchild 1997, p. 4).

An idea of how influential myths of origin are to identity perceptions, is further reiterated in a publication on Irish nationalism¹³, which states:

History shows that what is believed to be true is often more potent than what is actually true. So when we say the origin of tribalism is found in history, we must remember that we are dealing with “legend”, that is, the interpretation placed by the community on its history, its reaction to and rationalisation of past events¹⁴

In a more closely-related example, something of the nature of the heightened tensions and mutual ethnonational antagonistic attitudes, resulting from perceptions based on the history or myths of origin of ethnonational groups within Modern Ghana, is portrayed in a discussion on a Ghanaian e-mail listserv known as Okyeame¹⁵. In the ensuing discussion¹⁶, the current Akan-Ewe animosities are clearly highlighted by the Akan-Ewe rival discussants, as one Akan makes a remark which touches on the sensitivities of Ewe-speaking peoples in the West African sub-region, and when queried about it, follows up with clearer and more emphatic statements about Ewes in Ghana not being native Ghanaians because they were incorporated into Ghana from Togo by the plebiscite of 1956¹⁷.

¹³ New Ulster Movement. *Tribalism or Christianity in Ireland?*, NUM, 1973 (Publication No. 9), p. 8.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Okyeame is a Ghanaian electronic mail listserv. Discussions can be very heated, and as the listserv is unmoderated, the uncensored views of discussants find their way into the public domain, especially on the explosive subject of ethnonational identities in relation to politics, as portrayed in the discussions in Appendix VII.

¹⁶ Full details of the discussion between the rival Akan and Ewe discussants are available in Appendix VII. The Akan-Fanti, whose remarks aroused the anger of Ewes on the listserv is Steve Garbrah, and the main Ewe responses to his views are generated from Anthony Mawuli Sallar, C. K. Ladzekpo, Doe Ladzekpo, Bensa Nukunya and Andy Kwawukume. Other Akans, for example, Kwadwo Boahene and Mark Opoku-Adusei are also discussants. As the discussion covered some aspects of my thesis - (traditions of origin, ethnonational identities and perceptions) - I entered the fray to seek some clarifications on the relevant contributions being made, as well as contribute. I was debating under my cyber nickname “frisky”. In the discussion, Doe Ladzekpo seemed always to address me as “Rev” Amoah as he had heard from the grapevine that I had received some sort of Bible College training in the past.

¹⁷ Results of the plebiscite in 1956 led to the United Nations Organisation’s (UN) decision to annex the part of British Togoland to Ghana, just before the latter’s independence from British colonial rule.

If the historical backgrounds of individual ethnonational groups has a crucial influence over current perceptions of identity and politics vis-à-vis others, it becomes obvious therefore, that any pre-colonial anthropological and historical evidence should be examined and given due consideration as a means of making sense of the current politics. It is becoming more widespread, that any academic focus on Ghanaian ethnicity and politics, cannot ignore the history and anthropology of its peoples and how this links to current trends. As an introduction to one of the most recent works on Ghana, edited by Paul Nugent and Carola Lentz, they state:

Our initial intuition was that, by contrast with parts of Southern Africa, many of the identities of present day Ghana were not simply an “invention” of the colonial period, but drew on older “we”-group processes of inclusion and exclusion. For that reason, the contributors were invited to adopt a long-range perspective on identity, spanning the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods (Lentz and Nugent eds. 2000, p. 2).

As already argued, perceptions assumed by individual ethnonational groups vis-à-vis others, render arguments of veracity, mythicity, as well as attachment of remote significance to the traditions of origins a moot point. Besides, it would appear that due significance ought to be attached to the anthropological evidence than is usually accorded. The findings of Sandra Greene regarding her study of the Anlo-Ewe emphasize this point, as well as the relevant connections between the distant past and current trends. According to Greene:

I argue, in particular, that ethnic identities – defined here as notions of “we” and “they” based on geographical origins, as well as time of residence and kinship relations – existed well before the impact of European colonialism. I also argue that Anlo women were viewed and viewed themselves as integral members of their lineages and clans. They identified fully with these groups and it was because of this fact that Anlo women – along with Anlo men – throughout their history became deeply involved in both supporting and undermining the boundaries that define “we” and “they” in Anlo. This was the case during the pre-colonial period when an influx of refugees and conquerors prompted the Anlo to

redefine who was, and indeed, an Anlo. It continued to be so during the colonial and post-colonial periods when missionaries, colonial government officials, a new emergent educated Anlo elite and average Anlos began to generate in the twentieth century a new and larger ethnic identity in response to yet another set of developments [Greene 2000, pp. 29-30; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, pp. 29-30].

Hence, this chapter has been an exercise to establish a historical context, from which current identity patterns of political nature can be traced, in order to derive some understanding and illumination from the history which buttresses these patterns. Any current patterns which demonstrate linkage between the contextual history and current politics, are at least briefly mentioned, and further discussed in the following chapters.

2.2 ORIGINATION OF THE “GHANA” HYPOTHESIS

The first Gold Coast literary source to suggest any link between the ethnonational groups of Modern and Ancient Ghana was Reverend W. T. Balmer, who speculated that the Akans and Ahantas are traceable to the ancient Negro kingdom (Balmer 1925, p. 27). R. A. Mauny also referred to this in his article in Africa Vol XXIV, 1954. After Balmer's theory, and from 1928, J. B. Danquah took interest and developed it further, thus culminating into a research he conducted in England from 1934-6 (Ofosu-Appiah 1974, p. 29). Thereafter, Danquah debated extensively on the subject, for example, in his article of 20 July 1949 in the African Morning Post (Akyeampong 1971, pp. 45-7) and succeeded in strongly impressing this hypothesis on the main political players of the time, that the adoption of the name “Ghana” had become a foregone conclusion as part of the struggle towards independence. The hypothesis encountered some criticisms, for example, from Mauny, who referred to it as a belief (Mauny 1954, p. 200), and among other things claimed: that ‘. . . nothing is known of the origin of Ghana . . .’ (Ibid, p. 205); that ‘all that can be said of the history of Ghana before the coming of the Arabs in the eighth century must, in the present state of our knowledge of West Africa, be merely speculation’ (Ibid, p. 207); that ‘. . . we know little of the pre-Islamic Ghana civilization’ (Ibid p. 209), and; that ‘the real origins of the Akan are unknown’ (Ibid, p. 211). Mauny's claims were followed by rebuttals from Danquah in the November-December 1957 edition of The West African Review, in which the latter argued that a second century map of the Greek geographer and astronomer Ptolemy ‘included a town situate on the Niger, which he named Thamondakana in the country of the Nigritae’, and that Thamondakana shares the same geographical location with present day Timbuctoo (Akyeampong 1970, p. 113). Danquah argued that ‘. . . Ptolemy's Thamondakana must be referred to as the Ghana of ancient history, and that

the name Kana (Akana) in that name is no other than a verbal variation of Akan' (Ibid, p. 114). In rebutting Mauny's claims of lack of evidence whether any ancient Mediterranean people knew the northern part of the Sahara or ever visited tropical West Africa (Mauny 1954, pp. 200-1), Danquah argued: that Herodotus records Pharoah Neco's Phoenician circumnavigation of the African continent which covered geographical areas of the Sahara beyond Libya; that a Carthaginian voyage made by Hanno with sixty ships and 30,000 sailors passed around West Africa, and again; that Herodotus records five Nasamonean youngmen from the Great Syrtis in the Mediterranean crossing the Sahara and coming into contact with the Niger (Akyeampong 1970, p. 113; Rawlinson (ed.) Vol II 1875, pp. 46-53, 383; Vol III 1875, pp. 142-9). Danquah provided sufficient evidence to deal with Mauny's criticisms, but was also aware that some amount of scepticism remained. Danquah therefore held his ground, but also stated that '... the Akan claim to origin in Ghana is only a hypothesis, not yet a theory. But that does not prevent those who have eyes to see to see its truth' (Akyeampong 1970, p. 121). Irrespective of whatever difficulties the hypothesis had encountered, the end result was that 'at the time of independence the Gold Coast had become Ghana' (Ofosu-Appiah 1974, p. 29). Given that Nkrumah and Danquah no longer belonged to the same party at the time of independence, it remains unclear exactly what ticked Nkrumah to settle on the name "Ghana", other than the fact that the force of Danquah's arguments had remained with the major political players of the time, thereby making the name choice a foregone conclusion. Several other authorships, both around the time of the Mauny-Danquah debates, and following that, prove the anthropo-historical connection between the majority of Modern Ghana and Ancient Ghana. This chapter deals with this connection in more detail.

2.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE ETHNO-GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF MODERN GHANA

Modern Ghana as a country is divided into ten politico-administrative Regions. Beginning from the hinterland Northern Territories and flowing eastwards and southwards towards the coastal South, they are the Upper-West Region, Upper-East Region, Northern Region, Brong-Ahafo Region, Western Region, Central Region, Ashanti Region, Eastern Region, Greater-Accra Region, and the Volta Region. Each region has its administrative capital, but the country's capital is Accra, located in the Greater-Accra Region. Ghana is a multi-national state, with both large and small national and/or linguistic groupings, some of whose constituent sub-groups have similar geographical and historical origins. The Akan constitutes the largest grouping, about 52.4% of Ghana's total population of about 16 million. The Mossi or Mole-Dagbani-Gurense grouping make up about 15.8%, the Ewe 11.9%, the Ga & Adangbe 7.8%, the Gurma 3.3%, the Yoruba 1.3%, and other 7.5% (Britannica 1994, p. 615). With the exception of the Ewes, and a few other non-Ewe groups in the Volta Region of Ghana who have been dubbed by Paul Nugent as the "Central Togo Minorities" – CTMs or "Togo Remnants" (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178), the majority of modern Ghana are believed to originate from a common ancestry traced to the Djenne-Timbuktu area (Meyerowitz 1952; 1958). The Ewes have been clearly traced from the Abomey dynasty in Dahomey (currently Benin) and may have Yoruba ancestry (Argylle 1966, pp. 3-5; Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13). Also, over the last three centuries, as a result of migrations, conquest and resettlements, there have been some evolutionary patterns, resulting in some groups being engulfed and subsumed under new names, whilst others have been split into new

and different groups. For example, currently, the Akan (the largest linguistic grouping) includes the Akuapem and Agona. However, Kyerepon-Guans and Late-Guans (based in the Eastern Region) – and who form part of the Akuapem – refer to themselves as Guans, and not Akan (Kwamena-Poh 1973, pp. 3 & 8; Meyrowitz 1952, pp. 77-9). Also, Efutu-Guans of Winneba, whose current geographical location is based in Akan-Fanti territory in the Central Region, refer to themselves or are known as Guans. In addition, although they are originally a patrilineal people, they have been socially influenced by their matrilineal and dominant Akan-Fanti neighbours (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 2). Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, also in the Central Region, were Guans but have since become matrilineal, after having contact with the surrounding and matrilineal Akan-Fantis (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-9)¹⁸. Although there is a wider and more ancient Guan ancestry incorporating the majority of modern Ghana (including Akans), and although the evolution of group identities has resulted in the emergence of new identity names, there exists a few groups who have held onto the ancient Guan identity, name, or tag. Subsequently, the Guan name and identity has significance in: (a) tracing the Guan ancestry of the majority of Ghanaian groups who currently do not use the Guan tag, as well as; (b) having current and specific reference to the few groups who have held on to the Guan tag. For example, the current Ga-Adangbe grouping, although not Akan are also of Guan ancestry (Ibid 1952, pp. 77-8), but do not use the Guan tag. Therefore, whereas the majority of Modern Ghana are of Guan ancestry, only a handful of groups currently use the Guan tag or refer to themselves as Guans. The

¹⁸ An interview with Andrew Asamoah, who hails from Senya Bereku, and whose father is a sub-chief of the town, confirms that although the Senya Guans originally practised patriliney, the traditional lineage practice has switched to matriliney since being in close proximity with the matrilineal Akan-Fantis. Andrew also analyzed that although the current traditional position is matrilineal, the details of inheritance vary on a case by case basis as a result of influencing factors such as the stipulation of a will, adherence to the Intestate Succession Law of 1985, and/or the political strength of the external family.

Akuapem, Agwana, Bono, Ahafo, Ashanti, Fanti and Akyem, who are all of Guan ancestry, are all now classified as Akan. Even some Efutu-Guans refer to themselves as Akan and prefer to speak Fanti instead of Guan (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 10 & 13). Some of the earlier Akan tribal-states were Bono, Asante, Akyerekere, Twifo-Heman, Akwamu and Domaa, Kormante and Etsi (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17). The latter ones include the Fanti, Akyem and Akuapim. The Akerekere and Twifo-Heman do not exist as a tribal entity anymore, having been overrun by more powerful neighbouring states. They would now be mixed up among any of the remaining earlier or later Akan sub-groups. The evolution of identity groups, whether along political and/or linguistic contours, has been countrywide, and therefore, the current Akan-speaking and Guan-speaking peoples of southern Ghana are not the only examples of current linguistic homogeneity. The Gur-speaking Nanumba, Dagomba and Mamprusi of Northern Ghana are separate polities, but are culturally linked by the Gur language, which they share with some Mossi kingdoms south of Burkina Fasso, a neighbouring country north of Northern Ghana (Drucker-Brown 1999, p. 181; J. Royal, *Anthrop. Inst.* 5, (2), 1999, p. 181).

According to Meyerowitz, the Akan people of Gold Coast or Modern Ghana, have migrated from the area around the Niger Bend, roughly between Djenne and Timbuktu, their former dwelling site, until they were routed and forced out by Islamized Saharan Berbers at the beginning of the 11th century by Assaud or Azawagh. [I. Hrbek and J. Devisse argue that the ruler of Ancient Ghana – situated north of the Inland Niger Delta – was more accommodating to the Muslim Almoravids, and that Ancient Ghana officially became Islamic after the Almoravid conquest at the end of the 11th century (Hrbek and Devisse 1988, pp. 354-61)]. Some of these Akan states, are able to trace

their ancestry and geographical origins to a different area and era before Djenne and Timbuktu (the Ancient Ghana territory and polity). The Bono-Takyiman or (Techiman-Brong) recall from their ancestral history that prior to the Niger area, they were settled farther north in the "White Desert" or *Sarem* (the country of the sand), now called the Sahara (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 33; 1958, pp. 17-8). The tradition as preserved by the Kormante and Etsi have the name of the place as "Djadu", "N'Djadum" or "Diadom", whose literal translation is: "Dja confederation" or "Dia confederation" (Ibid 1952, p. 64; 1958, pp. 17-8). In current Akan, *dum* or *dom* literally means, a crowd of people. According to Meyerowitz, the identification of the names Djadu, Djadom or Diadom may be with the Oasis of Djado (or Jado) located in the western Tibesti in Eastern Sahara. The Arab name of Djado seems to be "Agwas" for the Tuaregs of Air; "Gua" for the Tuaregs of Fezzan; and "Braun" (sounding like modern Brong) for the Tebu. It is said therefore, that the Akan have a mixed ancestry. The pre-11th century Agwas of the Eastern Sahara (or with prefix: Ilagwas) are also known as "Agwatin", "Ilagwatin", or "Ilaguantan". The tradition follows that they were Eastern Libyans of the same stock as the Luata in North Africa. Altogether, all the above-mentioned tribes or people-groups are believed to originate from Kushite stock, or are descendants of Kush (Cush), from the Tigris-Euphrates area in Mesopotamia (Ibid 1952, pp. 63-9; Ibid 1958, pp. 17-20). [This extension of the myths of origin of some groups in Ghana 'from as far away as the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia' (Wilson 1992, p. 12), has attracted a lot of controversy, as some historians have labelled it as far-fetched. However, Wilson argues that the variation of the traditions of origin which suggests a migration from the Chad-Benue region, has some validity (Ibid)]. The Dja, or "Za", "Zaga" (Arabic "Zaghawa") gave the Djado Oasis its third name, and their origins are believed to be Abyssinia, or Southern Arabia. The Zaga are known to have conquered the Eastern Sudan, Eastern

Sahara and a large portion of North Africa sometime in the 1st century AD. Thus, the Zaga or Zaghawa Kingdom was founded in the Tibesti area of the Eastern Sahara (Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8). [This is confirmed by the Arab writer Al Muhallebi – AD 903-63 (Palmer 1936, p. 156)]. The Fezzan-Lake Chad caravan route also span this region. The pre-11th century Zaga Kingdom appears to be: (a) a confederation of the Za, Dja or Dia, who are believed to have formed the ruling aristocracy and also named the state, the Oasis of Djado, serving as the seat of government; (b) the Agwas, Gwa (without prefix and suffix) or Gua, who are Libyan Berbers from Eastern Libya, and; (c) the Gara out of whom the Tibu and the Kora'an (called Garawan in the Fezzan – medieval descendants of the Garamantes of antiquity) emerge. Currently, Kora'an is still part of the Zaghawa, now populating Eastern Sudan. Tibu is the language of both present day Kora'an and Zaghawa people (Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8). It appears therefore, that the founders of the Akan states descended from: the Dia or Za (Diaga or Zaga); the Libyan Berbers, and; the Gara of Tibesti who migrated southwards as a result of Arab conquests of North Africa, and their territory replaced with the Lemta Tuaregs who were displaced from the Fezzan by the Arabs. The inter-tribal settlement along the Niger Bend between Djenne and Timbuktu ended up in the incorporation of the aboriginals in the area into the clanship of the settlers. As is unsurprising among matrilineally organised groups, the intermarriages with the aboriginals resulted in the ethnic purity of the settlers from North Africa being corrupted. As part of the huge Islamic campaign which affected both the Sahara and sub-Saharan, when the Islamized Berbers routed the new Dia or Dja Kingdom near the Niger Bend, thousands of the Dja sought refuge further south, thus founding a number of states among the Mo (Grusi-speaking aboriginals). Subsequent defeat by the Mo just before AD 1300, caused a further southward movement into Gonja (the Northern territories in Modern Ghana).

Movements further south by some others resulted in settlement around the Black Volta River known as the Bono Kingdom and founded by Asaman. The Bono Kingdom became the first Akan state in Ghana. Other refugees of the Dia, Libyan Berber and Gara tribes who fled from the Niger region, managed to colonize aboriginals to the north-west and west of Modern Ghana (now La Cote d'Ivoire) and founded states including the Bona and Kumbu Kingdoms. These subsequent kingdoms, after suffering defeat also, moved further south into the tropical rain forest of modern Ghana resulting in the founding of the Akyerekere and Twifo-Heman kingdoms in AD 1500, Akwamu around 1575 and Domaa around 1600. Refugees from the Bona Kingdom moved eastwards and northwards and settled in the Bono Kingdom, and their descendants subsequently founded the Asante Kingdom in 1701 in the heart of the tropical forest (Ibid. pp. 19-20). According to Meyerowitz:

the descendants of the Dia, Dja, or Za seem to be represented among the Akan by the Diala (Ayoko clan), who founded the Bono Kingdom about AD 1295; the Adiaka, who founded the Dia-Mo (or Djomo) Kingdom at the same time; the Diana (Ayoko clan), who founded the Juaben and Bekwai States, now in the Asante Confederacy; and the Diara-N'Koran (Ayoko clan), who founded first the Bona Kingdom in the beginning of the eleventh century, then the Kokofu and Kumasi states (seventeenth century), and finally the Asante Kingdom. The *akyeneboa*, or totem animal, of the Ayoko of Dia descent was, and still remains, the falcon (Ibid, p. 20).

The historical analysis continues that the descendants of the Libyan Berbers – *Agwas* (Gua), *Agwatin*, *Laguantan*, or *Iguantan* - without the prefixes and plural suffixes – Gwa, Gua or Guan, became the most powerful clan in the Bono Kingdom, having “styled” themselves “*Agwana*” or “descendants of Gwa”. (*A* is the Akan prefix for living things). In other Akan states the name, in the various districts, became *Aguana* or *Eguana*, *Agona*, *Akwona* or *Aguna*. Their totem animal and state emblem, as is from

their remote ancestry, is parrot, since the majority of the Bono people were by descent Gwa or Guan. As the historical account further explains:

Bron” or “Abron” (nasalized “Brong”) recalls the Saharan “Braun”, one of the names for the Oasis of Djado in the Eastern Sahara. “Brong” is a contraction “Bonong”, the accent being on the second syllable. The Takyiman-Brong pronounce the name of their former kingdom “Bono”, that is to say, without the *ng*-sound at the end. Bono, as mentioned above,, was the first great Akan Kingdom in Ghana. The Bonos proudly sang: *O’ Bono be- ank-ama*, meaning “Bono who alone gives civilisation” (Ibid, pp. 20-21).

2.4 THE GUAN CONTROVERSY

Before delving into the regional locations of the current ethnonational groups in Modern Ghana and their relevant traditions of origin, it is important to explain (solve) what I have termed as the Guan controversy.

According to Meyerowitz, some groups in Modern Ghana, including the Akan, are traced from the Niger Bend area - popularly referred to as the area between Djenne and Timbuktu (Meyerowitz 1952; 1958). For example, the Gonja (or Guan-Dja) of Northern Ghana are also traced to the Djenne-Timbuktu area (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51; 1958, p. 17). Kwamena-Poh also refers to the Guans as part of the “Niger-Congo family” and relates them to some Akan groups such as the Fanti and Twi (Kwamena-Poh 1973, p. 12). Ephirim-Donkor also traces the Efutu-Guans to Timbuktu (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 25-7). As already analyzed (in Section 2.3), according to Meyerowitz, some of the Akan states [e.g. Bono, Etsi and Kormantse (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 33, 63-5; Ibid 1958)] trace their ancestry to a Saharan location as well as an era prior to Djenne-Timbuktu. Furthermore, Meyerowitz traces the etymology of the word “Guan” to the Saharan and Libyan Berbers (Meywrowitz 1952; 1958, pp. 17-20). There is therefore, a wider, more ancient, inclusive and latent Guan ancestry than what amounts to the current exclusive usage of the Guan tag by a handful of groups in Modern Ghana such as the Efutu-Guans, Kyerepong-Guans, Late-Guans and Kpesi-Guans. The wider Guan ancestry and identity includes such ethnonational groups as the Gonja (Guan-Dja) and Akan. It is therefore not surprising that some Akans and Gonjas refer to themselves as Guans and vice versa. For example, as already mentioned, some Efutu-Guans of Winneba see themselves as both Fanti and Guan, as they live in Fanti territory and speak Fanti as well as Guan (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 10 & 13). The

confusion within the Guan controversy is aptly summarised in the statement: 'whether I am Effutu or Fantse I am still an Akan' (Ibid, p. 13). The Efutus are originally patrilineal, but their patriliney has been socially influenced and threatened by a variety of factors inherent in proximity with their dominant Akan-Fanti neighbours (Ibid, p. 2). Also, the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, who are current occupants of Fanti territory in the Central Region, were patrilineal Guans but are now practicing matriliney (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76-80)¹⁹.

Second, in addition to the over-riding, wider and more inclusive Guan ancestry, plus the few confusing cases of evolutionary interchangeability between Akans and Guans, there are Guans who, although have encountered Akans (or have perhaps even been under Akan jurisdiction), remain Guan-speaking, have kept, and currently keep a strong Guan identity. For example, the Kyerepon-Guans and Late-Guans (Kwamena-Poh 1973, pp. 3 & 8). Kwamena-Poh states that, unlike the Kyerepon dialect which has been invaded by some Akan words, the Late dialect has remained "compact" and uncorrupted (Ibid, p. 10). At the extreme end of the spectrum, we have the 'Kpesi-Guans (earliest settlers of Guan extraction)' [Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76-7], who have never mixed with the Akan, have been based in the southeastern tip of Modern Ghana, and were the original 'owners of the land and lagoons between Accra and the mouth of the Volta' (Ibid pp. 64-5; Field 1940, pp. 82-4). The Kpesi-Guans are not Akan.

Third is the issue of patriliney and matriliney. Guans are originally a patrilineal people, but some who have entered Akan territory or mixed with Akans, have become matrilineal. Guans who have never mixed with the Dja or Akan, or been under their

¹⁹ See footnote 18.

jurisdiction, remain patrilineal (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77), for example the Kpesi-Guan. Some Guans who have encountered the Akan have maintained their patriliney, for example the Late-Guans and Kyerepon-Guans. The Efutu-Guans have been socially influenced by the neighbouring Akan-Fanti matrilineal system, and are undergoing a struggle between patriliney and matriliney, with serious ramifications to the Efutu political system and the process of electing the Efutu King (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 2). However, others have converted to matriliney, for example the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76 & 79). Therefore, any hard and fast distinction between a patriliney of Guans and/or a matriliney of Akans is not as universalistic as authorships such as Michelle Gilbert would like to portray [Africa 64 (1) 1994, p. 100; Africa 67 (4), 1997, pp. 501-2].

Within the ethnonational configuration of modern Ghana, it must therefore be seen that there is a current, remnant and exclusive Guan usage and identity, as well as a latent, wider and inclusive Guan ancestry. The Guan name and identity therefore has significance in: (a) tracing the Guan ancestry of the overall majority of Ghanaian groups some of which do not currently use the Guan tag, as well as; (b) having current and specific reference to a few groups who have held on to the Guan name, and still use the Guan tag, for example the Kpesi-Guans, Kyerepong-Guans, Late-Guans and Efutu-Guans.

At Independence in 1957, the name Ghana was chosen to replace the colonial name Gold Coast for reasons including the anthropological proof that the majority of Modern Ghana – of the wider Guan ancestry – have migrated from the geographical area of Ancient Ghana. This wider Guan ancestry therefore has a significant contribution

towards the modern Ghanaian identity which over-rides any exclusive, latter-day clings or allusions to the Guan tag by a few groups. It is for this same reason that groups which are not of the wider Guan ancestry, for example the Ewes and CTMs, are viewed by some Ghanaians (rightly or wrongly so) as modern “immigrants”, and not only because of the more recent colonial annexation from Togo to Ghana just before independence. Hence, any current ethnonational differences between groups of the wider Guan ancestry (e.g. Akans, Gonjas, etc.) and those not of Guan ancestry (e.g. Ewes) is farther-fetched than is normally understood. Akans and Ewes have never been enemies historically (Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8). However recent developments of colonial and post-colonial import have contributed to the current high-tensioned political differences between the two groups. Therefore, despite the lack of historical enmity, it would appear that, the recent historical and political developments of the immediate pre- and post-independence period, have heightened the notions of common Guan (and especially Akan) identity against minorities such as the Ewe.

2.5 THE BONO KINGDOM AND THE BRONG-AHAFO REGION

The capital city of the Bono kingdom, Bono-Mansu, is purported to be the 'oldest centre of Akan civilisation south of the Black Volta river' (Manoukian 1950, p. 13; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 29). The date for the founding of this city is fixed at 1295 and its destruction by the Asante at 1742, and the whole Bono kingdom in 1740 by the same (Ibid; Ibid). The Bono ruling class (and the Bonos for that matter), are known by the Takyiman tradition to have originated from the "Great White Desert", (the Sahara) from where they migrated to Diala or Diula, close to a big river, with their livestock, and later moved on to settle in Mo (or Mossi), the aboriginals of the region immediately north of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.

In spite of the great kingdom founded here by the Bonos, a defeat in war resulted in some of them fleeing southwards to Gonja as refugees along the military routes charted and led by their fleeing army. From Mo to Gonja in the Northern Territories, they were led by three men, two of whom died. The survivor is Nana Asaman. It is said that on reaching the fringes of the Black Volta, the remaining and surviving Bono folk under Nana Asaman defected from the main Bono body and crossed the Black Volta to the fringes of the tropical forest about 30 miles east of modern Takyiman - formerly the second largest city in the Bono kingdom after Bono-Mansu (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 33-4). It is not known whether the split was initiated by Nana Asaman, but as the tradition continues, Nana Asaman led this defected group, and in a time of crises, led them to build two sites, first Yefri, and later Bono-Mansu, which later became the capital of the new Bono. (One group of refugees who did not follow Nana Asaman broke away and wandered through the forest via the Afram, a tributary of the Volta, and finally reached

the coast to found the town of Eguafo. The same Eguafo also founded Elmina (Ibid, pp. 70-1). Another group which also moved southwards to the coast, became the Afutu or Efutu people who founded Ogua - now called Cape Coast, and Tumpa or Simpa - now called Winneba (Ibid, pp. 74-5). Bono rose to wealth and fame as a result of gold discovered in its territory. Bono-Mansu became a market centre to which traders from Sudan, Egypt, North Africa and Arabia came through the caravan routes, and the main trade items were gold and kola nuts. In the first half of the 17th century, Bono-Mansu defeated and annexed Beeo-Nsoko. Later on, at the height of its power, the Bono kingdom was attacked by the Asante and Bono-Mansu was totally destroyed in the process by 1740. The Bono people, together with the Ahafos in the Ahafo district, form the Brong-Ahafo region of Modern Ghana, where Takyiman and Nkoranza are still prominent trading towns, the latter being next-in-line to Takyiman in terms of prominence in the Bono Kingdom. Brong is pronounced as in "Bono".

The Ahafo district is inhabited by the Ahafos, the allied Kukuom and the rival Mim. The settlement of the Ahafo dates from the middle of the 18th century (Dunn & Robertson 1973, p. 10), and in accordance with the literal meaning of Ahafo (hunters), oral tradition has it that they trickled into the area as isolated communities hunting for and gathering animals and forest produce (Ibid). Many Ahafos admit that they are "strangers" and also admit that their settlement is within the last two centuries, thereby proving that the Ahafos have no autochthons (Ibid, p. 12). However, a more objective account has it that Ahafo settlement is a 'by-product of: (a) conflict during the eighteenth century between the rival states of Ashanti and Denkyira, and; (b) the expansion of Ashanti after the defeat of Denkyira in the epoch-making battle of Feyiase - 1701' (Ibid). Being part of the geographical and military union of the Ashanti

confederacy, the Ahafos had to pay tribute to their Ashanti overlords. When the Ashanti Confederacy was abrogated in 1901, both the Ahafos and Kukuom (under the paramount leadership of the latter) enjoyed autonomy and independence until it was re-established in 1935 (Ibid, p. 13). Mim, a close associate of the Ashanti, prospered in the re-establishment of the Ashanti Confederacy in 1935. The Ahafo district as a whole seems to be fraught with political vicissitudes. In 1958, the Convention People's Party - CPP of Nkrumah's government restored Kukuomhene (Chief of Kukuom) to paramountcy, and deposed the Mimhene (Chief of Mim). Mimhene re-gained the upper hand when Nkrumah's government was overthrown in a coup d'état in February 1966. This coup was more or less Ashanti-led, and Kukuomhene was abrogated as a result (Ibid). This political see-saw has resulted into the two main political alliances in the Brong-Ahafo Region - the Kukuom faction and the Mim faction. The former advocated secession from Ashanti in order to form an independent Ahafo state, on the grounds that they originate from the Denkyiras (Ashanti's historic rival), whilst the latter alligns with Ashanti in support of a wider Ashanti union incorporating Ahafo (Ibid). Incidentally, both Mim and Kukuom are located in the Ahafo district of the Brong-Ahafo Region. Thus, Nkrumah's CPP government, and any other subsequent government/party to which the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition (which assumed government in December 2000) has been opposed (for example, Rawlings' PNDC government which ruled until December 2000), usually plays upon this historic factional division to gain divisive foothold over the Ahafo district of the Brong-Ahafo Region, as a political ploy against the Ashantis. This ploy has had recurrences in Ghana's modern political history. The Danquah-Busia tradition – the Progress Party (PP) as it was called in 1969 - was led by Dr. Kofi Busia to electoral victory culminating in Ghana's Second Republic which began in 1969. Busia became the

Prime Minister of the Second Republic. Busia however, hails from the Brong-Ahafo Region and is a descendant of the royal family of Wenchi (Wenkyi or Wankyi). But Wenchi is in the Bono (Brong) section of the Region and has not had any direct dealings with the Ahafo rivalries. Relations between the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti Regions have always been erratic and sensitive, with each playing on one another's weaknesses. The loyalty and electoral alliances which are supposed to have been between them due to their common ancestry from the Djenne-Timbuktu area, seem not to have crystallised, even after Busia's leadership of the PP to electoral victory in 1969. The Ashanti defeat of Bono in 1740 might be an explanation. Because as a vassal state to the Ashanti, the Bono (Brong) had to pay tribute from off their own land (now controlled by the Asantehene) to Kumasi, as well as accept settlers and hunters "posted" there by authorisation from Kumasi (the capital of Ashanti). Even as at now, some Ashanti chiefs still assert rights to demand and allocate land in the Brong-Ahafo Region (Ibid, p. 12). It would appear that the electoral results from 1992 and 1996 indicate that overall, the Brong-Ahafo Region has not supported the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition. Results of the 1992 Parliamentary elections reveal that out of the 21 constituencies in the Region, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - the Danquah-Busia tradition as it assumed from 1992 – lost in as much as 20 of them, all to the rival and then ruling NDC (Nugent 1993, pp. 54-8). It would appear also, that as compared with the other Regions in Modern Ghana, the Brong-Ahafo Region feels very much neglected in overall country-wide development. Thus, the then ruling NDC party, capitalised on the recurrent implications of the political see-saw, and courted the Brong-Ahafo Region with the allocation of development projects including electrification, pipe-borne water, increases in cocoa producer prices and the building of

feeder roads. As Nugent states, 'Projects across the country were therefore timed to reach fruition in the immediate run-up to the poll' of 1996 (Nugent 1999, p. 297).

2.6 THE “GONJA” KINGDOM AND THE NORTHERN, UPPER-EAST AND UPPER-WEST REGIONS

The Gonja territory, as the analysis below would reveal, changed names from Gonja kingdom, to Kania kingdom, to Nta kingdom and finally to Gonja. The aborigines of the Gonja kingdom were the Mo (Mossi) people (commonly called Grunshi by the Europeans). The Dja-Mo or Djo-Mo or Ka-Dju-Mo, are Mossi people who had accepted the matrilineal organisation of the N’Gwa from Dja (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 53). The origins of the Gonja, according to tradition dates from the 11th century. A section of the Gonja people – the Guan-Dja, claim that their ancestors, the N’Gwa or A’Gwa, came from the region called Dia or Dja known to be between Djenne and Timbuktu, in order to avoid compulsory “conversion” to Islam when the muslim Assauano or Assaud (Azawagh), leader of the Islamized Berbers, invaded it at the beginning of the 11th century (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51; 1958, p. 17). [Note that the Dia kings who succumbed to Islamic conversion as a result of the same routing were also to be found in the “Niger Bend” area, their capital being transferred from Kukia to Gao on the Middle Niger from 1009 to 1010 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51)]. Between 1200 and 1300, the N’Gwa or A’Gwa states around the Niger Bend were conquered by the Bozamfri people from Zamfara in Northern Nigeria. The N’Gwa proper were routed in 1200, the Mamprusi in about 1250 and four or five other states in Mossi in about 1300. These “Bozamfri refugees” from Mamprusi later conquered Dagomba in the latter half of the 14th century (Ibid, p. 49). Thus, the Gonja Kingdom, which occupies the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast was created from the refugees who came from Dia or Dja – the region between Djenne and Timbuktu (Ibid).

In the middle half of the 15th century, under the leadership of King Darigudienda of the Dagomba, the Gonja kingdom was conquered by the Dagomba and Mamprusi. Darigudienda (whose descendants established the Kania kingdom) took the town of Bona, married the Bona princess and had a son called Bonkane. A generation or two after Bonkane had succeeded him, the Kania kingdom came into existence in Gonja resulting in the ousting of the Dagomba from the territory. The Kania or (Accany or Akan), according to the tradition of the Twifo-Heman, originated from the Kingdom of Kumbu – a confederated state of the great Mande Mali Kingdom. When Djenne, the capital state of Mali was conquered by the Songhai in 1473, Kumbu passed into the hands of the Songhai. The founders of Kania are therefore Akan from Kumbu in Mande who took refuge in Bona before settling finally in the Gbipe region on the Black Volta, immediately north of Bono-Mansu. The capital of Kania was Kania-se or Kaniamase, and the King of Kania's title was Kinimpase-Wura (Ibid, pp. 54-5). Sometime in 1591 [a date preserved in the Koran as "the 1000th year of the Hegira" (Ibid)], a Mande general named Djakpa, accompanied with a lot of refugees came and sought refuge for a brief period in Dja-Gbon (or the Bole area), after which he attacked the Kania kingdom. As King of Kania, Djakpa styled himself as Ndo-wura (Nda-Wura or Nta-wura), that is "Lord of Ndo (Nda or Nta)". They are sometimes also referred to in literal Fante language as Ntafo (meaning people of Nta). Djakpa, after consolidating his power, defeated the Dagomba and their capital Njani or Djani was transferred south into Konkomba territory. The name Njani or Djani was corrupted to Yandi or Yendi, as the town and its people are still called today. Today, the Nta area is still called Gonja territory. Djakpa died through mortal wounds when he tried to invade and capture the Bono territory south of the Northern Territories (Ibid, pp. 55-9). In about 1600, the Mandingo people (called Mande or Mende by the Gonja and Bono people) came from

Kangaba and Segu, conquered the whole Gonja country (or the Northern Territories), and established themselves as the ruling class till today (Ibid, p. 54). On the administrative map of Modern Ghana, the “Northern Territories” are now the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions (see Appendix I). Together, these three politico-administrative regions occupy a geographical section of Ghana usually referred to as Northern Ghana, and its occupants as "Northerners". Phonology helps to understand the origins of the Gonja. According to Meyerowitz:

to understand the term N’Gwa, it is necessary to explain that N’Gwa and A’Gwa, and Guan are forms of the same word. “N” or “A” is the noun class prefix of Gwa or Guan. Other variants of the word Guan in use in Gonja are Gban and Gbon; G’bon in turn is the same as M’bon, the ancient name for the Bono in the Gonja; in other words the language confirms what the Gonja allege – namely, that Guan, Gonja, A’Gwa and Bono are all closely related to one another and have a common ancestry. Seeing that the Gonja call the Akan Ka-Mbon, and that the Akan and Bono also regard themselves as closely related and that they have the same matrilineal clans, one may assume that the word Akan is also derived from Guan, and may be a variant of A’Gban (A’Kpan) or A’Guan. There is further the Akan clan name Anana, the final “na” means ‘descendants of’, which is derived from A’Gwa or A-N’Gwa (with the Akan prefix “A” before the old prefix “N”). Anana, pronounced thus in Bono, has become Agona in Asante and Anona in Fante. The small state Agona in the coastal district, founded by mixed Guan and Akan was written Agwana, Aguna, and Agonna on old European maps. It is interesting to note here that the elders of the Na of Yendi, ruler of the Dagombas, whom I consulted, called the N’Gwa people Sosi or So people. Since these people came from Dja, they ought to be by origin the same as the So-nke, which also means So people (So-nke was later corrupted to Soninke). The N’Sona or A’Sona clan people among the Akan, including Bono, Asante, Fante and so forth are, as their name says Descendants of S, and have partly come from the ‘Sosi’ area into the Gold Coast, partly direct from the Timbuktu region, or via the Northern Ivory Coast. The name of the country, Gonja, Gbon-Dja, Gban-Dja, Guan-Dja or Giuan-Nia, is derived from Gbon, Gban, or Guan and Dja, Nja or Nia, the country of origin of its chief inhabitants (Ibid, pp. 52-3).

Sometime after the final destruction of the Bono Kingdom by the Ashantis, the Ashanti hegemony and control of the hinterland extended to the Northern Territories. Ashanti controlled the trade between the coast and the hinterland, with the “Northerners” acting

as middlemen between the Saharan trade routes and the Ashanti. Ashanti trade influence extended as far as Salaga in the Northern Territories, Salaga being the chief trade centre in the area. After the Ashanti had consolidated its gains from her central position in the coastal-interior trade, it began to militarily challenge the Northern neighbours, resulting in several wars being fought with the Gyaman, Gonja and Dagomba between the 17th and 18th centuries. The Ashanti also fought southwards against coastal tribes and the European establishments over trading rights and “free trade” between the coast and the Northern Territories, resulting in seven different wars in 1821, 1824, 1826, 1828, 1865, 1873-4 and 1894-6 (Massing 1994, p. 16). First contacts of colonial authorities with the Northern Territories took place after the Berlin Conference of 1884, the initial aims of contact being for the sole purposes of commercial treaties. The first were from the Germans in 1886 and 1888. Thereafter, Germany, intent on avoiding a conflict with either France or Britain, agreed with London on a neutral zone within which both colonial powers would ‘abstain from protectorates or exclusive influence’ (Ibid, p. 17). Despite British overtures to the native authorities of Dagomba, Gonja, “Gurunsi” and Mossi, the Ya-Na of Yendi accepted protection from Germany in 1894, and subsequently all Anglo-German negotiations on trade influences broke in 1895 until the Anglo-German Border Treaty was signed in 1899 (Ibid, p. 19). The area east of the border was until 1914 administered by Germany as “Schutzgebiet Togoland”, until British troops from the Gold Coast annexed it from 1919 till 1947, after which it became a United Nations (UN)-mandated area. Before this period the British colonial-cum-military officer - the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories (CCNT) - had joined the Gold Coast Executive Council in 1934 and the Gold Coast Legislative Council in 1946. The results of the plebiscite of May 9 1956 (discussed in Section 2.12) released the “Togoland”

area of the Northern territories finally into the hands of the Gold Coast and henceforth Ghana (Ibid, p. 20). The “Northern Territories” or the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West Regions of Ghana have taken various active parts in the political history of Modern Ghana both in the pre-independence struggle and in the post-independence era. Among many other things, the late President Hilla Limann (who died on 23 January 1998) was President of Ghana’s Third Republic and leader of the Nkrumahist-led People’s National Party which won the elections in 1979. Until his death, he was the Paramount Chief of Gwolu in “Gonja” country under the chieftaincy title Kuoro Hilla Limann III. In addition, due to the ethnic arithmetic normally worked out by Ghanaian governments, there have always been a fairly good representation of “Northerners” at the political helm of affairs. As at May 1997, the cabinet of the ruling NDC government had six people hailing from Northern Ghana (West Africa 12-18/05/97, p. 742).

It can be argued that, owing to the common ancestry of the Gonja peoples, their emergence as a nation would have been formed had it not been the advent or intervention of colonialism. Although the Ashanti conquered the Bono who were south of Gonja, they never conquered the Gonja even though they had trade influences and links with them. There is also the likelihood that the Bono would/could have joined forces with their Gonja relatives of common ancestry against Ashanti.

2.6.1 "Northerners" versus "Southerners"

Owing to the colonial history of the Gold Coast, the associated development of the coastal Southern Ghana and the relative underdevelopment of the inland Northern Ghana, a somewhat common identity has formed among the "Northerners". Northern Ghana is meant the geographical area occupied by the current politico-administrative sections known as the Northern, Upper-West and Upper-East Regions of Ghana. References to Northerners as Mabians springs from the Northern Ghana traditional word "mabia" or "mmabia", meaning "my brother". Northerners see themselves as belonging to a common identity or "brotherhood" in a way that Southerners do not. There is the obvious, occasional inter-tribal conflict in Northern Ghana, as usually occurs between the Nanumbas and Konkombas for example (Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000), but there does not seem to be that tense tribal antagonism as exists in the South between Akans and Ewes for example, and which has translated into far reaching political connotations. The whole of Northern Ghana is savanna land which makes a clear vegetational distinction from the forestry South. Perhaps this also adds to the development of the Northern identity with respect to the dry weather and associated agricultural pursuits. Moreover, commonality of feeling among Northerners seems to have derived from the relative underdevelopment of their location, as well as having a relatively predominant Muslim community in comparison with the South. Northern Ghana has very scarce educational resources whereas the best educational establishments in Ghana are located in Southern Ghana. Incentives to schooling have been rather low, and for several decades after independence, Northerners have been entitled to free education as an incentive to educational pursuits. Despite sharing the Guan identity with most of Southerners, any combination of the scenario explained

above has contributed to the “brotherhood” which has resulted in Northerners becoming Mabians. Occupants of Northern Ghana have been accustomed to such name calling as “Northerners”, or “people from the North”, etc. thus lumping citizens living in this geographical area into one identity. It must be noted, that in terms of citizenship, Northerners are no less Ghanaian than occupants of other geographical sections of Ghana. Also, the “mabian-ness” of Northern Ghana does not reduce in any way the beauty of the tribal diversity which exists in the sub-region, as Table 1 depicts:

Table 1: Major tribes of Northern Ghana in their current politico-administrative Regions:

tribe	language	major city/town	region
Dagomba	Dagbani	Tamale, Yendi, Tolon	n/r
Gonja	Gonja	Damongo, Salaga	n/r
Nanumba	Nanumba	Wulensi	n/r
Konkomb a	Konkomb a	Kpandai, Dambai	n/r
Bimoba	Bimoba	Nakpanduri	n/r
Mamprusi	Mampruli	Walewale, Gambaga	n/r
Frafra - Nabdams, Gurunses, Talensis	Nabke, Gurunne, Talene	Bolgatanga, Bongo, Zuarungu, Zorko	u-e/r
Kusasi	Kusali	Bawku	u-e/r
Kasena/Na nkani (Grushie)	Kasem	Navrongo, Paga	u-e/r
Builsa	Builsa	Sandema	u-e/r
Wala	Wala	Wa	u-w/r
Dagaaba	Dagaare	Nandom, Lawri, Jirapa	u-w/r
Sisala	Sisala	Tumu	u-w/r

Source - George Atiah Nsoh (see acknowledgements)

However, despite the fact that Northerners and Southerners share the same citizenship in Modern Ghana, the less fortunate history and ecology of the area, and the common Mabian identity thus evolved, has translated into several implications. For example,

Northern migrants living in any city, town or village in Southern Ghana often coagulate, cluster or ghetto-ise themselves into a common residential area which has come to be termed as “Zongo”. Second, politics in Ghana seems to treat Northerners as second class citizens. The inclusion of Northerners into the political arithmetic only seem to occur for the sake of wooing their votes for electoral victories, as happened in 1979 when the choice of Dr Hilla Limann (a Northerner) as the presidential candidate of the People’s National Party – PNP, became the crucial factor to the PNP’s victory at the elections.

2.6.2 The “Northern” vote

It would appear that in subsequent years, politicians have tactically cashed in on the Northern votes with promises of political favours which have not been forthcoming. Therefore, in a pre-election development, discontent was expressed at what appeared to be a scheme by the top hierarchy of the ruling NDC to sideline Northerners in their bid for the vice-presidential candidacy. The Northerners complained that both past two elections in 1992 and 1996 had an Ewe president and an Akan vice-president. As the NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was an Akan-Fanti (John Ata Mills), Northerners deemed it as their bona fide right to field their candidate. Alhaji Salpawuni Alhassan, Executive member of the Chogo-Tishigu Constituency in Tamale, said ‘the country has got to a stage where we think that the North should be given the chance’ (Ghanaian Online Chronicle, Vol. 8 No. 83, 28/03/00). Hence, all Zongos in the country had been put on the alert to fight against the trend in political discrimination against Northerners (Ibid). It became obvious, that the general direction of Northern votes depended very much on the ethnonational identities of the

presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Subsequently, 'a union of citizens from the three Northern regions and various Zongo communities throughout the country, calling itself COZONGO, dared the leadership of the NDC to make the right choice of a Northerner as a running mate or face the consequences' (GRi Press Review, 24/05/00; <http://www.mcglobal.com/History/May2000/24e2000/24e0r.html>). Obviously, the rationality (Sections 3.1.1 & 3.1.2) behind the ethnonationalism of the Northerners, was dictating the direction of their votes. The COZONGO made it clear that they were not asking for a favour, and that this was a 'genuine demand', owing to the immense contribution and sacrifices which Northerners had made to the NDC's success (Ibid). Although some power brokers within the NDC were of the persuasion that the NDC's vice-presidential candidate should be an Ewe, and had in mind Dr Obed Asamoah, since the choice of running mate lay with Ata Mills, the NDC eventually bowed to the political pressure of the Northerners, as well as what seemed to be the political wisdom of the 2000 electoral season, and selected Alhaji Amidu as the party's vice-presidential candidate. Soon afterwards, the NPP also selected Alhaji Mahama Aliu, a Northerner, as the party's vice-presidential candidate. Professor George Hagan, the presidential candidate for the CPP also selected Alhaji Ibrahim Abubakr, a Northerner, as his running mate, and Goosie Tanor the presidential candidate for the NRP also picked Cletus Kosiba, a Northerner, as his running mate. The competition for the Northern vote therefore became keener than expected. However, as the NDC was popularly approached by Northerners to field a Northern vice-presidential candidate, and as it was the first party to do so, it would appear that the NDC's accession to the popular Northern request paid off, in that, the party's presidential candidate won most of the Northern vote in the first round ballot held on December 7: 50.75%, 52.13% and

62.29% for the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West regions respectively (see Section 6.1 in Postscript).

2.7 THE CENTRAL REGION

With the exception of the Ewes, and a few non-Ewe tribes in the Volta Region known as the “Central Togo Minorities” or “Togo Remnants” (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178), the majority of Modern Ghana trace their ancestry from Dia or Dja in the region between Djenne and Timbuktu. Also, not all people in the Central Region are Fantis, or even Akans in the modern Ghanaian sense. As already mentioned, a number of the few groups in Ghana who have retained the Guan tag, can be found in the Central Region, which is currently and strictly Akan-Fanti territory. For example, the Efutu-Guans of Winneba and the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku. Also, the area of the Central Region just behind Winneba has been popularly known on 18th century European maps as *AGuana* territory (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80).

A group of refugees who split from the leadership of Nana Asaman at the time of the founding of the Bono Kingdom, moved further southwards through the forest, possibly alongside the route of the Afram, a tributary of the Volta, and founded the town known as Eguafo. Kobena Amankwa, a grandson of the first Eguafohene founded a village called Amankwa-kurom (translated as Amankwa town) between the sea and the lagoon. Amankwa-kurom, together with a nearby Afutu settlement at the opposite side of the lagoon and built around the same time, jointly became known as ‘the village of two parts’, and was named by the Portuguese and Dutch traders as El Mina, as it is called today. Another grandson of the first Eguafohene, called Akyene Takyi founded ‘Little Eguafo’, which was later called by the Dutch who built their fort there as Komenda, as it is still called today. The descendants of another grandson of Eguafohene later founded Djabi, and subsequently Shamaa. Tradition has it that among the followers of the Eguafo Prince, were a people called Djabi, who according to their remaining

ancestors in ancient Djabi in the Djenne area, were among the founders of Wag'du, west of Timbuktu, and who later moved to the ancient town of Ghana, staying there until 1224. Ancestors of Shamaa also claim to have been Djabi from Walata, a town situated 100 miles north of the ancient town Ghana on the great caravan route which led to Morocco, and founded by emigrants from ancient Ghana in 1224. A Mohameddan people later drove them away, resulting in their return to rejoin some of their brothers in Timbuktu. They later moved southwards to Bono-Mansu during the reign of Akumfi-Ameyaw (1328-1363), one of the most notable chiefs of Bono. The Djabi later left Bono-Mansu to join the Eguafu, and subsequently founded Djabi, and Shamaa. An explanation of why the migrant Djabi called their second town Shamaa could be because Walata was situated in a region called Chama - or Ghana (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 74).

The Efutu claim to have come to the coast round about the middle of the 14th century at the foundation of Bono. They claim to have had no matrilineal ruling class and therefore elected their chiefs from the Dentzen and Tufua (the organisations of the old and young warriors respectively). [As Guans, they are patrilineal, and this is confirmed in Ibid, p. 77]. Under the leadership of two brothers Bonde and Gyan, they founded Awutu (or called by the Fanti as Efutu). A split from the Efutu led by Edwe and Etumpan resulted in the founding of Oguu, now known as Cape Coast. Its large size and inadequate drinking water led some of its citizens off to found Dwemma near Mumford on the coast, and finally Tumpa or Simpa, now called Winneba, as it is this day (Ibid, pp. 74-5). Cape Coast is currently the capital city of the Central Region. The Etsi were the first Dja people to have settled along the coast of the Gold Coast. They lived up north with the Bono and left the region as a result of famine. As habitual fisherfolk in

the “large river” (or Benue River) they followed their fishing career along this river and ended up in Nigeria. After being attacked by a people from a north-easterly direction, they came to settle in Benin City. After the conquest of Benin City, they came to southern Benin, and afterwards moved in a south-westerly direction to found Egysa and Onyinatsiadze (now known as Anomabu). Kormantse (or Kormantin) was founded by Njadum people who had also fled from the Bono area and had also gone through Benin. A people of Fante dialect called Asebu (who were neither of Dja nor Akan origin, and were “great lovers of fetish”, came from Benin and founded Asebu and Moree. They are said to have originated from a desert area beyond Northern Nigeria (Ibid, pp. 63-9). Their love for fetish can be attributed to having passed through the Benin area, which was inhabited by the Ewe, a people very much known for their fetish cults. In the reign of the second King of Bono (Akumfi Ameyaw I), a group of Fante dissented the Bono folk for a southward direction towards the coast and founded Kwaman near the shore-located Saltpond. Kwaman became the capital of the Abukpa state.

After the destruction of Kania by Djakpa sometime at the beginning of the 17th century, some Fante (known as the Adminadze Fante) and some Djomo people from Bono-Mansu also dissented the city for a southwards direction and settled with the Etsi by reason of linguistic similarity, resulting in the joint founding of Mankessim by all three groups. A quarrel between the Fante and the Djomo resulted in the latter moving on into deeper Etsi country to found Gomoaman (derived from Djomo-na-man). (“Djomo” is the Gonja pronunciation, same as “Gyomo” or “Gomo”. “Na” means “descendants of”. (O)man means “state”. The state is now known as Gomoa-Assin. With time, the stronger Fante subdued the Etsi over the whole stretch of coast from Akumfi to Yamoranza, killed the Etsi chief in process, additionally conquered Afutu, Eguafu,

Komenda, and Shamaa and finally founded Anomabu at Onyinatsiadze. When Bono-Mansu was destroyed by the Ashanti in 1742, the Fante and Djomo who had remained in Takyiman (the second largest city in the Bono Kingdom) had to move away, and as a result joined their brothers down south on the coast and finally settled in Akerakurom, which they renamed Mankessim. Again, the Etsi in the region were subdued in order to achieve this, during several individual battles at Etsi towns including Abakab, Aduoagyro, Sunkwaa, Anoo, Bosom Adwi (Atwe) and Gyraikan. Due to geographical insufficiency, the Djomo moved on to join their brothers in Gomoaman (Gomoa-Assin), and later founded the nearby Gomoa-Adwumako state. The Djomo are also among the founders of Bono-Mansu.

The group of Fante who came southwards later from Bono-Mansu after its destruction by the Asante - "the latter-day Fante" - seem to have subdued their brothers at the coast as well as the Etsi, and ruled such large capital states as Mankessim (capital Mankessim), Nkussukum (capital Saltpond), Abora Dunkwa (capital Abacrampa), Abora Abeadze (capital Domenase), Abora Kwamankase (capital Ayiredo) and Akumfi (capital Ebirem). Komenda was founded by a group of the "latter Fante" who first settled at Kormantin and later moved to Eguafo. The region behind Winneba (designated on 18th century European maps as Agwana, Aguna or Agonna), was inhabited by Guans from the North. These Guans were first conquered by the Akwamu during the 17th century, got their freedom after the fall of Akwamu in 1734, and were reconquered by the Mbooko from Ahafo in the Brong-Ahafo area. Following the capture of the Mbooko by the Asante in the Domaa-Asante war, both the Mbooko and the Agwana (or Guans) became servants of the Asante. They later escaped and hid in a settlement which they founded known as Kuntanase, near the forest area of Lake

Bosumtwe. During the reign of Asantehene Opoku Ware, they were rediscovered, as a result of which they moved out of their hide-away settlement to seek refuge in the Breman State. There, they founded Nyankurum, near Esikuma, the capital of the Breman State. A quarrel which arose between the Agwana (and Mbooko) and the Breman resulted in the conquest of Breman, and by this the rest of the towns within the Breman State including Kwaman, Asenka, Bobokuma (or Bobikuma), Abodom, Nsaban (or Nsabaa), Odabeng (or Odobeng), Brakwa, Akuntanase (or Kuntanase), Ochiso, and Okyi. With this large conquest, the Agona State was founded in 1750 (Ibid, pp. 79-80). Finally, a group of Denkyira, while fighting their way through Adanse, joined the “latter-day Fante” at Mankessim, and later broke away to found Anyan-Denkyira on the Mankessim-to-Accra road (Ibid, pp. 81-3). Dunkwa is the current capital of the powerful Denkyira kingdom which was founded in the central forest in 1620 by the Asante. Denkyira was defeated first by the Asante in the famous battle at Feyiase in 1701. Subsequently, they migrated to an area adjacent to their Akwamu relatives in Wasa-Amanfi, and founded Dunkwa (Ibid, pp. 94-5). Thus, the current location of Dunkwa is not the origins of the Denkyira. The original Denkyira kingdom came out of the royal line of the Agona (Aguana) clan (Ibid, p. 104).

2.7.1 The Fanti vote

As already explained, the NDC’s presidential candidate for 2000 (Mills) was a Fanti, and soon after his public endorsement as candidate, a Mills Brotherhood Club was inaugurated at Winneba in the Central Region by Dr Don Arthur (GRi Newsreel, 14/03/00). Dr Don-Arthur, a key adviser to Rawlings, is also a Fanti, and one of four Fanti key figures in the NDC’s cabinet known as the “Fanti Confederacy”. A

perception had assumed (rightly or wrongly so), that Mills's background could be used to whip up Fanti sentiments for the NDC. Panic therefore arose from within the Mills camp when Professor George Hagan, a Fanti from Cape Coast, and a lecturer at the University of Ghana, also emerged as the presidential candidate for the Nkrumahist Convention People's Party (CPP), since this meant a keener competition for the Fanti vote (GRI Press Review 14/06/00; <http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Jun2000/14f2000/14f0r.html>). Although Mills is a Fanti, and Kufour is Akan, Fantis in the Central Region seemed to be presented with an alternative choice in the CPP presidential candidate. Doubtless, anti-NDC-cum-Fanti-ethnonationalists preferred Professor Hagan (GRI Press Review 14/06/00; <http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Jun2000/14f2000/14f0r.html>), however, as a candidate of a minor party, he was not expected to pull a significant percentage of votes away from even his own people, especially if any candidate of the two major parties was Akan, or even so, Fanti.

2.8 THE WESTERN REGION

The Western Region of Ghana shares its western border and a thick forest region with the neighbouring country and French-speaking La Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). The Western Region is populated mainly by the Nzima, Ahanta, Wasa, Anyi (or Brosa), Sewhi and other peoples. Ghana's first president, the late Kwame Nkrumah was an Nzima. The Ahanta state was founded by the ruling class of the Evalue people who claim to have been among the founders of Eguafu. The Nzima (N'Zi-mba) arrived from beyond Kankyeabo in the north of La Cote d'Ivoire, and settled west of Evalue between Cape Three Points and La Cote d'Ivoire's border. They also founded Axim, which became the capital of the Nzima state. Beyin, the capital of the Western Nzima state, is said to have been founded by Asebu from Anweamea. A group of refugees who fled to La Cote d'Ivoire from Takyiman after the fall of Bono-Mansu in 1740, later returned to the Gold Coast to join the Asebu. Refugees from besieged Bono who had also passed through La Cote d'Ivoire country, founded Kabeku, and thereafter Atuabo, which became the capital of the Eastern Nzima state. Another group of Fante refugees from Takyiman, and of the Asona clan came to live in Wartrain and later Bentenase, both in Wasa country. They met the Erzohale people (Nzima from Axim), and together migrated seawards to found Miegwina. These latter-day Takyiman refugees also founded Asiama based on land given them by their brothers in Atuabo (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 84-6). The Wasa-Amenfi State in the south-western forest of the Western Region was founded by some refugees of the Akwamu who were defeated in the Akyem area of the Eastern Region in 1734 (Ibid, pp. 99). The Aowin (Anyin) State was founded by Brosa (Anyi) people from Anwianwia in the Ahafo district. They were refugees, and after founding Aowin, moved southwards and founded Enchi, the present capital of the Anyin State (Ibid, p. 117). The northern part of the Western Region is

dominantly populated by the Sewhi people, forming the Sewhi State which is a confederation of three states: Sewhi-Wiawso, Sewhi-Anwiaso and Sewhi-Bekwai. The original royal house fled to La Cote d'Ivoire after the Asante defeat in 1743, and their descendants still live there. The Sewhi Anwiaso State was founded by refugees from Wankyi after the conquest of Wankyi by the Asante in 1740. Sewhi-Bekwai was founded as a result of a quarrel which broke out between Wiawso of the Ayoko clan and the Sewhis of the Koonaa clan. The two clans lived together under the jurisdiction of Asantehene Osei Yao. Therefore, after the quarrel, they were granted permission to leave for Bekwai (Ibid, p. 118). The Western Region's main claim to fame in Ghanaian politics is inherent in the fact that the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, an Nzima, hailed from there. In comparison with the other tribes, Nzimas are very few.

2.9 THE GREATER-ACCRA REGION

The La or Ga Boni, another group of Guan, immigrated into the Gold Coast, towards the end of the 16th century, after making a detour to Nigeria (Manoukian 1950, p. 13; Meyerowitz 1952) and approaching Modern Ghana through the Benin area, and settling among the Kpesi aborigines at the mouth of the Volta. Under their chief Okpolaebi, they founded, on their own La Doku and La Badi. But together with the Ga Wo and Ga Masi, who came with them from Benin, they founded Accra, which soon grew into importance (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77). These Guans can be traced to an area somewhat north of modern Ghana, from a territory that seem to lie between the White Volta and Red Volta and a part of the original Mossi territory north of the “Northern Territories” of modern Ghana (Ibid, pp. 77-9). The Ga Boni are Adangbe-speaking people, and form part of the Ga-Adangbe group which currently occupies the Greater-Accra Region and parts of the Eastern Region of Ghana.

2.10 THE EASTERN REGION

The La or Ga Boni are Guans and aboriginals of Mossi territory. The Kyerepon-Guans are also aboriginals of the area around “a” tributary of the Black Volta. (Ibid, p. 78). The Anum people founded Senya after 1734 when the Akwamu overthrew the Akyem and Akwapem people (Ibid, p. 76). Out of a quarrel between the Ga and La- or Ga-Boni, around 1580-1600, the chief of the latter left with most of his people some 30 or 40 miles inland and founded some 30 odd villages in the hilly country of Akwapem including Ahenase, Adiha, Dome, Sokorowanso, Dosu and Kubease. New Late, which exists today is their chief town. Around the same period as stated, some La Boni families wandered further inland from the coast, and together with some Afutu, founded Obutu, near Senya-Bereku. The La or Ga Boni are the actual aborigins of part of the Mossi territory further “North” in current Gonja territory between the White Volta and the Red Volta. When the Bono and some N’Gwa or Angwa vacated this region around 1300 (as a result of the routing by the Bozamfri people from Zamfara in Northern Nigeria), they settled with some Kyerepon people beside a tributary of the Black Volta. The settlement is still known today as Laboni. [This explanation – together with the names - has been given in retrospect, since the time of arrival of the Ga Boni from Benin to the coast is towards the end of the 16th century (Ibid, p. 77), three centuries after the Bozamfri invasion of Mossi territory. Unless of course when the Ga Boni left they first went to Benin and retracted later to the Gold Coast coastland, or better still unless they were known as La or Ga Boni when they were at their autochthonous region in Mossi territory. If this latter explanation is true, it would mean that they have maintained their name throughout their migrations around for three centuries before re-entering into Gold Coast territory. This is confirmed in Ibid, p. 79]. Some of the Ga Boni, after the “Bozamfri” invasion, went southwards into Gonja

territory and settled with the Kyerepon beside a tributary of the Black Volta, others joined Nana Asaman's group into founding Bono-Mansu, and others left with the Afutu (one of the breakaway groups from Nana Asaman) to the coastal region (Ibid, pp. 77-8).

It would appear that when the Adangbe-speaking and patrilineal Ga Boni, who stayed in Gonja with the Kyerepon, strayed from the area and detoured through Benin before returning to the Gold Coast, the Kyerepon migrated southwards and settled in Nsawam in a town known as Abotoase, about 25 miles north of Accra (which had probably not been built then). Louis Wilson also states that the Adangbe-speaking and patrilineal Krobos also trace their route as a migration from the direction of Benin and Togo (Wilson 1992, p. 12), most probably, after having detoured from Gonja territory. With the arrival of the Akwamu people at nearby Anyandawaase, the Kyerepon moved inland into the hills of Akuapem and founded the Kyerepon state, a confederation of five towns [or Amanonum], and which included Adukrom (the capital), Abonse, Abirin (or Aburi), Awukugua (capital of the current Akuapim state) and Odau (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 79). It is therefore amazing that the "stray Ga Boni" (the former neighbours of the Kyerepon in Gonja territory) should also after three centuries, wander around through Benin and also come and settle in the same hilly country of Akuapem. It was simply the similarity of language (as highlighted in Ibid, p. 77), as well as the common patriliney shared by the "non-stray Ga Boni" and the Afutu, which attracted the former to join up with the latter to found Obutu and live together. The Afutu came to the coast around the middle of the 14th century (Ibid, p. 74) and the Ga Boni also came to the coast towards the end of the 16th century (Ibid, p. 77). Thus, adding the time of the quarrel between the coastal Ga and "stray Ga Boni", as a result of which the latter

moved inland to join the Afutu (and consequently the Kyerepon state in the same Akwapem area), we should be approaching some three centuries, and this corroborates the analysis. But, it would also appear that a loophole has not been filled. The Afutu are said to be a mixed breed of people originating from different tribes in the "North" where there was a "big river" (Ibid, p. 75), and the Ga Boni are also said to originate from a part of Mossi territory north of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (Ibid, p. 78). If the "big river" is the Niger, then the loophole is not yet explained. If it is the Volta or part of it, then that explains it! According to Meyerowitz's explanation, there possibly was a Guan State in eastern Bono whose people (according to the traditions of Prang and Yeji), regarded themselves as brothers of Late, i.e. the La Boni. Therefore since the Kwaman, Kumawu and Agogo people of Asante refer to these Guan as Bono-Ntwumu (Nchumu-ru), one may assume that the La Boni were originally a branch of the large tribe Guan. Kokofu is deemed as once the site of the Guan capital, and that the Guan king, Atele Firempon, lives on the traditions of Kwaman, Kumawu, Agogo and Kwahu. Also, the current geographical sites of towns such as Kumawu, Kwaman, Agogo, Atonso, Satenso, Atwea and Mampon are all on King Atele Firempon's land. Therefore, the Kyerepons are Guans. Guans who have never come under the Dja or Akan, have remained a patrilineal people (Ibid, p. 77). Despite any traceability of tribal groupings to autochthons or common origins, the evolution of tribal names due to migratory reasons, has resulted in the Kyerepon-Guans "remaining" or "emerging" as part of the "remnant" or "latter-day" Guan ("in contrast" with the wider Guan ancestry traceable to Ancient Ghana territory). The Kyerepon-Guans are therefore only a part of the wider Guan ancestry. The Late-Guans were the aboriginals of the region which is part of the Mossi territory north of the Northern Territories (Ibid, p. 78), the same place where the Afutu-Guans of Winneba and the Ga Boni seem to have come from.

Nugent also confirms their autochthonous status in relation to the current geography of Modern Ghana. The confusion created by the current restriction of the Guan tag to the “remnant” Kyerepon-Guans, Efutu-Guans, Late-Guans, Senya-Guans and Kpesi-Guans (Kwamena-Poh 1973; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-80) - [what I have termed as the Guan controversy] - is confirmed by the fact that in 1985, a Festival of Arts and Culture which featured ‘a Grand Durbar of “all Guan communities”’, was held in Boso, their capital. This festival was meant to hold the political significance that these autochthonous Ghanaians had the potential to re-assert an autonomy in Ghanaian traditional affairs (Nugent 1997, p. 19). They share a common patriliney with their neighbours - the Ewe (Ibid), as well as the Adangbe-speaking Krobos in the Eastern Region of Ghana (Wilson 1992, p. 12). Between the two patrilineal societies lies the official boundary which splits the Eastern Region from the Volta Region. From the autochthonous area up-“North”, some Guans moved directly southwards to the coast, whilst others wandered around to Benin and re-entered Gold Coast later on. The Akwamu State had its capital as Asaremanke (now known as Asamankese), with many towns and villages under its jurisdiction, including Apeda (or Apedwa), Apapam, Akyem-Asafo, Akyem-Kwaman, Tafo and Mbease. The Akwamu State came to an end in 1734 when the three neighbouring and subject Akyem States and their allies rebelled and defeated the Akwamu. The three Akyem states are Akyem-Abuakwa (capital Kibi or Kyebi), Akyem-Kotoku (capital Oda), and Akyem-Bosome. The two latter states are said to have been founded by emigrants from Denkyira (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 99).

2.10.1 The Krobo vote

Regarding pre-election developments, the Krobos in the Eastern Region, a safe electoral area for the National Democratic Congress (NPP), known as only second to the Volta Region, were said to have shifted camp. The Yilo Krobos defied a heavy downpour of rain in order to attend a National Patriotic Party (NPP) election rally in the area. Thousands of them, who claimed to have supported the NDC in 1992 and 1996, had declared an intention 'to ignore the NDC's vain promises and test the NPP for the next four years come December 2000 elections' (GRi Press Review 02/06/00; <http://www.mcglobal.com/History/Jun2000/02f2000/02f0r.html>).

2.11 THE ASHANTI REGION

Tradition has it that the Asante royal clan, the Ayoko clan also originates from the Timbuktu (Tumutu) area through the Queenmother Nyamkomduewuo who ruled a country in the region of Tumutu until it was destroyed by Moslems, as a result of which her son left southwards and founded the Bona Kingdom in northern La Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). Bona was later conquered by King Darigudienda of Dagbon (or Dagomba) (Ibid, p.54) sometime in the latter half of the 15th century, and who was succeeded by his son Bonkane (a product of the Dagomba King Darigudienda and a Bona princess). The Kania or Akan (Accany/Acane) people, a Mande people originating from the Kumbu Kingdom (one of the confederate states of the Mande Mali Kingdom), also came around 1500 to establish political foundations, and as a result of this competition, the Dagomba dissented the Bona region. Much later, between 1591 and 1600, another group of Mande led by Djakpa conquered Bona. Djakpa's son and successor, Quattara introduced Islam, as a result of which three princesses left with a group each for other territories in the forest area southwards. These princesses and other people together established areas such as Kokofu, Juaben, Nsuta and Aduman, all of which later became part of the Asante Kingdom. Thus, around 1600, the first large Akan (or Kania) group settled in Okumanyinase (later corrupted to Kumase) which later became the capital of the Asante.

The Asante grew through a succession of kings from Oti Akenten to Obiri Yeboa to Osei tutu and to Opoku Ware. Since the Denkyira controlled vast portions of land, the Asante inherited a considerable geographical area by conquering Denkyira State, followed with the conquest of the Doma states of Abamperedase, Suman and Gyaman by 1730, followed with that of the Akwamu in 1734, and followed with that of the

mighty Bono by 1740. Bono-Mansu, the capital of Bono was finally destroyed by the Asante in 1742. During the reign of Opoku Ware, Bono was destroyed by the Asante, and therefore all the tributary states of the Bono from Banda to Krakye on the Volta became Asante territory. The Nta in the north (which was under the Kania kingdom) and Dagomba, as well as the three Akyem states were all conquered by the Asante in less than 50 years from the founding of the Asante Kingdom by Osei Tutu in 1701. However, their imperialistic effort was frustrated by Europeans who lived by the coast. The British defeated the Asante in 1900 and the latter was annexed to the Gold Coast in 1901 (Ibid, pp. 104-11, 54-9). The Ashanti Region spans a large forest area suitable for the cultivation of cocoa, Ghana's top cash crop. In 1954, an agitation for a rise in the producer price of cocoa led to the emergence of a nationalist movement in Kumase known as the National Liberation Movement (NLM). This Movement became the foundation for the Danquah-Busia political tradition, which represented itself as the Progress Party (PP) for the 1969 elections, Popular Front Party (PFP) for the 1979 elections, and the NPP for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections (see section 1.3.4 and the Glossary of political parties in Appendix II).

2.12 THE EWES & THE VOLTA REGION

Paul Nugent states:

Out of a list of 28 separate Guan peoples compiled in 1980, no less than 14 were from the Volta Region. This included not just the Nkonya, but the Lolobi, Akpafu, Likpe, Santrokofi, Bowiri, Logba, Nyangbo, Tafi and Buem – although for some reason the Avatime were excluded from the list. This classification was a radical innovation in the sense that nobody had previously thought to label the so-called “Togo remnants” as Guan (Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, p. 178).

Nugent writes that the Volta Region is currently not occupied by only Ewes, but also by other non-Ewe tribes, who together with the Ewe-speaking peoples, are termed as “Central Togo Minorities” (CTMs) or “Togo remnants”. The CTMs are found in both Ghana and Togo (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3; Lentz & Nugent eds. 2000, pp. 162 & 178). For example, the Likpe encountered the Ewe-speaking Danyi and Wli (by sharing boundaries with them), but whereas the Likpe are currently based in Ghana, the Danyi are based in Togo. The Togoland hills which harbours the CTMs, straddles the borders of both countries (Ibid, pp. 2-3). However, regarding the traditions of origins, there is common agreement between Nugent and other authors such as Amenumey and Law, that all current occupants of the Region have migrated westwards from an eastern location, perhaps close to the heart of Yoruba territory (Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13). The origins of non-Ewes in the Region are debateable to a certain extent (Nugent 1997), but the common agreement between these three authors leads to the establishment of an important fact, that the Ewes in Ghana do not share the same geographical origins with the majority of Modern Ghana. This has contributed to the marginalisation of Ewes in Ghana, both historiographically and politically. Although, Nugent offers a view that their marginalisation is partly (if not wholly) due to the way in which historical knowledge about them has been constructed,

he at the same time exercises caution, in that: (a) his view, described by himself as a simple deduction, is based on an examination of evidence accumulated over the recent past, and also; (b) Nugent is starkly aware of Sandra Greene's findings and argument, that the "we-group definition" among Anlo-Ewes is steeped in distant pre-colonial evidence (Ibid, p. 26; Greene 1996; Lentz & Nugent 2000, pp. 29-30). Therefore the pre-colonial development of the Ewe identity is not to be ignored. As Nugent himself states, with regard to CTMs, 'there may, therefore, be greater continuities between the pre-colonial, colonial and indeed post-colonial periods than is commonly allowed for' (Nugent 1997, p. 26). In order to grasp a fuller picture, this thesis has traced the pre-colonial history of the Ewe-speaking peoples in the West African sub-region, as well as contextually examine how this relates to the politics of the colonial and post-colonial periods, thereby establishing its relevance to current politics in Modern Ghana.

The Ewe-speaking peoples occupied the stretch of land in West Africa from the east of modern Ghana (formerly Gold Coast), to as far as the west of Nigeria. This geographical region is also termed as the Slave Coast of West Africa. The Ewes therefore span the four countries of Ghana and Nigeria, which are English-speaking, and Togo and Benin (formerly Dahomey), which are French-speaking (see maps of West Africa in Appendix I). Comparatively, there are less of them in Ghana (occupying the region south-east of the Volta river) and in Nigeria (only in the region west of the Niger Delta). Their concentration, both numerically and geographically, have therefore always been in Togo and Benin. Argyle confirms the location but makes a stricter geographical demarcation by stating that the Slave Coast 'corresponds to the coastal portions' of the four countries (Argyle 1991, p. 14). A confirmation of this and a more detailed definition is given by Ellis thus: 'the Slave Coast is that portion of the West

African coast situated between the Volta River on the west and the delta of Niger on the east, the Benin River being taken as the western boundary of the latter, and thus extends from about 30° east longitude to about 5 degrees east 8° longitude' (Ellis 1890, p. 1). Before and around the period 1890, the inhabitants of the Slave Coast consisted of the following tribes and states, commencing with the most westerly, and on the sea front: Awuna, Agbosomi, Aflao (or Flohow), Togoland, Geng, Great Popo, Dahomi, Kotonu, Fra and Appa, To the north of the above-mentioned tribes and further inland are Anfueh, Krepe, Ewe-awo, Agotine, Krikor, Mahi (or Makki), Ewemi and Port Novo (Ibid, pp. 5-7). With the exception of the Agotine who speak Adanme, all the mentioned tribes speak dialects of the one language Ewe. Among these tribes, Togoland and Geng were under German colonial control, whereas Great Popo, Kotonu and Port Novo were under French control. Dahomi, Ewe-awo, Mahi (Makki) and Ewemi did not seem to be under any specifically-designated colonial control for any considerable length of time, although the colonial control and influences over surrounding tribes affected them in many significant ways. The rest of the tribes were under English control (Ibid, p. 7). According to Ellis, 'the boundary between the German and French territories is a meridian passing through the west point of the island of Bayol, in the lagoon, and runs inland as far north as the ninth degree of north latitude' (Ibid, pp. 7-8). According to Amenumey, at the turn of the 20th century, there had evolved as many as 120 Ewe tribes or political chieftaincies which (to name just the few in south-east Gold Coast and southern Togo) included, eastwards from the River Volta, the Anlo, Some, Be, Ge; inland from the coast, the Peki, Adaklu, Ave, Tove, Ho, and further inland and north, the Kpando, Watsi and part of Atakpame (Amenumey 1989, p. 1; Bukh 1979, p. 15). Despite inter-tribal wars generated mostly by economic interests, especially jealousies over geographical salt and fishing rights

and control over the slave trade, the Ewe tribes recognised or perceived themselves as 'one people sharing a common language and social customs' (Amenumey 1989, p. 3) or 'one nation with a common language, history and culture' (Bukh 1979, p. 18), until the advent of colonial rule effected some political separations. According to Law, the Ewe in the Volta Region of Modern Ghana were known in pre-nineteenth century sources to be called the Krepi. The "Peki" State in the interior of the Volta Region was also known as "Krepi" State, however, the name "Krepi" was generically used for the whole Ewe group (Law 1991, p. 14). Although the Krepi or Ewe comprised of numerous autonomous groups (a fact which confirms Amenumey's statement above), they are known to loosely or politically trace or associate their origins to the ruler of Notse (Nouatja), a region based 'in the interior to the north-east' (Ibid). This same Krepi polity also refers to "Anlo" on the coast. East of the interior Krepi/Ewe were two groups, the Aja, and Tado - or Sado (Ibid, pp. 14-5). According to Argyle, the traditions of origins of the Ewe-speaking peoples were kept by chroniclers whose lives were on the line if they made any errors in their accounts, thus ensuring a much less variation over time. Argyle recounts about an observation made by Herskovits (1938), that there seems not to be any differences between Norris' version of 1789, Le Herrise's rendition of 1914 and other variants published in the interim regarding the origins and establishment of the Adja-Tado (or Adja-Sado) dynasty (Argyle 1966, p. 2). The royal families of the Slave Coast, moving eastwards from the "Krepi", Anlo, Aja, Hula (or Pla), Whydah (or Hueda), Allada, Fon (or Dahomey), are all of the same stock as the royal dynasty that established Abomey, since all originated from Adja-Tado (or Adja-Sado). The people of Adja-Tado are themselves from Ketu in the east and according to Argyle, their royal kingship is related to Yoruba peoples. Adja-Tado is said to have been established at about 1300 (Ibid, pp. 3-5). Abomey was the capital of Dahomey and

Dahomey seems to have conquered Weme, Allada and Whydah between 1710 and 1730 (Law 1991, p. 17). Sometime before 1600, the ancestors of the royal family of Abomey emigrated from Adja-Tado. In one version of the tradition, intercourse with a leopard encountered in the forest resulted in the wife or the daughter of the king of Adja-Tado giving birth to a son. This miraculous child was called Agasu and became the *tohwio* (super-natural founder) of the royal family of Abomey. Other varying versions of the tradition of origin also do not miss out on the incipient role of the leopard. It is said that either the descendants of the leopard or that of a Yoruba magician (who had married a vassal of the King of Adja-Tado) killed the King. Irrespective of whoever managed to kill the King of Adja-Tado, the “Agasuvi” (meaning, children of Agasu) were led into migration in Allada territory by “Adjahouto” (meaning, the one who killed Adja), and settled there. When this leader died, he became the *tovodun* or “deified” ancestor of the “Agasuvi”. Owing to this leader’s superiority over Aida, the *tovudon* of the natives of Allada, his name became “Adja-to-hou-Aida” meaning, “the father of the Adja is greater than Aida” (Argyle 1966, pp. 4-5). According to Argyle, ‘the leopard is a common symbol of royalty in this part of West Africa, and to assert that they were descended from the animal was a claim by the Agasuvi for the right to kingship’ (Ibid, p. 5). After settling at Alladah, the Agasuvi prospered and dominated the surrounding territory through a succession of kings notably Dogbagri, and later occupied the plateau of nearby Abomey. The move to Abomey actually occurred after the death of Dogbagri. As the details of the lineage unfolds, around 1625, the headship of the Agasuvi, Dogbagri, died and a contest between his two sons Dako and Ganhesou ended up in the former becoming the leader. Dako is considered as the founder of the dynasty of Abomey (Ibid, pp. 6-7).

2.12.1 The Partition versus Ewe irredentism

British rule over Eweland in the Gold Coast, which began in 1850, did not actually encompass all the Ewe-populated regions even as at 1874, until the German presence in the Ewe-populated regions of modern Togoland in 1884 posed a threat to both colonial parties. A boundary agreement reached and signed between the colonial powers effected a split between the Ewe regions. The Ewe states of Anlo, Some, Klikor, Peki and Tongu were apportioned to the Gold Coast, and the remaining ones to the German Protectorate of Togoland. There were strong protests against the partition (Amenumey 1989, pp. 3-4) The Germans later lost the Protectorate, and a split of the Togoland territory between Britain and France resulted in British Togoland and French Togoland. In the meantime, protests about the split generated into the Ewe Unification Movement, which aimed mainly at bringing the Ewe people under one administration, and also to secure the release of the relations of "Gold Coast" Ewes in British Togoland who had now come under French administration in French Togoland as a result of the colonial split of boundaries (Ibid, p. 1), and furthermore to avert certain developmental disabilities suffered by the Ewe 'which were directly attributable to the division' of Ewes among the two colonial powers (Ibid, p. 47). It appeared that the Ewes generally preferred British rule to French rule (Ibid, pp. 12-3). Activities of the Ewe Unification Movement eventually led to the formation of an All Ewe Conference (AEC) in June 1946 (Ibid, p. 43). In August 1946, the AEC protested to the newly-created United Nations Organisation (UN) and the British Government about the draft Trusteeship Agreement drawn by Britain and France for the administration of the divided Ewe territories under the two colonial powers. This protest was disregarded and the colonial agreement was approved (Ibid, pp. 46-7). French authorities in Togo campaigned in various ways against the unification movement (Ibid, pp. 62-3). It must be borne in

mind that British Togoland included certain tribes in its northern territories who were non-Ewe, but because the Ewe straddled the boundaries of both colonies, the decisions of the formal annexation of British Togoland to the Gold Coast impinged more on the Ewe problem than on any considerations of other tribal groupings in the North. In the North, the Konkomba of the Gold Coast and the B'moba of British Togoland (Ibid, p. 337) were not of the same tribe. Under UN General Assembly Resolution 944 (X), on 15/12/55, the British were ordered to organise a plebiscite in British Togoland 'in order to ascertain the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants in regard to (a) the union of their territory with an independent Gold Coast or (b) separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of its political future' (Ibid, p. 259). The plebiscite conducted in June 1956 resulted in 52% of voters for unification of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, and 42% for separation (Ibid, p. 266). Consequently, on 13/12/56, the UN passed Resolution 1044 (XI) sanctioning the unification. The annexed territories of Gold Coast and former British Togoland soon became independent in March 1957, together as Modern Ghana. According to Amenumey, 'Since Britain had always administered British Togoland jointly with the Gold Coast, the difference between 1957 and the period preceding it was one of degree, but not of kind. The problem remained, as before, that of the relationship between the Ewe of French Togoland and the rest of the territory' (Ibid, pp. 274-5).

2.12.2 The climax of irredentist, secessionist and territorialist claims

Despite the Ewe unification argument, the deterioration of the relationship between Ghana's Nkrumah and Togo's Sylvanus Olympio made this impossible as both parties infuriated each other with irredentist claims made over one another's territory (Ibid, pp. 39, 337-45; Zartman 1969, p. 82). This was worsened when at independence in 1960, Togo began to harbour some of Nkrumah's political enemies by granting them political asylum (Ibid, p. 344). Ghana's intention as revealed through its draft Republican Constitution in March 1960 was to welcome all peoples outside her borders with any racial, family or historical links into an integrated Ghanaian State (Ibid, p. 342). This included the Ewes of Togo as well as Agnis from La Cote d'Ivoire (Neuberger 1991, p. 100) and of course the territories they occupied. With the background of a long-standing Ewe unification bid straddling over a territory wider than the newly-created boundaries of the two independent states, coupled with the political domination of the new Togolese government by Ewes under the leadership of the Ewe nationalist Olympio, Togo was 'a quasi Ewe nation-state' (Neuberger 1991, p. 100). The tenure of pan-Eweist nationalism continued even during the post-Olympio, non-Ewe administration of Gnassingbe Eyadema. Togo under Eyadema supported the irredentist Togoland Liberation Movement (TOLIMO) activities in Ghana in the period spanning the 1970s and 1980s. However, in the absence of an Ewe administration in Togo, it would seem that TOLIMO irredentism had lost much of its pan-Eweist sting to what appeared as Togolese territorialism (Ibid). Although at independence in 1960 the electoral victory of Ewe unificationists in Togo (Olympioists) meant brighter prospects for pan-Eweism, the impossibility for Nkrumah and Olympio to reach an agreement on a political *modus vivendi* meant disaster for Ewe unification. In the absence of an Ewe-dominated state machinery after the Olympio administration, there was no continual

backing of Ewe irredentism by Togolese government. This is mainly because Olympioists now came to represent the Opposition in Togolese politics, and their wishes would not be carried out by Eyadema's administration. Togolese, pan-Eweist irredentism therefore waned as the Togolese state gradually reduced its parental support to Ewe unification. In theoretical terms, as Ewe unification ceased to have any de-facto state backing, it ceased to become an irredentist movement. Amenumey expresses this frustration in both theoretical and practical terms in his summary of Ewe nationalism. According to Amenumey:

Ewe nationalism represented a major attempt to invoke the principles of self-determination, but it was limited in its objective. It was neither a typical irredentist nor a secessionist movement; nor did it aspire to ethnic sovereignty. It wanted Ewe unification but not a separation of the Ewe-inhabited area from the existing territorial units to constitute a separate state. What was envisaged was a coming together of the territories in which the ewe were comprised (Amenumey 1989, p. 348).

It must be noted though, that Amenumey's statement (above) on Ewe nationalism is restricted only to the Ewe tribes which occupied the geographical territory of the Togolands, and not the original vast Eweland of the Slave Coast ranging from east of the Gold Coast to west of Nigeria. But, in addition to any nationalistic drive which the Ewe lacked, or could have developed, an argument can be made that the advent and threat of colonialism, which resulted in the partitioning of the Ewe sub-tribes, is the main factor which militated against the emergence of the vast Ewe territory into a nation. Had the Ewe been left alone, national consciousness, and consequently national self-determination may have naturally emerged. Prior to colonialism, the cultural homogeneity of the Ewe peoples was clearly in shape, even if they were a loose collection of chieftaincies, and political formations in Eweland were in the form of states of multi-tribal or mono-tribal units, with varying geographical jurisdictions for

each state (Amenumey 1989, p. 3; Bukh 1979, pp. 15 & 18; Ellis 1890, pp. 5-8). As it were, the chance for the Ewes achieving any real political homogeneity and hegemony was disrupted by colonial intervention and the Partition of Africa. This confirms Basil Davidson's "wasted years" view and the role of colonialism in disrupting indigenous nation-formation processes in Africa. Davidson claims that 'wasted years because, in every crucial field of life, the British (and of course other colonial powers) had frozen the indigenous institutions while at the same time robbed colonised peoples of every scope and freedom for self-development' (Davidson 1992, p. 72). Somehow, the destiny of the Ewe peoples was determined by colonial politics over and above their heads and which they had no control of. Given that 'the Ewe sub-tribes had never been one political unit' (Bukh 1979, p. 18), and were antagonistic towards each other through inter-tribal wars, there is therefore no proof that any nascent Ewe national consciousness, political unification and self-determination would have eventually constituted into a nation-state. However, the fact still remains that the advent of colonialism has prevented history from determining whether or not this would have happened. The former President, Jerry Rawlings, is Ewe. Ewes have been referred to in the past as being nepotistic and inward-looking [Smock & Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, p. 24]. In the last three presidential and parliamentary elections, the Ewes, who predominate the Volta Region, have massively supported Rawlings and the NDC²⁰.

²⁰ See Volta Region election results in Appendix VIII and Section 6.1 in the Postscript.

2.13 A CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONS OF ORIGIN

2.13.1 Vansina and Owusu

In spite of the fact that other academics regard the work of Meyerowitz on Ghana as a 'systematic account' (Owusu 1970, p. 16) and also as 'one of the best works devoted to the past history of pre-literate peoples' (Vansina 1965, p. 15), there are other claims which discredit it. According to Owusu, Meyerowitz's account on the Agona is a mistaken version because she neglected 'extant respectable recorded sources' regarding the Agona people. According to Owusu, in addition to Meyerowitz's failure to examine another account on the Agona by A. B. Ellis (another anthropologist), her 'major weakness' is inherent in the fact that she also failed to speak to the elders of Nsaba who also have another version of the establishment of the Agona State. Nsaba is purported to be the seat of the Paramount Chief of Agona until 1931 (Owusu 1970, p. 17). Owusu furthermore contends that, in addition to the medium of an interpreter being a stumbling block to relating truth, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the elders (of Nyakrom) interviewed by Meyerowitz to withhold or conceal some information from her regarding the defeat of the Agona by the Gomoa-Fante, and the loss of the paramountcy position of Agona by Nyakrom to Nsaba. Owusu therefore makes the argument that Meyerowitz received a distorted version of events as far as the establishment of Agona is concerned. He further argues out the possibility that Meyerowitz based the date of the establishment of the Agona State (1750) on her observation of the occurrence of the name "Agwana", "Aguna" or "Agonna" on certain 18th century European maps. Owusu argues that a Dutch map dated 1670 also refers to the "Agwanna Kingdom". Additionally, Owusu argues that a quote of A. B. Ellis regarding an occurrence on 28 May 1662, that 'the King of Aguna, instigated by the

Dutch, had plundered their [English] factory at Winnebah' (Ibid, pp. 17-9; Ellis 1893, p. 55), also lends weight to the establishment of the Agona State prior to 1750. By this and other subsequent observations, Owusu makes the claim that less weight should be attached to the works of Meyerowitz on Akan origins.

Vansina's critique of Meyerowitz's work falls mainly within source criticism and methodology. He admits that the innovations by which Meyerowitz arrived at her conclusions, and the processes through which she makes her deductions from oral sources are very rare indeed. Vansina recognises that the work is a masterpiece (Vansina 1965, p. 15). He also views the extent to which Meyerowitz utilises the rich sources of traditional specialists like 'minstrels, masters of ceremony, royal drummers, royal hornblowers, the king's spokesman, his grave priest, his stool-carrier-chief, female soulbearers of the souls of the deceased queen mothers, masters of ceremonies to the state gods, court functionaries and the administrator of the capital' (Ibid, p. 33), as not only a sign of great dedication, but also a demonstration of how specialised the duties of the functionaries are. However, he complains, (in a rather incongruous fashion to his previous praise), that Meyerowitz 'has not attempted to explore the reasons for this, nor has she exercised much critical judgement in her handling of her sources' (Ibid). A specific example Vansina uses is an account given by Meyerowitz about the separation into two of the twin city Beeo-Nsoko which was located in the Banda Kingdom (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 46-48). In this account, Meyerowitz claims that the two sons of the King of Beeo and the Moslem chief of Nsoko, fell in love with the same girl, and in order to settle their jealousies and rage, literally cut her into two halves, one for the other, and this "split" thereby led to the destruction of the twin city through factional wars and ultimate destruction. According to Vansina, the story

(tradition) could have been thematic or proverbial, and therefore Meyerowitz's gullibility to the literal meaning of the story as an explanation to the destiny of the destruction of the city signifies a 'lack of critical judgement' in the 'handling of her sources' (Vansina 1965, p. 15). However, not being in total disagreement with Vansina's assertion and appreciating the point he makes, there seems to be no reason given [by Vansina] as to why Meyerowitz should thematize or proverbialize what she has been made to understand as literal truth. Also, Vansina does not indicate by what "yardstick" Meyerowitz should exercise 'critical judgement'. The "barbarity" or irksomeness of the story is not a yardstick for claiming its falsity. Nor is there any proof that the details of the story or tradition as given did not actually occur. It would appear that Vansina's criticism may not be fair. Vansina makes further criticism about Meyerowitz's use of onomastics in tracing the origins of various tribes and the derivation of tribal names. Vansina criticises Meyerowitz's derivation of the term "Guan" from "Illagua" and "Laguantan". He claims that in addition to these names being non-existent, their "false" deduction from the Arabic forms "Luvata" and "Lewata" make the derivation even more spurious, since no linguistic adducements could be derived as evidence to support the ultimate "Guan" derivation (Ibid, p. 16). But it is also interesting to note that Vansina does not come up with what he thinks constitutes (or should constitute) the meaning of the Arabic forms "Luvata" or "Lewata". Also, it would appear that Meyerowitz, does arrive at other tribal names from "Laguantan", for example the "Agwana" or (Aguna & Agona), and not only the Guan. Therefore this weakens the Vansina criticism. But ironically, the Agona are of Guan ancestry.

2.13.2 Herskovits versus Ellis

- Herskovits gives a short critique of A.B. Ellis. He claims that the author did visit the places he wrote about, and had actual experience in one of them, (i.e. the Gold Coast), but he criticises that Ellis is noted among Africanists for his notoriety in ‘uncritical burrowing from other authors’ (Herskovits 1941, pp. 55-6).

• 2.13.3 Levtzion:

- Levtzion (1971) suggests that Ghana was a kingdom of antiquity, although the date of its foundation is uncertain. He expresses certainty however, over the fact that Ghana was located in the “Sahil” (or “Sahel” or “Sahara”) – referred to as “‘the shore’ of the huge sea of sand’ (as already discussed in Sections 2.3 & 2.5). He infers and concludes from this, that Ancient Ghana (and its geographical location) ‘is to be associated with the growth of traffic across the Sahara’. He claims the main item for the traffic was gold. He refers to his sources as ‘Arabic’ (Levtzion 1971, p. 120). Sahil is the Arabic word for ‘a shore’ (Levtzion 1971, p. 122). This seems to corroborate information from Meyerowitz, who maintains that a large chunk of the inhabitants of Modern Ghana (especially the Bonos) inhabited a region farther north in the Great White Desert or Sarem (Sahara) – ‘the country of the sand’, before moving southwards to the Niger area. Sarem is the Akan word for an unvegetative region. According to the preserved tradition of the Kormantse and Etsi of Modern Ghana, this desert area was known as “Djadu” or “Zaghawa” (Arabic) or “Agwas” (Tuareg) or “Braun” (Tebu). All three names seem to be common to the modern Akan who seem to have had a mixed ancestry (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 17; 1958, p. 33). Levtzion accepts evidence given by al-Sadi, that Ghana was a capital town of Baghana, and the explanatory evidence from al-

Bakri in 1067-8, that “Awkar” was a Berber name for a region known as “Wagadu” (Levtzion 1971, p. 125). Wagadu seems to be a derivation of Djadu and Zaghawa, both of which mean and stand for the same people (Meyerowitz 1958, pp. 17-8). Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion give the zenith period of Ancient Ghana as the 11th century, the same century in which it was over-run by Islamic invaders. Although the Islamic campaigns begin with the 11th century (Meyerowitz 1958, p. 17), it was not until the ‘the middle of the eleventh century’, and precisely 1076, that final conquest by the Arabic Almoravids occur (Levtzion 1971, p. 127). The mid-eleventh century is also seen as the zenith and crucial period of Islamic campaigning in the Western Sudan. Levtzion explains that Ghana of the mid-eleventh century ‘offered the example of resistance to Islam’ (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Both Meyerowitz and Levtzion claim to have obtained their information from the same source – the Sudanese Tarikhs or Tarikh-es-Sudan (Levtzion 1971, p. 122; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). Also, al Sa’di (one of Levtzion’s Islamic oral sources) was a native of Timbuktu (Levtzion 1971, p. 140). Levtzion maintains that a king of Ghana resisted Islamic conversion and stuck to his ancestral religion (Levtzion 1971, p. 153). Meyerowitz also submits that a large number of the people of Ghana (including some of the kings) migrated southwards in order to avoid compulsory Islamic “conversion” (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 51). Hrbek and Devisse also argue that the ruler of Ancient Ghana managed to ward off Islamic control of his polity, was accommodating to the Almoravid Muslims and maintained excellent relations with them, and that, not until Ancient Ghana was conquered by the Almoravids towards the end of the 11th century, that it officially went over to Islam (Hrbek and Devisse 1988, pp. 357-61). The conquest by the Almoravids therefore explains the southward migration of the citizens of Ancient Ghana, as compulsory conversion could not be resisted at this stage.

2.13.4 Wilks

Ivor Wilks does rely on the works of Meyerowitz in detailing some ecological underpinnings and the geographical location of the Akan and Bono tribes from Ancient to Modern Ghana. Apart from the lack of specificity in dates, there seems to be corroboration in the fact that some particular tribes in Modern Ghana have originated from the Western Sudan. Wilks states that the nucleus of the Gonja kingdom is to be found in migrants from Western Sudan (and of Malinke culture) in the mid-sixteenth century (Wilks 1971, pp. 344-5). Meyerowitz holds that the current Gonja ruling class came to the Black Volta area from Kanagba (Kanga) and Segu in the Western Sudan around 1600 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 54). Wilks lists a number of communities or settlements which grew around the Dyula to include the (Akan-speaking) Bron, the (Guan-speaking) Dompò and the (Senufo-speaking) Nanfana. Wilks demonstrates clearly that the date given by Meyerowitz for the founding of the Bono kingdom is unacceptable. Notwithstanding a discrepancy in dates however, the essential trace of the Bono and Akan states from the Western Sudan is not disputed. The alternative story of Bono people originating from a cave in Takyiman (as supported by Wilks) also seems unacceptable, due not only to the impossibility of the account, but also to the fact that the evidence of migration from the Western Sudan is too enormous to set aside for any ridiculous cave origins meant to substantiate an “alternative autochthonous status”. It would appear that the discrepancies in dating is only due to discrepancies in calendar calculations rather than the essential agreement in accounts regarding the origins of the Bono, Akan and other tribes being of Western Sudanese ancestry. Nevertheless, Wilks relies heavily on Meyerowitz for other trade and migratory details of the Akan and other tribes, and argues for the similarities in the Akan and Bono languages, an occurrence, which can be witnessed today. Wilks also argues that the

Bono people of Modern Ghana speak Akan languages and practise Akan customs. However, he notes that, not only do they utilise Malinke language in performing their rituals, but also purify hammers and anvils (instead of ancestral stools) for their rituals. Furthermore, he maintains that current Bono masked dancing cults, for example the Sakrabundu, are of Malinke origin (Wilks 1971, pp. 355-9).

It is clear that Wilks' account of the traditions of origin are less rich than that of Meyerowitz. For example the Wilks account of the origins of the Akwamu (Wilks 1971, p. 365) is very sketchy when compared with the Meyerowitz account (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 98) which gives not only the origins of the Akwamu, but also details of their conquests and failures, relationships with other tribes, associated geographical locations, trade patterns and partners, as well as dates. Wilks also confirms the Meyerowitz account of the emergence of the Ashanti nation in 1701 (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 106), the date at which a number of tribes including the Denkyira had been conquered and had subsequently transferred their allegiance to the Asantehene Osei Tutu (Wilks 1971, p. 370). Wilks maintains that by 1680, the Ashanti kingdom had emerged (Ibid, p. 373), however, in view of the fact that there were other surrounding tribes who were competing with Ashanti for supremacy in the area, and especially, that the war between Ashanti and Adanse in 1680 ended in a stalemate (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 109), it is understandable why the emergence of Ashanti as a nation is fixed not at 1680 but at 1701, the year by which all surrounding tribes had been subdued and had as a result transferred their allegiance to the Asantehene as part of the Confederacy of states whose capital was at Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti. The battle of Feyiase in 1701 in which the Denkyira were defeated seems to be the deciding factor. In addition to the fact that the last opponent had been conquered, the defeat of

the Denkyira made way for Ashanti to have access to the Gold Coast. Even the Dutch settlers sent an ambassador to King Osei Tutu in 1701 from their headquarters in coastal Elmina (Wilks 1971, p. 373). In another example - the origins of the Fante, it is also seen that Wilks corroborates the Meyerowitz account. Wilks claims that the Borbor (or Bore) Fante came southwards from Bono-Takyiman, defeated the Etsi (who already lived south by the coast) and founded Mankessim (Wilks 1971, p. 370). This account is already given at least twice separately by Meyerowitz (1952, pp. 68, 82). But it would appear that this time, Wilks gets his dates wrong. Wilks maintains that the Borbor Fante defeated the Asebu in 1707-13, whereas the date given by Meyerowitz for this occurrence is 1740. Given: that the Fante lived with the Bono; that it was due to the conquest of the Bono kingdom in 1740 which caused the migration of the Fante southwards to re-establish contact with the Etsi and Asebu at the coast, and; that both the Etsi and the Asebu (former neighbours of the Bono and Fante) were actually living at the coast when the Fante re-“contacted” them (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 63-68, 82), it seems that more authenticity is attributable to Meyerowitz’s date than Wilks’s. Other authors including Acquah, also seem to agree with the Meyerowitz account (Acquah 1959?, pp. 15-8). Wilks’ shaky account is further confirmed by his admission to having little knowledge of the Etsi, a people well traced by Meyerowitz (1952, pp. 63-9). Meyerowitz’s grasp of the traditions of origin is clearly demonstrated, and it would appear that her version of events gives a fuller and more detailed picture of the origins of the tribes of Modern Ghana. In addition to the fact that many authors rely on her account, the actual current geographical distribution of the tribes in Ghana gives credence to her version of events, in that, their location matches the exact version as given by Meyerowitz, a feat which none of her critics has been able to accomplish. Inaccuracies in dating is not only peculiar to Meyerowitz but to the other authors as

well, including Wilks. Given that date discrepancies have not in themselves resulted in wide dissimilarities in the accounts of origin, and also given that current ethno-geographic patterns of the tribes in Modern Ghana corroborate Meyerowitz's account, it must be said that her work, although not totally sacrosanct, seems to be more reliable than those of her opponents. In addition, her opponents, for example Wilks, also exhibit inaccuracies and flaws in dating.

2.13.5 Manoukian

Madeline Manoukian, in geographically locating certain tribes in Modern Ghana, confirms various sections of the Meyerowitz account. According to Manoukian:

The evidence at present available shows that the Akan did not arrive in the far north of what is now the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast before the eleventh century. In the coastal zone, the *Etsi*, who regard themselves as 'brothers' of the *Bono*, a branch of the Akan, claim to have been the first settlers in the region, and their arrival can be dated at the beginning of the thirteenth. Their tradition has it that they met some *Brossa* people in the Central coast area, ancestors of the modern *Brossa* or *Aowin*. These appear to have been the first *Brossa* to have been driven from their home, north-west of the Gold Coast forest belt, by the invading Akan from the Niger bend in the eleventh century. *Etsi* and *Brossa* were followed from the beginning of the fourteenth century by *Bono* (*Brong*) *Fanti*, *Guang* (mostly under Akan domination), by *Afutu* from the Northern Territories and beyond, and by the *Asebu* and *Ga-Adangbe* from Nigeria. The forest zone was not occupied by the Akan proper before the end of the fifteenth century, when the arrival on the coast of the first European settlers, the Portuguese, brought prosperity through trade in gold and slaves (Manoukian 1950, p. 13).

The above quote from Manoukian goes to confirm the following facts: (a) that the Akan began to move towards Modern Ghana from the Niger Bend during the 11th century as a result of the Islamic invasion of Ancient Ghana (as already confirmed by Levzion, Meyerowitz and Hrbek & Devisse); (b) that the *Etsi* were the first of the *Dja*

tribes to settle in the Northern Territories, and that whereas some of their Bono, Fante and Afutu “brothers” moved directly southwards to the coast, some of the Etsi detoured to Nigeria and returned to the coastal regions of Modern Ghana through Benin (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 63-4); (c) that although the Etsi were the first tribe from the Niger Bend to settle in the Northern Territories (at the beginning of the 13th century), the first of the tribes to become a state was the Bono, founded in 1295; (d) that some Guan, Afutu and Asebu people (who had settled in the Northern Territories) also detoured through Nigeria and later approached the forest and coastal regions of Modern Ghana through Benin (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 66-9), and; (e) that the Ga-Adangbe are people of Guan ancestry who migrated from the Northern Territories, detouring through Nigeria and approaching the coast of Modern Ghana from Benin (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 77-9). Further evidence from Manoukian also confirms sections of the Meyerowitz account. Manoukian confirms that the Guans lived in the Northern Territories, and that most Akan are of Guan ancestry, including Akans in the Akwapim area and Efutu in current Fanteland (Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 74-7). This can also be sifted from the quote below:

The *Guang (Gbanya)* are the northern neighbours of the Akan peoples, and small pockets of Guan-speakers are found in the Akan area, for example in a number of small towns on the Akwapim ridge, at Krachi, and at Efutu in Fanti country. The eastern neighbours of the Akan are speakers of the ‘Togo remnant languages’, and the *Ewe*, and their south-eastern neighbours are the *Ga-Adangbe* peoples (Manoukian 1950, p. 9).

2.13.6 Daaku

The works of other Ghanaian authors in the tracing of the traditions of origins through oral tradition and other pieces of evidence can also be discussed. K. Y. Daaku has some works on the Sefwi and Denkyira (Daaku 1974 and 1970) respectively. His account of the Sefwi people tends to be highly consonant with that of Meyerowitz. With regard to names and the political structure, Daaku presents Sefwi-Wiawso, Sefwi-Anwiaso and Sefwi-Bekwai as three mutually independent paramountcies of the Sefwi people, whereas Meyerowitz presents Sefwi generally as a confederation of the three states mentioned by Daaku (Daaku 1974, p. v; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 117). Also, although on this occasion the Daaku account seems to be more elaborate, it would appear that the Meyerowitz account is a very sharp, concise and brief summary of the same events narrated by Daaku. Both Daaku and Meyerowitz agree to the roles played by Ashanti and Denkyira, as well as the chronology. For example they are both consonant on the fact that: (a) the Sefwi-Wiawso people (of the Ayoko clan) are of Asante descent or were propped up by the Asante; (b) the Sefwi-Anwiaso people (of the Asona clan) are descended from Wankyi, and; (c) that the Sefwi-Bekwai people (of the Koona or Ekoona clan) are descendent from Adanse in Ashanti. Daaku asserts that the last phase of the Denkyira imperial campaigns could be pinned down to the period from 1680 to the end of the 17th century, and Meyerowitz also gives 1690 as a specific date of a particular Denkyira campaign led by Ntim Gyakari against the Sefwi-Bekwai (Daaku 1974, pp. vii-x; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 117-8). Although Daaku's account seems to be more authoritative, in that it is more elaborate, the account has a few factual and structural incoherences. For example, in his introduction, Daaku claims that the Aowin people, the aboriginals of the current Sefwi territory were very scanty and therefore adopted an open door policy of welcoming and harbouring other migrating tribes in

order to increase their population. However, evidence in the Daaku account of wars between the Aowins and Sefwis and other neighbours tends to discount this “open door policy” (Daaku 1974, p. 10). This makes it even more confusing as regards Daaku’s theory of the etymology of the word Sefwi (Sehwi) as “Esa-wie” or Esa-hie”, meaning “war is over” (Daaku 1974, p. vi). On the whole, looking at the fact that the publication dates of the Meyerowitz and Daaku accounts are 22 years apart, and also that they both consulted with different people (but from the same royal household), it is remarkable that they should both end up with such astounding similarities in account. This not only confirms the importance of the Meyerowitz account, but also lends some credence to traditional oral sources as important data sources. Daaku’s account on the Denkyira (1970), which is also based on oral tradition, does not seem to differ in substance from the accounts of Meyerowitz and other authors.

2.13.7 Wilson

Louis Wilson states that any suggestion that the origins of Ghanaian groups are traceable ‘from as far away as the Tigris and Euphrates in Mesopotamia’ (Wilson 1992, p. 12), is far-fetched, if not false. However, Wilson argues that the variation of the traditions of origin which suggests a migration from the Chad-Benue region, has some validity (Ibid).

2.13.8 Nugent

Paul Nugent puts forth a thesis that the non-Ewe occupants of the Volta Region, and perhaps even the so-called Akan tribes in the Region, altogether described as the “Central Togo Minorities” (CTMs), have a pre-colonial history which seems to be more related to Ewes than Akans (Nugent 1997). Geographically, the CTMs ‘are presently to be found strung out along the Togoland hills on either side of the international border’ of Ghana and Togo (Ibid, p. 2). He also shares, with Amenumey and Law, the common Ewe tradition of migrating westwards from an eastern Yoruba-related location (Amenumey 1989, pp. 1-3; Law 1991, p. 26; Nugent 1997, p. 13), thus confirming the clear distinction between the origins of the Ewes as against the majority of Modern Ghana. Nugent and Law both agree on the Yoruba connection, as well as Ketu being a major location or springboard in the migratory route of the Ewes, but differ on the next destination from Ketu. Nugent has this as Notse, whereas Law’s rendition of events points to Tado, and later on to Notse. Nugent attributes this difference in renditions to ‘nothing more than a difference of oral traditions amongst the Aja-[Tado]/Ewe sub-groupings’ (Nugent 1997, p. 13). It is clear from Amenumey, Law and Nugent (and others) that the Ewe/Krepi groups in the Volta Region are linked to Notse, but the link between the CTMs and Notse is not clear from Nugent’s paper.

Nugent draws distinctions between the various tribes within the Volta Region based on linguistic nomenclature, self-defined by these tribes. However, he is also aware of the dangers inherent in using language as the criteria of distinction, in that, languages can be learnt over time, thus masking actual tribal roots. He cites the example of the Yikpa, a currently Ewe-speaking people who may have been speaking Sekpele about a century ago (Ibid, p. 3). Still on linguistic nomenclature, Nugent further reiterates that, although

the general pattern of colonial historical discourse identified “tribes” as the main unit of group analysis, the autochthonous status accorded the CTMs was based on linguistic evidence (Ibid, p. 6). Given that, what exactly is autochthonous about this linguistic evidence is not explained, the validity of the assertion that the CTMs are/were autochthonous is somewhat shaky.

Nugent’s oral sources on the Likpe (or Bakpele), especially what culminates into the “Atebubu tradition” (Ibid, pp. 9 & 14), are to be cautiously considered, in that, the authenticity is based on the weak assumption that what Linguist Udzu says is true. There is also a contradiction or confusion in what appears to be Rattray having accepted the “Atebubu tradition” about Likpe, but at the same time ‘apparently not taken in by it’ (Ibid, p. 14). It is noticeable that Nugent accepts a piece of oral tradition collected by Rattray (Ibid, p. 4), but should be skeptical about the piece of oral evidence given to Rattray by Linguist Udzu (Ibid p. 14) - there is no evidence of an established criteria for discriminating between the two. The evidence gleaned from Nugent’s paper is that the Likpe tradition is not yet settled (Ibid, p. 12) because of competing histories (Ibid, p. 26).

2.13.9 Kwamena-Poh

Kwamena-Poh makes an essential contribution to the traditions of origin, especially those of the few, current Guan-speaking groups. He also refers the origins of the Guan to a “Niger-Congo family”, and links the Guan language to some Akan dialects such as Fanti and Twi (Kwamena-Poh 1973, p. 12). However, it would appear that Meyerowitz is the source of the more substantial, wider and far-reaching traceability and etymology

of the people and word “Guan” respectively. Meyerowitz claims her sources include the tradition of the Late-Guans (Meyerowitz 1952). As Kwamena-Poh is himself an Akuapem Guan, and has been deemed as having an interest in the rendition of the accounts of the “latter-day” Guans (Africa 67, (4) 1997, p. 509), it would appear that in addition to any views between his work and that of Meyerowitz, the main distinction is that Meyerowitz successfully deals with both the issue of a wider inclusive and latent Guan ancestry, as well as the current and remnant Guan tag.

2.13.10 Gilbert

Michelle Gilbert’s entrance into the debate is made by his attempt at drawing a hard and fast line between a Guan patriliney and Akan matriliney (Africa 64 (1) 1994, p. 100; Africa 67 (4), 1997, pp. 501-2). However, as already explained in Section 2.4, this distinction is not universalistic. Although Guans are originally a patrilineal people, there are some who have entered Akan territory or mixed with Akans and have become matrilineal. Guans who have never mixed with the Dja or Akan, or been under their jurisdiction, remain patrilineal (Meyerowitz 1952, p. 77), for example the Kpesi-Guan. Also, some Guans who have encountered Akan have maintained their patriliney, for example the Late-Guans and Kyerepon-Guans. The Efutu-Guans of Winneba are currently struggling between patriliney and matriliney owing to proximity with the Akan-Fantis. However, the Senya-Guans of Senya Bereku, who were previously patrilineal, have converted to matriliney (Ephirim-Donkor 2000; Meyerowitz 1952, pp. 76 & 79).

2.13.11 Ephirim-Donkor

Like Owusu and Vansina (in Section 2.13.1), Ephirim-Donkor also has a bone to pick with Meyerowitz. He claims that ‘the 1530 date offered by Meyerowitz as the founding of Winneba is incorrect’ (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 22) and that ‘the fundamental flaw in Meyerowitz’s study was the distorted information provided to her by the deposed king, Ayirebe Acquah III’ (Ibid). Ephirim-Donkor argues that Meyerowitz was used by this king as a channel of misinformation to propagate a new political order through matrilineal succession, something which contravenes the Efutu past, and is a major contributor to the continued political conflict in Efutu. Despite any discrepancies in accounts, some of Ephirim-Donkor’s arguments [for example, that Bonde and Gyan were not brothers, and/or that Edwe and Etumpan were one and the same person (Ibid, pp. 22-3; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 75)] do not essentially discount the import of Meyerowitz’s message that the Efutu originally had a patrilineal ruling class, and as a people, have migrated through the centuries to their current location Winneba. Ephirim-Donkor confirms this, but would not forgive Meyerowitz for communicating the erroneous view that Efutu kings were elected from the militia or *dentzen* (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, p. 24; Meyerowitz 1952, p. 75). Readers must bear in mind that Ephirim-Donkor is no ordinary Efutu, but is also Nana Obrafo Owam X, the traditional ruler of Gomo Mprumem. Therefore, like Kwamena-Poh of the Akuapem (Section 2.13.9) a totally impartial interest in the sensitive issues of Efutu cannot be attributed to him even if his account is to be considered superior to that of Meyerowitz as far as Efutu history is concerned. Ephirim-Donkor also traces the Efutu-Guans of Winneba to Timbuktu (Ephirim-Donkor 2000, pp. 8, 25-7) and confirms the Ghana hypothesis (Section 2.2). Moreover, his book sheds light on the Guan controversy, the identity crisis of some Efutus as to whether they are Guan and/or Fanti, and the evolutionary

struggle of the Efutu political and social system between patriliney and matriliney (Ibid, pp. 2, 10 & 13).

Chapter 3

Research Design And Methodology

3.1 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FORMULATION

3.1.1 "Politics-of-the-belly"

"Politics of the belly" is a Cameroonian political phrase which summarises a status quo of unequal distribution and accumulation of public opportunity and wealth, aptly described by the term "figuration" borrowed by Jean-Francois Bayart from Norbert Elias (Elias 1978, p. 130), in which a system of social inequality operates through the political interdependence of allies (or opponents) within the political arena, along tribal or clientelistic contours, and supervised by the State (Bayart 1993, pp. ix-x, 55). In simple terms, the patron-client relationship operates such that, the holders of political power within the state (patrons) ensure that their supporters (clients) are rewarded within a framework by which state resources are accessed and appropriated as personal tribute along the circuit of corruption and reciprocity. Politics-of-the-belly operates within the backdrop of the characteristic personalized and traditionalised political arrangement termed as patrimonialism, a system whereby the holder of political power or 'the ruler allocates political office to his clients on the basis of patronage, rather than according to the criteria of professionalism and competence which characterize the civil service' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 6). In patrimonialism therefore, there does not seem to be a clear cut demarcation between the private and public spheres of allocation, distribution and administration, and the clientele utilises political attention in distributing state resources to their benefit instead of restructuring society and bridging class gaps. Subsequently, in its advanced form, neo-patrimonialism is the term which describes 'the personalized character of African politics, in which formal constitutions and organizations are subordinate to individual rulers (the president or "big man") . . . ' (ROAPE 1998, No. 76, p. 235). The term neo-patrimonialism has assumed an approach

which 'seeks to make sense of the (real or imaginary) contradictions to be found in the state in sub-Saharan Africa . . . and accounts for the undeniable fact that the public and the private spheres largely overlap. Second it helps to explain in which ways the operation of a political system is no longer "traditional" – hence the weight of the prefix *neo*' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 9). To underscore its murkiness is the dangerous precedent that 'criminal activities can serve the patrimonial purposes of patron-client relationships' (Ibid, p. 79), and that perhaps this situation is given support by the irony that 'there has always existed in Africa a wide range of activities (such as corruption) which, although illicit from a strictly constitutional point of view, have been regarded as patrimonially legitimate by the bulk of the population' (Ibid). The murky, shadowy and indistinctive nature of the private and public spheres render the successful emergence and subsequent operation of civil society a difficult task. Civil society has been defined as 'an intermediate layer of associational structures occupying the space between the state, on the one hand, and ethnic and kinship networks, on the other. In this conception, civil society refers to the organisations and interests which act to influence public policy and moderate the authoritarian tendencies of both community and state' (ROAPE 2000, No. 85, p. 432). It has been argued that 'the notion of civil society would only apply if it could be shown that there were meaningful institutional separations between a well organized civil society and a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 17).

Although it is an interesting fact that corruption, politics-of-the-belly and forms of patrimonialism are not unique to Africa (ROAPE 1998, No. 76, p. 237), it must be noted that the roots of clientelism and African presidentialism are located in a combination of the nature of colonial development, the transition from colonialism, as

well as the performance of the post-colonial state within international stipulations (ROAPE 2000, No. 85. pp. 428, 430 & 432). But even more note-worthy, and perhaps the lesson to be learnt by Africa, is the fact that the experience of Japan and the other “Asian tigers” proves that development can occur irrespective of corruption and clientelistic patronage. It would appear that the difference between the Asian and African experience is that, Asian patrimonialists reinvested their booty locally and nationally, whereas their African counterparts often dissipated their wealth in local ostentation and stashed their financial wealth in Swiss and other foreign banks (Chabal and Daloz 1999, pp. 106-8).

Given the ‘dependence of accumulation and class formation on state power and public resources (RAOPE 2000, No. 85, p. 429), and that ‘clientelism in this sense represents a politics of class domination as distinct from a politics of class struggle . . . a means of enabling propertied classes to legitimate their political dominance’ (Ibid, p. 435), the critical question poses whether politics-of-the-belly is an essential stage in economic accumulation in Africa. Obviously it is only essential for the purposes of the selfish accumulation of assets to the advantage of those who hold political power, however, such economic accumulation (or the misappropriation of state/public wealth by a private few) does not necessarily denote economic accumulation for the continent, nor has it proved to offer Africa an economic advantage over the other continents. The phenomena of the politics-of-the-belly and the associated misuse of state resources as well as bad governance, are not essential for the economic development of Africa, and have been aptly termed by Rene Dumont as the ‘False Start in Africa’ (Dumont 1966). Dumont states that, together, these phenomena ‘remain large obstacles to the realistic policies which alone can produce essential socio-economic revolutions’ (Ibid, p. 292).

As far back as the mid 1960s, Dumont had already identified Ghana (among other countries on the African continent) as an example of where 'the dichotomy between progressive economic development and destructive misuse of resources can be seen most vividly' (Ibid, p. 293).

3.1.2 Ethnonationalism versus political nationalism

To understand the true nature and pattern of nationalism and politics in Ghana, one must come to appreciate the stark reality, that there is a fundamental difference between the ideals within the theory of political nationalism and what actually occurs in practice. To explain this, it is important to highlight the conflict between the two theories of ethno-nationalism and political nationalism. Ethnonationalism (sometimes referred to as cultural nationalism), is a form of nationalism based on feelings of shared or common ethnicity (Kellas 1991, p. 51) and derived from members of similar tribal, ethnic or national group. This form or theory of nationalism, which derives from Herder, ' . . . perceives the nation as a natural solidarity endowed with unique cultural characteristics' (Hutchinson 1994, p. 42), hence the term cultural nationalism. Political nationalism (also known as official nationalism or civic nationalism), on the other hand, focuses on rationality and citizenship rights, or 'the belief in reason as the ethical basis of the community . . . ' (Hutchinson 1994, p. 43). It is essentially 'the nationalism of (or towards) the state, encompassing all those legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national identity and culture' (Kellas 1991, p. 52). Thus, political nationalism has more to do with expressions of patriotism towards the state than to a particular identity group, within a multi-ethnic or multi-national state setting (Ibid). Hutchinson aptly states that, 'of course, this is a cosmopolitan conception that

logically looks forward to a common humanity transcending traditional differences' (Hutchinson 1994, p. 43). Theory postulates an antagonistic relationship between ethnonationalism and political nationalism. Ethnonationalism is deemed to undermine political nationalism and vice versa, in that, one should advance at the expense of the other. Whereas ethnonationalism arises essentially out of ethnic or national affiliation and considerations, political nationalism should arise out of supposed rational, non-ethnic and non-national choices and attitudes towards the cosmopolitan state. Therefore, within a state of multiple identity groups such as Ghana, a conflict of interest would exist among political attitudes, aims and choices for multi-party democracy and electoral politics. The idea of political nationalism seems to be an imposition on the will of adherents to cultural nationalism, and the conflict or tension between the two political attitudes could not have been better encapsulated by the statement below:

In contrast, for cultural nationalists the state is at best, accidental, and is frequently regarded with suspicion as a product of an over-rationalist ethos that seeks to impose a mechanical uniformity on living cultures. Rejecting the ideal of uniform citizenship rights as the basis of solidarity, cultural nationalists perceive the nation as a differentiated community, united not by reason or law, but by passionate sentiments rooted in nature and history. According to this organic conception found, for example, in Herder, humanity, like nature, is infused with a creative force that endows all things with an individuality. Nations are primordial expressions of this spirit; like families, they are natural solidarities. Thus the Slovak poet, Kollar, contrasted the formal allegiance due his state with the instinctual loyalty he offered his cultural nation. Cultural nationalists demand that the natural divisions within the nation – sexual, occupational, religious and regional – be respected because the impulse to diversity is the dynamo of national creativity (Hutchinson 1994, p. 44).

It must be noted however, that within the context of African politics, in which the “politics of the belly” is pervasive (Bayart 1993), political rationality, reasonableness or ethicality, as enshrined in the theory of political nationalism, could be different from (if

not the opposite of) the meaning portrayed by the Hutchinson and Kellas definitions, and that for some Ghanaians, political rationality is found in, and demonstrated by, making political choices which would best serve the calculated interests of their ethnonational group. Their rationality is embedded in the argument that the pervasiveness of the “politics of the belly” leaves them with no other preference than to make political choices geared at placing their group in state control, as this would serve their best interests, and by extension that of the state. As confirmed by Hameso, ‘for as long as the state engulfs society, ethnic strategy is but a legitimate response. Participation as it is, it remains available, prone to use and abuse’ (Hameso 1997, p. 41). Where “politics of the belly” is the status quo, this seems not a selfish attitude, but rather, the rational way to go. It means that in the political rationality of Ghanaian (or African) reality, for some, ethnonationalism is the patriotism towards the state. For this group of people, being an ethnonationalist is the true/right way of being a political nationalist. If one’s interests would be best served when the status quo is controlled by one’s ethnonational group, it falls within the rationality of the individual, to ensure that one’s political preferences are skewed towards that which reflects the identity interests of one’s group. Therefore, within the contextual background of “politics of the belly”, ethnonationalism becomes equated with political nationalism. Therein lies the paradox between theory and reality.

3.1.3 Tribalism versus ethnonationalism

Before discussing any distinction between tribalism and ethnonationalism, and the complexity of their dual existence within the melting pot of politics, it is worth pointing out, that contrary to the usual narrow restriction of tribalism to Africa by Western authorship and discourse (Curtin et al 1978, p. 579; Hameso 1997, p. 8) and the comparatively widespread application of the term to African examples, the occurrence of tribalism is just as universal across the globe as the existence of ethnonational groups (Hameso 1997, pp. 4-5), and that, not only is tribalism not peculiar to Africa, but also synonymous with nineteenth century European nationalism (Davidson 1992, pp. 74-5), and indeed twenty-first century European nationalism, and elsewhere across the globe. As stated in the New Ulster Movement (NUM) Publication No. 9²¹, negative ascriptions of one identity group against the other in the Irish identities crises, which has its roots from as far back as the 12th century, is termed as tribalism. In Northern Ireland, there has been ‘a Catholic tribalism, an Anglican tribalism and a Presbyterian tribalism, which has further degenerated into “Catholic” and “Protestant”, “Orange” and “Green”’²²

The distinction between tribalism and ethnonationalism is sometimes also blurred, thus contributing to the complex nature of issues of identity politics. It would appear that, the evolution of terminological usage has assigned ethnonationalism to the demonstration of patriotism towards one’s ethnonational group, and tribalism to the negative usage and/or manipulation of ethnonationalistic potential for controversial purposes. The distinction can be more or less reduced to the respective use and abuse

²¹ New Ulster Movement. Tribalism or Christianity in Ireland?, NUM, 1973 (Publication No. 9), p. 7.

²² Ibid.

of ethnonational identity. Therefore, whereas diversity in political participation, and quests for national self-determination or autonomy, are deemed as demonstrations of ethnonationalism, “politics of the belly” (Hameso 1997, p. 40), and/or the manipulation of ethnonational identities for electoral or other political purposes are deemed as tribalistic. The scenario becomes even more complex and confusing, in that, politicians often tend to malign legitimate expressions of political diversity, ethnonational self-determination and autonomy, as tribalism, with the intent to repress the former (Hameso 1997, pp. 38-43). As the term itself is abused, it has become the case, therefore, that prescription of tribalism occurs by both an abuse of ethnonationalistic potential, as well as for cat-calling purposes.

Since Ghana’s independence in 1957, the nationalistic expressions of Ghanaian citizens towards the state have reflected the paradox of theoretical conflict between ethnonationalism and political nationalism on one hand, and the practical reality of their equal status, on the other. The patterns of ethnonationalism in the country’s politics, especially in electioneering and multi-party democracy, confirms this paradox. Although, in the immediate pre-independence period, ethnonationalistic expressions were made towards regionalisation and/or federalisation in Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Trans Volta Togoland [Allman 1993; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, p. 22], the anti-colonial nationalism promoted and strengthened political nationalism, in that, country people fought for a common aim – (independence for the whole country) - irrespective of citizens’ individual ethnonational identities. Perhaps the fact that the anti-colonial nationalism was unified under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who was Nzima, and whose ethnonational identity was not of the aforementioned contentious locations, helped submerge ethnonationalism. However, in the post-

colonial era, identifiable patterns of both ethnonationalism and/or tribalism have resurfaced. For example, in the last elections of 1996, the Volta Region, which is predominantly Ewe, voted *en masse* - 94.5% for the Ewe Rawlings (Nugent 1999, p. 306)²³. In another example, the main Opposition party – the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - is dominated more by Ashantis than any other identity group, owing to its Ashanti foundations, although this view is not generally accepted by some of the party's prominent members²⁴. These patterns of tribalism and ethnonationalism shift or change in variation with the socio-political context. As patterns of ethnonationalism in voting behaviours echo from the political context and the issues at stake, it has become clear that ethnonational allegiance plays a definite role in party politics and electioneering. For example, in addition to qualities, the ethnonational identity of a presidential candidate is a major influence over voter decisions. Negative ethnonational ascriptions can primarily disqualify politicians from being candidates, or ultimately take away votes if they became candidates. For example, during the 1979 electioneering campaign, the late Victor Owusu (died December 2000), an Ashanti political heavyweight from the Danquah-Busia political tradition and prospective presidential candidate, who once made an undiplomatic assertion against Ewes, alienated himself from many non-Akan prospective voters (Nugent 1995, p. 224). Victor Owusu was on record to have made a pronouncement in the Parliament of the Second Republic of Ghana, along the lines that, Ewes were inward-looking²⁵ and nepotistic [Smock & Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, p. 24]. In another example during the same 1979 electioneering campaign, the choice of a Northerner as the presidential

²³ Statistical details of the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections are provided in Appendix VIII.

²⁴ See transcript of my interview with the NPP Member of Parliament for Tema, Mr Ossei Aidoo, in Appendix IX.

²⁵ The response of the NPP Member of Parliament for Tema, to my unstructured interview with him (Appendix IX), also seems to reflect this view, a possible indication that the source of the view may be

candidate contributed immensely to the Peoples National Party's (PNP) victory which swept the late Dr Hilla Limann into the presidency. A large proportion of the votes from Northern Ghana were cast in favour of the PNP since Limann, a Northerner, was the party's candidate. A current demonstration of the complexity of the dual occurrence of ethnonationalism and tribalism is what seems to have contributed to the strategic decision-making of the vice-presidential candidates of the NDC, NPP, CPP and NRP, as discussed in sections 2.6.2, 2.7.1 and the Glossary in Appendix II. At the same time as Northerners demonstrated ethnonationalism by campaigning for the vice-presidential slot (of the NDC for example), the intentionality of any party in considering a Northern vice-presidential candidate, was the hope of manipulating Northern votes into their political baskets at the election – a demonstration of tribalism. Or one can equally argue that Northerners have been manipulating their ethnonational identity to their political advantage – also tribalism. It is fair to pinpoint that sometimes it becomes difficult to ascertain whether the politics manifesting is ethnonationalism or tribalism.

Tribalism and ethnonationalism seem more easily discernible from the viewpoint of the governed than from government, in that, there is as yet no scientific evidence of the “politics of the belly” other than the usual exchange of accusations from rival and/or past governments and political parties (see footnote 29 in Section 5.1.1). No government has commissioned an enquiry that can catalogue the phenomenon as scientific, despite the widespread knowledge of it. To date, the nearest to a scientific attempt can be found in the anti-corruption campaign commissioned by the World Bank.

The government's Governance Issue Paper, released as part of the National Institutional Renewal Programme, reveals that:

Ghana is among seven (7) African countries that is piloting the new integrated strategy to fighting corruption sponsored by the World Bank and other development partners. The approach is preventive. It is to attack the root causes and fight it with a coalition of internal forces. The methodology requires a country-wide diagnostic survey to delineate areas of attention for priority action. The survey is expected to provide a firm empirical basis for developing an action plan, the sharing of information and responsibility among coalition partners and finally, implementing and monitoring an integrated national anti-corruption programme. Several anti corruption campaigns in the past has failed, but now the nation is taking the bull by the horn. The core anti-corruption group is in the process of refining the country Action Plan. The next steps identified for immediate action are: (a) The Establishment of a coalition group; (b) Organisation of a stakeholders' meeting to determine the structure and composition of the coalition and to adopt the Action Plan; (c) Obtaining a signed permission from the President of the Republic for the purpose of undertaking a diagnostic survey with the assistance of Donors; (d) Integrating anti-corruption measures into the on-going public sector reforms; (e) The commencement of an awareness creation campaign in earnest²⁶.

The practice has been that, governments, in order to have a broad appeal to the whole populace, indulge in ethnic arithmetic at the helm of affairs in order to maintain a balance (Hameso 1997, p. 42). For example, in the early days of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) - the paramilitary government headed by Rawlings before he won the 1992 elections - 'there was a deliberate effort to achieve a rough ethnic balance' in its top hierarchy (Nugent 1995, p. 43). Public awareness of the calculative or strategic positioning of government and public officials through ethnic arithmetic is widespread. In some cases (as it became with the P/NDC later on), the ethnic arithmetic skews off-balance depending on the aims of the power brokers within the governing caucus. The analysis explains that since Rawlings became Head-of-State from December 1981, some of the major allegations levelled against him are: that his

²⁶ Office of the President of Ghana. Governance Issue Paper for the 10th Consultative Group Meeting.

rulership in Ghana has been with the assistance of an ethnocentric clique of personalities from his own Anlo Ewe tribe (Yeebo 1992, p. 52); that the majority of this clique are also from his own Adzovia clan in Eweland (Adjei 1993, p. 262); that his closest advisers draw from Ewes (Shillington 1992, pp. 144-5). Hence, the initial perception of Rawlings' rulership and ruling caucus as tribalistic and Ewe-based (Herbst 1993, pp. 86-7) has not waned. Although other authors, for example Shillington, have portrayed Rawlings as a politician who plays a balanced game of ethnic arithmetic (Shillington 1992, pp 144-5), the vast majority of the literature on Ghanaian politics seem to directly suggest the role of tribalism in government and point fingers to Rawlings' rulership as a prime example. The complexity of the dual occurrence of tribalism and ethnonationalism within the same political arena is compounded by the equally complex relationship between each of the two phenomena and the "politics of the belly". As aptly summarised by Jean Francois Bayart:

in Africa ethnicity is almost never absent from politics, yet at the same time it does not provide its basic fabric. Put this way, the dilemma is naturally absurd. Manifestations of ethnicity inevitably involve other social dimensions, as anthropologists have long demonstrated. And in the context of the contemporary state, ethnicity exists mainly as an agent of accumulation, both of wealth and of political power. Tribalism is thus perceived less as a political force in itself than as a channel through which competition for the acquisition of wealth, power and status is expressed (Bayart 1993, p. 55).

Morrison's study also concluded, in its analysis, that, 'rather than fade and disappear from the African scene, ethnicity will grow more varied and complex, forcing governments to deal with it. Ethnicity has already emerged as a distinct tool for politicians and for circulating the benefits of central government' (Morrison 1982, p.

19). The general effect of the “politics of the belly” is that it elicits a response from citizenry which reflects in voting patterns.

The dual existence of tribalism and ethnonationalism is a pervasive feature in Ghanaian politics, however, the exploitation of ethnonationalism does not always occur for the sharing of material benefits (as portrayed by Bayart and Morrison), but sometimes, for the purposes of consolidating power. For example during Rawlings’ P/NDC era, it is evident that certain key portfolios within the national security set-up, foreign affairs bureau and important areas of the economy have been held by Ewes. This is due to the fact that Ewes, could be trusted by Rawlings to ensure his safety, do his bidding, as well as perform duties to the best of their ability in honour of an Ewe president and the Ewe group. It is generally observed that, in addition to Ewes seeing the Rawlings era as their chance of being part of the ruling caucus (something which seems to have eluded them in the past), they see it also as a duty to ensure Rawlings’s safety and success as one of their kin. It is therefore rational for Rawlings to cash in on ethnonationalism, and only rational for Ewes to vote for him at elections. Patterns of tribalism, whether solely for the purposes of material benefits (as held by Bayart and Morrison), for power consolidating purposes, or just for sheer ethnic arithmetic, or a mixture of all three, are as evident as the awareness exists countrywide.

Given the pervasiveness of the “politics of the belly”, it must be understood why some people demonstrate political rationality by making political choices geared towards their best-calculated ethnonationalistic interests, and also, why this should be seen as their political nationalism. Individual political attitudes are therefore indicators of approval or otherwise of the status quo. The benefits accruable from the “belly

politics”, cause citizens to develop an interest in the politics surrounding the distribution of opportunity, wealth and political power. For example, in a study conducted by Agyeman, citizens revealed their willingness ‘to give up tribalism in favour of nationalism (only) if the social, political and the economic advantages derived from tribalism are removed’ (Agyeman 1988, p. 45). Agyeman’s study further revealed that, politically, tribalism is seen as disadvantageous at the state level but advantageous at the sub-state level (Ibid, p. 44), and that 62.9% of Ghanaians admit to the dysfunctional effects of tribalism on the potential homogenisation of sub-groups within the state, hence lending support to the suppression of tribalism (Ibid, p. 42), as a means of preventing a further undermining of the state. Among the many strong views which were expressed during a round-table discussion organised by Ghana’s Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) under the title Managing Ethnic Conflicts in Ghana, Professor Dominic Agyeman, a leading sociologist of ethnicity in Ghana is quoted as saying that ‘ethnic diversity should be exploited for nation-building, . . . equitable allocation of state resources and a non-ethnic mode of the selection of public officials should be the policy of all governments, . . . ethnic conflict in Ghana is likely to change from verbal confrontation to physical ones if the regime in power treats with contempt complaints of opposition parties’ (GRi. Newsreel, 26 June 1997). During the J. B. Danquah Lectures 1988 organised by the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, Professor Adu Boahen, in addressing the issue of social injustice and inequity, said ‘public offices must be distributed equally and equitably among the various ethnic groups in the country’ (Boahen 1989, p. 66). Also, as part of the 39th anniversary lectures of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, Professor George Hagan, head of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, delivered a lecture entitled Factors Undermining the Viability of the State in Africa: Internal Factors. In the

lecture, he identified the creation of unjust systems, and unequal distribution of resources as the causes of internal power struggle in African states (GRi Newsreel, 19 November 1998). He further identified that instead of opening up state institutions to all citizens on the basis of equality, many see them as opportunities to lord it over other groups on the basis of religion, cult, class, caste, language or regional location, and that instead of uniting the people, state institutions become agents of division and group competition (Ibid). He is quoted as saying that ‘besides poor planning and management strategies, resource dislocations occur through corruption and abuse of power’ (Ibid). The themes in the above quotations reflect the views earlier expressed by Bayart and Morrison on tribalism and the “politics of the belly”, and are in sharp contrast with the themes of fair ethics, rationality and patriotism towards the state inherent in Hutchinson’s theory of political/civic nationalism. An empirical gap therefore exists between the theory and actual practice. As it is clear that the theoretical conflict between attitudes of ethnonationalism and political nationalism is not universally demonstrated by all Ghanaians, it has become necessary to investigate the extent to which the attitudes are pervasive, and their effects on Ghanaian politics.

3.1.4 Integration, urbanisation/detribalisation

Political expression, aspiration and participation occur through instant actions such as voting, and also, long-term processes of integration. The latter (political integration) is seen to take place through ‘a series of experiences and activities which lead to the development of linkages between national [state] and sub-national [sub-state] political units. The linkages are identified by positive and negative interactions which lead to increased flexibility between the national and sub-national units’ (Morrison 1982, p.

89). Political integration is therefore defined as ‘the development of linkages and flexibility in relations between the national government [the cosmopolitan state] and its sub-units’ (Ibid, p. 183). Thus, interaction with national [state] agencies, functional interdependence and shared values serve as indicators of political integration. It is assumed that ‘the cumulative effect of interdependence and interactions lead to relationships which constitute a degree of integration’, and that the acceptance and co-operation of a sub-national unit with the national government [the cosmopolitan state] indicates that the former has “value orientations” towards the latter (Ibid, p. 13). Education, occupation and urbanisation have been identified as some of the variables which influence not only social mobilisation and/or integration, but also interaction with the state, or political integration (Ibid, p. 104). Although the ratio of political involvement between urbanites and non-urbanites varies from country to country, the trend seems pervasive that urbanite political involvement exceeds that of non-urbanites. A report on urbanization and political involvement between France and USA confirms that ‘intranational studies have persistently shown higher political involvement among urban residents and, more strongly still, among people of more advanced education’ (Campbell et al 1966, p. 270). The point is made therefore that urbanisation enhances political involvement, and that there seems to be some grounds for the existence of the notion that the urban exposure orientates its subjects towards involvement and interaction with the institutions of the cosmopolitan state, whose political and logistical strength are usually concentrated in the metropolis. It must be noted however, that the notional trend that urbanites are detribalised and should therefore be political nationalists is not globally universalistic, and generally not consistent with Africa, or at the very least Ghana. As already argued, within the status quo of “politics of the belly” in multinational African states, the local political

rationality enhances ethnonationalism rather than political nationalism. Despite the widespread notion that urbanisation, with its concomitant integrative and modernising opportunities, constitutes detribalisation, and subsequently, that urban mobilisation could lead to ‘ . . . a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state . . . ’ (Connor 1994, p. 35), it seems that on the contrary, urbanites are only partially detribalised. Furthermore, in certain urbanite situations, primary allegiance to ethnonational identity is actually rejuvenated. Morrison’s case study of national [state] identity vis-à-vis Ashanti identity (conducted from 1971 to 1974) revealed that any group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or otherwise) tended to reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 1982, p. 186).

Detribalisation is referred to by some authors as an actual alienation from autochthonous and tribal roots (Francis 1976, p. 404), and that its definition must necessarily be inherent in migration from an “uncontaminated” rural setting and subsistence life to urban industrial areas, and/or an assimilation into an urban society and culture (Watson 1958, pp. 3-8). Other authors argue that detribalisation is more attitudinal rather than any de-rooting from a tribal base, and that it should be seen as the process of attitudinal separation from general tribal or other sub-national attitudes resulting from urbanisation and integration. Whereas, the modernising factors of urbanisation, such as education and integration, do enhance detribalisation, many authors do not see a constant correlation between these enhancing factors and detribalisation. For example, Watson identifies that assimilation into urban culture ‘does not necessarily imply “detribalisation”’ (Ibid, p. 5), a view corroborated by Agyeman, who also claims that urbanisation does not necessarily result in detribalisation (Agyeman 1988, pp. 35-6). This view is supported by the fact that, ‘in

spite of the growing social distance between the educated and the illiterate masses, the educated are not detribalised or isolated from their kinship groups' (Ibid, p. 36). The views of Watson and Agyeman are also corroborated by Lucy Mair, the famous anthropologist. According to Mair, 'as generally used nowadays, however, "detribalization" refers to the adoption of city ways of life in cities, and not to the rejection of traditional ways in the country' (Mair 1965, pp. 11-2).

However, it would appear that the widespread notion that urbanization should lead to detribalization, is not simply because the modernising factors associated with the former accelerates the latter, but also that the conceptualization of some authorship (Wilson 1941, pp. 12 & 16; Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6; Wilson and Mafeje 1963, pp. 13-46, 53) does equate the two processes with each other, that is, that urbanization is detribalization. Hence, the essential difference is not to be sought between the two terms or concepts, but instead, the depth of the phenomenon.

Attempts at drawing a neat distinction between the rural lifestyle and the urban opposite have therefore been confused by the argument that, detribalization is not just about physical or geographical alienation from tribal autochthons or bases – (geographical detribalization) - plus a change in lifestyle akin to the urban setting, in that, so long as urbanites still maintain relations with tribal roots – irrespective of physical alienation, detribalization has not occurred. It is therefore argued by others, that detribalization is only deemed to have occurred when an individual develops the attitude to reduce relationships and contact with tribal roots even when both parties are accessible to each other - (attitudinal detribalisation). The extreme end of attitudinal detribalization is envisaged as when an individual ceases to have (cuts off)

relationships with tribal bases or autochthons, including communication and commuting. Given the various arguments from the polarized authorships, a distinction should be drawn between geographical detribalization and attitudinal detribalization.

Godfrey Wilson's comparative study of pre-modern and modern Northern Rhodesia, not only helps draw a neat line between rural and urban life, but also makes the important point that, the process of detribalization begins with the process of urbanization, or vice versa. Wilson describes the tribal setting as a world of its own, a we-group scenario within which the lifestyle and cycle of members largely depends upon, and is restricted mainly to themselves, and not between similar groups elsewhere.

In the tribal setting, a person belongs to:

a single tribe – that is, easily understand one another's speech and possess a common name and a homogeneous culture – and often it was a few thousand only; . . . marked by a high degree of autonomy . . . social relationships were only confined to little areas of a few square miles. Subsistence agriculture or cattle-keeping seldom involved a man in cooperation with any save friends and relatives who lived nearby. Marriage was a local affair and seldom joined families more than thirty miles apart. Religious ritual, ceremonial, warfare hunting and fishing were only occasionally organised on any large scale; normally they were confined to the family, the village and the local district or chiefdom; and so a high degree of autonomy in each primitive community was inevitable . . . consisted almost entirely of men personally acquainted with one another; there were few impersonal relations. Business, law and religion joined men mainly to those they had known all their lives. Kinship had an enormous importance in this world of personal relations, since it set a large proportion of them for each individual for life. The village was the main unit of local aggregation and villages themselves were small. Writing was unknown; there was no need for it, when few messages had ever to be sent more than a two days journey, and when all messages were simple . . . there was little possibility of specialization, and hence the level of technical achievement was low . . . Men differed in wealth, as in status; but differences of wealth were seldom embedded in a class system . . . Of land there was sufficient for all; and normally the economic functions and wealth of the different families in a primitive community were too similar to give rise to any class distinctions . . . It was almost a world in itself, a homogeneous world and its contacts with the neighbouring tribes were slight . . . the bonds of kinsfolk and neighbourhood were as much a matter of business – that is of reciprocal

economic advantage – as of affection, duty and respect . . . (Wilson, 1941, pp. 9-12).

By contrast, Wilson paints the opposite scenario of the emerged social change in the urban setting, as:

. . . members of a huge, world-wide community, and their lives are bound up at every point with the events of its history. New methods of transport by bicycle, lorry and rail have increased their own range of travel twentyfold. Many of them now speak a European language, and most of them have learnt the language of some other tribe than their own . . . They have entered a heterogeneous world, stratified into classes and states . . . in pre-European Northern Rhodesia there were thousands of almost self-sufficient primitive communities; now there are none, and Northern Rhodesia itself is only a small part of a world-wide community. To-day, then, Northern Rhodesia is in process of rapid adjustment to the conditions of world community; a community in which impersonal relations are important; where business, law and religion make men dependent on millions of other men whom they have never met; a community articulated into races, nations and classes; in which the tribes, no longer almost worlds in themselves, now take their place as small administrative units; a world of writing, of specialized knowledge and of elaborate skill. The relationships of kinship and village life are becoming yearly less important, for kinsmen and fellow villagers no longer make up half each individual's world. New local groups have grown up and continue to grow in the industrial, administrative and commercial towns on the line of rail; and in each town the members of a hundred tribes live cheek by jowl (Ibid, pp. 12-3).

The contrast between the two scenarios speaks for itself. Wilson argues that the process of social change which transforms tribespeople from the exigencies of the former to the latter scenario, is termed as detribalisation (Ibid, p. 12) or urbanization (Ibid, p. 16), and that the rising demand for labour in urbanised centres is one main push factor which causes migrant labour to become temporarily urbanized, or graduate into a state of permanent urbanization (Ibid, pp. 46-71). According to Wilson therefore, the process of urbanization is itself the process of detribalization, and that, so long as one is urbanized, one is detribalised. Using Broken Hill, an urban dwelling in Northern

Rhodesia as a case, the results of Wilson's study establishes a clear connection or linkage between urbanization and detribalization. Wilson identifies 4 main categories or shades of detribalised or urbanised folk: (1) peasant visitors ' . . . come mainly from the nearer villages; they have spent most of their working lives in the country [village] but they pay occasional short visits to town [urban centre] and there enter employment' (Ibid, p. 46). 8.6% of Broken Hill belonged to this category; (2) a migrant labourer is 'one who has spent between one third and two thirds of his time in town and between two thirds and one third in the country since first leaving his tribal area' (Ibid). 20.5% of Broken Hill were migrant labourers; (3) temporarily urbanized folk are those who have 'been born and brought up in the country; they have spent most of their time, in long periods, in the towns since the age of fifteen and a half years; they pay occasional short visits to their rural homes and people from home come to visit them' (Ibid). A temporarily urbanized person is therefore 'one who spends the best of his (or her) working life in the towns but his childhood and old age in the country' (Ibid, p. 54). 69.9% of Broken Hill consisted of temporarily urbanized folk (Ibid, p. 47); (4) permanently urbanized folk are those 'who have been born and brought up in town and who know no other home' (Ibid), that is, 'one who spends all his life in the towns' (Ibid, p. 54). Only 1% of Broken Hill belonged to this category.

Wilson's findings revealed not only a demonstration of geographical detribalization, but also the fact that social change sometimes resulted in attitudinal detribalization. Among the many factors which contributed to the processes of detribalisation and/or the various stages of urbanization, marital status and cohabitation had an influence on the attitudes of urban male dwellers towards their tribal roots, including spending

patterns (Ibid, pp. 48-65). Wilson's findings revealed three different categories and their corresponding attitudes. According to Wilson:

The first category (married: wives in town) is the most stabilized; its members go home on the average once after each period of five years, six and a half months in town, and 82.7% of them are temporarily urbanized; among them the personal transfer of wealth to the country is only 11.5% of their cash wages; but it is this category which makes the greatest demand on the rural areas for produce . . . The second category (married: wives in the country) is the least stabilized; its members go home on the average, once after each sixteen months in town and only 35.25% of them are temporarily urbanized; among them the personal transfer of wealth to the country is 32.2% of their cash wages . . . The third category (single men and youths) falls between the other two, but approximates most closely to the first. Its members (excluding the permanently urbanized) go home, on the average, once after each period of three years two and a half months in town; while 66.5% of them are temporarily and about 2.4% permanently urbanized. Among them the personal transfer of wealth to the rural areas is 20.1% of their cash wages (Ibid, pp. 58-63).

According to Wilson therefore, 'marriage is the closest of all personal relationships' (Ibid, p. 62) and the most important factor contributing towards attitudinal detribalisation. The other factor working in conjunction with marriage, to stimulate attitudinal detribalisation, is distance (Ibid, pp. 62-9).

Another study completed on the Langa township near Cape Town, by Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, to investigate the character, mobility and turnover of the African labour force in the Cape Peninsula, from the periods 1955-7 and 1961-2, also resulted in similar conceptualization and findings to those of Godfrey Wilson (Wilson and Mafeje 1963). Wilson and Mafeje also equate the 'process of urbanisation' (Ibid, p. 53) - and/or absorption - with the processes of physical alienation of migrant labour from tribal bases into towns (Ibid, pp. 13-46), and describes partly urbanized men as 'would-be townsmen who are "trying to push in and be absorbed", trying to imitate townsmen' (Ibid, p. 21). Wilson and Mafeje conceptualise categories of urban folk as: (1) migrant

labourers; (2) semi-urbanized, and; (3) urbanized folk (Ibid, p. 15). Furthermore, their study also reveals changes in the attitudes and values of urbanized folk towards tribal bases, indicated by spending patterns and distance. Their findings also reveal attitudinal differences between the sexes (Ibid, pp. 15-6).

In another study conducted by Philip Mayer on Xhosa society in East London, South Africa, Mayer clearly sets the distinction between rural and urban Xhosa society by revealing the effects caused by social mobility (Mayer 1961). Mayer also equates urbanization with detribalization and depicts both terminology as the process of social mobility - movement of individuals from the rural to the urban area (Ibid, pp. 4-6). Furthermore, he makes a distinction between physical alienation from the rural area – (geographical detribalization) and changes in culture, values and attitudes – (attitudinal detribalization), by distinguishing between the “way of life” of the “town-rooted” and the “country-rooted” (Ibid, p. 6). Mayer’s conceptualisation of changing identities within the process of detribalization (or urbanization) is not too different from those of Godfrey Wilson, or Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, and ranges between migration and stabilization. Mayer points out that stabilization is a strong indicator for identifying those fully or genuinely urbanized, but not vice versa (Mayer 1961, pp. 4-6). But in addition to a distinction between physical and attitudinal detribalization, Mayer further makes the very important point, that not all urbanites are detribalized. Irrespective of the terminological confusion, Mayer’s message is clear about those who have become ‘culturally “urbanized” without having been correspondingly “detribalized”’ (Ibid, p. 10). These, described by Mayer as “double-cultured”, are adept in both rural and urban cultures, and not to the neglect of either. Mayer conceptualizes urbanization as both a state (or condition) as well as a process. (Ibid, pp. 5, 10-1).

The relevance of the conceptualization and findings of the above-mentioned studies seem only relevant to the discussion on urbanization and detribalization. Godfrey Wilson's study does not investigate inter-tribal relationships, and therefore, is unable to inform readers of the nature of such relationships as they existed in Rhodesia. The study did not offer participants the opportunity to demonstrate their nationalistic feelings vis-à-vis other groupings in a broad context of competition for territorial political power and wealth. At the time of Wilson's study, the political situation was different. Rhodesia was then (1940) under colonial administration, but is now independent as Zimbabwe, and under an indigenous administration which may or not be a fair reflection of its subject groupings, in terms of the control and distribution of political power and wealth. Wilson's study is therefore unable to inform us of the patterns of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism, and/or the competitive responses of the various subject groupings towards the post-colonial Zimbabwean state. The Wilson and Mafeje (1963) study also took place when South Africa was still apartheid. As the study was not about political attitudes, subjects were not offered the opportunity to express them. Philip Mayer's study also has no political ambitions to it.

However, in Agyeman's study conducted in 1970, which investigated Ghanaian attitudes on nationalism and ideological education, citizens revealed their willingness 'to give up tribalism in favour of [political] nationalism (only) if the social, political and economic advantages derived from tribalism are removed' (Agyeman 1988, p. 45). Agyeman's study further revealed that, politically, tribalism is seen as disadvantageous at the national [state] level but advantageous at the sub-national [substate] level (Ibid, p. 44), and that 62.9% of Ghanaians admit to the dysfunctional effects of tribalism on national integration, hence, the advocacy for the abolition of tribalism in order to

prevent tribal favouritism (Ibid, p. 42), and in order that tribalism would cease to undermine the state.

Also, Morrison's case study, conducted in Ghana from 1971 to 1974, on citizenship identity under a single Ghanaian state vis-à-vis Ashanti national identity, revealed that any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or not) tended to reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 1982, p. 186).

No doubt, in a multi-national state, urbanisation and integration lead to a shift of primary allegiance from tribal and autochthonous bases to the state and its institutions which are very well concentrated in the urban areas, and enhance the potential for political nationalism. But at the same time, where "politics of the belly" is prevailing, ethnonationalism is enhanced at the expense of political nationalism.

Tribal mobilization and coagulation occurs in urban settings irrespective of their potential for integration, modernisation and social mobilisation. Rather than the integrative potential of urbanisation fostering a unified identity through political nationalism under the incubative capacity of single statehood, in multi-national states, urban dwellings tend to constitute ripe settings for the gestation, or rejuvenation of tribal consciousness (Morrison 1982, p. 186). According to Connor:

If the processes that comprise modernization led to a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favour of identification with the state, then the number of states troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease. To the contrary, however, a global survey illustrates that ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, are being increasingly challenged by this trend. And, what is of more significance,

multi-ethnic states at all levels of modernity have been afflicted . . . That social mobilization need not lead to a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state is therefore clear (Connor 1994, p. 35).

Obviously, Connor is making the point that geographical detribalization and urban integration do not necessarily result in attitudinal detribalization.

Thus, within multinational states, despite the integrative, modernising and mobilisational potential inherent in urbanisation, as well as the potential for unifying different ethnonational groupings under a single statehood, it would appear the capital cities provide just the ripe arena for the entrenchment of ethnonational consciousness. This has resulted not only in the immense difficulty often encountered in attempts at forging a single national identity within multi-national states, but in some cases, the split-up of states. The latter scenario has not occurred in Ghana, although as already hinted by Professor Agyeman (above), the potential for explosion exists if ethnonationalism and the “politics of the belly” are not suppressed.

3.2 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH

This research therefore aimed at: (1) conducting a survey of Ghanaian urbanites in order to measure the current trends of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism by investigating their voting attitudes and intentions, in order to establish the extent to which proneness towards political nationalism by supposedly detribalised urbanites, is imagined or real, of style or substance; (2) critically examining patterns in Ghanaian voting behaviours by analysing the distinctive patterns between ethnonational and state attitudes.

3.3 METHODOLOGY

Due to the immense advantages inherent in the combination of both quantitative and qualitative strategies in research (Brannen ed. 1992), both methodologies were utilized as appropriate. The overall research strategy included: (a) a questionnaire-administered survey; (b) unstructured interview/s as opportuned, and; (c) analyses of media reports. Unlike the other large cities in Ghana which have been founded by specific ethnonational groups, Tema, the industrial city chosen for this research, has been founded on the implosion of job-seekers and employees from across the country (see section 3.5). Any ethnonational skew in the city's population is therefore artificial and circumstantial. The survey data was analysed using the SPSS software. Qualitative data was examined and analysed through analytic induction. Themes and concepts which are 'grounded' to the research or 'closely and directly relevant to' (Nachmias & Nachmias 1992, p. 284) electoral politics in multi-national Ghana were derived via the grounded theory method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The idea was to develop 'grounded' rather than 'grand' concepts for the political situation under investigation (Gilbert ed. 1993, p. 168). Media sources included both print and cyberspace media.

3.3.1 The questionnaire

Although it seems easy to demarcate facts from attitudes and viewpoints, the evolution of experience within social science has proved, that with regard to certain issues, such as ethnicity and identity, the boundary between fact and attitude is sometimes vague, blurred, subjective or even ambiguous (Converse & Presser 1986, p. 17). This questionnaire was designed as an instrument to be used in a factual as well as an

attitudinal survey. The questionnaire therefore posed questions which elicited both factual and tentative responses, and was designed to build a political history of respondents, such that, their tentative views for the 2000 elections were not in abstract, but related to past political behaviour as well as family political orientation.

3.3.2 Assumptions underpinning the questionnaire

The questionnaire can be found in Appendix X. Among many other things, the questionnaire accounted for the assumptions inherent in detribalisation and aimed to elicit the attitudes of urbanites towards ethnonationalism and political nationalism through their voting intentions. Additionally, it solicited views on the extent to which urbanites felt detribalised, as well as any deliberate attempts towards attitudinal detribalisation, their propensities to maintain association with their roots or otherwise, and the reasons behind such actions. In view of the fact that urbanites also have the tendency to bond or coagulate along ethnonational lines, and also Morrison's view that any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or not) tended to reassert its ethnonational base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 1982, p.186), the questionnaire sought to elicit views on potential or tentative voting intentions as dependent on the ethnonational identities of presidential candidates and the prevailing political context. In addition to certain aspects of the questionnaire already discussed, the basic backgrounds of all interviewees as well as their political orientation, were sought. Responses derived from this section aided in forming a demographic picture of what type of respondents they were. Their interests and levels of engagement in politics were also sought in order to know their levels of familiarity with, and commitment to political activity. Response choices of "ineligibility" indicate

the possibility of some respondents having not registered to vote in 2000 for whatever reason. The section on “freedom of expression” elicited some indication on how candid and bold respondents were with regard to political expression. Like all opinion polls, there is no guarantee that opinions are the truth (and even candid opinions could have changed by election day), however, it helped to know the type of respondent, as this was measured against questions 22 – 30. The section labelled “tentative votes – pressure or prevailing factors” was aimed at eliciting how respondents were affected by public opinion and pressure, whether they had a “mind of their own” and how strongly they would maintain their stance and stick to their own convictions and not be swayed by public thinking. The section was also aimed at testing whether or not respondents were ethnonationalistic. The section labelled “urbanised/detribalised” dealt with the length of urban experience respondents have had, their means of maintaining urban-rural relationships through postal services, telecommunication or travel, as well as whether any form of attitudinal detribalisation had been a natural urban experience or with deliberate effort. The section on “religious background” is straightforward but responses could serve as explanation to religious voting patterns, regarding the choice of candidates. The section on “tribal derivation” was left at the end since its earlier appearance on the questionnaire might alarm certain respondents and prevent free and candid responses. However, it was only included for purposes of confirming the ethnonational identities of respondents (as already given in Q. 3). Generally, a typical Ghanaian surname easily gives away one’s ethnonational identity.

3.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON GHANAIAN ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

It must be noted that, first, both past and present voters' registers in Ghana do not give place for indicating ethnonational identity. Second, scientific post-election surveys conducted so far did not investigate ethnonationalism in politics as a stand-alone issue, but as one of many aspects of Ghanaian political attitudes. Results of these surveys have therefore not been forthcoming as far as any detailed analyses of the specific patterns and deep intricacies of ethnonationalism in electoral politics are concerned. Moreover, their results have very limited predictive value for future trend setting. For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), in cooperation with the Electoral Commission of Ghana, conducted a national survey of Ghanaian public opinion from February 26 to April 16 1997. The survey measured attitudes about the December 1996 elections, politics and the economy. Results of the survey interview (conducted by Research International – R.I. in Ghana) revealed, among other things, that, 'a quarter (26%) of all Ghanaians felt that relations between ethnonational groups ranged from 'somewhat bad' to 'very bad'. Pessimism about mutual ethnonational relations was highest in the Ashanti, Greater Accra, Western and Volta regions. One-fourth (25%) of all Ghanaians claim to have been discriminated against because of their ethnonational identity. This was highest among the Frafra and Ewe' (McCarty 1997, p. 3). This IFES survey did not investigate ethnonationalism in voting habits.

In another example, both a pre- and post-election survey conducted by the Department of Political Science of the University of Ghana, sought information on respondents' ethnonational identities, party alliances and votes in the last elections. However, this was circumstantial to the research in that the survey was not specifically aimed at

investigating ethnonational patterns in voting behaviours alone, but rather many variables. The Department's survey investigated the combination of 'agential and structural variables that intricately combined to produce the particular pattern of results' in the last elections (Jonah 1998, p. 229). The survey was based on the hypothesis that 'neither agency nor structure by itself can fully explain the election results of 1992 and 1996 . . . structural variables constitute the social, economic and political parameters within which agential factors operate. Structures then are the external bounds and limits within which Ghanaian voters exercised their free choices in the elections of 1992 and 1996' (Ibid). The survey identified the "structural" factors as the ethnic, industrial, urban-rural and regional structures of the country, and the "agential" factors as 'the recorded feelings, reasons and decisions of the Ghanaian electorate acting as free agents and exercising their free choices in elections generally considered to be free and fair' (Ibid). The research posited the broad overview that the former influenced the latter (Ibid, pp 229-55). The Department's survey results reveal strong indications that 'ethnicity is a major factor that influenced Ghanaian voters in both the 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections' (Ibid 1998, p. 246), that a full understanding of the past elections cannot be gained 'without reference to the ethnic factor' (Ibid), and that 'to ignore the ethnic factor is to ignore a major key to understanding the mind of the Ghanaian voter (Ibid). However, the survey has limited predictive value for the 2000 elections (as far as patterns of ethnonationalism and political nationalism are concerned) since it failed to gather data on voters' intentions. Second, although it makes mention of mass, patriotic, block voting along ethnonational lines, it failed to demonstrate or detail the specific antagonisms between which ethnonational groups, and also the manifestations of such antagonisms against presidential candidates. Third, the Department's survey did not investigate the

intricacies in ethnonationalistic and/or tribalistic behaviours of supposedly detribalised urbanites.

This research, however: (a) had predictive value for the 2000 elections with regard to patterns of ethnonationalism and political nationalism; (b) reveals the specific antagonisms between which ethnonational groups, and also; (c) reveals antagonisms against presidential candidates as a result of their ethnonational identities. More interestingly, the study has been conducted on urbanites, who are supposed to be detribalised, and are expected to be political nationalists.

3.5 TEMA

Tema is essentially an artificial creation to suit the industrial need for a dwelling site for urban workers. Unlike the other traditional cities in Ghana, for example Kumasi, Cape-Coast, Accra and Tamale, which were founded as settlements by specific ethnonational groups such as the Ashanti, Fanti, Ga-Adangbe and Dagomba respectively, Tema was founded strictly on migrant urban skilled workers without any specific ethnonational basis. Therefore, whereas there would always be more Ashantis in Kumasi, more Fantis in Cape-Coast, more Ga-Adangbes in Accra and subsequently more Dagombas in Tamale, any ethnonational skew in the population of Tema is artificial and circumstantial. Obviously, the ethnonational configuration of Tema is not equi-representative of all the groups, but this is by chance and not design.

As a result of a governmental decision in 1951 to construct a new deep water harbour/port in Tema for the exchange of both imports and exports to augment the Volta River Electrification Scheme (meant essentially for the supply of electrical power to the aluminium smelting and other industries catering for Ghana's mineral and farm produce), a city was planned to host any migrant labour in relationship with the Scheme. Tema was therefore a joint entity embracing the harbour, the city and related industries and a unique city to be utilised for the purposes of this research, in that, the city guarantees: (a) an urban population not traditionally assembled on the basis of a traditional ethnonational settlement, and; (b) a multi-national, supposedly detribalised urban population, whose political attitudes can be investigated.

A land area of 64 square miles (102.4 sq. kilometres) or 40000 acres of stool land was procured by the Ministry of Housing, Town and Country Planning for the purposes of

developing the city. In July 1952, Ordinance No. 35 established the Tema Development Corporation (TDC), which was entrusted to the building of 24 Communities, to house at least 250,000 people. According to the Master Plan, the city was to evolve into its full plan over a 25-year period from 1961-1985, and to host 250,000 people. Due to intensive labour migratory movements, the average annual population growth rate for Tema was estimated at 12% for the first ten years and 7% for the following 15 years, or an average 9.1% over the 25-year period. As compared with a 5% growth rate for Accra and 2.5% for the whole country, that of Tema was to be very high indeed (although Accra, the country's capital and traditional home for the Ga tribe, had a larger traditional and stool land allocation). It was estimated that by 1985, Tema will be populated by 234,000 people. Due to reductions of fiscal injections into Tema's development as a result of general economic slump faced by subsequent governments, the Tema Project did not progress at the planned rate, however, the 1984 census gave the population of the city as 189,102. The Tema Project seems to have picked up again and at the moment has already built up to 20 Communities. Lately, private housing development has been introduced as pieces of the allocated land has been sold into private ownership for private development. Although this has rejuvenated the Tema Project, private developments have different architecture, but with planning permission from the TDC. This has changed the architectural landscape of Tema from as it would have been had all the buildings been erected by the TDC.

Chapter 4

Fieldwork, Analysis And Interpretation Of Data

4.1 FIELDWORK

4.1.1 Methodological innovation to surmount the 'culture of silence'

The fieldwork and data gathering process, was mainly through one-to-one, computerised, questionnaire-based interviews. I also had an unstructured interview schedule with the Member of Parliament for Tema. The computerisation of the primary data-gathering process was chosen to surmount the prevailing cultural and political inhibitions to the original plans, such as the 'culture of silence' (Boahen 1989, p 1), and its potential for a low rate of return to questionnaire distribution. The computerised research strategy was instrumental to achieving the aims of the field trip, in that, it also enabled the data gathering process to be completed in a record time from the period 22/01/99 to 20/02/99. Altogether, there were 501 respondents to the questionnaire. Computerised survey strategies are now widely used as the need for innovation has prompted their adoption in the West since the late 1980s (Survey Methods Centre Newsletter, Summer 1989, pp. 1-12). However, in the relatively poor regions of the world, such as West Africa, a computerised survey was both revolutionary and innovative. None of the surveys conducted so far in Ghana have been computerised.

4.1.2 The 'culture of silence'

The phrase 'culture of silence' came into being when the Ghanaian President first used it in a speech he delivered in Sunyani, Ghana, in April 1987, to describe the development of a political culture whereby freedom of political expression was lacking (Boahen 1989, pp. 1, 54). Ghana had been under oppressive and repressive military rule from 1981 until 1992 when resumption of multi-party democracy occurred.

Although the 'culture of silence' has been waning since 1992, freedom of expression was generally not being fully exercised by citizenry. The 'culture of silence' manifests in several ways including: (a) refusal to air views critical to the government for fear of political intimidation through detention, liquidation of assets, or any sort of molestation; (b) murmuring as against a positive declaration of opinion; (c) selective media coverage due to fear of the media to broadcast or publish views critical to the government. In the past, some media houses, for example, the "Catholic Standard" and the "Free Press" have had to be closed down as a result of harassment from the government; (d) as a result of the above, silence, apathy and indifference as a means of protest against the government, instead of the usual open and organised protest through demonstrations and/or media presentation; (e) a prevailing state of anomie, alienation and lack of freedom of association (Boahen 1989, pp. 51-8). Obviously, breaking the culture of silence is necessary for the full realisation of freedom of expression and association, and their subsequent contribution to national development (Ibid 1989, pp. 67-8).

4.1.3 Problems to initial data-gathering strategy

An initial idea of distribution and retrieval of questionnaires by post was discounted because of: (a) an expected low response rate for any of the reasons attributable to the 'culture of silence' (Ibid); and (b) the strategy not guaranteeing freedom of respondents from household pressure and neighbouring political influences. It became clear that the postal venture did not offer good value for money. House to house questionnaire-based interviews with a representative random sample, an appropriate strategy which would guarantee a response rate of some success also had to be shelved owing to the negative

impact of the 'culture of silence'. Graduating from being ruled by a military regime to an elected government, freedom of political expression was gradually increasing, but most citizens would still not be comfortable with the idea of their political opinions being recorded through a survey exercise, however well intended.

4.1.4 Innovative research strategy

Finally, a strategy that will guarantee the acquisition of a cross-section of respondents fairly representative of the city's population, as well as complete anonymity and confidentiality to respondents was adopted. The use of high technology strategy aided in the administration and eliciting of data from a total of 501 respondents in only four weeks via a questionnaire of 53 questions each. This is remarkable, in that, pursuing any of the previously intended data-gathering strategies would have taken several months to complete, and would still not guarantee bias-free data. All questions and answers were coded into numerical representation and programmed into SPSS computer software. Respondents to the questionnaire recited their answers in the coded numbers, which were then inputted directly into a laptop computer as the answers were being given. The spreadsheet mechanism of SPSS easily facilitated this data-inputting method and the laptop was easy to carry around to all places including street corners, factory plants, market places, classrooms and other nooks. The portable and battery-operated laptop was very handy for such operations and for places without electricity. This research strategy guaranteed respondents the anonymity, security and most of all, the confidentiality, which encouraged freedom of expression. Respondents were engaged on one-on-one basis and no third party was within easy earshot. Even in circumstances where others were within reasonable proximity, reciting answers in

coded numbers made eavesdropping not worthwhile, since an eavesdropper could not easily decipher a response being given in numerical codes. Moreover, respondents were freed from any neighbouring pressure and gave responses freely, knowing that their responses could not be known by others. This methodology also meant that the database for the whole fieldwork was automatically and simultaneously created as interviews took place. By the end of all interviews, a computerised database already existed for the whole questionnaire-based interview process. Last but not least, in a country where ownership of a laptop was a luxury limited to city executives and their offices, the parading of a laptop in public places and for the purposes of conducting a survey on political attitudes provoked a lot of interest which made the acquisition of respondents much easier.

4.1.5 Sampling

The prospect of availability of eligible respondents led me to visit places which offered the possibility of a group of adults on site. Therefore, the factories, markets, shopping malls, schools and restaurants provided the perfect sampling sites for the interviews. Adults of the eligible voting age by 2000 (at least 17 years) were interviewed in the large factories which granted permission for interviews to be conducted on their site when approached. These are Volta Aluminium Company Ltd (VALCO), Cocoa Processing Company Ltd (CPC), Ghana Textile Printing Company Ltd (GTP), Ghana Cement Works (GHACEM), Ghana Textile Manufacturing Company Ltd (GTMC), and Wahome Steel Industries Ltd. Factory respondents included both management and factory hands. Final year students of Tema Secondary School were also interviewed.

Teachers from a number of schools also responded to the questionnaire²⁷. Last but not least, shopkeepers, market traders and sailors from the harbour also took a keen interest in the research and responded to the questionnaire. Respondents reflected a wide age and class range. The sample is not typically representative of Tema as a population census would be. Hence, the results of the survey have validity regarding relationships between the variables, but not absolute validity for the individual variables. However, the slightly unrepresentativeness of the sample is balanced by a data-gathering procedure which eliminated household pressure and neighbouring political influences that would have inhibited respondents from speaking freely. A number of respondents also gave vital information through answers to unstructured interviewing, most notably the Member of Parliament for Tema.

4.1.6 Problems to innovation

It would be realised at a latter stage, that some Ghanaians, particularly those with sympathies for the ruling NDC, were unhappy about the idea of any survey being conducted for whatever purposes, in that, it was an avenue for assessing any public disaffection to the ruling party, and that the potential existed for results of the survey to carry negative consequences. To them, any such revelations would be considered as ammunition to the Opposition parties. Others, were also suspicious of the intentions of the survey, some suspecting the CIA or other foreign collaboration, and duly questioned the "authorities" behind the survey. In all the factory sites, and even in some of the market shops, I had to produce copies of the covering letters from Middlesex

²⁷ See Appendix VI(a) for a list of names and official addresses of headteachers of some of the schools visited. Not all schools visited are happy for their identity to be made public.

University and the University of Ghana, before clearance was given to interview respondents. In Aluworks, a large aluminium plant within walking distance from Wahome Steel Industry, I was refused clearance to carry out interviews because (as I was told), the management was not sure of how they would be viewed by the government for allowing such an exercise to be carried out on its premises. I was however not given any such excuse in neighbouring Wahome.

Overall, the innovative research strategy of using a laptop for a questionnaire-based survey was highly successful and has positive implications for research methodology in political cultures where the 'culture of silence' exists in any variety.

4.2 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FIELDWORK DATA

4.2.1 Introduction

The sample is not as typically representative of Tema as census data. Hence, the results of the survey have validity regarding relationships between the variables, but not absolute validity for the individual variables. The last but one census in Ghana was held in 1984. Its statistics are out of date and neither has current relevance nor reflect the drastic changes which Tema has experienced, both geographically and numerically, since then. Within the last 10 years alone, the city's growth rate has accelerated rapidly. As at 1990, there were 12 Communities, but now there are 24. Provisional results of the last Housing and Population Census, held in 2000, puts Ghana's current population at 18.4 million (GRI Newsreel, 28 July, 2000; <http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Jul2000/28g0n.html>). Final results and itemised details for cities (e.g. Tema) are not yet available.

All statistical data pertaining to the survey and ordered from the SPSS data editor are made available in Appendices XI - XXI, for reference. It must also be noted, that throughout the chapter, 'Akan' is the collective name for the emerged ethnonational group represented by the Fantis, Ashantis, Akyems, Bonos and Akwapims on the questionnaire. Similarly, the Bolga, Dagomba, Dagaaba and Gurenne groups collectively represent "Northerners" or "Mabians". To avoid baffling respondents with terminology, one's ethnonational group or identity simply refers to "tribe" on the questionnaire. Subsequently, "level of tribalism" on the SPSS survey data refers to level of ethnonationalism, and "tribalistic" means ethnonationalistic.

4.2.2 Gender (q1)

Out of 501 respondents to the questionnaire, 63.7% were male and 36.3% were female (Table 2; Appendix XI).

Table 2: (q1).

GENDER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Male	319	63.7
Female	182	36.3

4.2.3 Age distribution (q2)

49.5% of respondents were within the 17-30 age range, 27.5% within the 31-40 age range, 17.6% within the 41-50 age range, and 4.8% within the 51-60 age range (Table 3; Appendix XI). This is obvious from the fact that most of the urban/industrial work force are between the vibrant age of 17 and 50, and that those nearing retirement at 60 years are fewer in number. Also, the large number of final year secondary school students interviewed -112 or 22.4% - explains the high figure for the 17-30 year group (Ibid).

Table 3: (q2).

AGE RANGE	FREQUENCY	VALID%
0-16	2	0.4
17-30	248	49.5
31-40	138	27.5
41-50	88	17.6
51-60	24	4.8
61-70	1	0.2
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.2.4 Tribal (ethnonational) distribution (q3)

The tribal distribution of respondents indicated that 52.5% represented the Akan grouping of Fanti, Ashanti, Akyem, Akwapim and Bono, 21.2% represented the Ga-Adangbes, 19% represented Ewes, 4.2% represented Northerners and 3.2% represented Nzimas (Table 4; Appendix XI).

Table 4: (q3).

TRIBE	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Fanti	100	20.0
Ashanti	76	15.2
Akyem	39	7.8
Akwapim	45	9.0
Bono	3	0.6
Ga-Adangbe	106	21.2
Nzima	16	3.2
Bolga	10	2.0
Dagomba	7	1.4
Dagaaba	1	0.2
Gurenne	3	0.6
Ewe	95	19.0
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.2.5 Occupational distribution (q4)

Of the occupational distribution, 38.5% were professionals (one profession or another – e.g. teachers described themselves as professionals). 2% were specialists, 2.8% were managers, 10.8% were clerical staff, 3.8% were administrative staff, 14.2% were skilled workers, 4% were semi-skilled and only 1.6% were unskilled (Table 5; Appendix XI).

Table 5: (q4).

OCCUPATION	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Unskilled	8	1.6
semi-skilled	20	4.0
Skilled	71	14.2
Clerical	54	10.8
Administrative	19	3.8
Managerial	14	2.8
Professional	193	38.5
Specialist	10	2.0
Student	112	22.4
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.2.6 Education (q5)

There are three main levels of education – primary, secondary and tertiary. Any form of education below secondary is considered to be primary. Secondary education constitutes anything after primary but before university level, and includes secondary, technical and vocational schooling, as well as teacher training for primary school teachers. Tertiary education includes education at universities, polytechnics and professional awarding bodies such as institutes for management and journalism.

The level of education was very high. 47.3% of respondents had studied to tertiary level, 47.5% to secondary level, and only 5.2% had ended education at primary level (Table 6; Appendix XI).

Table 6: (q5).

EDUCATION	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Primary	26	5.2
Secondary	238	47.5
Tertiary	237	47.3
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.3 HYPOTHESIS/AIMS

As outlined in the Introduction, and also in section 3.2., the research aimed at: (1) conducting a survey of Ghanaian urbanites in order to measure the current trends of ethnonationalism versus political nationalism, by investigating their voting attitudes and intentions, in order to establish the extent to which proneness towards political nationalism by supposedly detribalised urbanites, is imagined or real, of style or substance; (2) critically examining patterns in Ghanaian voting behaviours by analysing the distinctive patterns between ethnonational and state attitudes. Some characteristics of respondents (variables) are investigated in order to examine what bearing they have on political attitudes. These are: the traditional party orientation of respondents and their families; the current party orientation of respondents; political participation, and; freedom of expression. Voting attitudes of respondents are later examined for 1996 and 2000, and comparisons made. This is followed by a critical examination of ethnonationalism on voting patterns. The political stability of respondents is also investigated in order to examine the extent of shiftability of voters with regard to party loyalty. Afterwards, the analysis digs deeper into examining the true nature of respondents and the extent to which they are ethnonationalists or political nationalists, as well as the extent to which this is influenced by association with their tribal roots or ethnonational bases. This is done by establishing: the type of voter – whether ethnonationalist or political nationalist; their level of ethnonationalism, and; the extent to which they are associated with their roots. Examining the levels of ethnonationalism is very much the same as examining those for political nationalism, as both attitudes highlight each other, that is, the higher the one, the lower the other, and vice versa. Although variables such as gender, age, occupation and education do not form the main

thrust of the thesis, any influence they have on political attitudes is also examined and discussed.

4.4 PARTY ORIENTATION

4.4.1 Traditional party orientation of respondent's families (q6):

As many as 28.5% indicated that their families were not traditionally orientated to any specific party. 24.2% indicated that their families were traditionally orientated to the NDC, 34.5% to the NPP and 10.6% to Nkrumahism. 2% of respondents indicated that their families were somewhat orientated towards parties other than any of the three mainstream political traditions (Table 7; Appendix XI).

Table 7: (q6).

PARTY	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Ndc	121	24.2
Npp	173	34.5
nkrumahist	53	10.6
Other	10	2.0
None	143	28.5
*	1	0.2
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.4.2 Traditional party orientation of respondents (q7):

As many as 29.1% of individual respondents indicated that they had no traditional orientation towards any of the three mainstream political traditions. 23.6% were traditionally orientated towards the NDC, 34.3% NPP and 11% Nkrumahists. 2% did not have a traditional orientation towards any of the three mainstream political traditions (Table 8; Appendix XI).

Table 8: (q7).

PARTY	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Ndc	118	23.6
Npp	173	34.5
nkrumahist	53	10.6
Other	10	2.0
None	146	29.1
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.4.3 Current party orientation of respondents (q8):

As many as 28.7% had no party orientation at all. 24.2% were orientated towards the NDC, 37.9% NPP, 6.4% Nkrumahism. Only 2.8% did not belong to any of the three mainstream political traditions (Table 9; Appendix XI).

Table 9: (q8).

PARTY	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Ndc	121	24.2
Npp	190	37.9
nkrumahist	32	6.4
Other	14	2.8
None	144	28.7
TOTAL	501	100.0

It is evident from the party orientation tables (7, 8 & 9) that the traditional party orientation of individuals and their families had generally stabilised for all three mainstream traditions with a meagre percentage range of plus/minus 0.2% - 0.6%. However, it is noticeable from tables 7 and 9 that whereas current party orientation of respondents and the traditional party orientation of their families had stabilised for

individual NDC supporters (remaining at 24.2%), between those same variables, the NPP had an increase of 3.4%, “other” (that is, any non-mainstream or minor party) increased by 0.8%, and Nkrumahists had a decrease of 4.2%. It is clear that the NPP and some minor parties had gained from a shift in support from the Nkrumahist camp. This may be explained by the fact that at the time of interviews, the Nkrumahist coalition seemed divided and disorganised while the NPP was shaping up and seemed more focused (see Glossary in Appendix II). A little percentage of support had therefore moved away from Nkrumahism towards the NPP and any other minor party. Stability for the NDC is also explained by the general feeling that some NDC supporters were disillusioned about the party but were at the same time reluctant to shift support towards the NPP or any other minor party. Despite any apparent freeze or stability in orientation or support figures for the NDC, the actual voter intentions for the 2000 elections indicated a decline in votes for the party (Tables 19-22; Appendix XI).

4.5 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation as used here, denotes any overt demonstration by respondents in the overall political process. This would include a wide range of activities, for example, registration to vote, formal registered membership with a party, or ordinary but active support to a party such as distribution of leaflets, sticking of posters, and attendance at rallies and conferences (yet without party registration). 84.4% of respondents had registered to vote, 9.8% were ineligible to register as they were under 18 at the time of the survey, 2.6% had no support for any of the candidates, and 3% were simply apolitical. Only 30.5% of respondents were registered members of any party. 7 % could not afford party registration, 14.6% were disillusioned about the parties, and a good 46% were apolitical and not interested in political party participation, or perhaps did not want to be identified with a party. This explains why only 27.7% participated in politics at the local level, as little as 8.4% at both district and national levels, 1.2% at all levels, but 54.3% participated at no level at all (Tables 10-15; Appendix XI). The implicit suggestion or indication that there were some who had registered with a party but were not actively involved with the party, is confirmed by the data. A cross-tabulation of party registration (Q15) and level of party political participation (Q18) reveals that 5.2% of registered party members (to any party) had no active involvement with the party at any level, other than their party registration (Appendix XII). In another light, the implicit suggestion or indication that there were some who were actively involved with party activities but remained unregistered members of the party, is also confirmed by the data. Although: 27.7% claimed local involvement in politics, 15.8% were registered members of a party and 12.0% were not; 8.4% claimed political involvement at the district level, 5.2% had party registration and 3.2% did not; 8.4% claimed political involvement at national level, half of these (4.2%) had party

registration and the other half did not (Appendix XII). This means that, just as there are those who, by reason of party registration, had paid party dues but did nothing more and were almost invisible, there were also visible party enthusiasts without any party registration at all. This is an indication of the scope for both fluidity and ambiguity as far as partisanship is concerned. Nevertheless, there is a link between “party registration” (Q15) and “level of party involvement” (Q18), and it can be concluded that there is a significant association between the two variables. This is written as:

$$\chi^2 = 129.27; df = 4; p < 0.01$$

The subtable for symmetric measures provides a measure of the strength of the association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: $\Phi = 0.508; p < 0.01$ (Appendix XII; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284).

Of all respondents with party registration, 13.4% were registered members of the NDC, 14.8% for NPP, 2.4% for Nkrumahists, and 0.2% for the other minor parties. Most respondents - 44.1% familiarised themselves with the politics through the media, only 16.8% attended political rallies, 6.8% fed from both rallies and the media, and 32.3% did none of these (Tables 13 & 16; Appendix XI).

4.5.1 Are you a registered voter (q13)?:

In Ghana, individuals of voting age (18) register to vote on a local basis, and not via the party as in U.S.A. The voters' register is opened every year, and country-wide elections take place every four years.

Table 10: Voter registration (q13).

ANSWER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Yes	423	84.4
No	78	15.6
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 11: If 'no' (to q13), why are you not a registered voter (q14)?

ANSWER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
ineligible	49	9.8
negative	13	2.6
a-political	15	3.0
n/a	424	84.6
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 12: Are you a registered member of any party (q15)?

ANSWER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Yes	153	30.5
No	348	69.5
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 13: If 'yes' (to q15), which party (q16)?:

PARTY	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Ndc	67	13.4
Npp	74	14.8
Nkrumahist	12	2.4
Other	1	0.2
n/a	347	69.3
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 14: If 'no' (to q15), why are you not a registered member of any party (q17)

ANSWER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
no money	35	7.0
Disllusion	73	14.6
a-political	232	46.3
n/a	160	31.9
*	1	0.2
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.5.2 What is your level of political participation (q18)?

The levels of political participation are local, district and national, and individuals can be involved in any combination of these. Participation at the “district” level includes any form of participation above the local level but not at the national level. Participation could range from mere attendance at rallies to actual decision-making activities such as election of officers or amendments to the party constitution. Some amount of participation is restricted to only registered party membership. For example, whereas anyone could attend campaign rallies, only registered party members and officers could vote at the national conference to elect candidates for national elections.

Table 15: Level of political participation (q18).

LEVEL	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Local	139	27.7
District	42	8.4
National	42	8.4
all levels	6	1.2
None	272	54.3
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 16: How do you familiarise yourself with the politics (q19)?

This denotes the means by which respondents acquainted themselves with political phenomena.

ANSWER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
attend rallies	84	16.8
Media	221	44.1
all (both)	34	6.8
None	162	32.3
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.6 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

66.5% said they freely shared their political opinions with others. The remainder who felt no such freedom confided in: none (13.8%); only friends (9.2%); spouse and unit family (5.2% each), and; distant relatives (2%). If 66.5% claimed they freely shared their political opinions, it can be safely concluded that, largely, the opinions gathered from this survey were freely given (Tables 17 & 18; Appendix XI).

Table 17: Do you freely share your views/opinions with everyone (q20)?:

ANSWER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
yes	333	66.5
no	168	33.5
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 18: If 'no' (to q20), please state confidants and preference order (q21)

PREFERENCE	FREQUENCY	VALID%
spouse	26	5.2
family	26	5.2
friends	46	9.2
distant relations	2	0.4
none	69	13.8
n/a	332	66.3
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.7 VOTES

4.7.1 1996

During the 1996 parliamentary elections, 26.9% of respondents voted for the NDC parliamentary candidate, 42.1% for NPP, 3.2% for Nkrumahists and 1% for independent or other candidates. During the presidential elections, 34.7% of respondents voted for Rawlings (NDC), 43.7% for Kufour (NPP), and 1% for Mahama (Nkrumahism). 15% of respondents were ineligible to vote for an MP, either as a result of age disqualification or non-registration to vote. Another 11.8% did not vote at all either as a result of dislike for candidates, non-registration to vote, apathy or other reason. For the presidential elections, 14.2% were ineligible to vote and 6.4% did not vote at all, for any of the reasons outlined above (Tables 19 & 20; Appendix XI).

Table 19: Vote in 1996 parliamentary elections (q9):

PARTY OF MP	FREQUENCY	VALID%
ndc	135	26.9
npp	211	42.1
nkrumahist	16	3.2
other	5	1.0
none	59	11.8
ineligible	75	15.0
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 20: Vote in 1996 presidential elections (q10):

VOTE	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Rawlings	174	34.7
Kufour	219	43.7
Mahama	5	1.0
none	32	6.4
ineligible	71	14.2
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.7.2 2000

For the 2000 parliamentary elections, 19.6% intended to vote for the NDC parliamentary candidate, 43.7% for NPP, 3.8% for Nkrumahist, 1.2% for the NRP (“new NDC”), and 1.8% for independent or other candidates. 23.2% were undecided. For the presidential elections, 26.9% intended to vote for Ata Mills (NDC), 44.5% for Kufour, 1% for Tanor (NRP) and another 1% for independent or other candidates. 20.6% were undecided. 0.8% would not be eligible to vote for an MP and 6% would vote for no parliamentary candidate for similar reasons outlined above. Also, 1.2% would not be eligible to vote for a presidential candidate and 4.8% would vote for no presidential candidate for similar reasons already outlined. Whereas voter intentions for the NPP parliamentary and presidential candidates for 2000 seemed to have stabilised with the 1996 figures (with meagre increments of 1.6% and 0.8% for parliamentary and presidential elections respectively), the same results for the NDC indicated drastic decrements of 7.3% and 7.8% for parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. This constituted a sure sign of reduction in urbanite votes for the NDC in the 2000 elections. Statistically, this is partly attributable to the fact that as much as 23.2% and 20.6% were yet undecided about their choice of candidates for the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. Given that current party orientation or support (at the same period) for the NDC was stable (as compared with family orientation), it becomes clear that slightly over a third of the remaining undecided urbanite voters would not vote for the NDC (Tables 21 & 22; Appendix XI). Also, given that the NPP was already in the lead in the urban area, this was additional bad news for the then ruling NDC party. Furthermore, given that since January 1999, the ruling party (NDC) had become more unpopular due to the high spate of scandals, failed policies and

political manipulations in Parliament, the shift of undecided votes away from the NDC would be on the increase among urbanites.

The issue of the large percentage of undecided voters can also be explained further, in that, a percentage of the Ewe (and other non-Akan) solidarity for the NDC was on hold because the NDC presidential candidate for 2000 was not Ewe but Akan (Fanti). According to the survey, 11.4% of total respondents who voted for the NDC parliamentary candidate in 1996 were Ewes (Appendix XIII). Voter intentions for the parliamentary elections in 2000 indicated that this had reduced to a mere 5.6% (Ibid). Also, in 1996, the 12.97% of total respondents who voted for Rawlings (NDC candidate) were Ewes (Appendix XIII). Voter intentions for the presidential elections in 2000 indicated that this figure had also dwindled to 7.98% (Ibid). These constitute sure signs of ethnonationalism in voting attitudes. It would appear that a main reason for this indecision on the part of some voters could be attributed to the change of the NDC presidential candidate's ethnonational identity from Ewe to Akan. A cross-tabulation of "tribe" (Q3) and "choice of presidential candidate for the 2000" elections (Q12) indicated that the percentage of undecided voters was higher among Ewes than the other groups. Although, 20% of all respondents were Fantis and 19% were Ewes (only 1% difference), the data reveal that as at the time of this survey, 32.6% of Ewe respondents were undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000, as against 15% of Fanti respondents, or 14.5% of Ashanti respondents, or 20.8% of Ga-Adangbe respondents. The Dagombas register the highest percentage of undecideds – 42.9%, but out of the total number of respondents (501) Dagombas numbered only 7 or 1.4% (Appendix XIII). This pattern of indecision could well have changed by the time of the presidential elections in December 2000, as some would have made up their

minds by then, however it is interesting to note the patterns of ethnonationalism which had emerged, as a result of the relationship between ethnonational identity and political indecision among potential voters.

Table 21: Tentative vote in 2000 parliamentary elections (q11):

PARTY OF MP	FREQUENCY	VALID%
ndc	98	19.6
npp	219	43.7
nkrumahist	19	3.8
new ndc	6	1.2
other	9	1.8
none	30	6.0
ineligible	4	0.8
undecided	116	23.2
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 22: Tentative vote in 2000 presidential elections (q12):

VOTE	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Ata Mills	135	26.9
Kufour	223	44.5
Tanor	5	1.0
other	5	1.0
none	24	4.8
ineligible	6	1.2
undecided	103	20.6
TOTAL	501	100.0

4.8 THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNONATIONALISM ON VOTING HABITS

The survey tested for the extent to which a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity influenced urban voter attitudes, in other words, the tendential response of the urban population towards a candidate's ethnonational background. As the influence of patriotism towards one's ethnonational group – (positive ethnonationalism) - on voting habits is already of widespread occurrence (see sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), it is important that the nature and extent of ethnonational resentment – (negative ethnonationalism), was also measured. The 'politics of the belly' had cast a historical influence on voting habits, but the tendency for an urbanite to vote against any presidential candidate, or abstain from voting as a result of direct resentment towards the candidate's ethnonational identity group is to be considered as an extreme demonstration of negative ethnonationalism. Questions 26-30 of the questionnaire sought to elicit the voting attitudes of interviewees vis-à-vis the ethnonational background of a presidential candidate. Both a negative vote or abstention are regarded as constituting a protest against one's candidacy due to the candidate's ethnonational background. An abstention is taken to mean a form of reservation, and constitutes a protest. As shown in Table 23, the survey revealed that 16.6% of Ghanaian urbanites would outrightly not vote for a presidential candidate if he/she were a Fanti, 23.6% if the candidate were Ashanti, 34% if Ewe, 21.8% if Ga-Adangbe, and 21.8% if a Maban or Northerner. Demonstration of direct, negative ethnonationalism was highest against the Ewe and Ashanti groups, the two groups known to have the strongest mutually antagonistic relationship. Subsequently, in a cross-tabulation of the ethnonational identities of interviewees (Q3) versus their tentative votes vis-à-vis a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity (Q26-30), the highest among the patterns of mutually antagonistic identity relationships are represented as follows: a total 6.4% of Ewes (2.6% against and 3.8% abstain) and a

total 6.2% of Ga-Adangbes would outrightly not vote for a candidate if he/she were an Ashanti; a total 7.8% of Fantis, 6.2% of Ashantis 6.4% of Ga-Adangbes would outrightly not vote for a candidate if he/she were an Ewe (Appendix XIV).

Table 23: Extreme negative ethnonationalism

Vote if candidate was:	against %age	abstain %age	Cumulative protest %age
Fanti	6	10.6	16.6
Ashanti	13.2	10.4	23.6
Ewe	21.8	12.2	34
Ga	10.2	11.6	21.8
Northerner	12.0	9.8	21.8

(Table derived from Appendix XI).

A cross-tabulation of tribe versus voter intentions for parliamentary candidates for the 2000 elections reveals that, among the total 23.2% undecided voters, 9.4% were Akan, 7.2% were Ewes, 4.8% were Ga-Adangbe, 1.4% were Northerners and 0.4% were Nzimas. Also, a cross-tabulation of tribe versus voter intentions for the 2000 presidential elections indicates that among the total 20.6% of undecided voters, 7.2% were Akan, 6.2% were Ewe, 4.4% were Ga-Adanbge, 1.6% were Northerners, and 1.2% were Nzima (Appendix XIII). As Akans were more prone to vote for an NPP presidential candidate, it could be safely argued, that irrespective of the reasons for the temporary indecision, the NPP would gain more from the army of undecided voters. It

could also be argued that some of the undecided voters at the time of the survey, who voted against Rawlings in 1996 because he was an Ewe, could now vote for the NDC presidential candidate in 2000, because he was not Ewe.

4.9 STABILITY OF SUPPORTERS

Respondents were quizzed to test for their political stability and potential vote shifting as influenced by general public opinion or endorsement of any party (Q 22 & 23). 28.3% said they would vote NDC if the party was riding highest in public endorsement, and 41.5% said they would vote NPP. On the other hand, 49.9% said they would vote NPP if the party was riding highest in public endorsement, and 19.4% said they would vote NDC (Appendix XI). A difference of 8.9% between the NDC high and low [28.3%-19.4%] and 8.4% [49.9%-41.5%] between the NPP high and low, meant that the NDC had only a 0.5% edge over the NPP on the luckiest days for both parties. However, the fact remained, that the NPP would register 49.9% of votes whereas the NDC would register only 28.3% (Ibid).

4.9.1 The Ga-Adangbe factor

Yet another issue was the comparative unpredictability of Ga-Adangbe political attitudes vis-à-vis the two main opposing parties (NDC and NPP). The Ga-Adangbe political complexion did not easily lend itself to analysis. First, Ga-Adangbes do not have special predominance in the formation and maintenance of any of the three mainstream political traditions. Second, Ga-Adangbe support for the NDC and NPP seemed to be shared on a near equal basis. It therefore became difficult to judge to any meaningful extent, whether, as a collectivity, they were ethnonationalists or political nationalists. The fact of being non-Akan tends to lend a sway in affiliation towards the political leanings of the non-Akan stream/led parties (e.g. the NDC). However, the skew has not been that strong to make anything concrete out of it. The survey results indicate that during the 1996 parliamentary elections, 6.6% of total respondents who

voted NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 7.2% of them voted NPP - a difference of only 0.6%. For the 2000 parliamentary elections, the survey revealed that 7% of total respondents who intended to vote NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.6% of them intended to vote NPP - a difference of only 0.4%. For presidential elections, the survey revealed that in 1996, 9.78% of total respondents who voted NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.6% of them voted NPP - difference of 3.2%. In 2000, 8.6% of total respondents who intended to vote NDC were Ga-Adangbes, and 6.8% of them intended to vote NPP - a difference of 1.8% and a reduction in the difference of 1.4% from 1996 (Appendix XIII). As already hinted, the ethnonational skew of the Ga-Adangbe political complexion has been very narrow between the two parties. A tendency to feel non-Akan may exist, and which may explain the reduction in votes away from the presidential candidates of Akan-led NPP. But this difference is still narrow – 1.8% for 2000 (Ibid). Both the NDC and NPP had been doing their best to woo the Ga-Adangbes, with the NDC slightly in the lead. Given that urban support generally sways towards the NPP, the narrow Ga-Adangbe skew towards the NDC was an indication that their tendency to affiliate with non-Akanness is something not to be ignored altogether. Naturally, more Ga-Adangbes would tend to support the NDC than the NPP because of the anti-Akan factor. Therefore among all factors, any forecasts or speculation regarding the December 2000 elections needed to examine very closely the Ga-Adangbe factor, in order to be comprehensive and very accurate. Despite the significant Ga-Adangbe presence among the NPP high echelons (e.g. the party Chairman, General Secretary and National Campaign Manager)²⁸, Ga-Adangbe anxiety to have total control over Ghana's capital city, Accra, is one very important reason why they would prefer the NDC to any other party whose ethnonational composition reflects

²⁸ See section on NPP in Glossary of political parties in Appendix II.

a predominance of any identity group/s which have no traditional links with the capital (e.g. NPP). Accra is also the traditional capital for Ga-Adangbes. In addition to various contentious and controversial land claims, and the sale of similar plots of land by Ga-Adangbe traditional landowners to multiple “buyers”, thereby causing numerous cases of litigation, some of the Ga-Adangbe claims over citizens of Accra have been religious, to which non-Ga-Adangbes and non-traditionalists (Ga-Adangbe or otherwise) would not wish to oblige. For example, the annual Ga-Adangbe 40-day drum ban in respect of the Homowo festival had caused serious controversies over the years and reached new heights in 1999. Non-Ga-Adangbe Accra citizens and several Charismatic churches (some of whose congregants are Ga-Adangbes) refused to comply with the drum ban. The Wulomo (Ga-Adangbe traditional priesthood) organised aggressive attacks against offenders resulting in bloody clashes in which church congregants were clubbed, knifed and beaten with weapons. Reverend Tackie Yarboi, the Ga-Adangbe Pastor of Victory Bible Church, who is also an heir apparent to the Ga-Adangbe throne in Accra, suffered a broken skull when his church was attacked for not observing the ban. The royal household claimed that, as he is of royal blood, he should have known better not to have transgressed. Both central government and the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) negligently turned a blind eye to these criminal attacks, leaving the Ga-Adangbe traditionalists to carry out their unconstitutional aggression against residents of Accra who had indulged in drumming (Ghana Review International, Newsreel, 21 May 1999). Constitutionally, drumming is not a legal offence, and no citizen is legally obliged to observe a traditional drum ban. The Police failed to protect attacked residents of the city even when they were tipped of impending attacks. However, they moved in to prevent a subsequent counter-attack by city residents of Christian orientation against the Wulomoist shrine and priests. It

would appear that the La Mantse, Nii Kpobey Tettey Trusu III, ordered the Lakpa Wulomo to quit the Wulomoist shrine, not only because the former had Christian leanings, but also because he has disciplinary authority over the latter. The Police therefore intervened to avert clashes as two huge crowds, each in support of the La Mantse and the Wulomo priest, converged to observe how the quit order was to be effected (Daily Graphic August 6, 1999). Incidentally, the ruling NDC's Minister of Interior, who also had ministerial control over the Police, is a Ga-Adangbe royal, and the NDC government was not interested in upsetting the Ga-Adangbe indigenes, from whom a fair amount of its urban support would be derived. It is not surprising therefore, that during the crucial pre-Homowo season in 1999, the government held "behind closed doors" meetings with the chiefs of the Accra Traditional area to dispel "wrong" impressions harboured by the traditionalists regarding the government's position on the chieftaincy's politics, as well as support for the Homowo festival. At the meeting, the government pledged adequate security protection and the maintenance of law and order during the Homowo celebrations (Ibid).

Most Ghanaians would claim they are Christian, even if they are not church attenders. It is therefore not surprising that 96.6% of all respondents to the survey claimed that they were Christians. It is also usual for some nominal or Orthodox Christians to be syncretistic and observe both traditional and Christian practices. But the fanatical Charismatics of the Christian Faith, whose numerical strength seems to be growing at an alarming rate, do not wish to observe the drum ban, and therefore became the main targets of aggression from the Ga-Adangbe Wulomo traditional priesthood. 41.1% of the survey's respondents were Charismatics (Appendix XI), and most of the largest Charismatic churches are based in Accra and Tema. There was anxiety that any

government and political party with no particular sympathies towards Ga-Adangbeness would neither support the idea of Ga-Adangbe religion being obligatory to residents of the capital, nor any of the other political scheming to control Accra in other forms. Ga-Adangbes feared they would lose grip of their traditional control over the city if the NPP should win the elections. There had been speculation that most Charismatics would not vote for the NDC in the next elections since the government failed to protect their religious interests with regard to the Homowo drum ban issue. The paradox of the scenario was that the NDC presidential candidate for 2000 (Ata Mills) is a Charismatic Christian, and a regular attendant at the Assemblies of God Church. Mrs Mills also regularly attends one of the pioneering Charismatic churches in Ghana – Christian Action Faith Ministries (CAFM). On the other hand, the NPP candidate (Kufour) does not attend a Charismatic church, and would have a greater tendency to be sympathetic towards Ga-Adangbe traditional religion, but he was the candidate of a party with a predominantly Akan support base. It could not be guaranteed that an NPP government would have sympathies for Ga-Adangbe traditional religion as had been demonstrated by the NDC. It was therefore very difficult to judge how the Charismatics, especially those within the Accra-Tema metropolitan area, would be voting in December 2000. Religion has not been known to be a key factor in Ghanaian politics, but it would appear that the clash between the Charismatic churches and Ga-Adangbe traditional priesthood had stirred up religious sentiments and introduced the potential for religion to have a bearing on the outcome of the election results in Accra and Tema.

4.10 NATURE OF VOTERS

4.10.1 Type of voter

Further analytical work was carried out on the survey data to elicit more intricate patterns as to the very nature of the respondents and what types of political animal they were. A universal, objective criteria was used to derive a typology. Based on the survey results, a new column was created on the SPSS data editor for “level of tribalism”. This had six categories including: (1) extreme - “ext”; (2) very high - “vh”; (3) high - “h”; (4) low - “l”; (5) very low - “vl”; (6) benefit of the doubt - “b”. Subsequently, any respondent whose “level of tribalism” was extreme, very high, or high, was deemed an ethnonationalistic voter or an ethnonationalist, and those whose “levels of tribalism” were low, very low, or had to be given the benefit of the doubt, were deemed as political nationalists. The typology was derived from how respondents answered the questions, as below:

- if a respondent would vote against a presidential candidate not of their tribe in any of section "e" questions 26-30, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting an extreme level of tribalism or "ext".
- if a respondent would vote against a presidential candidate of their tribe in any of section "e" questions 26-30, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very low level of tribalism or "vl".
- if a respondent is Akan, and indicated “2” or "NPP" throughout from section "b" questions 6/7-12, and/or similar in section "e" questions 22-25, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very high level of tribalism or "vh".

- if a respondent is Ewe and indicated “1” or “NDC” throughout from section “b” questions 6/7-12, and/or similar in section “e” questions 22-25, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very high level of tribalism or “vh”.
- if a respondent is Ewe and indicated “1” or “NDC” in any of section “b” questions 7-10, but “8” and/or “7” in questions 11-12 respectively, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very high level of tribalism or “vh”.
- if a respondent is Akan and indicated not “2” or “NPP” in question 6, but “2” or “NPP” in any of questions 7-12 (even if not in section “e” questions 22-25), the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a high level of tribalism or “h”.
- if a respondent is Ewe and indicated not “1” or “NDC” in question 6, but “1” or “NDC” in any of questions 7-12 (even if not in section “e” questions 22-25), the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a high level of tribalism or “h”.
- if a respondent is Akan and voted not “2” or “NPP” in any of questions 6-8, but “2” or “NPP” in any of questions 9-10, and/or 11-12, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a low level of tribalism or “l”.
- if a respondent is Ewe and voted not “1” or “NDC” in any of questions 6-8, but “1” or “NDC” in any of 9-10, and/or 11-12, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a low level of tribalism or “l”.
- if a respondent is a Mabian/Northerner and indicated “3” or “Nkrumahist” in any of section “b” questions 7-11 and/or section “e” questions 22-25, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a high level of tribalism or “h”.
- if a respondent is Akan and indicated “1”/“NDC” or “3”/“Nkrumahist” at some stages in questions 6/7-12, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very low level of tribalism or “vl”.

- if a respondent is Ewe and indicated "2"/"NPP" at some stages in questions 6/7-12, the respondent is categorised as exhibiting a very low level of tribalism or "vl".
- if a respondent is in none of the categories set above, or is not registered to vote and does not intend to enter the voters register, the respondent is given the benefit of the doubt - "b". It is taken to mean that the respondent's political colour is indecipherable and therefore unknown.

Table 24: Type of voter

VOTER	FREQUENCY	VALID%
Tribalistic	361	72.1
non-tribalistic	140	27.9
TOTAL	501	100.0

Table 25: Type of voter by group

	tribali stic voters		non- tribalistic voters		total	cumulative%
akan	211	42.1%	52	10.4%	263	52.5
ga- adangbe	49	9.8%	57	11.4%	106	21.2
nzima	10	2%	6	1.2%	16	3.2
norther ners/ mabians	12	2.4%	9	1.8%	21	4.2
ewe	79	15.8%	16	3.2%	95	19
total	361	72.1%	140	27.9%	501	100.0

The frequencies for “type of voter” reveal that 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalistic voters and only 27.9% vote non-tribalistically or are political nationalists (Tables 24 & 25; Appendices XI & XV). A cross-tabulation of “tribe” and “type of voter” reveal that, although Fantis constituted 20% of total respondents, 16% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 4% are political nationalists. Although Ashantis constituted 15.2% of total respondents, 12% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 4% are political nationalists. Akyems constituted 7.8% of total respondents, but 6.6% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 1.2% are political nationalists. Akwapims constituted 9% of total respondents, but 7.4% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 1.6% are political nationalists. Bonos constituted 0.6% of total respondents, but 0.2% are ethnonationalistic and 0.4% are political nationalists. Altogether, among the 52.5% of total respondents who are Akan, 42.09% demonstrated ethnonationalism, and only 10.41% are political nationalists. Ga-Adangbes constituted 21.2% of total respondents. 9.8% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and 11.4% are political nationalists – a difference of 1.6%. Once again, with the Ga-Adangbes, the general skew towards either ethnonationalism or political nationalism, was not strong enough to base an emphatic judgement on. Nzimas made up only 3.2% of total respondents, but 2% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and 1.2% are political nationalists. Mabians (Northerners) constituted 4.2% of total respondents, but 2.4% intended to vote as ethnonationalists and 1.8% are political nationalists. Ewes made up 19% of total respondents, but as much as 15.8% intended to vote as ethnonationalists, and only 3.2% are political nationalists. Of the total number of respondents, 42.1% demonstrating ethnonationalism by their vote are Akan, 15.8% are Ewes, and 9.78% are Ga-Adangbe (Appendix XV). Given that 52.5% of all respondents are Akan, 19% are Ewes and

21.2% are Ga-Adangbes, a representation of the percentage of ethnonationalistic voters for each identity group against the respective percentages of overall group responses equals Akans (80%), Ewes (83%), but for Ga-Adangbes only (43%). Whereas the representations of ethnonationalism for Akans and Ewes are high, that for Ga-Adangbes is around midpoint, or average. This is due to the political complexion of Ga-Adangbes not being easily susceptible to analysis, as already outlined. The 11.4% of remaining Ga-Adangbes, for whom it was impossible to decipher what type of voter they were as a result of insufficient evidence, and who were given the benefit of the doubt, became classified as political nationalists. Generally, Ga-Adangbes had managed to conceal their votes (Ibid). Also, the data reveal that, generally, Ghanaian urbanites are more of ethnonationalists than political nationalists, and therefore, that proneness towards political nationalism is more imagined than real, of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics.

4.10.2 Level of ethnonationalism:

Table 26:

LEVEL	FREQUENCY	VALID%
extreme	211	42.1
very high	128	25.5
high	21	4.2
low	4	0.8
very low	38	7.6
benefit	99	19.8
TOTAL	501	100.0

The frequencies reveal that among Ghanaian urbanites, 42.1% of respondents demonstrated extreme levels of ethnonationalism, 25.5% very high, 4.2% high, 0.8%

low, 7.6% very low, and 19.8% had to be given the benefit of the doubt due to insufficient evidence, 11.4% of whom are Ga-Adangbes (Table 26; Appendix XV). A cross-tabulation of “tribe” and “level of tribalism” reveals that among Ghanaian urbanites a total 22.6% of Akans exhibit extreme levels of ethnonationalism and a further 17.4% exhibit very high levels of it. The figures for Ewes are 7.2% and 7% respectively. Those for Ga-Adangbes are 9% and 0.6% respectively (Appendix XV). The representation of these percentages against those of their respective overall group responses equals: Akans (42.9% and 33% for extreme and very high levels of ethnonationalism respectively); Ewes (37.78% and 36.7%); Ga-Adangbes (42.3% and 2.83%). Given that, of the 21.2% of overall Ga-Adangbe respondents only 9.8% could be deciphered politically, it is clear that almost all who were politically decipherable exhibited extreme levels of ethnonationalism (Appendices XV & XI). There is therefore a strong suggestion that either: if all Ga-Adangbes were politically decipherable, almost all would be ethnonationalistic voters of at least very high or extreme degree, or; most Ga-Adangbes had (within the political complexities of the Ghanaian context) managed to conceal their political complexion for whatever reason. Since, for most of them, their indecipherableness was no fault of theirs other than that the rigorous questionnaire still failed to have them cough out their ethnonationalistic intestines, it can be safely concluded also, that the general political history of Ghana makes it easier for Ga-Adangbes to conceal their political complexion than all the other ethnonational identity groups.

4.11 ASSOCIATION WITH ROOTS

The frequencies indicate that of all respondents, 74.5% said they lived in Tema. 55.7% since 1961 and 18.8% within the post-1990 period. Thus, 55.5% had lived in Tema for over 10 years, 10.2% from 4-10 years, 3% from 4-12 months, and 1.2% for 3 months or under. 74.7% of respondents had tasted city life before coming to live in Tema, 27.3% of these in Accra and 10.4% in Kumasi, the two largest cities in Ghana. A further 17% had lived in any combination of the eleven cities, and 58.1% had always lived in a city. 18.2% had tasted village/town life for over 10 years prior to coming into the city, 10.6% from 4-10 years, 7.4% 1-3 years, 2.6% from 4-12 months, and 2.8% for 3 months or under. A good 90.4% visited their relatives, 55.5% wrote to them, 67.9% telephoned them, and 81.4% actually visited their individual villages or home towns (Appendix XI).

A further column was created on the SPSS data editor. Its contents were derived from a universal criteria to indicate a respondent's "association with roots", centring around whether a respondent visits relatives, writes to them, telephones them or actually visits their individual villages or hometowns. These were based on questions 39, 42, 45 and 48 of the questionnaire. A typology was derived thus:

- if a respondent indicated "yes" or "1" in all of section "f" questions 39, 42, 45 & 48, the respondent is categorised as having very high association with roots.
- if a respondent indicated "yes" or "1" in any 3 of section "f" questions 39, 42, 45 & 48, the respondent is categorised as having high association with roots.
- if a respondent indicated "yes" or "1" in any 2 of section "f" questions 39, 42, 45 & 48, the respondent is categorised as having average association with roots.

- if a respondent indicated “yes” or “1” in only one of section “f” questions 39, 42, 45 & 48, the respondent is categorised as having low association with roots.
- if a respondent indicated “no” or “2” in all of section “f” questions 39, 42, 45 & 48, the respondent is categorised as having apathy for association with roots, or being apathetic to roots.

Table 27: Association with roots

LEVEL	FREQUENCY	VALID%
very high	171	34.1
high	186	37.1
average	102	20.4
low	26	5.2
apathetic	16	3.2
TOTAL	501	100.0

A lot of respondents - 34.1% - registered as “very high”, that is, they visited relatives, wrote to them, telephoned them and also visited their individual villages or hometowns. A further 37.1% registered as “high” or exhibited any three out of the four indicators of association with roots. Another 20.4% were “average” or exhibited any two of the indicators. 5.2% registered “low” or exhibited only one of the four indicators. Only 3.2% were “apathetic” in associating with their roots, or did not exhibit any of the four indicators (Table 27; Appendices XI & XV). The results therefore give a strong indication that, generally, urbanites are more highly inclined to be associated with their roots than otherwise, and that, for the vast majority of Ghanaian urbanites, geographical detribalisation would not lead to attitudinal detribalisation. In other words, the Ghanaian urbanite is generally not fully detribalised by urbanisation, or, that urbanisation does not always lead to attitudinal detribalisation.

The research confirms the fact that, it is not universalistic for the integrating and modernising factors associated with urbanisation to lead to attitudinal detribalisation, and explains why most Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists. Furthermore, as 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists, and 27.9% are political nationalists (Appendix XV), it can be concluded, that political nationalism is more of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics, and that, most Ghanaian urbanites consider it more rationalistic to be ethnonationalist than political nationalist. Engagement with the metropolis, and integration into the institutions of state and government, have neither swayed Ghanaian urbanites towards attitudinal detribalisation nor political nationalism. The opposite ideal could have been possible had it not been the “politics of the belly” and the associated ethnic arithmetic, which results in a reciprocal voter behaviour whereby votes are cast in calculative ethnonational interests. The link between “politics of the belly” and ethnonationalism is clear, however any idea that political nationalism would prevail in the absence of “politics of the belly” is yet to be proven.

A cross-tabulation of “tribe” versus “association with roots” also revealed that irrespective of one’s ethnonational identity, most Ghanaian urbanites exhibit “very high” and “high” levels of association with their roots as against “average”, “low” and “apathetic” (Ibid). However, a cross-tabulation of “length of residence in a city” versus “association with roots” astonishingly reveals that, generally, the longer Ghanaians lived in the urban area, the higher the association with their roots became. The cross-tabulation reveals that 18.2% and 20.2% of total respondents who had lived in Tema for more than 10 years exhibited “very high” and “high” association with roots respectively, as against 12.8% for “average”, 2.6% for “low” and 1.8% for “apathetic” (Appendix XVI). For those who had lived in Tema from 4-10 years, 3.4% and 4.2%

exhibited “very high” and “high” association with roots respectively as against 2.2% for “average” and 0.2% each for “low” and “apathetic”. For those who had lived there for 1-3 years, 1.6%, 1.8% and 0.6% exhibited “very high”, “high” and “average” association with roots respectively, and 0.4% for “low” and none for “apathetic”. For those who had lived there for three months and under, only 0.8% and 0.2% exhibited “very high” and “high” respectively, 0.2% for “apathetic” and none for “average” and “low” (Appendix XVI). The statistics imply that association with roots would seem to diminish for those who had lived shortest in the city. For example, out of the 6 respondents who had been in Tema for three months or under, 0.8% exhibited “very high” association with roots, 0.2% exhibited “high”, 0.2% was “apathetic” and obviously none for “average” and “low” (Ibid). It is clear that even the most recent city residents had very high associations with their roots. However, the data does not prove the existence of a direct relationship between length of stay in the city and association with roots. Also, even though the statistics suggest an association between length of stay in the city and association with roots, chi-square is not a suitable statistical test for measuring the strength of association (if any).

In another interesting finding, a cross-tabulation of “level of tribalism” and “association with roots” also reveals that the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest levels of association with roots. The cross-tabulation reveals that 15%, 14.2% and 9.8% of total respondents who exhibited “very high”, “high” and “average” associations with roots respectively, also exhibited “extreme” levels of ethnonationalism at the same time (Appendix XVI). A further 9.4%, 10% and 3.8% of total respondents who exhibited “very high”, “high” and “average” associations with roots respectively, exhibited “very high” levels of ethnonationalism at the same time.

Only 1.8%, 1.6% and 0.6% of those who exhibited “very high”, “high” and “average” associations with roots respectively, exhibited “high” levels of ethnonationalism at the same time. Even lower still, only 0.2%, 0.2% and 0.4% of those who exhibited “very high”, “high” and “average” associations with roots respectively, exhibited “low” levels of ethnonationalism at the same time (Ibid). However, the data does not prove that levels of ethnonationalism are generally high because of urbanites’ association with their roots. Although, it is common knowledge that ethnonationalism is a calculative and rationalistic response to “politics of the belly”, there does not seem to be any direct relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots. It can be concluded therefore, that as far as Ghanaian politics is concerned, ethnonationalism comes rather naturally and rationalistically, and does not have to be propelled by an individual’s association with tribal roots. The evidence also clearly suggests, that generally, the notion that urbanisation leads to attitudinal detribalisation is more imagined than real, and that for most Ghanaian urbanites, political nationalism is more of style rather than the substance of politics.

4.12 GENDER AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The survey revealed that females were more apathetic towards party political commitment than males. Overall, 30.5% of respondents were registered members of any party (Table 12; Appendix XI). It can be concluded that there is a significant association between the variables “gender” (Q1) and “party registration” (Q15). This is written as:

$$\chi^2 = 17.23; df = 1; p < 0.01.$$

The subtable for symmetric measures also provides a measure of the strength of the association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi = 0.185; $p < 0.01$ (Appendix XVII; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284).

The survey also revealed that males had a greater tendency to freely share their political views than females. Overall, 66.5% of all respondents indicated that they exercised freedom of political expression (Table 17; Appendix XI). It can be concluded that there is a significant association between the variables “gender” (Q1) and “freedom of political expression” (Q20). This is written as:

$$\chi^2 = 9.87; df = 1; p < 0.01.$$

The subtable for symmetric measures provides a measure of the strength of the association rather like that of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This is written as: Phi = 0.14; $p < 0.01$ (Appendix XVII; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 284).

As already stated, 66.5% of respondents indicated they freely shared their political opinions. Also, a cross-tabulation of question 1 (gender) and question 21 (confidants and preference order) reveals that of those who did not freely share their political opinions, there existed an almost equal proportion for males and females who would

share their opinions with no one at all - 6.8% and 7% respectively. For those who did not freely share their political opinions, females had a different preference order from males. Whereas the confiding order for males was, in descending order: "friends", "spouse" and "family", for females it was: "friends", family" and "spouse". Three times as many females 4.2% will share their political opinions with friends as against those who would share with spouses 1.4%. Therefore, among females who had difficulty sharing their political opinions, the tendency ratio of sharing them with friends to spouses is 3:1. Also, the tendency ratio for males sharing their political opinions with their spouses to females doing the same is 2.7:1. There is therefore a clear indication that between spouses, males felt freer to share their political opinions with their wives than females with their husbands (Appendix XVII). We can deduce from Appendix XVII, with a measure of certainty, that whereas freedom of political expression seemed to be a rarity between spouses, males felt freer to share political opinions with their wives than females would with their husbands. There was a greater tendency for females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. In a society where a 'culture of silence' (Boahen 1989) has existed and is not fully broken, and where to a very large extent males are the main opinion leaders, it becomes difficult for females to freely air their views on many issues, especially those as explosive as politics. Even in circumstances not specifically adverse, the intimidation posed by the male-dominated society contributes to the phenomenon of females hiding their feelings on certain issues, including the political. A cross tabulation of question 1 (gender) and question 8 (current party orientation) reveals that, out of the 28.7% who had no specific party orientation, the proportion of male to female is equal, that is 14.4% each (Appendix XVIII).

4.13 AGE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Overall, the data reveal that, irrespective of age-group, there were consistently more votes for the NPP presidential candidate than that of the NDC candidate. There was only 1 respondent for the 61-70 age group. Owing to the minimum voting age being 18, only those aged at least 17 years at the time of the survey, and would be eligible to vote in 2000, had relevance to the survey. As responses within the 17-30 age group were the most obvious to be affected, in that some respondents would have been ineligible to vote in 1996 due to age or other reasons, this analysis concentrates on them. The data reveal that in 1996, 27.4% of respondents in this age-group voted for Rawlings and 36.3% for Kufour - a gap of 8.9%. For the 2000 tentative votes, we had 26.2% and 46.8% respectively - a gap of 20.6% (Appendix XIX). This signified a 2.2% [27.4%-26.2%] decrease in votes for Rawlings, and a 10.5% [46.8%-36.3%] increase for Kufour. It is obvious that this was partially due to the increase in eligible voters for the 2000 elections. However, the general pattern across the data is maintained, that irrespective of age group, there were more votes for the NPP than the NDC, either for 1996 or 2000. This pattern is attributable to the generality that the NPP has more support than the NDC in Tema, and is comparatively stronger among urbanites than ruralites. The pattern does not reflect the whole country. A further analysis of the data indicated that: for the 31-40 age group, the NDC-NPP vote gaps for 1996 and 2000 measured 4.4% and 13.1% respectively; those for the 41-50 age group were 12.5% and 12.5%, respectively, and; those for the 51-60 age group were 20.8% and 29.2% (Appendix XIX). Therefore, not only did the NPP generally have more vote potential in urban areas, but also, that the gaps had widened or increased to their advantage for all the age groups represented within the survey, with the exception of 41-50. This

signifies that the NPP's strength among urbanites had increased even further between 1996 and 2000 at the age levels represented regardless of the ethnonational identity connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited by some respondents, as explained in section 4.7.2 "Votes – 2000". However, the data does not prove the existence of a direct relationship between age and voting habits, either for 1996 or 2000. Additionally, chi-square is not a suitable test for measuring a strength of association between the two variables, if any, in that, 53.3% and 69% of cells from the output listings for age versus 1996 and 2000 votes respectively, have expected count less than 5, and the minimum expected count for both output listings is 0.01 (Appendix XIX; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281).

4.14 OCCUPATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The general pattern within the data reveals that the NPP commanded a majority of votes. This may not only be attributable to the simple reason that the NPP's stronghold is in the urban area as explained in section 4.13, but also that priority to the choice of a presidential candidate had been given to party rather than personality. The general rule was that potential voters chose whichever candidate was presented by their favourite party. The fact of the NPP championing urbanite Tema seemed to mask any significance of association between occupation and politics. Perhaps a countrywide survey may reveal such an association. The gaps between the votes for the NDC and NPP across the occupations were generally close, with the exception of professionals, among whom there was a wide gap between presidential choices either for 1996 or 2000. Responses for the 1996 presidential votes (Q10) indicate that 37.3% of all professional respondents voted for Rawlings whereas 52.8% voted for Kufour, a gap of 15.5%. For 2000, 24.9% of respondents intended to vote for Ata Mills (NDC) whereas 49.2% intended to vote for Kufour, a gap of 24.3% (Appendix XX). Although the gap has again increased to the NPP's advantage, there were decreases in votes for each party's candidate - 3.6% for the NPP candidate and 12.4% for the NDC candidate. The survey data reveal that 20.7% of professional respondents were still undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000 (Ibid). Perhaps this should explain the decreases in votes for both party candidates, especially the NDC candidate. As the analysis in section 4.7.2 "Votes – 2000" reveals, this was partially attributable to the identity group connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited by some respondents, owing to the fact that the NDC candidate for 2000 was Akan and not Ewe. The data clearly shows that among the urban population in Tema, the NPP had more support among Ghanaian professionals than the NDC. However, it must be

noted that this is not a countrywide survey. Besides, Tema was chosen due to the ethnonational neutrality of its origination or foundation, which is central to the thesis. Chi-square is not a suitable test for measuring the strength of association, if any, between occupation and choice of presidential candidates (Appendix XX; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281).

4.15 EDUCATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The data reveal that, for all levels of education, the NPP candidate commanded more votes than the NDC candidate, and that, the gaps between votes for the candidates had accentuated for 2000. This does not reflect the whole country. For 1996, the gap between votes towards the NDC and NPP candidates were: 3.9% [46.2%-42.3%] for respondents with primary education, 7.9% [39%-31.1%] for secondary, and 12.6% [50.2%-37.6%] for tertiary. For 2000, the gap between tentative votes were: 38.4% for primary, 16.8% for secondary, and 16.1% for tertiary education (Appendix XXI). In addition to the general increase in numerical strength for the NPP, it was also clear that the NPP generally had more support from people with higher education than the NDC. It must be noted that, 14.2% of respondents were ineligible to vote in 1996 as against only 1.2% for 2000 (Appendix XXI), and consequently, it would be expected that this increase in voter eligibility should benefit both parties. But the data reveal a general reduction in votes for the NDC and an increase for the NPP. For 1996, the NDC's votes from respondents with: primary education was 42.3%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 15.4%; secondary education was 31.1%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 27.7%; tertiary education was 37.6%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 27.4%. For 1996, the NPP's votes from respondents with: primary education was 46.2%, but for 2000, this had increased to 53.8%; secondary education was 37%, but for 2000, this had increased to 44.5%; tertiary education was 50.2%, but for 2000, this had reduced to 43.5% (Appendix XXI). There does not seem to be a pinpoint explanation to these undulating patterns, however, it must be borne in mind that 20.6% of all respondents were undecided on which presidential candidate to vote for in 2000, and that the identity connotations revolving around the dilemma of voter indecision exhibited by respondents from the various ethnonational groups (see section 4.7.2) had a role to play

in the reduction in NDC votes. The lack of a specific pattern is also highlighted by another interesting observation, that at the same time as the NDC's highest drop in support was from respondents with only primary education (42.3% for 1996; 15.4% for 2000), the NPP's only drop in support was from respondents with tertiary education (50.2% for 1996; 43.5% for 2000). Chi square is not a suitable statistical test for measuring the strength of association (if any) between level of education and choice of presidential candidates (Appendix XXI; Kinnear and Gray 1999, p. 281).

Finally, although the thesis would have liked to examine some further interesting relationships between, lets say, tribe and gender, or age, or occupation, or education, or any of the other variables within the survey, there is no rational way of amalgamating the categories under tribe, and therefore, chi-square is not suitable for investigating the associations, if any, between tribe and those variables.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The research findings offer the following conclusions and contribution to knowledge.

5.1 ETHNONATIONALISM AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM

Contrary to the ideals of political nationalism, as espoused by Hutchinson and Kellas (Hutchinson 1994, pp. 42-7; Kellas 1991, p. 52), in practice, most Ghanaian urbanites are ethnonationalists, and that, generally-speaking, political nationalism is more of style rather than the substance of Ghanaian politics. Overwhelming evidence from the data indicates that 72.1% of Ghanaian urbanites intended to vote ethnonationalistically, and only 27.9% were political nationalists. 52.5% of total respondents were Akan: 42.09% were ethnonationalists and only 10.41% were political nationalists. 19% of total respondents were Ewe: 15.8% were ethnonationalists, and only 3.2% were political nationalists. 21.1% of total respondents were Ga-Adangbe: 9.78% were ethnonationalists and 11.37% were political nationalists. In other words, 80% of urbanite Akans, 83% of urbanite Ewes and 46.2% urbanite Ga-Adangbes were ethnonationalists. Akans and Ewes score highest on the scale of ethnonationalistic voters, and constituted the extreme ethnonationalists, both positively and negatively.

5.1.1 Extremes of ethnonationalism and ethnonational resentment

The data reveal that 42.1% of Ghanaian urbanites exhibit extreme levels of ethnonationalism, 25.5% very high levels, and 4.2% high levels. In other words, a total of 71.8% of Ghanaian urbanites demonstrated at least high levels of ethnonationalism. Clearly, the general level of ethnonationalism is upbeat. Those who have been given the benefit of the doubt constitute 19.8%, and even this as a result of insufficient

evidence. Therefore, in reality, there could be more ethnonationalists than the 71.8% which the data revealed.

Negative ethnonationalism (or ethnonational resentment) is highest towards Ashantis and Ewes. Furthermore, mutual ethnonational resentment is highest between the Ashanti and Ewe. The research revealed that: 16.6% of Ghanaian urbanites would outrightly cast votes against, or perhaps keep their vote altogether, if a presidential candidate was a Fanti; 23.6% if the candidate was Ashanti; 34% if an Ewe; 21.8% if a Ga-Adangbe, and; 21.8% if a Mabian or Northerner. The data also reveal that the Ashanti and Ewe have the strongest mutually antagonistic relationship. A cross-tabulation of the ethnonational identities of interviewees versus their tentative votes vis-à-vis a presidential candidate's ethnonational identity, revealed the highest among the patterns of mutually antagonistic ethnonational relationships: 6.38% of Ewes and 6.18% of Ga-Adangbes would not vote for a candidate who happened to be an Ashanti; also, 7.78% of Fantis, 6.18% of Ashantis and 6.38% of Ga-Adangbes would not vote for a candidate who happened to be an Ewe.

There seems to be a broad Akan versus non-Akan alignment in these patterns of ethnonational resentment. The pinpoint explanation for this phenomenon is not totally clear in Ghanaian politics, and is to be sought from within the perceptions of Ghanaians for several reasons embedded in a combination of the myths of origin, “politics of the belly” and political events of the recent past. For example, it is a known fact, that any mutual antagonism between the Ashanti and Ewe, have arisen from the post-colonial period, and accentuated to a certain level when one political stalwart of the Ashanti-led Danquah-Busia tradition, the late Victor Owusu, bellowed in the

Parliament of the Second Republic, that Ewes were nepotistic and inward-looking [Smock & Smock, 1975, p. 247; Lentz & Nugent (eds.) 2000, p. 24]. The ruling Progress Party (PP) of the Second Republic, of which Busia was Prime Minister, was of the Danquah-Busia political tradition. The mutual antagonism between the Ashanti and Ewe reached its heights during the period of the so-called Ewe-led and ruling P/NDC. Akans in general and Ashantis in particular, felt that the "politics of the belly" had worked to their deficiency, especially when the strategic ethnic arithmetic (Nugent 1995, p. 43) had been heavily skewed towards the Ewes of Rawlings (Adjei 1993, p. 262; Herbst 1993, pp. 86-7; Shillington 1992, pp. 144-5; Yeebo 1992, p. 52), and also, when 94.5% of the Ewe-dominated Volta Region voted for Rawlings during the 1996 elections (Nugent 1999, p. 306). The P/NDC was also of the opinion that the "politics of the belly" during the 27-month Busia administration of the Second Republic benefited the Danquah-Busia political tradition, this view coming from President Rawlings himself²⁹. As there was no ancient enmity between Ewes and Ashantis (Nugent 1999, pp. 307-8), it becomes clear that political events within the post-colonial

²⁹ See news item (below), which also appeared in the electronic GRi Press Review of 14 March 2000:

**The Crusading Guide
NPP dares Rawlings!**

The Crusading Guide says that the NPP has challenged President Jerry Rawlings to tell Ghanaians what State enterprises were sold by the Busia administration, and the persons to whom they were sold. "The party expects the President to accept this challenge to substantiate his allegation with facts and figures", the party is quoted as saying. The paper in a story on its back-page, said the NPP's sentiments were expressed in a statement signed by the national chairman, Mr S.A. Odoi-Sykes, in reaction to President Rawlings' Declaration at a rally in Bolgatanga, the Upper East Regional capital, that "the NPP is richer than the NDC because during Busia's 27 months of administration, the (NPP) were able to sell state enterprises to themselves and they grew richer". According to Mr Odoi-Sykes, this statement is false and completely unfounded. "Every Ghanaian knows that it is rather the NDC, which is sitting on ever-rising mountain of money amassed from dubious and questionable sources", he is quoted as saying. The NDC, Mr Odoi-Sykes maintained, "uses the money to form a multiplicity of political groups as allies of the NDC, and also uses its enormous wealth to influence and rig national elections"...GRi/

period, which have touched on the sensitivities and insecurities of both groups, exert the most important influence on the current mutual antagonism, which have in turn enhanced the invocation of the distant myths of origin in explaining present patterns of nationalism. The extremes of ethnonationalism being demonstrated by the two groups perfectly fits Morrison's theory, that any ethnonational group perceiving discrimination (identity-based or not) tended to reassert its identity base in order to thwart country-wide integration (Morrison 1982, p.186). The late Victor Owusu, who was the Attorney-General during Busia's administration, died in December 2000 and was given a state burial in March 2001 by the current, Danquah-Busiaist, Kufour administration. A state-burial for him would have been unthinkable if the NDC were currently in power.

5.1.2 The Ga-Adangbe factor

The Ga-Adangbe political complexion was difficult to decipher, and that, the general political history of Ghana made it easier for Ga-Adangbes to conceal their political complexion than all the other groups. 21.2% of total respondents were Ga-Adangbe: 9.8% were ethnonationalists and 11.4% were political nationalists, the latter having been given the benefit of the doubt and categorised as political nationalists due to insufficient evidence. Therefore, as 46.2% of urbanite Ga-Adangbes were ethnonationalists, an uncertainty remains about the remainder. Also, as it has been difficult to tell whether Ga-Adangbes are skewed towards any particular political party, and as both the historical and ensuing evidence made it difficult to decipher their political complexion, this raises an issue of further research into the phenomenon.

5.1.3 The religious factor

Following from the Ga-Adangbe factor, it is worth noting that although religion is usually not a key factor in Ghanaian voter choices, the clash between the Charismatic churches and Ga-Adangbe traditionalists had stirred up religious sentiments which may well have had some bearing on the 2000 elections, at least in the Accra-Tema metropolitan area. On one hand, the Charismatic orientation of Mills, who was at the same time the flagbearer of a party which was politically sympathetic to Ga-Adangbe traditional religion, and Kufour's orientation as the flagbearer of a party not overtly sympathetic towards Ga-Adangbe traditions, left religious voters with difficult choices to make.

5.1.4 Political participation

Despite the enormous scope within Ghanaian politics for partisan prostitution, that is, fluidity and ambiguity of party loyalties, there is a significant association between party registration and level of party involvement.

5.2 URBANISATION/DETRIBALISATION AND ASSOCIATION WITH ROOTS

Urbanites do not become fully detribalised as a result of urbanisation, and this confirms the notion of geographical detribalisation leading to attitudinal detribalisation as not being universalistic. Indeed, the longer Ghanaian urbanites became exposed to urbanisation, the stronger the association with their roots became, although there is no direct association between ethnonationalism and association with roots. This signifies that ethnonationalism comes naturally for Ghanaian urbanites and does not have to be worked at, or influenced by an individual's association with roots. Ethnonationalism is the rational Ghanaian urbanite response to the "politics of the belly". The thesis scientifically corroborates, the view held by Agyeman, Mair and Watson, that there is no constant correlation between urbanisation and attitudinal detribalisation. In other words, although urban factors such as modernisation and its associated educational and occupational opportunities, enhance social and political integration (Morrison 1982, p. 104), this does not necessarily lead to a derooting from ethnonational roots (Agyeman 1988, pp. 35-36; Mair 1965, pp. 11-12; Watson 1958, p. 5);

The data also reveal that Ghanaian urbanites are more highly inclined to be associated with their roots than otherwise. Given the context of the link between "politics of the belly" and ethnonationalism, a lack of direct association between the latter and association with roots only goes to signify that: (a) where "politics of the belly" prevails in a multi-national state, ethnonationalism is of natural, rational, reasonable and ethical consequence, and; (b) ethnonationalism is not consequential from citizens' association with their roots. As the data revealed that: 34.1% exhibited "very high" association with their roots; 37.1% "high", and; 20.4% "average", a total of 91.6% of

Ghanaian urbanites had, at the least, an average association or attachment with their roots. It becomes clear, that detribalisation is more attitudinal than any de-rooting from ethnonational autochthons and that, geographical alienation from roots, and integration within an urban melting pot of multiple identities, do not always fully detribalise urbanites.

Agyeman's study on Ghanaians revealed that education and urban integration did not distance urbanites from their kingroups (Agyeman 1988, p. 36). However, my research goes further to reveal that the longer Ghanaian urbanites experienced urban life, the higher the association with their roots became. As already mentioned, this thesis does not prove, or offer the view, that association between urbanites and their roots influences ethnonationalism. Rather, the latter is as a consequence of the "politics of the belly".

5.3 ETHNONATIONALISM AND ASSOCIATION WITH ROOTS

As the highest levels of ethnonationalism match with the highest levels of association with roots, a suggestion is implied, that some sort of association exists between levels of (ethnonationalism) and levels of (association with roots), but the data does not reveal any direct relationship between the two, and therefore the thesis does not offer a view that there is a relationship between ethnonationalism and association with roots.

5.4 GENDER AND POLITICS

Although, the research did not set out to investigate the relationship between gender and politics, the data have provided information for an interesting discussion. Compared between the two sexes, there is a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. Within the male-dominated power relations of Ghanaian society, women generally seem to play second fiddle, and are therefore not usually given to freely airing their views on politically-sensitive issues. Jette Bukh (1979) highlights the view that the traditional household structure in Ghanaian society secures for women a basis for subsistence production, at the same time maintaining them in a secondary position. This difficult position for women is inherent in the societal policy of the traditional African state, and it would appear that 'women's possibility for fighting back is very limited' (Bukh 1979, p. 89). Any argument that Bukh's views may be exclusive to rural women would not hold, in that, in a wider and more inclusive attempt, the findings and conclusions of the ISSER/DPPC Research Team's investigations on Ghanaian women³⁰ reveal that they have a subordinate image in Ghanaian society, and generally play secondary roles. The views of Bukh and the ISSER/DPPC team are also confirmed by Yaw Oheneba-Sakyi, who also reveals that there are subordinate gender roles for women in Ghanaian society, and that this is a bi-product of the traditional system (Oheneba-Sakyi 1999, pp. 119-43). Perhaps, the intimidation caused by this subordinate secondary image is an explanation to why there is a greater tendency for Ghanaian females to try as much as possible to conceal their political opinions. It can also be argued, that the opposite

³⁰ This is to be found on pages xiii and xiv of a report entitled *Women in Public Life in Ghana*, presented to the Department for International Development (DfID) of the British Government by a joint research team comprising of members of the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) of the University of Ghana, and the Development and Project Planning Centre (DPPC) of the University of Bradford. For citation, see section B.1.3 in the bibliography.

gender of the interviewer could have inhibited female respondents from fully revealing their political intentions. However, this is not to be considered as a major issue, in that, in addition to the confidentiality and anonymity of the interview process, 66.5% of respondents indicated that they had freedom of expression (Table 17; Appendix XI). Besides, for females, it was the sharing of political views with their spouses that was a main problem, and not with friends, other family members (Appendix XVII), or an interviewer of the opposite sex. Within the intimidating, male-dominated Ghanaian society, females generally preferred to conceal their political views, particularly if they would differ from those of their spouses, on issues as sensitive as politics. It would appear that any explanations to the comparative political self-gagging of Ghanaian women in general, and spouses in particular, are to be sought from the countrywide image of the traditional household political system which still holds sway among urbanites, and not from the 'culture of silence' which is not gender-specific. This issue goes to strengthen the thesis that geographically-detribalised urbanites may not be detribalised attitudinally.

It must be noted, however, that in the past decade, the role of Mrs Rawlings has brought changes to the relationship between gender and politics. The 31 December Women's Group, (the official women's wing of the NDC) founded by Mrs Rawlings, has been engaged in raising the political awareness of women as citizens, as well as empowering them for political roles. The effect of the heightened awareness of women in current Ghanaian politics has been phenomenal, in that, the Opposition NPP, for fear of losing out on women votes, seriously considered a female as the vice-presidential candidate for the 2000 elections (GRi Press Review, 24/05/00; <http://www.mcglobal.com/History/May2000/24e2000/24e0r.html>). Although this did

not become a reality, one cannot ignore the fact that serious consideration has been given to women in Ghanaian politics, and that the door for this trend to continue is wider than before.

5.4.1 Other demographic factors and politics

In Ghanaian politics, it is not so much the factors of age, occupation, or education which matter as the ethnonational considerations.

5.5 THE NATION-STATE PROJECT

It would seem then, that the Ghanaian nation-state project would perhaps be difficult to complete, given the prevalent context of the rationalization of ethnonationalism, as well as the “politics of the belly”, and that nationalism within the matrix of any multi-national African state, such as Ghana, would not provide the ideal context for national integration and/or ethnonational homogeneity where the political and national units and frontiers will coincide (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 1; Gellner 1983, p. 1). The tension or conflict between ethnonationalism and political nationalism, as demonstrated by the survey data, proves that the attempt of the colonial legacy to subjugate separate national identities under a single state, which then should act as an incubator for the gestation of new nationhood (Smith 1991, p. 59), is only achievable within the understanding that whereas ethnonational homogeneity is a tall order for any new multi-national state, ethnonational heterogeneity is not a problem for the attainment of national identity for, as well as nationality within, the postcolonial state. In other words, modern Ghana is a nation and all citizens within the Ghanaian state have similar nationality irrespective of ethnonational heterogeneity. The rationalization of ethnonationalism by majority of citizens, in response to the pervasive “politics of the belly”, seems an indirect nod of approval to the latter, and the scenario clearly indicates, that the state does not have a smooth ride in creating ‘the necessary condition and matrix for the gestation of national loyalties’ (Ibid). This seems to reflect the views of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz when they reiterate the thoughts of an African - scholar Mwayila Tshiyembe, that ‘. . . since in Africa all countries (with a few exceptions such as Lesotho and Swaziland) are multi-ethnic nations, the only appropriate political order is one which makes space for a political framework grounded in this multi-ethnic reality’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 62).

The prospects of national integration for a state with subject groupings sharply antagonistic towards each other, and where the state system perpetuates these antagonisms through unfair political arithmetic motivated by ethno-sectarian interests, are very bleak. Despite its jurisdictional authority over the modern Ghanaian territory, the state has somewhat failed to live up to egalitarian expectations, and this is encapsulated in what Chabal and Daloz state, that:

. . . it is not because state power makes it possible to rule over a given “national” territory that the state can be said to be meaningfully institutionalised. Centralization of power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the development of a modern (Weberian) state – the fundamental attribute of which is its institutional emancipation from society. Because the African post-colonial state has failed to become differentiated from the society over which it rules, it cannot acquire the neutral political status which alone would allow its legitimation and its proper institutionalisation. Such a process would require at the very least that the political system overcome the particularistic constraints which presently govern its very functioning (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 13).

It must be noted that, the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, vis-à-vis others in Africa, can be attributed mainly to the presence of a demographically dominant *ethnie* - the wider Guan ancestry (or at least the emerged Akan identity). Furthermore, the less explosive degree of ethnonational antagonisms in Ghana, vis-a-vis other parts of Africa, for example Nigeria, Rwanda and the Congo, should be attributable to the rationalization of ethnonationalism and its general acceptability by a greater percentage of Ghanaians.

5.5.1 Latent sub-regional secessionisms and irredentisms

It is important that other impediments to national integration within the Ghanaian state are highlighted. Recent developments indicate that the four non-Ewe districts of the Volta Region of Ghana, from which the 52% votes in favour of the annexation of British Togoland to Ghana largely emanated, and who form part of the “Central Togo Minorities” (Nugent 1997, pp. 1-3), have made representations to the government for the creation of a separate administration from the Ewe-speaking area of the Region, on the basis that past governments have discriminated against them in terms of development planning. If successful, the new region is to be called Oti Region, after the main River Oti which runs through the four districts. The chiefs of the area claim that the ‘Ewe-Akan rivalry, which has been a plague in the Volta Region for years, has resulted in deprivation of development in their areas which are Akan dominated’ (GRI Press Review 29/07/99; Ghanaian Independent July 29, 1999). Agitation for a separate administrative region has been a recurrent feature for a few years running, without success. An attempt in 1997 was unsuccessful. The increasing pressure of these renewed representations could result in the granting of a separate administrative region for the agitating districts in the Oti River basin. Should this occur, Ewes in Ghana would be even more isolated, especially in a post-Rawlings Ghana, and the temptation would be strengthened for the option of a secession bid by Ewes in Ghana to join their historical relatives in neighbouring Togo.

In the 1956 plebiscite, 42% of the Volta Region, mainly the Ewe-speaking part of the Region, voted against their political annexation with Ghana. The unsteady relationship between Togo and Ghana since the annexation (Amenumey 1989, pp. 337-45) has continued with periodical allegations against each other. As recently as 1998, the

Ghanaian Foreign Office had to officially disassociate itself from reported armed incursions into Togo from the common border between the two countries, and the Togolese Opposition Leader, Gilchrist Olympio (who sometimes resided in Ghana), also denied any knowledge or involvement with these incursions (Pan-African News Agency Online News, August 17, 1998). Subsequent joint military exercises between both countries to contain the security situation have not been adequate enough to ease the strain. Reports reveal that the Ghanaian Armed Forces have been on the edge to deal with Togolese threats including several instances of land encroachment, annexation and usage by Togolese, and violations of Ghanaian air-space by Togolese military aircraft (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 18 August, 1999). In the latest of what is now clearly a border dispute, Togolese from Hanyigbatodzi had crossed at least two kilometres into Ghanaian territory, claiming that 'they recognised the old traditional boundaries and not the international frontier' (Ghanaian Times, August 20, 1999). Lt-Colonel John Forkuo, the Commanding Officer of the Ghana Artillery Regiment at Ho (the capital of the Volta Region) has disclosed that 'most of the pillars between Pillar I and Pillar 148, which the two countries erected jointly in 1974, to mark the international frontier between them, were recently destroyed by Togolese' (Ghanaian Times, 20 August 1999). The situation has not yet reached the point of an armed international conflict between the two countries.

Dating from the time of Nkrumah (when the annexation took place) until now, the idea of an Ewe secession from Ghana to join their ancestral relatives in Togo is not only antithetical to governmental position because of the constraints of the 1963 OAU Charter and the 1964 Arusha Declaration (Chazan ed. 1991, p. 107; Neurberger 1991, p. 107), but also ironically antithetical to the history of pan-Eweist irredentism within

the West African sub-region. The latter (pan-Eweist irredentism) has been stalled due to the emergence of Eyadema's non-Ewe administration and its subsequent long period of rule. It is interesting to note that the main Togolese Opposition to Eyadema's party and government are Olympioists, who are also proponents of pan-Eweist irredentism. Also interesting is the fact that both Ghana's Ewe Rawlings and Togo's non-Ewe Eyadema have been respective heads-of-states over the same period since the early 1980s until now. It is obvious that the prevalence of the non-Ewe Eyadema administration has prevented the resurgence of pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region at the same time that neighbouring Ghana was ruled by an Ewe. Owing to the uneasy relationship between Ghana and Togo since 1960, and also the suspicion between the governments of Eyadema and Rawlings, there has been a governmental commitment to tackle border disputes with the tact and sensitivity that it deserves. A secession of Ghanaian Ewes to Togo would automatically wipe out border incursions between neighbouring historical relatives, but a secession movement is not likely to be successful so long as either Eyadema or his non-Ewe power bloc remains the governing power in Togo. There is therefore a political stalemate in the sub-region as far as pan-Eweist irredentism is concerned. Since it is in the interests of the Eyadema power bloc to suppress the resurgence of pan-Eweist irredentism in the sub-region, a post-Rawlings, non-Ewe-dominated Ghana after the December 2000 election is an era which the Eyadema power bloc looked forward to. The complexity of the future political landscape is to be seen in the fact that the Eyadema power bloc is antithetical to any prospective secession bid by Ghanaian Ewes to join Togo, in that, the less Ewes incorporated into Togo, the better for the bloc. Therefore, the potential fears for Ghanaian Ewes include: (a) further isolation by the other Ghanaian ethnonational groups in a post-Rawlings era; (b) the possible granting of regional administrative

autonomy to the Oti districts away from the Volta Region; (c) the impossibility of secession to Togo, and; (d) an even further restricted prospect of pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region. Ewes would seem to be boxed-in, thus increasing the potential for frustration. The explosive potential which can result from Ewe suppression should not be overlooked. Whatever the case may be, the Ewe response would also depend on the future "politics of the belly" and how this plays itself vis-à-vis the mutual ethnonational antagonisms, and subsequently the extent to which Ewes in Ghana feel they belong, in contradistinction with their historical affiliations to Togo, irrespective of the nature of the Togolese political landscape.

5.6 CONCLUSION

It is clear, that ethnonationalism is more the substance of Ghanaian politics than style, even among urbanites, and furthermore, that despite the enhancement of socio-political integration by interactive urban factors such as education, occupation and modernisation (Morrison 1982, p. 104), not only does ethnonationalism strongly prevail over political nationalism, but also, that within the pervasive political culture of “politics of the belly”, ethnonationalism has established itself as the rational way to go. Largely, the ethnonationalistic attitudes of Ghanaian urbanites are not inhibited by urbanisation, and this casts the notion of geographical detribalisation leading to attitudinal detribalisation more into the shadows of rarity than common occurrence, at least in Ghana. Furthermore, it indicates that any proneness of urbanites towards political nationalism is more of an imagination than reality, in the Ghanaian case. Given: (a) the prevalence of the “politics of the belly”, and; (b) the prevailing heights of ethnonationalism in Ghanaian politics, it is easily predictable that political nationalism will continue to be more of a style, than of a rational choice. Largely, patriotic allegiance of general citizenry is first to the ethnonational group, and second to the state. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, and the often false impression given, that ethnonationalism is not a consideration when it comes to voting, the opposite is rather the case, and for most people, it is the main issue. The thesis indicates that both the current and future potential for the prevalence of this trend remains very high within the Ghanaian political context, unless a reversal of the prevailing “politics of the belly” occurs.

The above view is attributable to and consistent with findings from the thesis, as well as observations also made by Chabal and Daloz, that:

. . . neo-patrimonialism continues to suit both patrons and clients . . . The very dynamics of the system foster the continuation of vertical (communitarian, nepotistic or clientelistic) social relations . . . As we have noted, such a state of affairs may not be desirable in the long term for the country as a whole, but it remains both entirely coherent and eminently reasonable for those Africans who can manage to benefit from the system as it *works* (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 104).

It must also be concluded, that the comparative stability of the Ghanaian state, as opposed to other African examples where inter-ethnic issues have been highly explosive, can be attributed to a number of factors including: the presence of a predominant core *ethnie* (the wider Guan ancestry); the Akan factor; a rationalization of ethnonationalism, as well as; the nod of approval given to the “politics of the belly”. The rationalization of ethnonationalism and the “politics of the belly” works against national integration, or accentuates ethnonational heterogeneity, especially if state power is utilised as motivated by ethnonationalism. In reality, the Weberian ethos of the state has been rejected by Africa in general, and Ghana in particular, and ‘it is perhaps true that the model of the rejection of the transplanted state, on grounds of cultural incompatibilities, comes closest to an accurate analysis of the political evolution of post-colonial Africa’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 13). While the prospects for national integration are slimer but reachable, and given that the equation of the ethnic arithmetic will never balance, it becomes a huge responsibility how the state manages its citizens, and by what level of patriotic motivation (towards the state) this occurs. It would take a strong political will from both politicians and the rest of citizenry to transform the political game from ethnonationalism to political nationalism in Weberian terms. Where a nation is emerging, or has already emerged in a multi-

national state, the durability of the national feeling among citizens will very much depend on the fairness of state conduct and an attitude towards the eradication of the "politics of the belly". The Ghanaian nation-state project, and by extension, that of most African countries, has not prospered on the infertile ground of multiple national identities boxed under a single state.

Chapter 6

Postscript

6.1 THE 2000 ELECTIONS AND TRENDS IN ETHNONATIONALISM VERSUS POLITICAL NATIONALISM

Results of the 2000 multi-party presidential elections lend more support to the thesis. As summarised in the Introduction, explained in section 3.1.1, confirmed in sections 4.7.2, 4.8 and 4.10.1, and reiterated in sections 5.1 and 5.1.1, within the rationality of the Ghanaian political reality, citizens would make political choices skewed towards the interests of their ethnonational group, in reciprocation to the “politics of the belly”. Ethnonationalism remains the substance rather than the style of Ghanaian politics.

Posterity would have it that neither presidential candidate of the two leading parties, Mills and Kufour, would win a clear majority for a one-off victory. Mills won 44.5% of votes cast and Kufour won 48.2%. A run-off or second round ballot solely between the two candidates became necessary in order to determine a clear winner. In the first round, Dan Lartey, the GCPP presidential candidate, won 1% of all votes cast country-wide. Professor George Hagan of the CPP won only 1.8% of the countrywide vote and only 3.19% of votes cast in the Central Region. Obviously, and as discussed in section 2.6.1, he was not a real threat to Mills despite any panic which his candidacy may have aroused in the Mills camp. Goosie Tanoh also won 1.2% of national votes cast, and his candidacy did not detract significantly from the NDC's votes despite being leader of the NRM which broke away from the former. Charles Wereko-Brobby also won only 0.3% of the country-wide vote, and did not detract a significant fraction of votes from the NPP despite being leader of the UGM which broke away from the former. Edward Mahama of the PNC won 2.9% of the countrywide votes, but as a Northerner (from Nanlerigu), he won 8.12% of votes cast in Northern Region, 22.46% of Upper-East Region and 15.57% of Upper-West Region. Clearly, his candidacy detracted

significant votes from the major candidates, as would be discussed shortly. That noted, it seems clear that the first round of election was largely a two-horse race between the two leading parties – NDC and NPP. According to the Ghanaian Times, voter turn out for the first round was 59.2% as against 77% for 1996. Altogether, 6.46 million voted out of 10.67 million registered voters at a total of 20,112 polling stations (GRi Press Review 12/12/00; <http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Dec2000/121200/1210r.html>).

Table 28: Summary of Presidential Results – First Round

Candidate	Valid Votes	Vote (%)
Dan Lartey	67,504	1.0
Ata Mills	2,895,575	44.5
George Hagan	115,641	1.8
Edward Mahama	189,659	2.9
Wereko-Brobby	22,123	0.3
Goosie Tanoh	78,629	1.2
John Kufuor	3,131,739	48.2

Registered Voters Nationwide = 10,678,652	Total Valid Votes = 6,500,870
Constituencies Reported = 200	Total Rejected Votes = 104,214
National Turnout = 61.7%	Total Votes Cast = 6,605,084

Source: Electoral Commission; <http://www.ghanaelections.com/index-summary.htm>

As both hinted and discussed in several sections of the thesis (3.1.1, 3.1.2, 4.7.2, 4.8, 4.10.1, 4.10.2, 5.1), ethnonational patterns in voting habits would constitute a

distinguishing factor in the election results. In the first round ballot, 75.55% of votes in the Ashanti Region went to Kufour and 22.73% went to Mills. 88.81% of votes cast in the Volta Region went to Mills, and 6.94% to Kufour. Although Rawlings was no longer a candidate, he remained leader of the NDC, and therefore the fact of Mills being an Akan-Fanti did not prevent the Ewe-dominated Volta Region from delivering their vote to the NDC owing to the Rawlings factor. Besides, Ewes preferred to vote for the Fanti Mills rather than Ashanti Kufour, thus confirming the mutual antagonism between Ewes and Ashantis already discussed in sections 2.1, 3.1.2, 4.8 and 5.1.1 of the thesis

As highlighted in the Introduction as well as in Section 3.4, owing to the required indication of ethnonational identity from respondents to the 1999 research survey of voter-intent for the 2000 elections, the political attitudes of Ga-Adangbes (for example) could be isolated and analysed in section 4.9.1. On the contrary, the 2000 election results published by the Electoral Commission, can only provide a general pattern of votes in the Ga-Adangbe-dominated Greater-Accra Region. In this Region, Mills won 43.21% of the votes and Kufour won 53.18%. This 10% difference is not as strongly skewed as the gap between election results for the two candidates in the Ashanti and Volta Regions. However, it still constitutes a significant change in voting patterns within the Greater-Accra Region. Results of the 1999 survey of voter-intent reveal a vote gap of only 3.2% and 1.8% respectively for the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections between the NDC and NPP candidates (section 4.9.1; Appendix XIII). The gap increase for 2000 can, among other things, be attributed to Christian voters, particularly the Charismatics, who would have demonstrated their discontent at the NDC government's handling of the Homowo drum-ban issue (section 4.9.1), as

well as the increasing feeling among citizens regarding the need for political change. It will also be recalled that 11.4% of Ga-Adangbe voters were deemed as politically indecipherable (table 25) at the time of the survey in 1999, and could have contributed to increasing the gap. Despite the significant change in voting patterns in the Greater-Accra region, given that it is impossible to isolate and analyse the intricate patterns of nationalism for the Ga-Adangbe ethnonational group, the recommendation remains (as discussed in section 5.7.2) that further investigation into the group's political complexion is merited.

Northerners seem to have faithfully delivered the Northern vote to the NDC in return for the party faithfully heeding the request from Northerners to field a vice-presidential candidate from the North, and particularly since the party was also the first among the others to nominate their running mate for the presidency (see Section 2.6.2 and also the Glossary in Appendix II). As the election drama would unfold, final vote counts from the Regions in Southern Ghana trickled into the Electoral Commission much earlier than those from Northern Ghana, and it would appear that Kufuor was maintaining a clear lead until vote counts from Northern Ghana were finalised and added to the total. It is clear that Northern Ghana votes contributed to Mills closing the gap with Kufuor, and prevented the latter from maintaining a clear lead in the first round ballot. The results in Table 29 reveal that Mills had 50.75% of votes in the Northern Region, 52.13% in Upper East, and 62.29% in Upper-West, whereas Kufuor won 29.58%, 18.58 and 15.51% respectively in the said three Regions of Northern Ghana. It is interesting to note that Dr Edward Mahama, the presidential candidate for a comparatively insignificant party - the PNC, beat Kufuor in the Upper-East and Upper-West Regions by winning 22.46% and 15.57% respectively of the countrywide vote.

Edward Mahama is a native of the North, and it would appear that he gained from the ethnonationalistic sentiments of the citizens in Northern Ghana. The results further reveal that any election threat the NRP posed to the NDC was not as dangerous, since Tanoh – the NRP candidate, only managed to attract snippets of the countrywide votes.

Table 29: 2000 First Round Presidential Ballot (Selected Results)

region	mills	%	kufour	%	mahama	%	tanoh	%
Ashanti	286, 017	22.73	950, 602	75.55	3, 138	0.25	4, 420	0.35
B-Ahafo	270, 465	44.64	306, 512	50.59	10, 447	1.72	6, 634	1.09
Central	237, 227	43.73	269, 501	49.68	2, 791	0.51	7, 291	1.34
Eastern	308, 047	41.34	409, 635	54.97	4, 525	0.61	7, 738	1.04
G-Accra	467, 017	43.21	574, 737	53.18	2, 927	0.27	15, 423	1.43
Northern	286, 211	50.75	166, 827	29.58	45, 804	8.12	12, 990	2.30
U-East	125, 753	52.13	44, 829	18.58	54, 185	22.46	4, 887	2.03
U-West	111, 345	62.29	27, 714	15.51	27, 824	15.57	4, 295	2.40
Volta	506, 614	88.81	39, 535	6.94	1, 905	0.33	3, 182	0.56
Western	273, 355	43.93	314, 501	50.54	4, 873	2.90	4, 735	0.76
TOTAL	2871051	44.8	3104393	48.44	158, 419	2.5	71, 595	1.1

Source: GRi Newsreel 11/12/00;

<http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Dec2000/1112000/1110n.html>

Soon after the elections, at least four of the opposition parties which are not NDC decoys - PNC, NRP, UGM and CPP - pledged their support for Kufuor in the second round (GRi Press Review 12 December 2000; <http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Dec2000/1212000/1210r.html>). This seems to have made a lot of difference, in that, for example, Edward Mahama's votes in the North would now be diverted towards Kufuor. As the results in Table 30 reveal, Kufuor

performed much better in the North during the second round ballot. Although Mills won 51.10%, 57.17% and 61.97% of votes in the Northern, Upper-West and Upper-East regions respectively, Kufuor won 48.90%, 42.83% and 38.03% respectively for the same Regions. There is a clear improvement in his performance in the three Regions during the run-off, as compared to his votes during first round ballot -29.58%, 18.58 and 15.51% respectively.

Table 30: Summary of 2000 Presidential Run-off

	Prof. J. E. A Mills (NDC)		Mr. J. A Kufuor (NPP)	
Regions	Vote Count	%	Vote Count	%
Ashanti	258,623	20.11	1,027,132	79.89
Brong-Ahafo	245,300	41.70	342,961	58.30
Central	199,006	39.69	302,414	60.31
Eastern	269,270	37.59	447,154	62.41
Greater Accra	421,954	40.05	631,506	59.95
Northern	277,038	51.10	265,076	48.90
Upper East	154,703	57.17	115,880	42.83
Upper West	104,533	61.97	64,163	38.03
Volta	589,719	88.47	76,839	11.53
Western	299,978	39.10	358,138	60.90
National Totals	2,750,124	43.10	3,631,263	56.90

Registered Voters Nationwide = 10,678,652	Valid Vote Count = 6,381,387	Constituency Count = 200 of 200
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Source: Electoral Commission; <http://www.ghanaelections.com/run-off.htm>

Given that Kufuor won in every other region with the exception of Volta Region (same for the first round), the improvement in his Northern Ghana performance strategically contributed to his clear win during the run-off. A comparison between the first and second round ballots indicate that Mills' countrywide total decreased by a mere 1.7%, whereas Kufuor's increased by 7.46%. As there does not seem to be significant differences in Mills' performance in the Northern, Upper-East and Upper-West

Regions between the first and second round ballots 50.75%[51.10%], 52.13%[57.17%] and 62.29%[61.97%] – run-off results in parenthesis, it is quite clear that Kufuor gained substantially from Edward Mahama’s pledge of support, among other things, during the run-off.

Further analyses of the data reveal that the Volta Region’s overall support for the NDC in both rounds hardly changed: 88.81% [88.47%] but votes won by Kufuor from the same Region increased: 6.94% [11.53%], perhaps due to gains from the coalition of opposition parties within the Region. Nevertheless, the staunch support of the Ewe-dominated Region for the NDC should not be missed. In a similar vein, Kufuor’s votes from the Ashanti Region during the run-off increased: 75.55% [79.89%] while Mills’ votes decreased: 22.73% [20.11%]. As already discussed in sections 2.1, 3.1.2, 4.8 and 5.1.1 of the thesis, and as it still stands, Ewe-Ashanti mutual antagonism remains, and continues to reflect in the polarity of voting patterns between the Volta and Ashanti Regions.

The second round results in the Greater-Accra Region indicate that Mills’ votes decreased slightly: 43.21% [40.5%] while Kufuor’s votes increased: 53.18% [59.95%].

Despite any general consistencies between patterns of the election results published by the Electoral Commission, and those of the 1999 research survey of voter-intent, it should also be pointed out that there is no constant relationship between election fever indicators and actual result on voting day. For example, regarding the “Krobo vote” discussed in section 2.9.1 of the thesis, although the news media highlighted the pre-

election fever of the Yilo Krobo in the Eastern Region and their general determination to switch camp from the NDC to NPP, the detailed tally of Yilo Krobo constituency in Table 31 indicates that Mills won 54.3% of votes counted whereas Kufour won 45.7%. The results also indicate that only 51.2% of registered voters in the constituency voted during the run-off. For a place classified as an NDC safe area, the NDC's performance was rather poor. However, the point is made that the pre-election popular outcry 'to ignore the NDC's vain promises and test the NPP for the next four years come December 2000 elections' (GRI Press Review 02/06/00; <http://www.mcglobal.com/History/Jun2000/02f2000/02f0r.html>) did not translate into reality. It is also worth noting, as the results indicate, that the Krobo area (including Lower and Upper Manya Krobo) generally voted in favour of the NDC candidate Mills.

Table 31: Selected Run-off Results by constituencies: Eastern Region

constituencies	mills	%	kufou r	%	valid votes	rejects	total votes cast	reg. voters	turn out %
Lower Manya Krobo	12336	53.4	10771	46.6	23107	173	23280	47091	49.4
Upper Manya Krobo	11165	68.3	5192	31.7	16357	361	16718	37319	44.8
Yilo Krobo	13673	54.3	11494	45.7	25167	327	25494	49834	51.2

Source: http://www.ghanaelections.com/index_results.htm; Electoral Commission of Ghana

6.2 UPDATE ON THE “POLITICS OF THE BELLY”

As already concluded in section 5.6 of the thesis, current trends in ethnonationalism and/or political nationalism are not likely to change significantly unless there is a significant reversal in the trends of the prevailing “politics of the belly”. To quote:

Given: (a) the prevalence of the “politics of the belly”, and; (b) the prevailing heights of ethnonationalism in Ghanaian politics, it is easily predictable that political nationalism will continue to be more of a style, than of a rational choice. Largely, patriotic allegiance of general citizenry is first to the ethnonational group, and second to the state. Despite the pretence among Ghanaian urbanites, and the often false impression given, that ethnonationalism is not a consideration when it comes to voting, the opposite is rather the case, and for most people, it is the main issue. The thesis indicates that both the current and future potential for the prevalence of this trend remains very high within the Ghanaian political context, unless a reversal of the prevailing “politics of the belly” occurs . . .

While the prospects for national homogenisation is slimer but reachable, and given that the equation of the ethnic arithmetic will never balance, it becomes a huge responsibility how the state manages its citizens, and by what level of patriotic motivation (towards the state) this occurs. Where a nation is emerging, or has already emerged in a multi-national state, the durability of the national feeling among citizens will very much depend on the fairness of state conduct and an attitude towards the eradication of the “politics of the belly” (section 5.6).

President Kufuor, stated in his inaugural speech on 7 January 2001 that he will ensure zero tolerance of corruption in his administration, with himself leading in example setting. However, the announcement, a few days afterwards, of his brother as the Defence Minister to his administration only confirms the concerns already raised in the conclusions of the thesis.

In the “winner takes all” philosophy of multiparty democracy, it would appear that Kufour has no choice but to choose cabinet and other ministerial appointees from the membership of his own party, in the same way that the Republican George W. Bush of USA is not expected to recruit Democrats into his cabinet, nor Tony Blair of UK to

recruit similar ministerial appointees from among the Tories. But judging from Kufour's initial list of appointments, it becomes clear that the ethnic arithmetic is even more skewed towards Akans, (and particularly Ashantis), to a greater degree than the ethnonational skew in any government under Rawlings. Unlike Kufour's NPP, the P/NDC began not as an established party with a longstanding political tradition, but with revolutionary cadres, leftist academics and cronies, and therefore, had no established traditional and partisan restrictions with regard to choice of appointees. The P/NDC therefore had both the choice and chance to even the ethnonational arithmetic with regard to government appointees. Despite any partisan restrictions binding on Kufour's choices, his current list is ethnonationalistically loaded. It would be difficult for the NPP to argue that the party could not find competent appointees from other ethnonational groups, especially given Kufour's loud pre-election campaigns that he would form an all-inclusive government. As at 7 March 2001, the list of Kufuor's appointed Ministers and nominees for deputy ministerial posts indicated a predominantly Akan government. Out of the appointed Ministers, there are 72% Akans, 14% Northerners, 8.3% Ga-Adangbes, 3% Ewes and 3% Nzimas (Appendix XXII). The list of nominees for deputy ministerial positions is also heavily skewed towards the Akan. There are 53% Akans, 35 % Northerners, 6% Ga-Adangbes, 6% Ewes and no Nzima (Appendix XXII). The ratios for current appointments and nominations put together are: Akans – 63%; Northerners – 24.2%; Ga-Adangbes – 7.1%; Ewes – 4.2%; Nzimas – 1.4% (Ibid). With this trend, there does not seem to be much hope for the eradication of the “politics of the belly”, and it would appear that the nation-state project discussed in section 5.5 is far from achievement. Subsequently therefore, ethnonationalism, rather than political nationalism, would continue to dominate the substance of Ghanaian politics, and prevail as the rational guide to: (a)

the distribution of opportunity by government, and; (b) reciprocatory political choice making by citizens, to reflect the reality of the country's politics. This cycle of rationality would continue until further notice. As stated, 'it is for this reason that the prospect for institutionalisation is illusory' (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 104).

6.3 UPDATE ON PAN-EWEIST IRREDENTISM IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION

In another development regarding the prospects of pan-Eweist irredentism and Ghana-Togo relations as discussed in sections 2.11.2 and 5.5.1 of the thesis, it must be noted that soon after Kufour's inauguration as president, he made his first foreign trip by visiting Togo on the invitation of Gnassingbe Eyadema to celebrate the 34th anniversary of the coup which brought the latter to power through the assassination of Togo's first president, Sylvanus Olympio. The exiled Opposition Leader of Togo, Gilchrist Olympio (son of Sylvanus), has since, publicly agonized over the visit and condemned it as ill-advised and not circumspect (GRi Newsreel, 16 January 2001). The Olympioists and the Olympio-led Opposition in Togo have been the historic core supporters of pan-Eweist irredentism in the West African sub-region. The period of Eyadema's non-Ewe-led administration has neither contributed positively towards pan-Eweist irredentism nor the flourishing of any Olympio-led Opposition, and Gilchrist's connections in Ghana even during the administration of the Ewe Rawlings, were not enough to fan a resurgence of pan-Eweism in the sub-region, especially given the historicity of the political sensitivity between the two countries, as well as the uneasy relationship between Rawlings and Eyadema. As Gilchrist explains: 'Lets put it this way, I go to Ghana because I have family, friends and business there. We do not depend on Ghana for political support. We have never had it. Since the EU began sponsoring discussions between the opposition and government in Togo, the position of Ghana particularly in the last two years has not been in our favour' (Ibid). However, despite any lack of political support from Ghana, it would appear that the last development which Gilchrist and the Togolese Opposition would have bargained for

was that of a friendship between any president of Ghana and Eyadema of Togo. The current Togolese Opposition would therefore feel even more marginalized in the sub-region by this development. As discussed in section 5.5.1, given that Kufuor's NPP administration is more likely to agree to a split of the Volta Region of Ghana by granting regional administrative autonomy to the non-Ewe Oti districts within the said Region, and also given that the remainder of the Volta Region cannot secede to Togo, it would appear that Ewes in the Volta Region would feel even more marginalized and frustrated, yet with the least help on the horizon at this particular juncture in the geopolitique of the sub-region. A latent pan-Eweist irredentism combined with a frustrated and marginalized Ewe ethnonational group constitutes a potential time bomb. This may perhaps underpin reasons for President Kufour's choice of his brother as the Minister of Defence, to deal with any potential for insurrection within a military previously stuffed with Ewe appointees at sensitive positions by the erstwhile Rawlings regime (section 3.1.3). The new NPP government has since effected strategic portfolio changes across the military top hierarchy. As the "politics of the belly" perpetuates, so does ethnonationalism dominate as the rationality of the Ghanaian political reality.

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1979. After a short period of what seemed to be free and unchecked corruption in the handling of state affairs, and to the disappointment of the AFRC, the latter re-appeared through another coup d'état on 31 December 1981 as the PNDC, still under the leadership of Rawlings. Since it was the para-military PNDC which metamorphosed into the civilian NDC over an unbroken period of rulership from 1981 until 2000, they shall hereafter be referred to as the P/NDC where both apply in context. The NDC does not seem to have any particular political tradition, and appeared to concentrate on maintaining a populist appeal. According to the results of the 1996 elections, Jerry Rawlings polled 4,099,760 votes - 57.4% of total, and the NDC won 133 parliamentary seats (see Appendix VIII). The results of two seats were disputed, resulting in their loss by the NDC, and leaving the party with 131 seats. Professor John Ata Mills (Vice-President from 1996-2000) became the NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections. As the current constitution grants the automatic assumption of the presidency by the vice-president in the absence of the former, there were country-wide apprehensions about the prospects of a Mrs Rawlings vice-candidacy for the 2000 elections. Citizens seemed to smell a potential political dynasty for the Rawlingses in such an arrangement. After serious political tussles between several ethno-sectarian interests within the party, Alhaji Amidu, a Northerner, was chosen as the running mate to Mills.

The “Danquah-Busiaists”: The New Patriotic Party - NPP was the main Opposition Party to the NDC, and belonged to the Danquah-Busia political tradition. This tradition has a long history in the politics of Ghana, having evolved during the pre-independence struggle of the 1950s from the roots of the National Liberation Movement (NLM)¹ and the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). The tradition became the Progress Party (PP) during the Second Republic of Ghana when Dr Busia was Ghana’s Prime Minister, after having won the 1969 multi-party elections. The tradition or party adopted the name Popular Front Party (PFP) during the 1979 presidential elections, and finally NPP in 1996. John Kuffour, the NPP presidential candidate for the 1996 elections, polled 2,825,715 votes (40.09%) and the NPP won 61 parliamentary seats (see Appendix VIII). The tradition maintained the same name – NPP – for the 2000 elections. At the national delegates conference held in Sunyani on 24 October 1998, John. Kufuor was re-elected as the party’s presidential candidate for the 2000 elections by an overwhelming majority. Despite sharing some high profile party portfolios with personalities from other ethnonational groups, the NPP is widely perceived as an Ashanti party. The Party Chairman (Samuel Odoi-Sykes), General Secretary (Dan Botwe) and National Campaign Manager (Jake Obetsebi-Lamprey) are all Ga-Adangbes. The National Youth Organiser (Courage Quashigah) is an Ewe and a prominent defector from the Rawlings camp. However, owing to the party’s Ashanti roots, and the open secret that one has to be at least Akan to be its flagbearer, the party’s Ashanti image prevails. The party’s current First Vice Chairman is Ama Busia, daughter of the former Prime Minister.

¹ For brief details on the roots of the NLM, see sections 1.3.4 and 2.11 of the thesis.

The NPP, having observed the political landscape, took into consideration the fragility of the Northern versus NDC relationship. However, being also sensitive to the female vote, the NPP was torn between a male or female Northern candidate, with Joshua Hamidu and Madam Hawa Yakubu at the forefront of possible choices. Hamidu is from the Kusasi tribe and Yakubu is of the Dagomba tribe, both in Northern Ghana (GRI Press Review, 24/05/00; <http://www.mcglobal.com/History/May2000/24e2000/24e0r.html>). Both the NPP and NDC seemed to be stalking each other as to what type of candidate should be chosen for each party's vice-presidential slot (GRI Press Review 19/06/00; <http://www.mclglobal.com/History/Jun2000/19f2000/19f0r.html>). Soon after the NDC's announcement of Alhaji Amidu, the NPP also announced Alhaji Mahama Aliu, a Northerner, as the running mate to Kufour.

The “Nkrumahists”: A “third” party-political grouping was formed, known as the People’s Convention Party (PCP), with Mr. P. K. Donkor Ayifli as its acting National Chairman. This “third” party-political grouping – PCP - came under the broad Nkrumahist “banner”. It was formed out of a coalition of three previous parties which pretend to be inclined to a political tradition aligned to the ideals of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (the first President of Ghana). The “Nkrumahist” grouping has therefore consisted of: (a) the old PCP (originally led by Mr P. K. Donkor Ayifli and which party’s acronym was adopted for the coalition); (b) the People’s National Convention (PNC - led By Dr Edward Mahama), and; (c) the National Convention Party (NCP - led by Mr K. Sarpong-Kumankumah). It is noticeable that the word “Convention” is always maintained in accordance with the name of Nkrumah’s party, the Convention

People's Party (CPP). Despite the Nkrumahist overtones, the PCP was a very small party in terms of importance. In the last elections in 1996, out of a total of 200 seats in parliament, the PNC won only 1, and the NCP won 5. Dr. Edward Mahama, the presidential candidate for the PNC polled only 210,980 votes during the presidential elections - (3%) of the total presidential votes (see Appendix VIII). The first major unification event of all the Nkrumahist factions after the 1996 elections took place in November 1997. Not long after this, in April 1998, there were rumours that Dr Edward Mahama was being considered by the ruling NDC government for the post of vice-president in the 2000 elections. However founded or otherwise the rumours might have been, accusations of traitorship were hurled at him, resulting in his refusal to join the next round of PCP unification talks. A "reshuffle" within the PCP resulted in Dr Edward Mahama being ousted out of the PCP "coalition", thereby paving way for the re-constitution of a new Nkrumahist coalition known as Convention Party (CP). This reconstituted coalition was formed on Saturday June 13 1998, the 49th anniversary of the formation of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1949. The constant metamorphosis of the "Nkrumahist" following became a source of confusion, allowing less room for the neat definition of "Nkrumahist" parties. As the metamorphosis would unfold for the 2000 elections, the CP re-merged as Convention People's Party (CPP) with Professor George Panyin Hagan as their presidential candidate. He is a Fanti from Cape Coast, and his entrance into the presidential race is a contributory factor to the resultant keen competition for Fanti votes between himself and NDC's Mills (see section 2.7.1 of the thesis). Professor Hagan also chose Alhaji Ibrahim Abubakar, a Northerner, as his running mate. The PNC remained as the other "Nkrumahist" party for the 2000 elections, fielding Edward Mahama as its presidential candidate.

The National Reform Party – NRP (formerly The NDC “Reform Movement”)

Serious disagreeing factions within the NDC jointly formed the NDC Reform Movement, led by Goosie Tanor. The NRP received its certificate of party registration from the Electoral Commission in July 1999. Although this party did not command a substantial percentage of votes, its activities undermined the NDC to some extent, and managed to attract some disaffected MPs and supporters from the NDC camp. The party’s presidential candidate for the 2000 elections was Goosie Tanoh, and his running mate was Cletus Kosiba, also a Northerner.

The Democratic People’s Party – DPP

The DPP is one of the “minor” parties set up by the NDC as a strategy to proliferate the political scene with other minor parties in order to divert votes from the Opposition camp. The DPP received its certificate as a political party on 28 September 1992 under PNDC Political Parties Law (PNDCL 281). The party has therefore participated in the past two consecutive multi-party elections (1992 and 1996) with no national aim other than acting as a decoy party for the NDC. For the 1996 elections, the party’s leader and deputy were President Rawlings and Vice-President John Atta Mills respectively. So much is the DPP’s identification with the NDC that, the party threatened to sue the NPP’s flagbearer for campaigning that the NDC used state funds to acquire campaign vehicles. The DPP’s beef with the NPP was that the latter could not substantiate the statement (GRi Newsreel 12 - 09 - 00), even though the DPP could also not substantiate that the statement was false. It was argued that the onus lay on the NDC to sue the NPP in this case, and rightly so, the DPP is “another NDC”.

The Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere – EGLE - Party

The EGLE party is also one of the NDC's decoy parties for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections. As is usual with their contribution to the NDC campaign strategy, the party always joined forces with the NDC shortly before an election. For example, although it was a registered to take part in the 2000 elections, it eventually "pulled out". It received its party certificate on 13 August 1992 under PNDCL 281. Together with the DPP, they share an electoral alliance with the NDC. The party's presidential candidate at anytime is the same as that of the NDC.

The Great Consolidated Popular Party – GCPP

This party became legal in 18 June 1996, and is perceived as one of the decoys. The presidential candidate for the 2000 elections is Dan Lartey. The Women Organiser is Madam Victoria Annan (related to the Speaker of Parliament during the Rawlings government– Justice Annan).

The United Ghana Movement – UGM

The UGM is a breakaway faction of the NPP, headed by Dr Charles Wereko-Brobby, the founder, leader and flagbearer for the 2000 elections. Wereko-Brobby would prefer to be the NPP's flagbearer. The UGM's legal certificate as a party was issued on 10 January 1997, after the NPP lost the 1996 elections.

**TEXT
BOUND INTO THE
SPINE**

APPENDIX VI(a).

**LIST OF SCHOOLS IN TEMA WHERE STAFF MEMBERS GRANTED
INTERVIEWS, AND WHICH ARE FAVOURABLE TO BEING PUBLICLY
ACKNOWLEDGED:**

1. Aggrey Road Nos. 1 & 2 Primary Schools.
2. Aggrey Road No. 4 Primary School
3. Aggrey Road Junior Secondary School (JSS).
4. Mrs Emelia Annan, Headteacher, Mexico No.2 JSS, P. O. Box BT 146, Tema.
5. Mrs Nyarko, Headmistress, Tema Parents Association School, P. O. Box 539, Tema.
6. Ms Elizabeth Boakye-Dankwah, Headteacher, Onninku Drive No. 1 JSS, P. O. Box 429, Tema.
7. Mrs Addy, Headteacher, Onninku Drive No. 2 JSS.
8. James Mensah, Headmaster, St Paul's Methodist Preparatory School, P. O. Box 25, Tema.
9. Grace Lokko, Headmistress, St Paul's Methodist JSS.
10. Tema Secondary School.

APPENDIX VII

From: Anthony Mawuli Sallar [masallar@unixg.ubc.ca]
Sent: 05 February 1998 19:36
To: Steve Garbrah
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol.com;
okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:
> etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana under the
> protection of Ewe Language
> Steve

Steve

What exactly do you mean by that? What kind of nonsense is that. Go read your history. Do you know about colonialism, do you know about Partition for Africa etc. Do you know where your ancestors come from? For all you know they may have originated from the Pigmies in the Congo, from the so called Bushmen present day Namibia, or from the Nubians in the Sudan wherever. Will they be Ghanaians? You don't know.

I don't want to read that kind of crap from you anymore. You are noted for spewing a lot of crap and garbage on this net. Please spare us. Go learn some history of Ghana or European history and study partition of Africa.

MS

From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb.alexia.net.au]
Sent: 05 February 1998 21:59
To: Anthony Mawuli Sallar
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol.com;
okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

G'day ms

why are you crying MS?? are you telling me that all Ewe speaking people in Ghana today are native Ghanaians?? please educate me on this issue? MS Did you migrate from Togo or TVT to Ghana??

enjoy
Steve.

Anthony Mawuli Sallar wrote:

> On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:
> > etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana under the
> > protection of Ewe Language
> > Steve
>
> Steve
> What exactly do you mean by that? What kind of nonsense is that. Go read
> your history. Do you know about colonialism, do you know about Partition
> for Africa etc. Do you know where your ancestors come from? For all you
> know they may have originated from the Pigmies in the Congo, from
> the so called Bushmen present day Namibia, or from the Nubians in the
> Sudan wherever. Will they be Ghanaians? You don't know.
>
> I don't want to read that kind of crap from you
> anymore. You are noted for spewing a lot of crap and garbage on this net.
> Please spare us. Go learn some history of Ghana or European history and
> study partition of Africa.
>
> MS

From: Anthony Mawuli Sallar [masallar@unixg.ubc.ca]
Sent: 06 February 1998 00:36
To: Steve Garbrah
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol.com;
okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:

> why are you crying MS?? are you telling me that all Ewe speaking people in Ghana
> today are native Ghanaians?? please educate me on this issue? MS Did you
migrate
> from Togo or TVT to Ghana??

Garbrah

You are still exhibiting your ignorance relating to African history,
Ghanaian history and European history with special emphasis on The
partition of Africa.

BTW who is a native Ghanaian. Do give me that definition then we can
debate.

I guess by TVT you mean Trans Volta Togoland. People from TVT did NOT
migrate to Ghana. Another exhibition of your lack of knowledge on the
Plebiscite. Also note that most of Eweland were under British rule before
other inland areas in present day Ghana.

MS

From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb.alexia.net.au]
Sent: 06 February 1998 01:23
To: Anthony Mawuli Sallar
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; Andy Kwawukume; CpCoaster@aol.com;
okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Ms

Good on you,

My definition of native Ghanaian is everybody expect people addmitted to Ghana by plebiscite:

> On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:

>

> > why are you crying MS?? are you telling me that all Ewe speaking people in Ghana

> > today are native Ghanaians?? please educate me on this issue? MS Did you migrate

> > from Togo or TVT to Ghana??

>

> Garbrah

> You are still exhibiting your ignorance relating to African history,

> Ghanaian history and European history with special emphasis on The

> partition of Africa.

> BTW who is a native Ghanaian. Do give me that definition then we can

> debate.

> I guess by TVT you mean Trans Volta Togoland. People from TVT did NOT

> migrate to Ghana. Another exhibition of your lack of knowledge on the

> Plebiscite. Also note that most of Eweland were under British rule before

> other inland areas in present day Ghana.

>

> MS

From: Bensa Nukunya [bensa123@grove.ufl.edu]
Sent: 06 February 1998 15:28
To: Steve Garbrah
Cc: okyeame@mit.edu
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

As the old saying goes, Ignorance is no excuse.
Steve you know very well that the Gold became Ghana Coast on independence day.
I wasn't born then but I have had the chance of taking some history lessons both in primary school and secundary school (motown to be precise).

I may be mistaken but I remember very well that the plebiscite took place before indepenence and during the time both the Gold coast and TRANS VOLTA were jointly governed by the British. That plebiscite which took place was a question to the people of Trans Volta whether they wanted to merge with the Gold Coast or merge with Togo to where some Ewes were. Many people have their own explanations to this, but I think the result of the plebiscite was a merger of two countries (if I may call it that) to form one just like the two Germanies did recently. Thus none of the two groups can claim to be more Ghanaian than the other. On the other hand the choice was that of the people of the trans volta and the British had the power to implement it. The country Ghana itself has artificial borders which were created by foreigners, so whoever was added to the list last or even first has no right to claim that others are not native enough. Delaware citizens being the first state of the USA do not claim to be more american than alaska natives. That's why they leave peacefully. But this is not so in Ghana. Because some see Ewes as a source of stiff competition in matters such as politics, job opportunities, (What do you know Champions, beauty queens and what have you?) they come out with certain unfounded theories. My advice to such people who don't like ewes because Ewes work should also learn to work hard so they will also excel in what ever they do in competition with the Ewe people.
Bensa.

On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:

> Ms
>
> Good on you,
>
> My definition of native Ghanaian is everybody expect people addmitted to Ghana by
> plebiscite:
>

From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas.ucla.edu]
Sent: 06 February 1998 18:26
To: Andy Kwawukume
Cc: CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote:

> Mark,
> That Aliens Compliance Order was a mean one and shoddily implemented. No
> grounds to excuse it.

Well, if you talk about the implementation of it I may agree with you
but the fact still remains that the order was necessary in these
modern times as we are no more nomads.

> As for worrying about my dead great grandpas, I was not the least worried.

It's good that you're not worried for you are surely a Ghanaian!
Time has to tell when you, not a long ago, implicated that you know
my roots. By the way, my great grandpa, Nana Tutu, was born in the
confines of the present-day Ghana. I hope I have now answered your
query.

> Anyway, it'd be sheer waste of time for me to type out CMB reports of how
> devastating the Order was on the cocoa industry, for instance.

Well, can the farm labourers be classified as modern-time slaves? You
are an expert on slavery so let me hear more on that.

You'd
> retreat into your bunker as usual, when faced with hard evidence, and come
> back 3 or so months later to make song and dance about how good Busia's
> prototype of white racists' agenda was.

I go off the net when I have pressing issues to attend to and not due
to the rumblings on okyeame. I hope you get that right. We are making
'impossible things possible' as my old school teacher used to brag
about. Don't ask me what!
The Saint

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 07 February 1998 00:17
To: Kwadwo Boahene; okyeame@mit.edu
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Kwadwo

This is what I wrote below:

>At 04:05 AM 2/6/98 +0100, Andy wrote:

>>As for worrying about my dead great grandpas, I was not the least worried.
>>Not even for Yorubas living at Anloga. Nobody could touch them without
>>invoking the wrath of the townsmen. We have lived with Yorubas for
>>centuries and intermarried with them and never considered them as strangers
>>you Akans do.

>Kwadwo writes:

>How did you come to such conclusion, Andy? If Yorubas were no strangers the
>people of Anloga do you think they will be strangers to Anytown, Akan?
>Remember that not all Nigerians left Ghana. There are still so many in the
>Akan areas as Anloga. Next time check yourself before you make such a
>blatant untrue statement.

I am a loss at your response. I did not reach any conclusion. I just narrated empirical facts. Fact is, Ewes and Gas once lived with the Yorubas in Nigeria. Remnants of Ewes are still there in Lagos State in their own settlements along the coast of Badagry. Sure, Yorubas could be regarded as strangers to some towns in Ghana, just as some still regard Ewes (e.g., Steve Garbrah) and some others as not "natives" of Ghana. That's why Busia and the PP ordered them out! I did not say all Nigerians left. Did I? Of course, we've had a new influx of Nigerians and Yorubas to Ghana. ECOWAS, you know. But short of the Africa Unity our tradition stands for.

Alliance Compliance Order was a stinking anti-black and African wicked order. Unless we have the courage to accept these internal causes of problems in Africa, Euro-Americans will never take seriously our attacks on their roles in making these internal problems intractable.

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Kwadwo Boahene [kemet@pop.erols.com]
Sent: 07 February 1998 14:06
To: okyeame@mit.edu
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Andy,

Don't play dumb with me. You know what I am talking about. Re-read the part that I posted. Whether you reached any conclusion or not is not my business. All that I wanted to point out was not for you to make such statements as below:

">>>We have lived with Yorubas for
>>>centuries and intermarried with them and never considered them as strangers
>>>you Akans do."

The statement above is my problem. What makes you think Akans considered the Yoruba's as strangers? You never answered my question and you went into this thing with the Aliens Compliance Order.

>>>Sure, Yorubas could be regarded as
>>>strangers to some towns in Ghana, just as some still regard Ewes (e.g.,
>>>Steve Garbrah) and some others as not "natives" of Ghana. That's why Busia
>>>and the PP ordered them out!

Yep, Yorubas could be regarded as strangers in SOME towns in Ghana. Haba, now you're are talking - some towns in Ewe and Akan and whatnot. This is not the same as you said in your first mail. Good.

I don't think the PP gov't made his decision that "strangers" should get of Ghana. At this point it will not make sense for me to get into this with you. The merits and de-merits of the have been debated and over and over again. I took issue with you about the statement about Akans considering Yoruba's as strangers.

Thanks,
Kwadwo

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 07 February 1998 00:17
To: Anthony Mawuli Sallar; Steve Garbrah
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu;
radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Folks,
Well, it seems I have to comment on this after all.
At 11:35 05.02.98 -0800, Anthony Mawuli Sallar wrote:

>

>On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:
>> etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana
under the
>> protection of Ewe Language
>> Steve

When I read this crap, I deleted the mail immediately! After all, Affluent advised that we leave the peddlers of this kind of garbage alone, and they'd fade away! You know too that I know better than believe that.

And then Mawuli responded

>Steve

>What exactly do you mean by that? What kind of nonsense is that. Go read
>your history. Do you know about colonialism, do you know about Partition
>for Africa etc. Do you know where your ancestors come from? For all you
>know they may have originated from the Pigmies in the Congo, from
>the so called Bushmen present day Namibia, or from the Nubians in the
>Sudan wherever. Will they be Ghanaians? You don't know.

Good questions, Tony! But to answer them, Steve and his ilk needs complete re-education of themselves as you suggested. Their miseducation is profound and having a great toll on the nerves of some of us, for a long, long time now. I think I have suffered enough (their ignorance, foolish statements, etc.) in their hands!

Steve particularly stand out as outstanding among the miseducated. When I first read his Ashanti Home Page, I was mortified and horrified and so sent him a private mail. Well, I am aware that many of my "natural allies" like to be praised and "glamorised" and so might not see anything wrong with the things he wrote there. Moreover, I thought he was one of those boastful "natural allies" that has got or adopted a Fanti name, for one reason or the other: marriage or rewarding a kind Fanti a la JB, e.g. But the challenges and tasks confronting us cannot be dealt with on those terms. And as a concerned Ghanaian, I made contact with Steve to upbraid him privately. Little did I know that Steve is a bleeding "confused Fanti"!!! Well, that is how Cape Coaster branded him. I think his kind of disease is worse than that.

I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal strip to the West. No, Steve would not know that because he is one of millions of miseducated Ghanaians/Africans.

Half of Togo's population in Ghana? What are they doing in Ghana, btw? Does that include Konkombas and allies too, or only Ewes? I thought "Ghanaians" were still running away in their 1000s a few years ago to Togo, many of the women (overwhelming majority of whom we all know their ethnic origins as Akan) to engage in prostitution. Mind you, not in trokosi shrines.:-)

Steve, most of us Ewes don't respect the colonial border drawn to split our houses, farms, lands, etc., etc., into two! The CPP promised to negotiate for a union after independence and urged supporters to vote for its policy in the plebiscite instead of voting for those calling for either union or separation before independence. People are still waiting for that negotiation to commence!

Concerning the plebiscite, are you aware that the so-called British Togoland, that's, southern VR which became part of the Gold Coast long before the Ashanti Kingdom and the Northern Territories became British Protectorates, was not allowed to participate? Even when that area became the strongest advocate for outright separation due to the fall out with the CPP? And do you know that the CPP/British position "won" by a few votes, obviously rigged? I can't recollect the exact number since its over 20 years since I read details of the poll. George Padmore's The Gold Coast Revolution has the details too. The chapter on what he termed "Irredentism". In present Togo, the union or separation led by Olympio boycotted the plebiscite there - a mistake - spelling their doom. Olympio later won the elections for independence but it was too late.

Then, do you know that the TVT, down to Lome was part of the British annexation until Queen Victoria gave the area to her German cousin as a birthday present?!!! And this was not accepted by the people of the area, who immediately started working against this balkanisation? And that when WW1 broke out, the British made a deal with the Torgbi Sri 11 who raised 15,000 troops to kick out the Germans from Togo, with the promise that there would be a union of the people, but the British renegade on this deal? They took back what they gave to the Germans after the Berlin Conference, minus Lome. TOLIMO was simply a culmination of decades of frustration and suppression.

I know Ewes from Ghana who were literally stateless in Nigeria in the 1980s. To listen to their stories can bring tears into your eyes if you've any human feeling of pity. When they went to the Ghana High Comm. to get passports, they were driven away as Togolese, simply because they have Ga names among their Ewes names. It is reasoned they must be the so-called Mina-Ewes by the non-Ewe passport officers, even though they speak perfect Anlo-Ewe. Indeed some speak Ga too fluently, having grown up in Accra. You see, most are the descendants of the Ga fugitives who also took refuge among Ewes from the last quarter of the C17th. I bet Steve did not know about this history too, at least until he joined Okyeame. When these unfortunate people finally decided to get Togolese passports, they were insulted and chased away as criminal Ghanaians. Fact is, they were born and bred within present Ghana (just as their great grandparents) and could not tell the Togolese passport officers the name of the next village in Togo to that they claimed their great great grandparents came from on their bid to return to Accra!

Steve, chew on these things because they'd come to haunt you and your

jaded, reactionary compatriots in the near future when the full story is re-told on Okyeame and elsewhere.

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb.alexia.net.au]
Sent: 07 February 1998 14:11
To: Andy Kwawukume
Cc: Anthony Mawuli Sallar; Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com;
okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Andy,

I know you do post garbage on okyeame, I dont have time for you, I decided not to reply your mails long ago , b'cos all your writings are load of "SHIT; It seems to me that you have nothing better to do than to attach people,

RIP
IN NORWAY

Steve

>

> Folks,

> Well, it seems I have to comment on this after all.

> At 11:35 05.02.98 -0800, Anthony Mawuli Sallar wrote:

> >

> >On Thu, 5 Feb 1998, Steve Garbrah wrote:

> >> etc.? Anyway half of the population from Togo are still in Ghana

> under the

> >> protection of Ewe Language

> >> Steve

>

> When I read this crap, I deleted the mail immediately! After all, Affluent

> advised that we leave the peddlers of this kind of garbage alone, and

> they'd fade away! You know too that I know better than believe that.

>

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 08 February 1998 02:45
To: sgarbrah@melb.alexia.net.au
Cc: Anthony Mawuli Sallar; Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com;
okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

At 00:10 08.02.98 +1000, Steve Garbrah wrote:

>Andy,

>

>I know you do post garbage on okyeame, I dont have time for you, I

>decided not to reply your mails long ago , b'cos all your writings

>are load of "SHIT; It seems to me that you have nothing better to do

>than to attach people,

Steve, keep to your policy of not responding to my posts. Will continue to save me a lot of head pains and heartaches! My nerves are already seriously frayed! You don't have much to offer on Okyeame, btw. At least not against what I have to peddle. Indeed, I even pride myself on my ability to descend into the mud pit to make mud balls to throw myself at the face of mudslingers. I don't wait for the mudslingers to get their hands dirtied! No! BTW, no one needs to impose a culture of silence on you. You did it to yourself already!

'Bye 'bye!
Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Amoah, M [M.Amoah@LSE.AC.UK]
Sent: 07 February 1998 15:50
To: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@ataback.com'
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

Hi everyone,
I've been sketchily following this topic for a while. While I'm not interested in following up on the tribal connotations in the debate, I just wish to seek some verifications to a few statements made. On 7/2/98, Andy K wrote:-

> I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are
> descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek
> refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal
> strip to the West.
>

Andy K, according to the record/s, the Anyi people (also called Anyii or Brosa) founded the Anyin State. The capital of the Anyi State is Anyi (Enchi) in the Western Region. They were formerly residing in Anwianwia in the Ahafo district and their king was Abirimuro. Asantehene Opoku Ware defeated the Anyi in 1743, as a result of which they moved southwards in two groups, one which founded Nkwantaya, and the other Gyedua (now in the Wasa-Amanfi area in Western Region). The Gyedua-Anyi had a conflict with their landlords (The Wasa-Amanfi people) and as a result left, crossed the Tano River, and thus founded Anyi (Enchi) as already stated above. -[Meyerowitz 1952:117]

As the records indicate, any movement of the Anyis was south-westwards and not in the opposite direction towards Eweland as is being suggested by Andy K. I do not yet know of any records which indicate that Anyis from Fantiland sought refuge in Eweland after the Asante conquered Elmina. Perhaps Andy K would like to state his sources (page and all) to confirm/deconfirm his statement above. Thanks.

In the same post on 7/2/98, Andy K wrote:-

> Concerning the plebiscite, are you aware that the so-called British
> Togoland, that's, southern VR which became part of the Gold Coast long
> before the Ashanti Kingdom and the Northern Territories became British
> Protectorates, was not allowed to participate? Even when that area
> became the strongest advocate for outright separation due to the fall
> out with the CPP? And do you know that the CPP/British position
> "won" by a few votes, obviously rigged?

I wish to state that according to the records of the plebiscite, there were 194,230 registered voters and 82% or 160,587 people voted. Out of these 58% or 93,095 voted for the CPP/British position of union with the Gold Coast, and 42% or 67,492 voted for separation. -(Amenumey 1989:266). Andy K, I do not think that a 16% difference constitutes "a few votes" as you claim. Second, there is no suggestion or any proof anywhere that the plebiscite was rigged as Andy K claims. Perhaps Andy Kwaukume would like to stop deceiving people with his posts.

Having said that, I noticed that on 6/2/98, Steve Garbrah made some comments regarding specifically:- Ewes, the plebiscite of 1956 and nativity. Bensa Nukunya replied thus below:-

".....Because some see Ewes as a source of stiff competition in matters such as politics, job opportunities, (What do you know Champions, beauty queens and what have you?) they come out with certain unfounded theories. My advice to such people who don't like ewes because Ewes work should also learn to work hard so they will also excel in what ever they do in competition with the Ewe people.

Bensa.

I think that the contents of Bensa's reply are not necessary and have no relevance or direct bearing to the issues being discussed, to repeat:- Ewes, plebiscite and nativity. Bensa Nukunya's above statement is sweeping and unscientific. For example:

(1). Which people see Ewes as a source of competition.....?

(2). What must "people" excel in, in order to "compete" with Ewes?

(3). Perhaps Bensa Nukunya would like to substantiate his statements.

I think that perhaps, it would be better if Nukunya, in addition to disturbingly digressing, does not bombard us with tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which only seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all Ghanaians.

cheers everyone,
frisky.

From: Peter K Achireko [achirepk@tuns.ca]
Sent: 07 February 1998 21:58
To: M.Amoah@LSE.AC.UK
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Hi Frisky,

Thanks for your contribution on this longly-dragged subject.
My best regards to you.

Achiter

> Hi everyone,
> I've been sketchily following this topic for a while. While I'm not
> interested in following up on the tribal connotations in the debate, I
> just wish to seek some verifications to a few statements made. On
> 7/2/98, Andy K wrote:-
>

From: CK Ladzekpo [ladzekpo@uclink4.berkeley.edu]
Sent: 07 February 1998 09:52
To: 'okyeame@mit.edu'
Cc: M.Amoah
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

My dear Rev. Amoah,

On Sat, 7 Feb 1998, Rev M. Amoah wrote:

> I think that perhaps, it would be better if Nukunya, in addition
>to disturbingly digressing, does not bombard us with
>tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which only
>seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all
>Ghanaians.

You have conveniently left out a comment on Steve Garbrah's definition of who is a native Ghanaian. Nukunya was responding to that definition. Is your silence a consent and what Steve Garbrah wrote is not in your words "tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which only seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all Ghanaians? I would appreciate a clarification.

Regards,

CK Ladzekpo

From: Amoah,M [M.Amoah@LSE.AC.UK]
Sent: 07 February 1998 18:00
To: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@ataback.com'
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

On 7/2/98, CK Ladzekpo wrote:-

> You have conveniently left out a comment on Steve Garbrah's definition
> of
> who is a native Ghanaian. Nukunya was responding to that definition.
> Is
> your silence a consent and what Steve Garbrah wrote is not in your
> words
> "tribalistically-paranoid, unsubstantiated and wild assertions which
> only
> seek to generate tribal quarrels, and may not be too good for all
> Ghanaians? I would appreciate a clarification.
>
> Regards,
>
> CK Ladzekpo

NO mate! all I'm saying is that, that section of the reply given
by Bensa Nukunya was not necessary, whatever the question was, and
especially with relevance to the issues being discussed ie; Ewes,
plebiscite and "native Ghanaians".

cheers,
frisky.

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 08 February 1998 02:47
To: Amoah,M; 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@databack.com'
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

Folks,

Frisky needs some apor.

At 15:49 07.02.98 -0000, Amoah,M wrote:

>Hi everyone,

>I've been sketchily following this topic for a while. While I'm not

>interested in following up on the tribal connotations in the debate, I

>just wish to seek some verifications to a few statements made. On

>7/2/98, Andy K wrote:-

>

>> I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are

>> descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek

>> refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal

>> strip to the West.

So I wrote above. Perhaps I should have made it clear that for the Ashantis to reach the Elmina and the coastal strip to the west, they had to defeat all the people in their way too, thus displacing them. And one has to be aware that those early kingdoms were in the interior, not along the coast. Expansion to the coast happened later.

> Andy K, according to the record/s, the Anyi people (also called
>Anyii or Brosa) founded the Anyin State. The capital of the Anyi State
>is Anyi (Enchi) in the Western Region. They were formerly residing in
>Anwianwia in the Ahafo district and their king was Abirimuro. Asantehene
>Opoku Ware defeated the Anyi in 1743, as a result of which they moved
>southwards in two groups, one which founded Nkwantaya, and the other
>Gyedua (now in the Wasa-Amanfi area in Western Region). The Gyedua-Anyi
>had a conflict with their landlords (The Wasa-Amanfi people) and as a
>result left, crossed the Tano River, and thus founded Anyi (Enchi) as
>already stated above. -[Meyerowitz 1952:117]

> As the records indicate, any movement of the Anyis was
>south-westwards and not in the opposite direction towards Eweland as is
>being suggested by Andy K. I do not yet know of any records which
>indicate that Anyis from Fantiland sought refuge in Eweland after the
>Asante conquered Elmina. Perhaps Andy K would like to state his sources
>(page and all) to confirm/deconfirm his statement above. Thanks.

Here you are with a source. From D.E.K Amenumey (1986:18) we read:
"Meanwhile the fugitives settled at Kpodji (later named Glidzi), Zowla and Anfoin. They were not actually on the coast but beyond the lagoon. The chief of the Ga fugitives Ofori Nbiabia (Foli Bebe) who had joined the first band of fugitives paid court to the King of Tado. He secured the hand of a daughter of the King in marriage. Soon after the arrival of the Ga fugitives [in 1677, to be precise], a group of immigrants from Elmina (in the Gold Coast) led by Quarm Dessou went to settle on the beach to the west, some few kilometres from the Ga immigrants, at what became Anexo. Contacts developed between the two peoples with the result that they became fused. The Ga element however, predominated because of their numbers. The

entire community came to be known locally as Ge, but "Mina" and "Popo" in European documents".

Among these Akan fugitives, the Anyis were obviously predominant since they also lent their name to the new state that was formed, that is, Genyi (Ga-Anyi, remember, Ewes say Ge for Ga. Why? I don't know). Other Akan fugitives settled among Ewes later and you'd read about them from pp.16-20. In fact, you'd even understand why the people of Tongu/Bator, where the trokosi is found, speaks that atrocious and funny Ewe.

> In the same post on 7/2/98, Andy K wrote:-

>

>> Concerning the plebiscite, are you aware that the so-called British
>> Togoland, that's, southern VR which became part of the Gold Coast long
>> before the Ashanti Kingdom and the Northern Territories became British
>> Protectorates, was not allowed to participate? Even when that area
>> became the strongest advocate for outright separation due to the fall
>> out with the CPP? And do you know that the CPP/British position
>> "won" by a few votes, obviously rigged?

>

> I wish to state that according to the records of the plebiscite,
>there were 194,230 registered voters and 82% or 160,587 people voted.
>Out of these 58% or 93,095 voted for the CPP/British position of union
>with the Gold Coast, and 42% or 67,492 voted for separation. -(Amenumey
>1989:266). Andy K, I do not think that a 16% difference constitutes "a
>few votes" as you claim. Second, there is no suggestion or any proof
>anywhere that the plebiscite was rigged as Andy K claims. Perhaps Andy
>Kwawukume would like to stop deceiving people with his posts.

The figures you presented obviously represent the totals, and even though I was trying to remember from 20 yrs ago, I still think George Padmore presented different figures. When I wrote, I was thinking of the votes in the predominantly Ewe areas down south of the TVT. In fact, those areas voted overwhelming for separation. Their votes, whoever, were cancelled out by the votes in the northern parts stretching from Kete Kratchi, thru' Yendi to much of the Upper East, dominated by non-Ewes who could not wait to re-join their kins to the west from a position of strength.

The rigging allegation may not be true but that is what TOLIMO members and the people of Alavanyo who rose up in arms believed.

I think I have answered your concerns addressed to me.

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Amoah,M [M.Amoah@LSE.AC.UK]
Sent: 08 February 1998 17:09
To: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@ataback.com'
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

On 8/2/98, Andy K wrote:-

The figures you presented obviously represent the totals, and even though I was trying to remember from 20 yrs ago, I still think George Padmore presented different figures. When I wrote, I was thinking of the votes in the predominantly Ewe areas down south of the TVT. In fact, those areas voted overwhelming for separation. Their votes, whoever, were cancelled out by the votes in the northern parts stretching from Kete Kratchi, thru Yendi to much of the Upper East, dominated by non-Ewes who could not wait to re-join their kins to the west from a position of strength. The rigging allegation may not be true but that is what TOLIMO members and the people of Alavanyo who rose up in arms believed.

Andy K,

If you knew the "rigging" allegation was untrue, you should not have misinformed us by reiterating it, and concluding that the plebiscite was "obviously rigged". Neither did you say this allegation was a "belief" of "TOLIMO members of Alavanyo". In any case by reiterating their false "belief", you believed their belief. Also, you claim above that the votes that made the enormous 16% difference came from the non-Ewe 'north' of the Volta Region. In view of the fact that the 'north' of the Volta Region is (and has always been) sparsely populated as compared with the Ewe-dominated 'south', one can therefore conclude that the Ewes in the 'south' did not adequately patronise the plebiscite. If the Ewes in the 'south' did not adequately utilise their opportunity to decide for themselves, who is to blame?

On the same day, Andy K, also wrote:-

Here you are with a source. From D.E.K Amenumey (1986:18) we read:

"Meanwhile the fugitives settled at Kpodji (later named Glidzi), Zowla and Anfoin. They were not actually on the coast but beyond the lagoon. The chief of the Ga fugitives Ofori Nbiabia (Foli Bebe) who had joined the first band of fugitives paid court to the King of Tado. He secured the hand of a daughter of the King in marriage. Soon after the arrival of the Ga fugitives [in 1677, to be precise], a group of immigrants from Elmina (in the Gold Coast) led by Quarm Dessou went to settle on the beach to the west, some few kilometres from the Ga immigrants, at what became Anexo. Contacts developed between the two peoples with the result that they became fused. The Ga element however, predominated because of their numbers. The entire community came to be known locally as Ge, but "Mina" and "Popo" in European documents".

Among these Akan fugitives, the Anyis were obviously predominant since they also lent their name to the new state that was formed, that is, Genyi (Ga-Anyi, remember, Ewes say Ge for Ga. Why? I don't know). Other Akan fugitives settled among Ewes later and you'd read about them from pp.16-20. In fact, you'd even understand why the people of Tongu/Bator, where the trokosi is found, speaks that atrocious and funny Ewe.

Andy K,

The above quote from Amenumey 1986, as you can clearly see for yourself, does not mention the Anyi whom you claim (from your original post on 7/2/98) Ewes in Togoland have been descendent from. (Your quote is below to refresh your own memory). Neither does the Amenumey quote say that the "immigrants" from Elmina were Anyis. Nor is there any suggestion that those immigrants were Fantis.

"I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present Togo are

descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal strip to the West." -(Andy K :7/2/98).

And then you leave the quote alone, and start talking about "Akan fugitives, the Anyis" who helped to form a Ga-Anyi state. But there is no proof to indicate that the Anyis were from Fantiland or any Elmina for that matter. And then you continued to talk about "other Akan fugitives" (all outside the quote) who settled among Ewes. Although you have not proved that these "Akan fugitives" were Fantis or any Fantis from Elmina for that matter. You would realise that all the information you have given on 8/2/98, does not support you claim on 7/2/98 that the Anyis were Fantis who came from Elmina. I am afraid that your earlier mail was misinformative.

The "Ga" people earlier mentioned in Amenumey's quote (also known as the "La" or "Ga Boni" were Guans who migrated through Eweland before entering the Gold Coast because when they left Mossi territory in Northern Ghana, they wandered to Benin and had to retract to the Gold Coast. It was actually their wanderings through Benin that brought them into contact with Ewes. These Ga, La or Ga Boni people settled west of the mouth of the Volta and among the Kpesi aborigines and founded the towns of La Doku and La Badi under their leader Okpaolebi. These same Ga Boni people founded Accra together with the Ga Wo and Ga Masi (who also came with the Ga Boni from the Benin detour). A quarrel between the Ga Boni and the (Ga-Wo-and-Ga-Masi) caused a split and the Ga Boni people left to found the Late district and also part of the Akwapem district. -(Meyerowitz 1952:77-78).

The Kyerepon people, who also came from the same "Mossi territory" in Northern Ghana, just as the Ga Boni, also wandered through Benin before re-entering the Gold Coast. on entering the Gold Coast they settled in Nsawam near Accra, founded the town of Abotoase, and were later sacked by the Akwamu, as a result of which they moved on to found the Kyerepon and Akwapem States in the Kyerepon and Akwapem districts respectively. -(Ibid:78-79).

Andy K, you would realise that settlers in modern Ghana who had contact with Ewes as a result of passing through Benin settled in the Akwapem, Late, Accra and Kyerepon districts. They are/were nowhere near Elmina, neither were they Anyis. Again, I'm afraid your statement on 7/2/98 was misinformative.

Anyway, I only joined this debate to seek some clarifications which haven't been forth coming. I' gone now.

bye bye,
frisky.

From: CK Ladzekpo [ladzekpo@uclink4.berkeley.edu]
Sent: 08 February 1998 14:49
To: Kwadwo Boahene
Cc: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@datback.com'; Amoah,M
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

On Sun, 08 Feb 1998 08:55:52 -0500 Kwadwo Boahene wrote:

>If you want to know, a native Ghanaian is someone who lives in present day
>Ghana. Nothing more nothing less.

CK Ladzekpo's comment:

Thanks for your response. I do appreciate it. Your "ADF Repudiation Rule" analogy is interesting. It suggests some "us against them" theory. I do not think that analogy should apply in this case. Anything that has the potential of threatening the well being of our country, Ghana should receive a united attention of all Ghanaians. From that perspective, I made my enquiry.

I do not know if native Ghanaian, Steve Garbrah is serious with his opinion. If he is kidding, he should realise that, a child playing with matches is also capable of burning the house down.

Do you know what is interesting? It looks like it becomes a tradition on Okyeame that when we see something wrong, we do nothing about it until it is completely out of control. Then the faded calls for peace. Steve Garbrah had made a very irresponsible statement and everybody keeps quiet. As it is turning out, so many people disagree with him but are keeping quite. You disagree with him. Rev. Amoah also disagreed with him but at the same time trying to legitimize the statement as some intellectual discourse. I am very baffled by the "double talk" and "double standard". But anyway, let me take the opportunity to thank Rev. Amoah for his response and wish he could have been clearer like Kwadwo Boahene.

Thank once again.

CK Ladzekpo

>At 08:59 AM 2/7/98 +0000, you wrote:

>

>>Brother Kwadwo, what is your opinion on Steve Garbrah's position on who is
>>a native Ghanaian? In case you forgot what he wrote, here is a copy.

>>

>

>Under normal circumstances I would not have answered your question because
>of what I call the "ADF Repudiation Rule." This is where when anytime one
>black leader is accused of allegedly anti-semitism all other the black
>other leaders are asked to repudiate his actions. Well, the reserve though
>never happens. And I think we should not get to this ADF thing.

>If you want to know, a native Ghanaian is someone who lives in present day
>Ghana. Nothing more nothing less.

>

>Thanks,
>Kwadwo Boahene

>

>>On Fri, 06 Feb 1998 12:22:43 +1100, Steve Garbrah wrote:

>>>My definition of native Ghanaian is everybody expect people addmitted to

>>>Ghana by

>>>plebiscite:

From: Amoah, M [M.Amoah@LSE.AC.UK]
Sent: 09 February 1998 19:15
To: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@ataback.com'
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

On 8/2/98, Doe Ladzekpo wrote:-

> As it is turning out, so many people disagree with him but are keeping
> quite. You disagree with him. Rev. Amoah also disagreed with him but
> at
> the same time trying to legitimize the statement as some intellectual
> discourse. I am very baffled by the "double talk" and "double
> standard".
> But anyway, let me take the opportunity to thank Rev. Amoah for his
> response and wish he could have been clearer like Kwadwo Boahene.
>

Dear Doe Ladzekpo,

Please do not try to play some "politics" with who said this and that.

Your above statement that I "disagreed" with Steve Garbrah is false. I have never made any comment on Steve Garbrah's statement, so how can you implicate me of "legitimising" his statement? Netters are no babies, so you can't pull any wool over anyone's eyes with this one. I only entered the debate to seek some factual clarifications. That done I'm gone. BTW, in case you haven't scrutinised all the mails properly, the statistics I quoted were from Amenumey 1989. Andy K's quote (he claims) is from Amenumey 1986. The statistics I quoted from Amenumey is something he cannot lie about because those same statistics on the plebiscite are everywhere. If you have any disagreements about Amenumey (claiming that he is your cousin), his book and your claim that his book is not thorough and comprehensive enough, that is your business, and not mine. In any case I have not said that whatever Andy K said which is not in Amenumey's book is not true. I have simply asked him to cite his sources. Is that a problem for you? Finally as far as Trokosi is concerned, I presented facts that I came across. The issues I disagreed with in the Trokosi debate are specifically to do with the fact that the "explanations" brought forth to dispute the Ellis quote did not suffice, and therefore were fabrications. Period. If you want to dispute those facts, please review the sources and let your review be refereed. Thanks. Anyway, just to recap,. I only entered this debate to seek some clarifications, which have not been forthcoming. Very disappointing indeed! You can carry on the debate without me. Please do not politicise me around the debaters. Thank you.

frisky.

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 09 February 1998 01:48
To: Amoah,M; 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@datback.com'
Cc: Mark Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

Frisky,

It is obvious you are under very wrong impressions. I expect my single statement on "Anyis from present Fantiland" settling in present Togo Rep. not to make much sense to many but not to the extent it has confused you. Can you then tell me where the name Ge-nyi came from?

First, once again, you are trying to deny the obvious. I was not in the mood to engage in long quotes from books to support what I have known long ago before I first read it in any book. "Anyitorwo" is a designation which at least most Anlo-Ewes know. After all, the great great parents of some of us received them when they arrived as fugitives. Most Anyis, of course, escaped to the present Cote d'Ivoire following the Ashanti expansion. One thing I'd grant though is not all the "Akan" fugitives arriving from the Elmina/Fanti area or the whole of the Western Region could be identified as Anyis or Fantis, these entities also being mixed from origins. Indeed, the Denkyeras and Akims, among others, arrived at different periods to. Fanti fugitives who founded Anecho with the Gas were referred to as Adjigos. The Adjigo family, descendants of Quarm Desson, provided the chief in Anexo until rivalry with the much richer Lawson family led to civil war and their being driven out. See Amenumey p.24,86,90-93. See also W.K.A. Gaba: The history of Anecho (Aneho): Ancient and Modern, no date. Some people founded present Osu-Aneho (Anorhor) in Accra upon the return of some. I personally know many scions of the families involved in those ancient disputes. Some are indeed related by marriage.

I quoted in length how all this occurred, when and where they settled in my memorable first post on Okyeame, way back in 1994. Simple fact is I'm not in the mood to type out all that stuff. You've one ref. And there are others. Sandra E. Greene (1995) for example.

As for your spin on the Gas, made me laugh! Look! They are all over in my family (nuclear and extended), town and clan! I have 3 sisters, 2 got married to Ewes of Ga extraction, one to a Yoruba born and bred in Keta. You don't mean you know their own history than them?

When you ever go to Anloga, ask to be shown the area known as Lashibi. Ask to speak to Amega Le (La), Mr Tettey in private life.

BTW, I am just reading through a Ga-Adangbe history from Gilbert Addy in order to comment on it from a position of knowledge before he puts it on his web site.

I haven't seem anything about Mossi yet.:-) The last known place of settlement before the Gas moved to present Ghana was Nigeria! I make no claims to be an expert on Ga history but I'd know a spin when I see one!

As for the plebiscite, it was not confined to the present VR. I wrote that it did not take place in the populous British Togoland, which was part of the Gold coast proper. Had that been the case, it'd be a clear win for the separation and then union later position of most Ewes. Then, you seem to miss what I said about the extent of the former Mandated TVT where the voting took place. Portions have been added to the present Eastern,

Northern and Upper East! It is the remnant which has been added to the Ewe part of the Eastern Province of the colony, with headqtrs at Dodowa, to form the present VR. The Mamprusi area of the UER and Dagbon area around Yendi were/are also heavily populated, and non-Ewe. It was only the slave raiding areas of the TVT that was depopulated. As for the distribution of the ballot, I have to cross-check for myself.

I do not want to enter into any long drawn exchanges on these matters and is thus brief in what I write. Naturally, you'd find plenty to write about as my not proving what I say, as if even quotes may make any difference.

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

At 17:09 08.02.98 -0000, Amoah,M wrote:

>On 8/2/98, Andy K wrote:-

>*****

>The figures you presented obviously represent the totals, and even

>though I was trying to remember from 20 yrs ago, I still think George Padmore

>presented different figures. When I wrote, I was thinking of the votes

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 07 February 1998 23:22
To: Mark Opoku-Adusei
Cc: CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

>On Fri, 6 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote:

>

>> Mark,

>> That Aliens Compliance Order was a mean one and shoddily implemented. No
>> grounds to excuse it.

Marc responded

>Well, if you talk about the implementation of it I may agree with you

>but the fact still remains that the order was necessary in these

>modern times as we are no more nomads.

Andy responds

What modern times in the late 60s? Haven't you heard the Europeans had already formed EU by then, with aim to remove border restrictions, and visa requirements have now been removed for members? Heard of the Schengen Agreement before you left Germany?

Marc writes

>It's good that you're not worried for you are surely a Ghanaian!

Man! I don't need you to tell me I am a Ghanaian. My grandparents built up Ghana from scratch, sacrificing personal and the family wealth to do so. I had already written yesterday in another post some of us were part of the Gold Coast before Yaa Asantewaa led your part of Ghana to another and the final capitulation. By even then, as we historians know, no "brave" men could be found to lead the field.:-)

They took seriously the warning of Nana Krachi Dente to make stout sandals and run for dear life in the previous encounter.:-)

>Time has to tell when you, not a long ago, implicated that you know
>my roots. By the way, my great grandpa, Nana Tutu, was born in the
>confines of the present-day Ghana. I hope I have now answered your
>query.

Know your roots? Of course, I know where you are coming from. But your "ahenfie"? that's another question. That your forebear was born within the confines of present-day Ghana does not mean much to me. Whether they were born in Nigeria or Guinea a 200 years ago is not important! My position is that some and their parents were also born within the confines of present-day Ghana before independence and therefore qualified for automatic citizenship! They should not have been ordered out!!!!!!!!!!!!!! HEAR THAT NOW???????????

>> Anyway, it'd be sheer waste of time for me to type out CMB reports of how
>> devastating the Order was on the cocoa industry, for instance.

You wrote

>Well, can the farm labourers be classified as modern-time slaves? You
>are an expert on slavery so let me hear more on that.

I don't know what you mean by "modern-times slaves". What I know is that the cash crops farms such as palm oil, rubber, groundnuts, cotton and cocoa in West Africa were established with largely slave labour. Both African landlords and the European settlers were involved. But then there was a lot of free labour later, when the slave trade was abolished and suppressed by the colonialists. Many ex-slaves, however, remained on their former masters' farms on share-cropping basis, just as happened in the Americas too. Same applies to pastoral societies too. Reports abound of the parlous conditions such people were living in certain parts of Africa well into the 1930s. This slavery-based economy was finally disrupted by WW11. WW1 had also caused a lot of disruption to the use of slave labour, as the colonialists needed the labour for their own use and war efforts. BTW, why is it so difficult for you to know some of these things from your own backyard, i.e, ahenfie? OK, I think I know. Not even some inner circle Ewes know that some Ewe villages were actually settlements for slaves for some powerful families/clans/chiefs. Same applies to your end too. Taboo subject, eh?

Let me give you a few refs.:

1. Allan and Humphrey Fisher (1970) Slavery and Muslim In Africa detailed the use of slaves in much of Africa well into this century.
2. William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Cocoa Plantations and Coerced Labor in the Gulf of Guinea, 1870-1914, in Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage, and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia, ed. by Martin Klein, The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1993. There are other contributions in it which will make you relax about African slavery. Do you know that India was having more slaves than the Americas combined? Of course, many came from Africa, thanks to the Arab-Swahili/Turkish Ottoman empire!!!

Closer to home, Claire Robertson's in a contribution titled "Post-Proclamation Abolition and Slavery in Accra: A Women Affair?(hope I get the title right), in Women and Slavery in Africa, eds. Claire Robertson and Martin Klein, etc., etc. wrote of how slaves were still being sold in the first decades of this century for the cocoa farms. In fact, process fell, she claim, due to the earlier raids of Samori and Babatu in the north and beyond.

I guess I have said enough. Go and find out for yourself. Also, those who do not understand how slavery still impact on our efforts at development in many spheres of life should go read for themselves.

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas.ucla.edu]
Sent: 08 February 1998 00:34
To: Andy Kwawukume
Cc: CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

On Sun, 8 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote:

- > Andy responds
- > What modern times in the late 60s? Haven't you heard the Europeans had
- > already formed EU by then, with aim to remove border restrictions, and visa
- > requirements have now been removed for members? Heard of the Schengen
- > Agreement before you left Germany?

You seem to be losing the logic in this argument and I think I have to reiterate it here. Free movement of people, goods and services within a particular region and among a group of countries occur when there is a mutual agreement to that effect. Until that agreement comes into effect, every country has the right as regard to controls at their borders including issues on citizenry. Before the EU was born in late 1950s one could not live anywhere without the necessary papers. Even most of the restrictions were lifted only last two years or so when the Scheninger Agreement was signed. It took the Europeans at least four decades to conclude such an uniformity.

And now, we had Ghana where there were no official guidelines regarding identity whilst our neighbours were clinging to theirs. So what kinda a country was that? Could we even draw economic policies whilst certain info are even lacking. The order did not mean to expel the 'aliens' but to get them documented. Every alien had the opportunity to apply for resident permit. In Africa, before the official interpretation of laws get to the masses, it will have already gone sour and misinterpreted just as the Alien Compliance Order. If your ancestors had lived on the land for centuries, you had every right to claim your Ghanaian citizenship.

This is the gist of the whole matter and I don't understand your difficulty in seeing this too. Most of the time you don't sit down to gather the facts before you go amok.
The Alien Compliance Order did not state that if we had a West African Union, aliens should seek for visas, work permit etc.

- > Man! I don't need you to tell me I am a Ghanaian. My grandparents built up
- > Ghana from scratch, sacrificing personal and the family wealth to do so. I
- > had already written yesterday in another post some of us were part of the
- > Gold Coast before Yaa Asantewaa led your part of Ghana to another and the
- > final capitulation.

So what is the basis of your furry here?. Have I said you are not a Ghanaian?. I will not write the above statements if you tell me I'm a Ghanaian. By your statements, you are trying to prove that you are a Ghanaian. Someone who believes he is not a Ghanaian would write such statements.

- > My position is
- > that some and their parents were also born within the confines of
- > present-day Ghana before independence and therefore qualified for automatic
- > citizenship! They should not have been ordered out!!!!!!!!!!!!!! HEAR THAT
- > NOW??????????

Who told you the Alien Compliance Order disqualified such group of people (West Africans as you've characterised above) of citizenship whilst even people from India, Pakistan, Lebanon Syria etc, etc. were enjoying citizenship?. Boy, get your facts well before you engage in an argument of this sort.
The Sain

From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas.ucla.edu]
Sent: 09 February 1998 00:04
To: Andy Kwawukume
Cc: CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Andy,
I have made my points very clear to you and you can verify the facts. The Alien Compliance Order was necessary in all aspects and people who argue against it either do it out of political reasons or they are not very sure of their citizenry. Period! Happy Sunday.
The Saint

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 09 February 1998 02:38
To: Mark Opoku-Adusei
Cc: CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

At 16:03 08.02.98 -0800, Mark Opoku-Adusei wrote:

>

>Andy,

>I have made my points very clear to you and you can verify the
>facts. The Alien Compliance Order was necessary in all aspects
>and people who argue against it either do it out of political reasons
>or they are not very sure of their citizenry. Period! Happy Sunday.
>The Saint

Mark,

I am arguing against the ACO on political, social and economic grounds. It is against all my Pan-African perspectives.

As for your insinuation about not being sure about citizenry, that tickles me as an Anlo-Ewe with my own tuft within the Gold Coast colony before Agyeman Prempeh 1 was deported to the Seychelles! Nothing to be proud of, that's, becoming a colonised people, btw. Perhaps that is why the missionaries only gained access to Anloga in 1913, and full co-operation became possible only after the Awoamefia Torgbi Sri II, aka Cornelius Kwawukume, was promised and later appointed into the Legislative Council in 1916. Yeah! We got representation first among all the people and chiefs of present Ghana! Just watch me stage a comeback. I know where I come and where I am going, man! The country has gone to the dogs since our grandfathers went on retirement, and people without any experience or memories acquired from their ancestors have taken over the realms of office. Their book knowledge is also faulty, riddled with big holes!

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Mark Opoku-Adusei [opokuadu@seas.ucla.edu]
Sent: 09 February 1998 18:42
To: Andy Kwawukume
Cc: CpCoaster@aol.com; okyeame@mit.edu; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

On Mon, 9 Feb 1998, Andy Kwawukume wrote:

- > The country has gone to the dogs since our
- > grandfathers went on retirement, and people without any experience or
- > memories acquired from their ancestors have taken over the realms of
- > office. Their book knowledge is also faulty, riddled with big holes!
- >
- > Andy Kwawukume
- > Norway

Heheheeeee, who are the dogs?.. The Aggreys, Danquahs, Nkrumahs and the Busias? Is Rawlings among the doggees?

From: Amoah, M [M.Amoah@LSE.AC.UK]
Sent: 09 February 1998 19:35
To: 'opokuadu@seas.ecla.edu'
Cc: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@datback.com';
CpCoaster@aol.com; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: RE: African Politics? No Wings?

> Frisky,
> You have really educated Andy. I thought he was indeed a 'pope' in his
> own area, history, but now I will never take his polluted history
> stuffs seriously. I will take time to research into all his citations
> at the ucla library to prove their authenticity. Happy Sunday.
> The Saint

Hahahahaaaaaaa The Saint,

If you want to cross-check all of Andy K's "citations", you have a lot of surprises to meet. Happy hunting! You'll be lucky if he "cites" fully though. I'm not sure you want to grope around reading a whole book just because And K said it was there. You might not find it! And if there is something there it might not be about what he meant to say! "Researching" into Andy K's "citations" is a whole research career in itself. Good luck with your findings

cheers,
frisky.

From: Doe Ladzekpo [doe@hia.net]
Sent: 09 February 1998 10:49
To: Amoah,M
Cc: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@ataback.com'; Mark
Opoku-Adusei; CpCoaster@aol.com; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Amoah,M wrote:

> Andy K,
> The above quote from Amenumey 1986, as you can clearly see for
> yourself, does not mention the Anyi whom you claim (from your original
> post on 7/2/98) Ewes in Togoland have been descendent from. (Your quote
> is below to refresh your own memory). Neither does the Amenumey quote
> say that the "immigrants" from Elmina were Anyis. Nor is there any
> suggestion that those immigrants were Fantis.
> *****
> "I am sure he is not aware that some of those Ewes in present
> Togo are
> descendants of Anyis from present Fantiland, who escaped to seek
> refuge among Ewes when the Ashantis took over Elmina and the coastal
> strip to the West." -(Andy K :7/2/98).
> *****
> And then you leave the quote alone, and start talking about
> "Akan fugitives, the Anyis" who helped to form a Ga-Anyi state. But
> there is no proof to indicate that the Anyis were from Fantiland or any
> Elmina for that matter. And then you continued to talk about "other Akan
> fugitives" (all outside the quote) who settled among Ewes. Although you
> have not proved that these "Akan fugitives" were Fantis or any Fantis
> from Elmina for that matter. You would realise that all the information
> you have given on 8/2/98, does not support you claim on 7/2/98 that the
> Anyis were Fantis who came from Elmina. I am afraid that your earlier
> mail was misinformative.....
>bye bye,
> frisky.

Hi Frisky,

Let me state up front that I have not read Amenumey's book. The quotes by you and Andy from Amenumey shows it is a very interesting piece to read. Amenumey is my cousin and we grew up, though at different periods, in the Anya family compound at Anyako where the elders often, as they still do today, gathered the little ones around and recount to us the ancestral oral history of the Ewes and their neighbours as it was told them by their parents and grand parents. I believe Mr. Amenumey did further studies to collect more information to add to what we were told in childhood. The backdrop, however, is likely to be loaded with the oral history just as Andy's grand parents would have impacted to their children with a few differences here and there.

I spent a lot of time in Anexo, in Togo and heard a lot more information from the people of Togo about their relationship to the Ge (Ga) people of Ghana. I will not write all of it in a book. Some will amount to digging dirt on a neighbour when we have no way of checking the validity of some of these stories.

My caution to all of us is this. We just went through a nerve raking "dirt digging" process of half truths on the Trokosi issue. Frisky, there were issues around Trokosi you quoted from a few books and often checked everybody's comments against those "facts" you read and verhemently condemned others' explanations as lies or untrue statements just because they are not in the books you read. Unfortunately we may be seeing the beginning of another one: - "The Togo Ewe & Ga Relationship" as you start to insist that whatever Andy said which is not in Amenumey's book must be untrue. Believe me, Amenumey would leave out some issues, especially if he feels he can still deliver his message wighout dabbling into the imotional ones that he cannot prove.

Doe

From: Andy Kwawukume [akwawukume@usa.net]
Sent: 10 February 1998 03:17
To: doe@hia.net; Amoah,M
Cc: okyeame; africa_think_tank; radom@cam.gradcorp.com
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

At 02:49 09.02.98 -0800, Doe Ladzekpo wrote:

cut, cut

>I spent a lot of time in Anexo, in Togo and heard a lot more information
>from the people of Togo about their relationship to the Ge (Ga) people
>of Ghana. I will not write all of it in a book. Some will amount to
>digging dirt on a neighbour when we have no way of checking the validity
>of some of these stories.

Doe, you could not say it better! When I wrote my last post, I had to edit and cut out some names of families I knew. Not only that, I had to re-write the stuff in a more neutral and balanced manner, so that none of the families mentioned take offence should my post get to their notice. Fact is, there are conflicting versions of almost everything that happened in history. Amenumey presented both or triple, versions of the stories as best as he could, but we know each side sticks to their version. Moreover, Amenumey is neither the original source nor only source available on many of the things he wrote on. Same applies to the other authors too. It is dangerous to take sides, especially if you come from the area, as some of us do. I simply do not have the energy to represent all sides and hence give only the ref. and pages for anyone seriously interested to find out for him/herself.

Of course, when I am sure of a story, I stick out my neck and defend the position. That is what I did after quoting at length Newman's (1995) on Nubia. If we can even well-researched fault books written by scholars barely three years ago, how much more books written by common travelers and adventurers on Africa over a century ago? Of course, Frisky believes their fictions as "facts"!

His spin on the Gas in Eweland is one of the funniest I have read. We all have funny stories of origins, mind you! I thought the Gas claiming they came from the sea and th Akans from a hole were funny enough! Of course, historians will say they only mean they came by sea, (not from it), and from a cave respectively! Frisky's spin lack even simple logic: no, it was the Guans who settled in Benin among the Ewes, and then went to La, etc. So where did Gas come from in the first place? Were they always in present Ghana? What about the accepted presence in Nigeria? And when did the Guans moved in and moved out? BTW, Ewes moved there (Benin) as immigrants barely 800 years ago, according to the more reliable sources. Why go and quote unreliable and discredited sources as "facts" when the exact years of the flight of the Gas, Fantis and other Akans into Eweland are recorded history, not word of mouth (oral) history alone? Heard before how the Gas circumcised the Akwamu Prince and heir apparent, Akonnor, who was sent to them to be trained as a merchant? I have written about this more than once on Okyeame. It is enough!

Frisky, for your info, my wife's ancestors also came from the Fanti immigrant stocks. She therefore belongs to the "Eblu" clan, while I myself belong to the 5 Star Adzovia clan. The funny thing is that my kids become Adzovia automatically, while that of my sisters become Eblu clan members because of marriage to "Eblu" clan members. Their children must therefore observe Ga-Adangbe customs and are deprived of certain privileges! Stupid! Isn't it? That's why our grandfathers and fathers have been trying to erase this clan thing and we must continue it. Read Sandra Greene (1995) for the absurdities of clannishness, and how the ethnic outsiders in the Anlo area try to avoid it or cope with it. She has done a good job but as an insider, I can tell where she stretched her analytical ability to explain what no one is willing to or can volunteer sensitive information to her, being an outsider. Shouldn't we be allowed to keep some state secrets from even prying historians forever? No? Or Yes? Since I am an interested party, I don't think I can preside over these cases.

I have said enough for today.

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

From: Doe Ladzekpo [doe@hia.net]
Sent: 10 February 1998 08:03
To: Amoah,M
Cc: 'okyeame@mit.edu'; 'africa_think_tank@ataback.com'
Subject: Re: African Politics? No Wings?

Rev. Amoah,

I wish I know a way to tell you how to debate without sounding so nauseating. Unfortunately I don't. One thing very important to me, however, is that whatever you would enclose in quotes and assign my name to it, please make sure you are indeed quoting me but not someone else or from your imagination. You could take your time and read with some comprehension first, then you put your pen to paper. Most people do just that.

Doe

>
> Dear Doe Ladzekpo,
> Please do not try to play some "politics" with who said this and
> that.
> Your above statement that I "disagreed" with Steve Garbrah is
> false. I have never made any comment on Steve Garbrah's statement, so
> how can you implicate me of "legitimising" his statement? Netters are no
> babies, so you can't pull any wool over anyone's eyes with this one. I
> only entered the debate to seek some factual clarifications. That done
> I'm gone. BTW, in case you haven't scrutinised all the mails properly,
> the statistics I quoted were from Amenumey 1989. Andy K's quote (he
> claims) is from Amenumey 1986. The statistics I quoted from Amenumey is
> something he cannot lie about because those same statistics on the
> plebiscite are everywhere. If you have any disagreements about Amenumey
> (claiming that he is your cousin), his book and your claim that his book
> is not thorough and comprehensive enough, that is your business, and not
> mine.

Doe's Reply:

Rev. Amoah,

I hope this is just a joke and that you are not telling us with any seriousness that this is your understanding of the English I wrote when I said "I believe Amenumey did further studies to collect more information to add to what we were told in childhood". Man, you've been doing a damn good job cock-screwing your own intelligence in your quest and effort to find and sling cheap shots at people. It really marvels me why a Rev. will take the paths you do. May be one day I will learn.

Doe

In any case I have not said that whatever Andy K said which is not
> in Amenumey's book is not true. I have simply asked him to cite his
> sources. Is that a problem for you? Finally as far as Trokosi is
> concerned, I presented facts that I came across. The issues I disagreed
> with in the Trokosi debate are specifically to do with the fact that the
> "explanations" brought forth to dispute the Ellis quote did not suffice,
> and therefore were fabrications. Period. If you want to dispute those

> facts, please review the sources and let your review be refereed.
> Thanks. Anyway, just to recap,. I only entered this debate to seek some
> clarifications, which have not been forthcoming. Very disappointing
> indeed! You can carry on the debate without me. Please do not politicise
> me around the debaters. Thank you.
>
> frisky.

From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb.alexia.net.au]
Sent: 23 June 1998 08:56
To: Andy Kwawukume
Cc: paul qyartey; Okyeame@africaonline.com
Subject: Re: Tribal Conspiracy at Wesley College?

In reply to Andy-k's mail (this time I will write more than my usual few lines-
will try to be Gentle for only today)

It looks as if only a few of us using the forums are strong enough to stand up to Andy-k and his one-sided comments. Andy-k is pretending to be non-tribal, but his true affiliations come out very clearly in his writing. It is becoming more and more obvious to all of us that Andy-k and his associates are ANTI Ashanti and ANTI Akan. It would indeed be hard for him to prove otherwise. The 'tone' of his comments 'speak' the anger and hatred in his heart towards the Ashantis. How can I tolerate this abuse being thrown in the direction of the feet of Ashantis and Akan? Nana Yaa Asantewaa stood against the British. <http://www.ashanti.com.au/nana.htm>

Let me recall what happened to me when I visited Amsterdam (Holland) for the first time. At the Central Station I met a Ghanaian, who offered me assistance and invited me to his house, as I was new to the city. What a humane gesture, to offer help to a stranger in a new country. I was highly taken up by his generosity. But at his house one of the questions he asked was "which part of Ghana are you from?" I was happy to tell my fellow countrymen that I was from Akan Tribe. His immediate next question was to ask me what I did do when Victor Owusu insulted Ewes. I didn't know what he was talking about. I was only young then. So, I said I didn't say or do anything. The next minute he told me to get my bags and leave his house. He virtually kicked me out. Why? Maybe because I was young and didn't share his views? That is how the Ewe guy behaved.

When I listen to Andy-k I can feel the same attitude. I 'know' he would treat any Akan the same way.. Where is the trust among us? If an Ewe gets in to a position of power, he will select and appoint fellow Ewes all around him. (EXECTIVE CLUB) This is not because he is tribalistic, but because he doesn't trust anyone other than a fellow Ewe. This must change. **UNITED WE STAND, ONE NATION ONE PEOPLE**

You may remember when they closed the border with Togo at Aflao, only those who could speak Ewe, Just say the magic word "yen Bro"(something like that) and they will allow you to cross. No one speaking Twi was able to cross the border. I witnessed this. That says a lot about the Ewes attitude towards the Akan.

Now more and more people in Ghana and on OKYEAME are afraid to speak out. As countless lies are added, the truth is being distorted. We don't share this hatred and bad attitude towards others. I know who I am and what I stand for. But Andy-k doesn't. I have helped and still continue to help more Ewes than Andy-k has ever done. At the moment I am helping an Ewe that his own people from Eweland doesn't even want to know of. (If you want to know more about this boy write to me privately and I will tell you his story). I don't care about the tribe you belong to but if you do the 'right' thing you will always get my support.

I will continue to fight the kind of bigotry and stupidity displayed by Andy-k and his

associates, who spread lies around the world about the Ashanti and Akan. Andy-k's command of English or number of letters behind his name (BA's, MA's etc) is not going to make him sound like the good and honest man he is pretending to be. If anyone questions Ewe Andy-k is ready to jump to the defence (even 'kill' for). There are many things about Ewes I would like to know but Andy-K will labell me trabalistic, Ask any question about Asanteman, Any Ashanti will be only willing to explain, without jumping in to conclusions and distorting the truth? Show us your true colours Andy-k, I know what Andy-K stand for.

Hon Members of Okyeame understand and will not to be influenced by the command of Andy-K's English.

Let me remind you Andy-K, the British won the Ashanti war, but they could not win the control of the Sika Dwa Kofi. They could not defeat the sprit of the Ashantis.

ANDY-K I CAN DRIVE YOU MAD.

STEVE
"KANEWO

Andy Kwawukume wrote:

Steve,

As you can see, I normally delete superfluous post (previous mail) from mails when responding. I simply did same to yours. I did not delete any of yours. Why should I? Thanks for more of your idiotic poor stuff, anyway. Just showing everybody what we have to deal with. I advise all those who are writing to find fault in what I write to concentrate their energies on the like of Steve, or they'd be FORCED to read and hear unpleasant things from me too. That much is guaranteed! Tit for tat, and a bit more to choke on!

Andy Kwawukume
Norway

At 18:08 20.06.1998 +1000, Steve Garbrah wrote:
>>>>

Andy-k

why didnt you post the whole mail instead of my reply to your good DOCTOR?

I always replied according to the tone of your stupid mail. I refuse to be what you want me to be, To me you are Number one Bigot, and all your associates are fools. I have no respect for you and your crew. I'm glad to know that you have discovered your tribal roots which is Togo. Let me tell you Steve comes from Ghana not Togo. "who the cup fit"

Have a nice weekend.

Steve (KANEWO)

From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@ashanti.com.au]
Sent: 20 August 1999 11:29
To: csucc@ghana.com
Cc: Okyeame@mit.edu
Subject: Re: a lost pal testing

MS

Na who you the call trouble maker? Oga you thing say you fi hide?
na lie, We day as if we no day, Andy-K "Your buddy" don run.
Nice to know you are doing well, I hope your are putting your ideas into
action
you seems to have thousands of ideas (I hope they are not dead) Ghana
need you.

cheers
Steve G.

csucc@ghana.com wrote:

- > Hi folks
- > This is an anonymous message to some folks. You know yourselves so
- > please write back. Just to tell you I am alive and kicking. I miss
- > you all...Magic feet you dey, Azar you dey, Abuzzena you dey,
- > Kadzilla you dey, Buchii you dey, Cape Coaster now in Ghana you dey,
- > AndyK how is your new abode, pal Bodome, Ewuraba Ketsiina, Roxxi are
- > are you still alive, Eric Yankah I miss you pal, Mawuli Tse you dey,
- > sister Theresa good morning from home, Ash fighter marc Edusei-Poku
- > how be, Yaw Ahenkorah how be...still lashing our indefatigable, hard
- > working first lady, what about that trouble causer in
- > Australia...whatshisname? My political opponets, K. Danso and the
- > Prof himself. Prof thanks so much for the ride last time around in
- > that heavy downpour (don't break the code to anybody o.k?) I got
- > home safely. I hope you have all been of good behaviour, moral
- > uprightness, and no fights on the net. I got to go home. Those
- > that I have failed to mention...not that I love you less but simply I
- > am just tired after a hard days work. Next time o.k.
- >
- > I have just had a great meal of groundnut soup, fufu and
- > grasscutter soup. I can't stand light soup. Of course after the meal
- > I washed it down with a giant bottle of Star Beer. The best beer I
- > tell you. Who says enjoyment no dey for here. Sure enjoyment but no
- > bread, or dough or sika but we dey.
- >
- > Mr. Anonymous

From: Steve Garbrah [sgarbrah@melb.alexia.net.au]
Sent: 24 August 1999 12:28
To: Amoah,M (ex)
Subject: Re: a lost pal testing

Frisky

Another TvT Mawuli sallar

Cheers
Steve

-----Original Message-----

From: Amoah,M (ex) <M.Amoah@lse.ac.uk>
To: 'Steve Garbrah' <sgarbrah@ashanti.com.au>
Date: Monday, 23 August 1999 10:30
Subject: RE: a lost pal testing

>Hi Steve,
>
>who is <csucc@ghana.com>. please fill me in.
>
>thanks,
>frisky
>

APPENDIX VIII

1996 ELECTION RESULTS:

Presidential Votes By Candidate And Region:

region	rawlings	%	kufour	%	mahama	%
Ashanti	412, 475	32.8	827, 821	65.8	17, 736	1.4
B-Ahafo	395, 382	61.7	230, 457	36	14, 635	2.3
Central	313, 386	55.7	241, 542	42.9	7, 995	1.4
Eastern	459, 090	53.8	384, 597	45	10, 251	1.2
G-Accra	658, 826	54	528, 484	43.3	32, 723	2.7
Northern	370, 330	62.1	190, 621	32	35, 318	5.9
U-East	230, 791	69	54, 041	17.4	45, 696	13.7
U-West	145, 812	74.6	21, 871	11.2	27, 754	14.2
Volta	690, 421	94.5	34, 538	4.7	5, 292	0.8
Western	405, 992	57.3	289, 730	40.9	12, 862	1.8
TOTAL	4, 099, 760	57.4	2, 825, 715	39.6	219, 980	3

Parliamentary seats of Main Parties by Region:

region	ndc	npp	pcp	pnc
Ashanti	5	28	0	0
B-Ahafo	17	4	0	0
Central	14	3	0	0
Eastern	15	11	0	0
G-Accra	13	9	0	0
Northern	18	3	1	1
U-East	12	0	0	0
U-West	8	0	0	0
Volta	19	0	0	0
Western	12	3	4	0
TOTAL	133	61	5	1

APPENDIX IX

INTERVIEW WITH TEMA MP:

The unstructured interview with the MP for Tema, Mr Ossei Aidoo, a lawyer by profession, yielded a very interesting view regarding what he figured was the source and nature of the ethno-rivalry in mainstream politics. Mr Aidoo is an MP for the NPP, which is generally viewed as being Akan or Ashanti dominated. He is himself an Ashanti. I met him at the famous Big Base restaurant in Tema which he frequented. His answer to one of my questions posited the view that Ewes do not join Akan-dominated parties because Ewes in general are not open. Below is an excerpt from the interview.

Question: ‘It is common to hear that the Opposition NPP is Ashanti dominated, and the NDC is Ewe dominated, and generally Ashantis should support the NPP whereas Ewes should support the NDC. Having observed the exceptions to the rule, it is noticeable that more Ashantis have freely joined the NDC than more Ewes would join the NPP. Even in Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti, you find that a substantial percentage voted for the NDC in the 1996 elections, whereas in the Ewe Volta Region 94.5% of votes were cast in favour of the NDC. It seems clear that a comparatively greater number of Ashantis identify with the NDC than Ewes would identify with the NPP. Would you attribute this phenomenon to the NDC being more open to other tribes than the NPP?’

Answer: 'No. The answer to your question is this: Ashantis are more open, liberal and enterprising. That is why Ashantis are free to join other parties which are not Ashanti-led or Ashanti-dominated, and would not face any persecution from fellow Ashantis. However, Ewes would not freely join any party which has the history of Akan origins or even Akan leadership because they would be persecuted for doing so by fellow Ewes. Many people claim that Ashantis are generally rich, loud and are braggarts by attitude. However, I would say that Ashanti culture is more liberating and allows freedom of expression, association and enterprise. It is this free, enterprising spirit of embarking on challenges which has made Ashantis more successful and loud. It is unfortunate that any negativity should be associated with this. I think it is prejudicial. I understand that your research is seeking to investigate the role of tribalism in Ghanaian politics and any associated tribal patterns. Contrary to the usual and common views which people would have about tribes and politics in Ghana, I would like to stress that in your analysis, you make the distinction clear that, Ashantis are more open, more embracing and more liberal. Also, Ashanti culture embraces and encourages dissent, freedom of speech and of association. This is why we can condone division within our camp. Also, this is why you would notice that Ashantis are freer to join other parties not controlled by their tribe, for example the NDC, whereas Ewes would generally not want to affiliate or identify with the NPP for reasons best known to themselves'.

INTERVIEWER'S COMMENT:

In his explanation, the Tema MP gives the impression that Ashantis are open to other tribes. However, this view is not shared by many people in Ghana. Contrary to the attribution of openness, the perception (whether right or wrong) is widespread that the NPP is Ashanti-dominated, and an open secret exists that one has to be at least Akan in order to be the party's flagbearer. Despite the representation of other tribes in the party's hierarchy, the Akan lobby remains strongest.

APPENDIX X

Section (a) - BASIC BACKGROUND

(1). What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

(2). How old are you?

1. 0-16
2. 17-30
3. 31-40
4. 41-50
5. 51-60
6. 61-70
7. 71-80
8. 81-90
9. 91-100

(3). What is your tribe?

1. Fanti
2. Ashanti
3. Akyem
4. Akwapim
5. Bono
6. Ga/Adangbe
7. Nzima
8. Bolga
9. Dagomba
10. Dagaaba
11. Gurenne
12. Mampruli
13. Gonja
14. Hausa
15. Ewe

(4). What is your occupation?

1. Unskilled
2. Semi-skilled
3. Skilled
4. Clerical
5. Administrative
6. Managerial
7. Professional
8. Specialist
9. Pensioner
10. Student

(5). What is your level of education?

1. primary
2. secondary
3. tertiary

Section (b) - POLITICAL ORIENTATION

(6). What is the traditional party orientation of your family?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none

(7). What has been the traditional party orientation of yourself?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none

(8). What is your current party orientation?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none

(9). What is the party of the MP you voted for in the 1996 Parliamentary elections?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. none
6. not eligible

(10). Which Presidential candidate did you vote for in the 1996 Presidential elections?

1. Rawlings
2. Kufour
3. Mahama
4. None
5. Ineligible

(11). What would be the party of your choice MP in the 2000 Parliamentary elections?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible
8. undecided

(12). Which Presidential candidate would you vote for in the 2000 Presidential elections?

1. Atta Mills
2. Kufour
3. Tanor
4. Other
5. None
6. Ineligible
7. Undecided

Section (c) - INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS

(13). Are you a registered voter?

1. yes
2. no

(14). If No, why are you not registered?

1. Ineligible or under 18 currently
2. I support no particular party or candidate
3. I am not interested in politics
4. N/A

(15). Are you a registered member of any party?

1. Yes
2. No

(16). If Yes, which party?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. other
5. N/A

(17). If No, why are you not a registered member of any party?

1. lack of pre-requisite resources to become a registered member of any party
2. disinterested/disillusioned about the parties and politics for whatever reason
3. no apparent reason
4. N/A

(18). What is your level of party political participation?

1. local
2. district
3. national
4. all of the above
5. none of the above

(19). How do you familiarise yourself with the politics?

1. attend political rallies and meetings
2. follow the agenda of parties from the media
3. all of the above
4. none of the above

Section (d) – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

(20). Do you freely share your political opinions/views with everyone?

1. Yes
2. No

(21). If No, please state confidants and preference order:-

1. spouse
2. close family members
3. friends and peers
4. distant relatives
5. no one at all
6. N/A

Section (e) - TENTATIVE VOTES - PRESSURE OR PREVAILING FACTORS

(22). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the NDC?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. “nkrumahists”
4. “new ndc”
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(23). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the NPP?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahists"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(24). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the "nkrumahist" coalition?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(25). How would you vote if there is a major public endorsement of the "new ndc"?

1. ndc
2. npp
3. "nkrumahist"
4. "new ndc"
5. other
6. none
7. not eligible

(26). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Fanti?

1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(27). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is an Ashanti?

1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(28). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is an Ewe?

1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(29). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Ga?

1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

(30). How would you vote if a Presidential candidate is a Mabian/Northerner?

1. For
2. Against
3. Abstain
4. Not eligible

Section (f) - URBANISED/DETRIBALISED?

(31). Do you live in Tema?

1. Yes
2. No

(32). If Yes, during which time period?

1. 1961-1990
2. post 1990
3. both
4. N/A

(33). If No, are you a

1. visitor?
2. job-seeker?
3. student?
4. N/A

(34). For how long have you lived in Tema?

1. 0-3 months
2. 4-12 months
3. 1-3 years
4. 4-10 years
5. Over 10 years
6. N/A

(35). Have you lived in another city before?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure

(36). If Yes, which one?

1. Accra
2. Tema
3. Kumasi
4. Tamale
5. Bolgatanga
6. Wa
7. Sunyani
8. Koforidua
9. Takoradi
10. Cape-Coast
11. Ho
12. Combination
13. N/A

(37). Have you always lived in a city?

1. Yes
2. No

(38). If No, state how long you've lived in a village/town prior to city life:

1. 0-3 months
2. 4-12 months
3. 1-3 years
4. 4-10 years
5. Over 10 years
6. N/A

(39). Do you visit your relatives?

1. yes
2. no

(40). If Yes, do they live in:-

1. urban areas?
2. rural areas?
3. Both?
4. N/A

(41). If no, why do you not visit them?

1. they visit me
2. not necessary
3. at loggerheads with relatives
4. too expensive to travel
5. e-mail usage
6. aim towards detribalisation
7. detribalised
8. N/A

(42). Do you write to relatives? - (snail mail)

1. Yes
2. No

(43). If Yes, how often?

1. once a month
2. once a year
3. once every 3-5 years
4. once every 10 years
5. N/A

(44). If No, why do you not write to them? - (snail mail)

1. they write to me - (snail mail)
2. not necessary
3. preference for physical contact
4. letter writing is boring and tedious
5. lack of postal services in the village
6. snail mail postage too expensive
7. e-mail usage
8. aim towards detribalisation
9. detribalised
10. N/A

(45). Do you telephone relatives?

1. Yes
2. No

(46). If yes, how often?

1. daily
2. once a week
3. once a month
4. once a quarter
5. once a year
6. only during emergencies, Christmas and Easter celebrations
7. N/A

(47). If No, why do you not telephone them?

1. Relatives have no phone contact
2. They phone me
3. Not necessary
4. Preference for physical contact
5. Too expensive
6. e-mail usage
7. Aim towards detribalisation
8. Detribalised
9. N/A

(48). Do you visit your village/hometown?

1. Yes
2. No

(49). If Yes, how often?

1. once or more a year
2. once every three years
3. once every 4-10 years
4. N/A

(50). If No, why do you not visit your village/hometown?

1. they visit me
2. not necessary
3. too expensive to travel
4. no relatives left in village/hometown
5. e-mail usage
6. aim towards detribalisation
7. detribalised
8. N/A

Section (g) – RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION

(51). What is your religious orientation?

1. Christian
2. Moslem
3. Traditionalist
4. Other
5. A-religious

(52). If Christian,

1. Orthodox
2. Charismatic
3. N/A

Section (h). TRIBAL/ETHNIC DERIVATION

(53). What's your surname?

1. Fanti
2. Ashanti
3. Akyem
4. Akwapim
5. Bono
6. Ga/Adangbe
7. Nzima
8. Bolga
9. Dagomba
10. Dagaaba
11. Gurenne

- 12. Mampruli
- 13. Gonja
- 14. Hausa
- 15. Ewe
- 16. African
- 17. European
- 18. American
- 19. Asian
- 20. Australian
- 21. Other

Statistics

		gender	age	tribe	occupation	level of education
N	Valid	501	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		traditional party orientation of your family	traditional party orientation of yourself	current party orientation	party of MP in 1996 Party elections
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	party of choice in 2000 Party elections	choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	are you a registered voter?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		If no, why are you not a registered voter?	Are you a registered member of any party?	If yes, which party	If no, why are you not a registered member of any party?	what is your level of political participation?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		how do you familiarise yourself with the politics?	do you freely share your political views/opinion s?	if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	vote if - greater public endorsement of ndc
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		vote if - greater public endorsement of npp	vote if - greater public endorsement of "Nkrumahist" coalition?	vote if - greater public endorsement of new ndc	vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		Do you live in Tema?	If yes, during which time period?	If no, what are you?	For how long have you lived in Tema?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		Have you lived in another city before?	If Yes, which one?	Have you always lived in a city?	If no (to Q 37), state how long you've lived in a village/town prior to city life:-
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		Do you visit your relatives?	If yes (to Q 39), do they live in:-	If no (to Q 39), why do you not visit them?	Do you write to relatives?	If yes (to Q42), how often?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		If no to Q42, why do you not write to them?	Do you telephone relatives?	If yes (to Q 45), how often?	If no (to Q 45), why do you not telephone them?	Do you visit your village/hometown?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		If yes (to Q 48), how often in a year?	If no (to Q48), why do you not visit your village/hometown?	What is your religious orientation?1	If Christian, what stream, Orthodox or Charismatic?
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		What is your surname?	type of voter	level of tribalism	association with roots
N	Valid	501	501	501	501
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Frequency Table

gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	319	63.7	63.7	63.7
	Female	182	36.3	36.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0-16	2	.4	.4	.4
	17-30	248	49.5	49.5	49.9
	31-40	138	27.5	27.5	77.4
	41-50	88	17.6	17.6	95.0
	51-60	24	4.8	4.8	99.8
	61-70	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

tribe

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Fanti	100	20.0	20.0	20.0
	Ashanti	76	15.2	15.2	35.1
	Akyem	39	7.8	7.8	42.9
	Akwapim	45	9.0	9.0	51.9
	Bono	3	.6	.6	52.5
	Ga-Adangbe	106	21.2	21.2	73.7
	Nzima	16	3.2	3.2	76.8
	Bolga	10	2.0	2.0	78.8
	Dagomba	7	1.4	1.4	80.2
	Dagaaba	1	.2	.2	80.4
	Gurenne	3	.6	.6	81.0
	Ewe	95	19.0	19.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

occupation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	unskilled	8	1.6	1.6	1.6
	semi-skilled	20	4.0	4.0	5.6
	skilled	71	14.2	14.2	19.8
	clerical	54	10.8	10.8	30.5
	administrative	19	3.8	3.8	34.3
	managerial	14	2.8	2.8	37.1
	professional	193	38.5	38.5	75.6
	specialist	10	2.0	2.0	77.6
	student	112	22.4	22.4	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

level of education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	primary	26	5.2	5.2	5.2
	secondary	238	47.5	47.5	52.7
	tertiary	237	47.3	47.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

traditional party orientation of your family

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	121	24.2	24.2	24.2
	npp	173	34.5	34.5	58.7
	"nkrumahist"	53	10.6	10.6	69.3
	other	10	2.0	2.0	71.3
	none	143	28.5	28.5	99.8
	6	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

traditional party orientation of yourself

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	118	23.6	23.6	23.6
	npp	172	34.3	34.3	57.9
	"nkrumahist"	55	11.0	11.0	68.9
	other	10	2.0	2.0	70.9
	none	146	29.1	29.1	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

current party orientation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	121	24.2	24.2	24.2
	npp	190	37.9	37.9	62.1
	"nkrumahist"	32	6.4	6.4	68.5
	other	14	2.8	2.8	71.3
	none	144	28.7	28.7	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

party of MP in 1996 Parly elections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	135	26.9	26.9	26.9
	npp	211	42.1	42.1	69.1
	"nkrumahist"	16	3.2	3.2	72.3
	other	5	1.0	1.0	73.3
	none	59	11.8	11.8	85.0
	ineligible	75	15.0	15.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Rawlings	174	34.7	34.7	34.7
	Kuffour	219	43.7	43.7	78.4
	Mahama	5	1.0	1.0	79.4
	none	32	6.4	6.4	85.8
	ineligible	71	14.2	14.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

party of choice in 2000 Parly elections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	98	19.6	19.6	19.6
	npp	219	43.7	43.7	63.3
	"nkrumahist"	19	3.8	3.8	67.1
	new ndc	6	1.2	1.2	68.3
	other	9	1.8	1.8	70.1
	none	30	6.0	6.0	76.0
	ineligible	4	.8	.8	76.8
	undecided	116	23.2	23.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

choice of President for 2000 presidential elections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Atta Mills	135	26.9	26.9	26.9
	Kuffour	223	44.5	44.5	71.5
	Tanor	5	1.0	1.0	72.5
	other	5	1.0	1.0	73.5
	none	24	4.8	4.8	78.2
	ineligible	6	1.2	1.2	79.4
	undecided	103	20.6	20.6	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

are you a registered voter?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	423	84.4	84.4	84.4
	no	78	15.6	15.6	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no, why are you not a registered voter?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ineligible	49	9.8	9.8	9.8
	negative	13	2.6	2.6	12.4
	a-political	15	3.0	3.0	15.4
	not applicable	424	84.6	84.6	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Are you a registered member of any party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	153	30.5	30.5	30.5
	no	348	69.5	69.5	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If yes, which party

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	67	13.4	13.4	13.4
	npp	74	14.8	14.8	28.1
	"nkrumahist"	12	2.4	2.4	30.5
	other	1	.2	.2	30.7
	not applibale	347	69.3	69.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no, why are you not a registered member of any party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no money	35	7.0	7.0	7.0
	disillusioned	73	14.6	14.6	21.6
	a-political	232	46.3	46.3	67.9
	not applicable	160	31.9	31.9	99.8
	5	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

what is your level of political participation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	local	139	27.7	27.7	27.7
	district	42	8.4	8.4	36.1
	national	42	8.4	8.4	44.5
	all	6	1.2	1.2	45.7
	none	272	54.3	54.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

how do you famlliarise yourself with the polittics?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	attend	84	16.8	16.8	16.8
	media	221	44.1	44.1	60.9
	all	34	6.8	6.8	67.7
	none	162	32.3	32.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

do you freely share your political views/opnlions?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	333	66.5	66.5	66.5
	no	168	33.5	33.5	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	spouse	26	5.2	5.2	5.2
	family	26	5.2	5.2	10.4
	friends	46	9.2	9.2	19.6
	distant	2	.4	.4	20.0
	none	69	13.8	13.8	33.7
	not applicable	332	66.3	66.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - greater public endorsement of ndc

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	142	28.3	28.3	28.3
	npp	208	41.5	41.5	69.9
	"nkrumahist"	21	4.2	4.2	74.1
	new ndc	14	2.8	2.8	76.8
	other	13	2.6	2.6	79.4
	none	93	18.6	18.6	98.0
	not eligible	10	2.0	2.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - greater public endorsement of npp

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	97	19.4	19.4	19.4
	npp	250	49.9	49.9	69.3
	"nkrumahist"	26	5.2	5.2	74.5
	new ndc	17	3.4	3.4	77.8
	other	27	5.4	5.4	83.2
	none	74	14.8	14.8	98.0
	not eligible	10	2.0	2.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - greater public endorsement of "Nkrumahist" coalition?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	90	18.0	18.0	18.0
	npp	196	39.1	39.1	57.1
	"nkrumahist"	58	11.6	11.6	68.7
	new ndc	15	3.0	3.0	71.7
	other	19	3.8	3.8	75.4
	none	113	22.6	22.6	98.0
	not eligible	10	2.0	2.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - greater public endorsement of new ndc

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	ndc	95	19.0	19.0	19.0
	npp	194	38.7	38.7	57.7
	nkrumahist	27	5.4	5.4	63.1
	new ndc	34	6.8	6.8	69.9
	other	22	4.4	4.4	74.3
	none	119	23.8	23.8	98.0
	not eligible	10	2.0	2.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	for	409	81.6	81.6	81.6
	against	30	6.0	6.0	87.6
	abstain	53	10.6	10.6	98.2
	ineligible	9	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	for	374	74.7	74.7	74.7
	against	66	13.2	13.2	87.8
	abstain	52	10.4	10.4	98.2
	ineligible	9	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	for	322	64.3	64.3	64.3
	against	109	21.8	21.8	86.0
	abstain	61	12.2	12.2	98.2
	ineligible	9	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	for	383	76.4	76.4	76.4
	against	51	10.2	10.2	86.6
	abstain	58	11.6	11.6	98.2
	ineligible	9	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	for	383	76.4	76.4	76.4
	against	60	12.0	12.0	88.4
	abstain	49	9.8	9.8	98.2
	ineligible	9	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Do you live in Tema?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	373	74.5	74.5	74.5
	no	128	25.5	25.5	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If yes, during which time period?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	post-1990	94	18.8	18.8	18.8
	both	279	55.7	55.7	74.5
	N/A	128	25.5	25.5	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no, what are you?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	visitor	11	2.2	2.2	2.2
	job-seeker	69	13.8	13.8	16.0
	student	51	10.2	10.2	26.1
	not applicable	370	73.9	73.9	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

For how long have you lived in Tema?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0-3 mths	6	1.2	1.2	1.2
	4-12 mths	15	3.0	3.0	4.2
	1-3 yrs	22	4.4	4.4	8.6
	4-10 yrs	51	10.2	10.2	18.8
	>10 yrs	278	55.5	55.5	74.3
	N/A	129	25.7	25.7	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Have you lived in another city before?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	374	74.7	74.7	74.7
	no	127	25.3	25.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If Yes, which one?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Accra	137	27.3	27.3	27.3
	Tema	5	1.0	1.0	28.3
	Kumasi	52	10.4	10.4	38.7
	Tamale	5	1.0	1.0	39.7
	Bolgatanga	8	1.6	1.6	41.3
	Wa	1	.2	.2	41.5
	Sunyani	5	1.0	1.0	42.5
	Koforidua	21	4.2	4.2	46.7
	Takoradi	33	6.6	6.6	53.3
	Cape-Coast	18	3.6	3.6	56.9
	Ho	10	2.0	2.0	58.9
	Combination	85	17.0	17.0	75.8
	N/A	121	24.2	24.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Have you always lived in a city?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	296	59.1	59.1	59.1
	no	205	40.9	40.9	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no (to Q 37), state how long you've lived in a village/town prior to city life:-

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0-3 mths	14	2.8	2.8	2.8
	4-12 mths	13	2.6	2.6	5.4
	1-3 yrs	37	7.4	7.4	12.8
	4-10 yrs	53	10.6	10.6	23.4
	>10 yrs	91	18.2	18.2	41.5
	not applicable	293	58.5	58.5	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Do you visit your relatives?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	453	90.4	90.4	90.4
	no	48	9.6	9.6	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If yes (to Q 39), do they live in:-

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	urban areas?	165	32.9	32.9	32.9
	rural areas	136	27.1	27.1	60.1
	Both	153	30.5	30.5	90.6
	N/A	47	9.4	9.4	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no (to Q 39), why do you not visit them?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	they	17	3.4	3.4	3.4
	unnecessary	15	3.0	3.0	6.4
	loggerheads	1	.2	.2	6.6
	too expensive	5	1.0	1.0	7.6
	aim towards	1	.2	.2	7.8
	detribalisation	10	2.0	2.0	9.8
	detribalised	452	90.2	90.2	100.0
	N/A				
Total		501	100.0	100.0	

Do you write to relatives?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	278	55.5	55.5	55.5
	no	223	44.5	44.5	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If yes (to Q42), how often?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	monthly	169	33.7	33.7	33.7
	yearly	84	16.8	16.8	50.5
	every 3-5 yrs	14	2.8	2.8	53.3
	every 10 yrs	10	2.0	2.0	55.3
	N/A	224	44.7	44.7	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no to Q42, why do you not write to them?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	they write to me	4	.8	.8	.8
	not necessary	103	20.6	20.6	21.4
	preference for physical contact	70	14.0	14.0	35.3
	letter writing is boring and tedious	10	2.0	2.0	37.3
	lack of postal services in the village	6	1.2	1.2	38.5
	postage too expensive	2	.4	.4	38.9
	e-mail usage	2	.4	.4	39.3
	aim towards detribalisation	5	1.0	1.0	40.3
	detribalised	19	3.8	3.8	44.1
	N/A	280	55.9	55.9	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Do you telephone relatives?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	340	67.9	67.9	67.9
	no	161	32.1	32.1	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If yes (to Q 45), how often?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	daily	27	5.4	5.4	5.4
	weekly	133	26.5	26.5	31.9
	monthly	83	16.6	16.6	48.5
	quarterly	25	5.0	5.0	53.5
	anually	5	1.0	1.0	54.5
	occasions	71	14.2	14.2	68.7
	N/A	157	31.3	31.3	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no (to Q 45), why do you not telephone them?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no phone contact	89	17.8	17.8	17.8
	they phone me	5	1.0	1.0	18.8
	not necessary	38	7.6	7.6	26.3
	preference for physical contact	15	3.0	3.0	29.3
	too expensive	3	.6	.6	29.9
	aim towards detribalisation	1	.2	.2	30.1
	detribalised	9	1.8	1.8	31.9
	N/A	341	68.1	68.1	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Do you visit your village/hometown?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	408	81.4	81.4	81.4
	no	93	18.6	18.6	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If yes (to Q 48), how often in a year?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	> once a yr	317	63.3	63.3	63.3
	once in 3 yrs	50	10.0	10.0	73.3
	once every 4-10 yrs	37	7.4	7.4	80.6
	N/A	95	19.0	19.0	99.6
	5	1	.2	.2	99.8
	9	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If no (to Q48), why do you not visit your village/hometown?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	they visit me	16	3.2	3.2	3.2
	not necessary	40	8.0	8.0	11.2
	too expensive to travel	4	.8	.8	12.0
	no relatives left	11	2.2	2.2	14.2
	aim towards detribalisation	4	.8	.8	15.0
	detribalised	17	3.4	3.4	18.4
	N/A	409	81.6	81.6	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

What is your religious orientation?1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christian	484	96.6	96.6	96.6
	Moslem	10	2.0	2.0	98.6
	Traditionalist	3	.6	.6	99.2
	Other	3	.6	.6	99.8
	6	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

If Christian, what stream, Orthodox or Charismatic?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Orthodox	278	55.5	55.5	55.5
	Charismatic	206	41.1	41.1	96.6
	N/A	17	3.4	3.4	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

What is your surname?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Fanti	92	18.4	18.4	18.4
	Ashanti	81	16.2	16.2	34.5
	Akyem	40	8.0	8.0	42.5
	Akwapim	40	8.0	8.0	50.5
	Bono	3	.6	.6	51.1
	Ga/Adangbe	97	19.4	19.4	70.5
	Nzima	11	2.2	2.2	72.7
	Bolga	11	2.2	2.2	74.9
	Dagomba	6	1.2	1.2	76.0
	Dagaaba	2	.4	.4	76.4
	Gurenne	2	.4	.4	76.8
	Hausa	1	.2	.2	77.0
	Ewe	87	17.4	17.4	94.4
	Asian	21	4.2	4.2	98.6
	American	1	.2	.2	98.8
	European	1	.2	.2	99.0
	Poler	5	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

type of voter

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	tribalistic	361	72.1	72.1	72.1
	non-tribalistic	140	27.9	27.9	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

level of tribalism

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	extreme	211	42.1	42.1	42.1
	very high	128	25.5	25.5	67.7
	high	21	4.2	4.2	71.9
	low	4	.8	.8	72.7
	very low	38	7.6	7.6	80.2
	benefit	99	19.8	19.8	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

association with roots

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very high	171	34.1	34.1	34.1
	high	186	37.1	37.1	71.3
	average	102	20.4	20.4	91.6
	low	26	5.2	5.2	96.8
	apathetic	16	3.2	3.2	100.0
	Total	501	100.0	100.0	

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation?	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation?	0	.0%	501	100.0%

Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation?
Crosstabulation

			what is your level of	
			local	district
Are you a registered member of any party?	yes	Count	79	26
		Expected Count	42.4	12.8
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	51.6%	17.0%
		% within what is your level of political participation?	56.8%	61.9%
		% of Total	15.8%	5.2%
	no	Count	60	16
		Expected Count	96.6	29.2
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	17.2%	4.6%
		% within what is your level of political participation?	43.2%	38.1%
		% of Total	12.0%	3.2%
Total	Count	139	42	
	Expected Count	139.0	42.0	
	% within Are you a registered member of any party?	27.7%	8.4%	
	% within what is your level of political participation?	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	27.7%	8.4%	

Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation?
Crosstabulation

			what is your level of	
			national	all
Are you a registered member of any party?	yes	Count	21	1
		Expected Count	12.8	1.8
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	13.7%	.7%
		% within what is your level of political participation?	50.0%	16.7%
		% of Total	4.2%	.2%
	no	Count	21	5
		Expected Count	29.2	4.2
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	6.0%	1.4%
		% within what is your level of political participation?	50.0%	83.3%
		% of Total	4.2%	1.0%
Total	Count		42	6
	Expected Count		42.0	6.0
	% within Are you a registered member of any party?		8.4%	1.2%
	% within what is your level of political participation?		100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		8.4%	1.2%

Are you a registered member of any party? * what is your level of political participation?
Crosstabulation

			what is	
			none	Total
Are you a registered member of any party?	yes	Count	26	153
		Expected Count	83.1	153.0
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	17.0%	100.0%
		% within what is your level of political participation?	9.6%	30.5%
		% of Total	5.2%	30.5%
	no	Count	246	348
		Expected Count	188.9	348.0
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	70.7%	100.0%
		% within what is your level of political participation?	90.4%	69.5%
		% of Total	49.1%	69.5%
Total	Count		272	501
	Expected Count		272.0	501.0
	% within Are you a registered member of any party?		54.3%	100.0%
	% within what is your level of political participation?		100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		54.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	129.271 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	135.539	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	120.101	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	501		

a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.83.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.508	.000
	Cramer's V	.508	.000
N of Valid Cases		501	

- a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	501	100.0%
tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	501	100.0%
tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	501	100.0%
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%

tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections Crosstabulation

			party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		
			ndc	npp	"nkrumahist"
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	15.0%	52.0%	2.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	11.1%	24.6%	12.5%
		% of Total	3.0%	10.4%	.4%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	15.8%	60.5%	1.3%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	8.9%	21.8%	6.3%
		% of Total	2.4%	9.2%	.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	7.7%	71.8%	2.6%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	2.2%	13.3%	6.3%
		% of Total	.6%	5.6%	.2%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	11.1%	55.6%	
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	3.7%	11.8%	
		% of Total	1.0%	5.0%	
	Bono	% within tribe		66.7%	
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		.9%	
		% of Total		.4%	
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	31.1%	34.0%	2.8%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	24.4%	17.1%	18.8%
		% of Total	6.6%	7.2%	.6%
	Nzima	% within tribe	18.8%	43.8%	25.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	2.2%	3.3%	25.0%
		% of Total	.6%	1.4%	.8%
	Bolga	% within tribe	50.0%	20.0%	
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	3.7%	.9%	
		% of Total	1.0%	.4%	
	Dagomba	% within tribe	14.3%		28.6%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	.7%		12.5%
		% of Total	.2%		.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%	
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		.5%	
		% of Total		.2%	
	Gurenne	% within tribe	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	.7%	.5%	6.3%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	.2%
	Ewe	% within tribe	60.0%	11.6%	2.1%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	42.2%	5.2%	12.5%
		% of Total	11.4%	2.2%	.4%
Total		% within tribe	26.9%	42.1%	3.2%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	26.9%	42.1%	3.2%

tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections Crosstabulation

			party of MP in 1996	
			other	none
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	3.0%	12.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	60.0%	20.3%
		% of Total	.6%	2.4%
	Ashanti	% within tribe		7.9%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		10.2%
		% of Total		1.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		10.3%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		6.8%
		% of Total		.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe		13.3%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		10.2%
		% of Total		1.2%
	Bono	% within tribe		
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		
		% of Total		
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe		14.2%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		25.4%
		% of Total		3.0%
	Nzima	% within tribe		12.5%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		3.4%
		% of Total		.4%
	Bolga	% within tribe		20.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		3.4%
		% of Total		.4%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		14.3%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		1.7%
		% of Total		.2%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		
		% of Total		
	Gurenne	% within tribe		
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		
		% of Total		
	Ewe	% within tribe	2.1%	11.6%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	40.0%	18.6%
		% of Total	.4%	2.2%
Total		% within tribe	1.0%	11.8%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	11.8%

tribe * party of MP in 1996 Parly elections Crosstabulation

			party of	
			ineligible	Total
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	16.0%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	21.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	3.2%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	14.5%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	14.7%	15.2%
		% of Total	2.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	7.7%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	4.0%	7.8%
		% of Total	.6%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	20.0%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	12.0%	9.0%
		% of Total	1.8%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	1.3%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	17.9%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	25.3%	21.2%
		% of Total	3.8%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		3.2%
		% of Total		3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	1.3%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	42.9%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	4.0%	1.4%
		% of Total	.6%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		.2%
		% of Total		.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	12.6%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	16.0%	19.0%
		% of Total	2.4%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	15.0%	100.0%
		% within party of MP in 1996 Parly elections	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	15.0%	100.0%

tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 1996		
			Rawlings	Kuffour	Mahama
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	19.0%	57.0%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	10.9%	26.0%	
		% of Total	3.8%	11.4%	
	Ashanti	% within tribe	19.7%	59.2%	1.3%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	8.6%	20.5%	20.0%
		% of Total	3.0%	9.0%	.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	10.3%	71.8%	2.6%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.3%	12.8%	20.0%
		% of Total	.8%	5.6%	.2%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	22.2%	53.3%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	5.7%	11.0%	
		% of Total	2.0%	4.8%	
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	33.3%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.6%	.5%	
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	46.2%	31.1%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	28.2%	15.1%	
		% of Total	9.8%	6.6%	
	Nzima	% within tribe	12.5%	87.5%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	1.1%	6.4%	
		% of Total	.4%	2.8%	
	Bolga	% within tribe	50.0%	10.0%	20.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.9%	.5%	40.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	.2%	.4%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	28.6%	28.6%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	1.1%	.9%	
		% of Total	.4%	.4%	
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		.5%	
		% of Total		.2%	
	Gurenne	% within tribe	66.7%		33.3%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	1.1%		20.0%
		% of Total	.4%		.2%
	Ewe	% within tribe	68.4%	13.7%	
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	37.4%	5.9%	
		% of Total	13.0%	2.6%	

tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

		choice of President for 1996		
		Rawlings	Kuffour	Mahama
Total	% within tribe	34.7%	43.7%	1.0%
	% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	34.7%	43.7%	1.0%

tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for		Total
			none	ineligible	
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	8.0%	16.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	25.0%	22.5%	20.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	3.2%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	6.6%	13.2%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	15.6%	14.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	1.0%	2.0%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	7.7%	7.7%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	9.4%	4.2%	7.8%
		% of Total	.6%	.6%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	8.9%	15.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	12.5%	9.9%	9.0%
		% of Total	.8%	1.4%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe		33.3%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		1.4%	.6%
		% of Total		.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	4.7%	17.9%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	15.6%	26.8%	21.2%
		% of Total	1.0%	3.8%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections			3.2%
		% of Total			3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	10.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	3.1%	1.4%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		42.9%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		4.2%	1.4%
		% of Total		.6%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections			.2%
		% of Total			.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections			.6%
		% of Total			.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	6.3%	11.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	18.8%	15.5%	19.0%
		% of Total	1.2%	2.2%	19.0%

tribe * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

		choice of President for		Total
		none	ineligible	
Total	% within tribe	6.4%	14.2%	100.0%
	% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	6.4%	14.2%	100.0%

tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections Crosstabulation

			party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		
			ndc	npp	"nkrumahist"
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	15.0%	54.0%	4.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	15.3%	24.7%	21.1%
		% of Total	3.0%	10.8%	.8%
Ashanti	% within tribe	9.2%	68.4%		
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	7.1%	23.7%		
	% of Total	1.4%	10.4%		
Akyem	% within tribe	5.1%	79.5%	2.6%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	2.0%	14.2%	5.3%	
	% of Total	.4%	6.2%	.2%	
Akwapim	% within tribe	8.9%	51.1%	2.2%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	4.1%	10.5%	5.3%	
	% of Total	.8%	4.6%	.2%	
Bono	% within tribe		33.3%		
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		.5%		
	% of Total		.2%		
Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	33.0%	31.1%	3.8%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	35.7%	15.1%	21.1%	
	% of Total	7.0%	6.6%	.8%	
Nzima	% within tribe	12.5%	50.0%	25.0%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	2.0%	3.7%	21.1%	
	% of Total	.4%	1.6%	.8%	
Bolga	% within tribe	30.0%		20.0%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	3.1%		10.5%	
	% of Total	.6%		.4%	
Dagomba	% within tribe	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	1.0%	.5%	5.3%	
	% of Total	.2%	.2%	.2%	
Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%		
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		.5%		
	% of Total		.2%		
Gurenne	% within tribe	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	1.0%	.5%	5.3%	
	% of Total	.2%	.2%	.2%	
Ewe	% within tribe	29.5%	14.7%	1.1%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	28.6%	6.4%	5.3%	
	% of Total	5.6%	2.8%	.2%	
Total	% within tribe	19.6%	43.7%	3.8%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	19.6%	43.7%	3.8%	

tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections Crosstabulation

			party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		
			new ndc	other	none
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe		3.0%	3.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		33.3%	10.0%
		% of Total		.6%	.6%
Ashanti	% within tribe	1.3%		5.3%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	16.7%		13.3%	
	% of Total	.2%		.8%	
Akyem	% within tribe			5.1%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections			6.7%	
	% of Total			.4%	
Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	2.2%	6.7%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	16.7%	11.1%	10.0%	
	% of Total	.2%	.2%	.6%	
Bono	% within tribe				
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections				
	% of Total				
Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	1.9%	1.9%	4.7%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	33.3%	22.2%	16.7%	
	% of Total	.4%	.4%	1.0%	
Nzima	% within tribe				
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections				
	% of Total				
Bolga	% within tribe			10.0%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections			3.3%	
	% of Total			.2%	
Dagomba	% within tribe		14.3%		
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		11.1%		
	% of Total		.2%		
Dagaaba	% within tribe				
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections				
	% of Total				
Gurenne	% within tribe				
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections				
	% of Total				
Ewe	% within tribe	2.1%	2.1%	12.6%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	33.3%	22.2%	40.0%	
	% of Total	.4%	.4%	2.4%	
Total	% within tribe	1.2%	1.8%	6.0%	
	% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	1.2%	1.8%	6.0%	

tribe * party of choice in 2000 Parly elections Crosstabulation

			party of choice in 2000		Total
			ineligible	undecided	
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	2.0%	19.0%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	50.0%	16.4%	20.0%
		% of Total	.4%	3.8%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe		15.8%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		10.3%	15.2%
		% of Total		2.4%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		7.7%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		2.6%	7.8%
		% of Total		.6%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe		26.7%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		10.3%	9.0%
		% of Total		2.4%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	33.3%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	25.0%	.9%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	.9%	22.6%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	25.0%	20.7%	21.2%
		% of Total	.2%	4.8%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		12.5%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		1.7%	3.2%
		% of Total		.4%	3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe		40.0%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		3.4%	2.0%
		% of Total		.8%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		42.9%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		2.6%	1.4%
		% of Total		.6%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections			.2%
		% of Total			.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections			.6%
		% of Total			.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe		37.9%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections		31.0%	19.0%
		% of Total		7.2%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	.8%	23.2%	100.0%
		% within party of choice in 2000 Parly elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	.8%	23.2%	100.0%

tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			Atta Mills	Kuffour	Tanor
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	21.0%	53.0%	3.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	15.6%	23.8%	60.0%
		% of Total	4.2%	10.6%	.6%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	14.5%	67.1%	1.3%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	8.1%	22.9%	20.0%
		% of Total	2.2%	10.2%	.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	15.4%	74.4%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	4.4%	13.0%	
		% of Total	1.2%	5.8%	
	Akwapim	% within tribe	17.8%	55.6%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	5.9%	11.2%	
		% of Total	1.6%	5.0%	
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	33.3%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.7%	.4%	
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	40.6%	32.1%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	31.9%	15.2%	
		% of Total	8.6%	6.8%	
	Nzima	% within tribe	12.5%	50.0%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	1.5%	3.6%	
		% of Total	.4%	1.6%	
	Bolga	% within tribe	20.0%	20.0%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	1.5%	.9%	
		% of Total	.4%	.4%	
	Dagomba	% within tribe		28.6%	14.3%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		.9%	20.0%
		% of Total		.4%	.2%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		.4%	
		% of Total		.2%	
	Gurenne	% within tribe	33.3%	33.3%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.7%	.4%	
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	
	Ewe	% within tribe	42.1%	16.8%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	29.6%	7.2%	
		% of Total	8.0%	3.2%	

tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

		choice of President for 2000		
		Atta Mills	Kuffour	Tanor
Total	% within tribe	26.9%	44.5%	1.0%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	26.9%	44.5%	1.0%

tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			other	none	ineligible
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	2.0%	2.0%	4.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	40.0%	8.3%	66.7%
		% of Total	.4%	.4%	.8%
	Ashanti	% within tribe		2.6%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		8.3%	
		% of Total		.4%	
	Akyem	% within tribe		5.1%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		8.3%	
		% of Total		.4%	
	Akwapim	% within tribe		8.9%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		16.7%	
		% of Total		.8%	
	Bono	% within tribe			33.3%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections			16.7%
		% of Total			.2%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe		5.7%	.9%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		25.0%	16.7%
		% of Total		1.2%	.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe			
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections			
		% of Total			
	Bolga	% within tribe		10.0%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		4.2%	
		% of Total		.2%	
	Dagomba	% within tribe	14.3%		
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%		
		% of Total	.2%		
	Dagaaba	% within tribe			
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections			
		% of Total			
	Gurenne	% within tribe	33.3%		
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%		
		% of Total	.2%		
	Ewe	% within tribe	1.1%	7.4%	
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	29.2%	
		% of Total	.2%	1.4%	

tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

		choice of President for 2000		
		other	none	ineligible
Total	% within tribe	1.0%	4.8%	1.2%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.0%	4.8%	1.2%

tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of	
			undecided	Total
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	15.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	14.6%	20.0%
		% of Total	3.0%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	14.5%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	10.7%	15.2%
		% of Total	2.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	5.1%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	1.9%	7.8%
		% of Total	.4%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	17.8%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	7.8%	9.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	20.8%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	21.4%	21.2%
		% of Total	4.4%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe	37.5%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	5.8%	3.2%
		% of Total	1.2%	3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	50.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	4.9%	2.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	42.9%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	2.9%	1.4%
		% of Total	.6%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		.2%
		% of Total		.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	32.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	30.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	6.2%	19.0%

tribe * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

		choice of	Total
		undecided	
Total	% within tribe	20.6%	100.0%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	20.6%	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidetical candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidetical candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northermer?	0	.0%	501	100.0%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	88.0%	3.0%	6.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	21.5%	10.0%	11.3%
		% of Total	17.6%	.6%	1.2%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	81.6%	7.9%	9.2%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	15.2%	20.0%	13.2%
		% of Total	12.4%	1.2%	1.4%
	Akyem	% within tribe	82.1%	7.7%	10.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	7.8%	10.0%	7.5%
		% of Total	6.4%	.6%	.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	88.9%	4.4%	4.4%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	9.8%	6.7%	3.8%
		% of Total	8.0%	.4%	.4%
	Bono	% within tribe	66.7%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	.5%		
		% of Total	.4%		
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	79.2%	8.5%	11.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	20.5%	30.0%	22.6%
		% of Total	16.8%	1.8%	2.4%
	Nzima	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	3.9%		
		% of Total	3.2%		
	Bolga	% within tribe	70.0%	10.0%	10.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	1.7%	3.3%	1.9%
		% of Total	1.4%	.2%	.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	71.4%	14.3%	14.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	1.2%	3.3%	1.9%
		% of Total	1.0%	.2%	.2%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	.2%		
		% of Total	.2%		
	Gurenne	% within tribe	66.7%		33.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	.5%		1.9%
		% of Total	.4%		.2%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe Ewe	% within tribe		73.7%	5.3%	20.0%
	% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		17.1%	16.7%	35.8%
	% of Total		14.0%	1.0%	3.8%
Total	% within tribe		81.6%	6.0%	10.6%
	% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		81.6%	6.0%	10.6%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	Total
			ineligible	
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	3.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	33.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	.6%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	1.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	11.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		7.8%
		% of Total		7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	11.1%	9.0%
		% of Total	.2%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	11.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	.9%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	11.1%	21.2%
		% of Total	.2%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		3.2%
		% of Total		3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	11.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		1.4%
		% of Total		1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		.2%
		% of Total		.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?		.6%
		% of Total		.6%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	Total
			ineligible	
tribe	Ewe	% within tribe	1.1%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	11.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	.2%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	1.8%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Fanti?	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.8%	100.0%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	74.0%	14.0%	9.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	19.8%	21.2%	17.3%
		% of Total	14.8%	2.8%	1.8%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	89.5%	5.3%	3.9%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	18.2%	6.1%	5.8%
		% of Total	13.6%	.8%	.6%
	Akyem	% within tribe	89.7%	2.6%	7.7%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	9.4%	1.5%	5.8%
		% of Total	7.0%	.2%	.6%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	71.1%	17.8%	8.9%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	8.6%	12.1%	7.7%
		% of Total	6.4%	1.6%	.8%
	Bono	% within tribe	66.7%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	.5%		
		% of Total	.4%		
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	69.8%	19.8%	9.4%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	19.8%	31.8%	19.2%
		% of Total	14.8%	4.2%	2.0%
	Nzima	% within tribe	81.3%	18.8%	
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	3.5%	4.5%	
		% of Total	2.6%	.6%	
	Bolga	% within tribe	70.0%	10.0%	10.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	1.9%	1.5%	1.9%
		% of Total	1.4%	.2%	.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	1.1%	1.5%	3.8%
		% of Total	.8%	.2%	.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	.3%		
		% of Total	.2%		

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Gurenne	% within tribe	66.7%		33.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	.5%		1.9%
		% of Total	.4%		.2%
	Ewe	% within tribe	65.3%	13.7%	20.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	16.6%	19.7%	36.5%
		% of Total	12.4%	2.6%	3.8%
	Total	% within tribe	74.7%	13.2%	10.4%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	74.7%	13.2%	10.4%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	
			ineligible	Total
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	3.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	33.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	.6%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	1.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	11.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		7.8%
		% of Total		7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	11.1%	9.0%
		% of Total	.2%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	11.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	.9%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	11.1%	21.2%
		% of Total	.2%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		3.2%
		% of Total		3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	11.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		1.4%
		% of Total		1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		.2%
		% of Total		.2%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	Total
			ineligible	
tribe	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	1.1%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?	11.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	.2%	19.0%
Total	% within tribe		1.8%	100.0%
	% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an Ashanti?		100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		1.8%	100.0%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	58.0%	29.0%	10.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	18.0%	26.6%	16.4%
		% of Total	11.6%	5.8%	2.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	57.9%	30.3%	10.5%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	13.7%	21.1%	13.1%
		% of Total	8.8%	4.6%	1.6%
	Akyem	% within tribe	64.1%	23.1%	12.8%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	7.8%	8.3%	8.2%
		% of Total	5.0%	1.8%	1.0%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	55.6%	26.7%	15.6%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	7.8%	11.0%	11.5%
		% of Total	5.0%	2.4%	1.4%
	Bono	% within tribe	66.7%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	.6%		
		% of Total	.4%		
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	68.9%	20.8%	9.4%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	22.7%	20.2%	16.4%
		% of Total	14.6%	4.4%	2.0%
	Nzima	% within tribe	56.3%	25.0%	18.8%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	2.8%	3.7%	4.9%
		% of Total	1.8%	.8%	.6%
	Bolga	% within tribe	60.0%	20.0%	10.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	1.9%	1.8%	1.6%
		% of Total	1.2%	.4%	.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	42.9%	28.6%	28.6%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	.9%	1.8%	3.3%
		% of Total	.6%	.4%	.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	.3%		
		% of Total	.2%		

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Gurenne	% within tribe	66.7%	33.3%	
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	.6%	.9%	
		% of Total	.4%	.2%	
	Ewe	% within tribe	77.9%	5.3%	15.8%
			23.0%	4.6%	24.6%
			14.8%	1.0%	3.0%
Total		% within tribe	64.3%	21.8%	12.2%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	64.3%	21.8%	12.2%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	Total
			ineligible	
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	3.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	33.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	.6%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	1.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	11.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		7.8%
		% of Total		7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	11.1%	9.0%
		% of Total	.2%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	11.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	.9%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	11.1%	21.2%
		% of Total	.2%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		3.2%
		% of Total		3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	11.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		1.4%
		% of Total		1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		.2%
		% of Total		.2%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	Total
			ineligible	
tribe	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	1.1%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	11.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	.2%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	1.8%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is an ewe?	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.8%	100.0%

tribe * vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	68.0%	16.0%	13.0%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	17.8%	31.4%	22.4%
		% of Total	13.6%	3.2%	2.6%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	76.3%	14.5%	7.9%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	15.1%	21.6%	10.3%
		% of Total	11.6%	2.2%	1.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	71.8%	15.4%	12.8%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	7.3%	11.8%	8.6%
		% of Total	5.6%	1.2%	1.0%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	73.3%	13.3%	11.1%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	8.6%	11.8%	8.6%
		% of Total	6.6%	1.2%	1.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	66.7%		
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	.5%		
		% of Total	.4%		
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	85.8%	4.7%	8.5%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	23.8%	9.8%	15.5%
		% of Total	18.2%	1.0%	1.8%
	Nzima	% within tribe	81.3%	12.5%	6.3%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	3.4%	3.9%	1.7%
		% of Total	2.6%	.4%	.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	80.0%		10.0%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	2.1%		1.7%
		% of Total	1.6%		.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	71.4%		28.6%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	1.3%		3.4%
		% of Total	1.0%		.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	.3%		
		% of Total	.2%		
	Gurenne	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	.8%		
		% of Total	.6%		
	Ewe	% within tribe	76.8%	5.3%	16.8%
		% within vote if - Presidietal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	19.1%	9.8%	27.6%
		% of Total	14.6%	1.0%	3.2%

tribe * vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation

		vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		
		for	against	abstain
Total	% within tribe	76.4%	10.2%	11.6%
	% within vote if - Presidetial candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	76.4%	10.2%	11.6%

tribe * vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidetal	
			ineligible	Total
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	3.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	33.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	.6%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	1.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	11.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		7.8%
		% of Total		7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	11.1%	9.0%
		% of Total	.2%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	11.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	.9%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	11.1%	21.2%
		% of Total	.2%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		3.2%
		% of Total		3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	11.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		1.4%
		% of Total		1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		.2%
		% of Total		.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	1.1%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	11.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	.2%	19.0%

tribe * vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga? Crosstabulation

		vote if - Presidetal	
		ineligible	Total
Total	% within tribe	1.8%	100.0%
	% within vote if - Presidetal candidate for 2000 elections is a Ga?	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.8%	100.0%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	74.0%	14.0%	9.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	19.3%	23.3%	18.4%
		% of Total	14.8%	2.8%	1.8%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	75.0%	18.4%	5.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	14.9%	23.3%	8.2%
		% of Total	11.4%	2.8%	.8%
	Akyem	% within tribe	76.9%	17.9%	5.1%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	7.8%	11.7%	4.1%
		% of Total	6.0%	1.4%	.4%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	75.6%	11.1%	11.1%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	8.9%	8.3%	10.2%
		% of Total	6.8%	1.0%	1.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	66.7%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	.5%		
		% of Total	.4%		
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	77.4%	12.3%	9.4%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	21.4%	21.7%	20.4%
		% of Total	16.4%	2.6%	2.0%
	Nzima	% within tribe	87.5%	6.3%	6.3%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	3.7%	1.7%	2.0%
		% of Total	2.8%	.2%	.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	70.0%	10.0%	10.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	1.8%	1.7%	2.0%
		% of Total	1.4%	.2%	.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	1.8%		
		% of Total	1.4%		
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	.3%		
		% of Total	.2%		

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		
			for	against	abstain
tribe	Gurenne	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	.8%		
		% of Total	.6%		
	Ewe	% within tribe	75.8%	5.3%	17.9%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	18.8%	8.3%	34.7%
		% of Total	14.4%	1.0%	3.4%
Total		% within tribe	76.4%	12.0%	9.8%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	76.4%	12.0%	9.8%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	
			ineligible	Total
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	3.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	33.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	.6%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	1.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	11.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		7.8%
		% of Total		7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	11.1%	9.0%
		% of Total	.2%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	11.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	.9%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	11.1%	21.2%
		% of Total	.2%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		3.2%
		% of Total		3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	11.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		1.4%
		% of Total		1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		.2%
		% of Total		.2%

tribe * vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner? Crosstabulation

			vote if - Presidenti	Total
			ineligible	
tribe	Gurenne	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?		.6%
		% of Total		.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	1.1%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	11.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	.2%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	1.8%	100.0%
		% within vote if - Presidential candidate for 2000 elections is a Northerner?	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.8%	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
tribe * type of voter	501	100.0%
tribe * level of tribalism	501	100.0%
tribe * association with roots	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
tribe * type of voter	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * level of tribalism	0	.0%	501	100.0%
tribe * association with roots	0	.0%	501	100.0%

tribe * type of voter Crosstabulation

			type of voter		Total
			tribalistic	non-tribalistic	
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	22.2%	14.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	16.0%	4.0%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	78.9%	21.1%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	16.6%	11.4%	15.2%
		% of Total	12.0%	3.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	84.6%	15.4%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	9.1%	4.3%	7.8%
		% of Total	6.6%	1.2%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	82.2%	17.8%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	10.2%	5.7%	9.0%
		% of Total	7.4%	1.6%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	.3%	1.4%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.4%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	46.2%	53.8%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	13.6%	40.7%	21.2%
		% of Total	9.8%	11.4%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	2.8%	4.3%	3.2%
		% of Total	2.0%	1.2%	3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	1.1%	4.3%	2.0%
		% of Total	.8%	1.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	1.7%	.7%	1.4%
		% of Total	1.2%	.2%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		100.0%
		% within type of voter	.3%		.2%
		% of Total	.2%		.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	.3%	1.4%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.4%	.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	83.2%	16.8%	100.0%
		% within type of voter	21.9%	11.4%	19.0%
		% of Total	15.8%	3.2%	19.0%
Total	% within tribe	72.1%	27.9%	100.0%	
	% within type of voter	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	72.1%	27.9%	100.0%	

tribe * level of tribalism Crosstabulation

			level of tribalism		
			extreme	very high	high
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	47.0%	25.0%	8.0%
		% within level of tribalism	22.3%	19.5%	38.1%
		% of Total	9.4%	5.0%	1.6%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	36.8%	39.5%	2.6%
		% within level of tribalism	13.3%	23.4%	9.5%
		% of Total	5.6%	6.0%	.4%
	Akyem	% within tribe	48.7%	33.3%	2.6%
		% within level of tribalism	9.0%	10.2%	4.8%
		% of Total	3.8%	2.6%	.2%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	42.2%	40.0%	
		% within level of tribalism	9.0%	14.1%	
		% of Total	3.8%	3.6%	
	Bono	% within tribe		33.3%	
		% within level of tribalism		.8%	
		% of Total		.2%	
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	42.5%	2.8%	
		% within level of tribalism	21.3%	2.3%	
		% of Total	9.0%	.6%	
	Nzima	% within tribe	56.3%	6.3%	
		% within level of tribalism	4.3%	.8%	
		% of Total	1.8%	.2%	
	Bolga	% within tribe	20.0%	10.0%	10.0%
		% within level of tribalism	.9%	.8%	4.8%
		% of Total	.4%	.2%	.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	71.4%		14.3%
		% within level of tribalism	2.4%		4.8%
		% of Total	1.0%		.2%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%	
		% within level of tribalism		.8%	
		% of Total		.2%	
	Gurenne	% within tribe	33.3%		
		% within level of tribalism	.5%		
		% of Total	.2%		
	Ewe	% within tribe	37.9%	36.8%	8.4%
		% within level of tribalism	17.1%	27.3%	38.1%
		% of Total	7.2%	7.0%	1.6%
Total		% within tribe	42.1%	25.5%	4.2%
		% within level of tribalism	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	42.1%	25.5%	4.2%

tribe * level of tribalism Crosstabulation

			level of tribalism	
			low	very low
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	1.0%	15.0%
		% within level of tribalism	25.0%	39.5%
		% of Total	.2%	3.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe		13.2%
		% within level of tribalism		26.3%
		% of Total		2.0%
	Akyem	% within tribe		7.7%
		% within level of tribalism		7.9%
		% of Total		.6%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	2.2%	11.1%
		% within level of tribalism	25.0%	13.2%
		% of Total	.2%	1.0%
	Bono	% within tribe		33.3%
		% within level of tribalism		2.6%
		% of Total		.2%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe		.9%
		% within level of tribalism		2.6%
		% of Total		.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe		
		% within level of tribalism		
		% of Total		
	Bolga	% within tribe		
		% within level of tribalism		
		% of Total		
	Dagomba	% within tribe		
		% within level of tribalism		
		% of Total		
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		
		% within level of tribalism		
		% of Total		
	Gurenne	% within tribe		
		% within level of tribalism		
		% of Total		
	Ewe	% within tribe	2.1%	3.2%
		% within level of tribalism	50.0%	7.9%
		% of Total	.4%	.6%
Total		% within tribe	.8%	7.6%
		% within level of tribalism	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	.8%	7.6%

tribe * level of tribalism Crosstabulation

			level of	
			benefit	Total
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	4.0%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	4.0%	20.0%
		% of Total	.8%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	7.9%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	6.1%	15.2%
		% of Total	1.2%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	7.7%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	3.0%	7.8%
		% of Total	.6%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	4.4%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	2.0%	9.0%
		% of Total	.4%	9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe	33.3%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	1.0%	.6%
		% of Total	.2%	.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	53.8%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	57.6%	21.2%
		% of Total	11.4%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe	37.5%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	6.1%	3.2%
		% of Total	1.2%	3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	60.0%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	6.1%	2.0%
		% of Total	1.2%	2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	14.3%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	1.0%	1.4%
		% of Total	.2%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe		100.0%
		% within level of tribalism		.2%
		% of Total		.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe	66.7%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	2.0%	.6%
		% of Total	.4%	.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	11.6%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	11.1%	19.0%
		% of Total	2.2%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	19.8%	100.0%
		% within level of tribalism	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	19.8%	100.0%

tribe * association with roots Crosstabulation

			association with roots		
			very high	high	average
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	38.0%	34.0%	18.0%
		% within association with roots	22.2%	18.3%	17.6%
		% of Total	7.6%	6.8%	3.6%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	28.9%	36.8%	25.0%
		% within association with roots	12.9%	15.1%	18.6%
		% of Total	4.4%	5.6%	3.8%
	Akyem	% within tribe	38.5%	30.8%	23.1%
		% within association with roots	8.8%	6.5%	8.8%
		% of Total	3.0%	2.4%	1.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	28.9%	37.8%	24.4%
		% within association with roots	7.6%	9.1%	10.8%
		% of Total	2.6%	3.4%	2.2%
	Bono	% within tribe	66.7%	33.3%	
		% within association with roots	1.2%	.5%	
		% of Total	.4%	.2%	
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	31.1%	39.6%	24.5%
		% within association with roots	19.3%	22.6%	25.5%
		% of Total	6.6%	8.4%	5.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe	37.5%	37.5%	25.0%
		% within association with roots	3.5%	3.2%	3.9%
		% of Total	1.2%	1.2%	.8%
	Bolga	% within tribe	40.0%	40.0%	10.0%
		% within association with roots	2.3%	2.2%	1.0%
		% of Total	.8%	.8%	.2%
	Dagomba	% within tribe	28.6%	42.9%	14.3%
		% within association with roots	1.2%	1.6%	1.0%
		% of Total	.4%	.6%	.2%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe	100.0%		
		% within association with roots	.6%		
		% of Total	.2%		
	Gurenne	% within tribe	66.7%	33.3%	
		% within association with roots	1.2%	.5%	
		% of Total	.4%	.2%	
	Ewe	% within tribe	34.7%	40.0%	13.7%
		% within association with roots	19.3%	20.4%	12.7%
		% of Total	6.6%	7.6%	2.6%
Total		% within tribe	34.1%	37.1%	20.4%
		% within association with roots	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	34.1%	37.1%	20.4%

tribe * association with roots Crosstabulation

			association with roots		Total
			low	apathetic	
tribe	Fanti	% within tribe	7.0%	3.0%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	26.9%	18.8%	20.0%
		% of Total	1.4%	.6%	20.0%
	Ashanti	% within tribe	3.9%	5.3%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	11.5%	25.0%	15.2%
		% of Total	.6%	.8%	15.2%
	Akyem	% within tribe	2.6%	5.1%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	3.8%	12.5%	7.8%
		% of Total	.2%	.4%	7.8%
	Akwapim	% within tribe	8.9%		100.0%
		% within association with roots	15.4%		9.0%
		% of Total	.8%		9.0%
	Bono	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within association with roots			.6%
		% of Total			.6%
	Ga-Adangbe	% within tribe	3.8%	.9%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	15.4%	6.3%	21.2%
		% of Total	.8%	.2%	21.2%
	Nzima	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within association with roots			3.2%
		% of Total			3.2%
	Bolga	% within tribe	10.0%		100.0%
		% within association with roots	3.8%		2.0%
		% of Total	.2%		2.0%
	Dagomba	% within tribe		14.3%	100.0%
		% within association with roots		6.3%	1.4%
		% of Total		.2%	1.4%
	Dagaaba	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within association with roots			.2%
		% of Total			.2%
	Gurenne	% within tribe			100.0%
		% within association with roots			.6%
		% of Total			.6%
	Ewe	% within tribe	6.3%	5.3%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	23.1%	31.3%	19.0%
		% of Total	1.2%	1.0%	19.0%
Total		% within tribe	5.2%	3.2%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	5.2%	3.2%	100.0%

Crosstabs

APPENDIX XVI

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
For how long have you lived in Tema? *	501	100.0%
association with roots level of tribalism *	501	100.0%
association with roots		

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
For how long have you lived in Tema? *	0	.0%	501	100.0%
association with roots				
level of tribalism *	0	.0%	501	100.0%
association with roots				

For how long have you lived in Tema? * association with roots Crosstabulation

			association with roots		
			very high	high	average
For how long have you lived in Tema?	0-3 mths	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	66.7%	16.7%	
		% within association with roots	2.3%	.5%	
		% of Total	.8%	.2%	
	4-12 mths	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	46.7%	40.0%	13.3%
		% within association with roots	4.1%	3.2%	2.0%
		% of Total	1.4%	1.2%	.4%
	1-3 yrs	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	36.4%	40.9%	13.6%
		% within association with roots	4.7%	4.8%	2.9%
		% of Total	1.6%	1.8%	.6%
	4-10 yrs	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	33.3%	41.2%	21.6%
		% within association with roots	9.9%	11.3%	10.8%
		% of Total	3.4%	4.2%	2.2%
	>10 yrs	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	32.7%	36.3%	23.0%
		% within association with roots	53.2%	54.3%	62.7%
		% of Total	18.2%	20.2%	12.8%
	N/A	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	34.1%	37.2%	17.1%
		% within association with roots	25.7%	25.8%	21.6%
		% of Total	8.8%	9.6%	4.4%
Total	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	34.1%	37.1%	20.4%	
	% within association with roots	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	34.1%	37.1%	20.4%	

For how long have you lived in Tema? * association with roots Crosstabulation

			association with roots		Total
			low	apathetic	
For how long have you lived in Tema?	0-3 mths	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?		16.7%	100.0%
		% within association with roots		6.3%	1.2%
		% of Total		.2%	1.2%
	4-12 mths	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?			100.0%
		% within association with roots			3.0%
		% of Total			3.0%
	1-3 yrs	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	9.1%		100.0%
		% within association with roots	7.7%		4.4%
		% of Total	.4%		4.4%
	4-10 yrs	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	2.0%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	3.8%	6.3%	10.2%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	10.2%
	>10 yrs	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	4.7%	3.2%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	50.0%	56.3%	55.5%
		% of Total	2.6%	1.8%	55.5%
	N/A	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?	7.8%	3.9%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	38.5%	31.3%	25.7%
		% of Total	2.0%	1.0%	25.7%
Total	% within For how long have you lived in Tema?		5.2%	3.2%	100.0%
	% within association with roots		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		5.2%	3.2%	100.0%

level of tribalism * association with roots Crosstabulation

			association with roots		
			very high	high	average
level of tribalism	extreme	% within level of tribalism	35.5%	33.6%	23.2%
		% within association with roots	43.9%	38.2%	48.0%
		% of Total	15.0%	14.2%	9.8%
	very high	% within level of tribalism	36.7%	39.1%	14.8%
		% within association with roots	27.5%	26.9%	18.6%
		% of Total	9.4%	10.0%	3.8%
	high	% within level of tribalism	42.9%	38.1%	14.3%
		% within association with roots	5.3%	4.3%	2.9%
		% of Total	1.8%	1.6%	.6%
	low	% within level of tribalism	25.0%	25.0%	50.0%
		% within association with roots	.6%	.5%	2.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	.4%
	very low	% within level of tribalism	18.4%	50.0%	18.4%
		% within association with roots	4.1%	10.2%	6.9%
		% of Total	1.4%	3.8%	1.4%
	benefit	% within level of tribalism	32.3%	37.4%	22.2%
		% within association with roots	18.7%	19.9%	21.6%
		% of Total	6.4%	7.4%	4.4%
Total	% within level of tribalism	34.1%	37.1%	20.4%	
	% within association with roots	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	34.1%	37.1%	20.4%	

level of tribalism * association with roots Crosstabulation

			association with roots		Total
			low	apathetic	
level of tribalism	extreme	% within level of tribalism	3.8%	3.8%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	30.8%	50.0%	42.1%
		% of Total	1.6%	1.6%	42.1%
	very high	% within level of tribalism	7.0%	2.3%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	34.6%	18.8%	25.5%
		% of Total	1.8%	.6%	25.5%
	high	% within level of tribalism	4.8%		100.0%
		% within association with roots	3.8%		4.2%
		% of Total	.2%		4.2%
	low	% within level of tribalism			100.0%
		% within association with roots			.8%
		% of Total			.8%
	very low	% within level of tribalism	5.3%	7.9%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	7.7%	18.8%	7.6%
		% of Total	.4%	.6%	7.6%
	benefit	% within level of tribalism	6.1%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within association with roots	23.1%	12.5%	19.8%
		% of Total	1.2%	.4%	19.8%
Total	% within level of tribalism	5.2%	3.2%	100.0%	
	% within association with roots	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	5.2%	3.2%	100.0%	

APPENDIX XVII

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
gender * Are you a registered member of any party?	501	100.0%
gender * do you freely share your political views/opinions?	501	100.0%
gender * if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
gender * Are you a registered member of any party?	0	.0%	501	100.0%
gender * do you freely share your political views/opinions?	0	.0%	501	100.0%
gender * if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	0	.0%	501	100.0%

gender * Are you a registered member of any party?

Crosstab

			Are you a registered member of any party?		Total
			yes	no	
gender	Male	Count	118	201	319
		Expected Count	97.4	221.6	319.0
		% within gender	37.0%	63.0%	100.0%
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	77.1%	57.8%	63.7%
		% of Total	23.6%	40.1%	63.7%
	Female	Count	35	147	182
		Expected Count	55.6	126.4	182.0
		% within gender	19.2%	80.8%	100.0%
		% within Are you a registered member of any party?	22.9%	42.2%	36.3%
		% of Total	7.0%	29.3%	36.3%
Total	Count	153	348	501	
	Expected Count	153.0	348.0	501.0	
	% within gender	30.5%	69.5%	100.0%	
	% within Are you a registered member of any party?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	30.5%	69.5%	100.0%	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.231 ^b	1	.000	.000	.000
Continuity Correction ^a	16.404	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	18.014	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	17.196	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	501				

- a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 55.58.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Phi	.185	.000
Nominal Cramer's V	.185	.000
N of Valid Cases	501	

- a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

gender * do you freely share your political views/opinions?

Crosstab

			do you freely share your political views/opinions?		Total
			yes	no	
gender	Male	Count	228	91	319
		Expected Count	212.0	107.0	319.0
		% within gender	71.5%	28.5%	100.0%
		% within do you freely share your political views/opinions?	68.5%	54.2%	63.7%
		% of Total	45.5%	18.2%	63.7%
	Female	Count	105	77	182
		Expected Count	121.0	61.0	182.0
		% within gender	57.7%	42.3%	100.0%
		% within do you freely share your political views/opinions?	31.5%	45.8%	36.3%
		% of Total	21.0%	15.4%	36.3%
Total	Count		333	168	501
	Expected Count		333.0	168.0	501.0
	% within gender		66.5%	33.5%	100.0%
	% within do you freely share your political views/opinions?		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		66.5%	33.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.874 ^b	1	.002	.002	.001
Continuity Correction ^a	9.266	1	.002		
Likelihood Ratio	9.750	1	.002		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.855	1	.002		
N of Valid Cases	501				

- a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 61.03.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Phi	.140	.002
Nominal Cramer's V	.140	.002
N of Valid Cases	501	

- a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

gender * if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order

Crosstab

			if no, please state confidants and		
			spouse	family	friends
gender	Male	Count	19	12	25
		Expected Count	16.6	16.6	29.3
		% within gender	6.0%	3.8%	7.8%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	73.1%	46.2%	54.3%
		% of Total	3.8%	2.4%	5.0%
		Female	Count	7	14
	Expected Count		9.4	9.4	16.7
	% within gender		3.8%	7.7%	11.5%
	% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order		26.9%	53.8%	45.7%
	% of Total		1.4%	2.8%	4.2%
	Total		Count	26	26
		Expected Count	26.0	26.0	46.0
% within gender		5.2%	5.2%	9.2%	
% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
% of Total		5.2%	5.2%	9.2%	

Crosstab

			if no, please state	
			distant	none
gender	Male	Count	1	34
		Expected Count	1.3	43.9
		% within gender	.3%	10.7%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	50.0%	49.3%
		% of Total	.2%	6.8%
	Female	Count	1	35
		Expected Count	.7	25.1
		% within gender	.5%	19.2%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	50.0%	50.7%
		% of Total	.2%	7.0%
	Total	Count	2	69
		Expected Count	2.0	69.0
		% within gender	.4%	13.8%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	.4%	13.8%

Crosstab

			if no, please	Total
			not applicable	
gender	Male	Count	228	319
		Expected Count	211.4	319.0
		% within gender	71.5%	100.0%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	68.7%	63.7%
		% of Total	45.5%	63.7%
	Female	Count	104	182
		Expected Count	120.6	182.0
		% within gender	57.1%	100.0%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	31.3%	36.3%
		% of Total	20.8%	36.3%
	Total	Count	332	501
		Expected Count	332.0	501.0
		% within gender	66.3%	100.0%
		% within if no, please state confidants and indicate preference by numerical order	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	66.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.109 ^a	5	.007
Likelihood Ratio	15.781	5	.007
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.198	1	.074
N of Valid Cases	501		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .73.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.179	.007
	Cramer's V	.179	.007
N of Valid Cases		501	

- a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
- b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
gender * current party orientation	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
gender * current party orientation	0	.0%	501	100.0%

gender * current party orientation Crosstabulation

			current party orientation		
			ndc	npp	"nkrumahist"
gender	Male	Count	85	126	25
		Expected Count	77.0	121.0	20.4
		% within gender	26.6%	39.5%	7.8%
		% within current party orientation	70.2%	66.3%	78.1%
		% of Total	17.0%	25.1%	5.0%
	Female	Count	36	64	7
		Expected Count	44.0	69.0	11.6
		% within gender	19.8%	35.2%	3.8%
		% within current party orientation	29.8%	33.7%	21.9%
		% of Total	7.2%	12.8%	1.4%
Total	Count	121	190	32	
	Expected Count	121.0	190.0	32.0	
	% within gender	24.2%	37.9%	6.4%	
	% within current party orientation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	24.2%	37.9%	6.4%	

gender * current party orientation Crosstabulation

			current party orientation		Total
			other	none	
gender	Male	Count	11	72	319
		Expected Count	8.9	91.7	319.0
		% within gender	3.4%	22.6%	100.0%
		% within current party orientation	78.6%	50.0%	63.7%
		% of Total	2.2%	14.4%	63.7%
	Female	Count	3	72	182
		Expected Count	5.1	52.3	182.0
		% within gender	1.6%	39.6%	100.0%
		% within current party orientation	21.4%	50.0%	36.3%
		% of Total	.6%	14.4%	36.3%
Total		Count	14	144	501
		Expected Count	14.0	144.0	501.0
		% within gender	2.8%	28.7%	100.0%
		% within current party orientation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	2.8%	28.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.707 ^a	4	.001
Likelihood Ratio	18.687	4	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.890	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	501		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.09.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.193	.001
	Cramer's V	.193	.001
N of Valid Cases		501	

- a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
- b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
age * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	501	100.0%
age * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
age * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%
age * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%

age * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections			
			Rawlings	Kuffour	Mahama	none
age	0-16	Count	0	0	0	0
		Expected Count	.7	.9	.0	.1
		% within age	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	17-30	Count	68	90	2	21
		Expected Count	86.1	108.4	2.5	15.8
		% within age	27.4%	36.3%	.8%	8.5%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	39.1%	41.1%	40.0%	65.6%
		% of Total	13.6%	18.0%	.4%	4.2%
	31-40	Count	61	67	3	5
		Expected Count	47.9	60.3	1.4	8.8
		% within age	44.2%	48.6%	2.2%	3.6%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	35.1%	30.6%	60.0%	15.6%
		% of Total	12.2%	13.4%	.6%	1.0%
	41-50	Count	36	47	0	5
		Expected Count	30.6	38.5	.9	5.6
		% within age	40.9%	53.4%	.0%	5.7%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	20.7%	21.5%	.0%	15.6%
		% of Total	7.2%	9.4%	.0%	1.0%
	51-60	Count	9	14	0	1
		Expected Count	8.3	10.5	.2	1.5
		% within age	37.5%	58.3%	.0%	4.2%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	5.2%	6.4%	.0%	3.1%
		% of Total	1.8%	2.8%	.0%	.2%
	61-70	Count	0	1	0	0
		Expected Count	.3	.4	.0	.1
		% within age	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	.5%	.0%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.2%	.0%	.0%
Total		Count	174	219	5	32
		Expected Count	174.0	219.0	5.0	32.0
		% within age	34.7%	43.7%	1.0%	6.4%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	34.7%	43.7%	1.0%	6.4%

age * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of	
			ineligible	Total
age	0-16	Count	2	2
		Expected Count	.3	2.0
		% within age	100.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.8%	.4%
		% of Total	.4%	.4%
	17-30	Count	67	248
		Expected Count	35.1	248.0
		% within age	27.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	94.4%	49.5%
		% of Total	13.4%	49.5%
	31-40	Count	2	138
		Expected Count	19.6	138.0
		% within age	1.4%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.8%	27.5%
		% of Total	.4%	27.5%
	41-50	Count	0	88
		Expected Count	12.5	88.0
		% within age	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	17.6%
		% of Total	.0%	17.6%
	51-60	Count	0	24
		Expected Count	3.4	24.0
		% within age	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	4.8%
		% of Total	.0%	4.8%
	61-70	Count	0	1
		Expected Count	.1	1.0
		% within age	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	.2%
		% of Total	.0%	.2%
	Total	Count	71	501
		Expected Count	71.0	501.0
		% within age	14.2%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	14.2%	100.0%

age * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000 presidential elections			
			Atta Mills	Kuffour	Tanor	other
age	0-16	Count	0	0	0	0
		Expected Count	.5	.9	.0	.0
		% within age	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%
	17-30	Count	65	116	0	1
		Expected Count	66.8	110.4	2.5	2.5
		% within age	26.2%	46.8%	.0%	.4%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	48.1%	52.0%	.0%	20.0%
		% of Total	13.0%	23.2%	.0%	.2%
	31-40	Count	38	56	3	3
		Expected Count	37.2	61.4	1.4	1.4
		% within age	27.5%	40.6%	2.2%	2.2%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	28.1%	25.1%	60.0%	60.0%
		% of Total	7.6%	11.2%	.6%	.6%
	41-50	Count	27	38	2	1
		Expected Count	23.7	39.2	.9	.9
		% within age	30.7%	43.2%	2.3%	1.1%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	17.0%	40.0%	20.0%
		% of Total	5.4%	7.6%	.4%	.2%
	51-60	Count	5	12	0	0
		Expected Count	6.5	10.7	.2	.2
		% within age	20.8%	50.0%	.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.7%	5.4%	.0%	.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	2.4%	.0%	.0%
	61-70	Count	0	1	0	0
		Expected Count	.3	.4	.0	.0
		% within age	.0%	100.0%	.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	.4%	.0%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.2%	.0%	.0%
	Total	Count	135	223	5	5
		Expected Count	135.0	223.0	5.0	5.0
		% within age	26.9%	44.5%	1.0%	1.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	26.9%	44.5%	1.0%	1.0%

age * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000			Total
			none	ineligible	undecided	
age	0-16	Count	0	2	0	2
		Expected Count	.1	.0	.4	2.0
		% within age	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	33.3%	.0%	.4%
		% of Total	.0%	.4%	.0%	.4%
	17-30	Count	13	2	51	248
		Expected Count	11.9	3.0	51.0	248.0
		% within age	5.2%	.8%	20.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	54.2%	33.3%	49.5%	49.5%
		% of Total	2.6%	.4%	10.2%	49.5%
	31-40	Count	6	2	30	138
		Expected Count	6.6	1.7	28.4	138.0
		% within age	4.3%	1.4%	21.7%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	25.0%	33.3%	29.1%	27.5%
		% of Total	1.2%	.4%	6.0%	27.5%
	41-50	Count	5	0	15	88
		Expected Count	4.2	1.1	18.1	88.0
		% within age	5.7%	.0%	17.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.8%	.0%	14.6%	17.6%
		% of Total	1.0%	.0%	3.0%	17.6%
	51-60	Count	0	0	7	24
		Expected Count	1.1	.3	4.9	24.0
		% within age	.0%	.0%	29.2%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	.0%	6.8%	4.8%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	1.4%	4.8%
	61-70	Count	0	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.0	.0	.2	1.0
		% within age	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	.0%	.0%	.2%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%	.2%
	Total	Count	24	6	103	501
		Expected Count	24.0	6.0	103.0	501.0
		% within age	4.8%	1.2%	20.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	4.8%	1.2%	20.6%	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	501	100.0%
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%
occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%

occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 1996		
			Rawlings	Kuffour	Mahama
occupation	unskilled	Count	5	2	0
		Expected Count	2.8	3.5	.1
		% within occupation	62.5%	25.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.9%	.9%	.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	.4%	.0%
	semi-skilled	Count	8	9	0
		Expected Count	6.9	8.7	.2
		% within occupation	40.0%	45.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	4.6%	4.1%	.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	1.8%	.0%
	skilled	Count	30	36	1
		Expected Count	24.7	31.0	.7
		% within occupation	42.3%	50.7%	1.4%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	17.2%	16.4%	20.0%
		% of Total	6.0%	7.2%	.2%
	clerical	Count	26	25	0
		Expected Count	18.8	23.6	.5
		% within occupation	48.1%	46.3%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	14.9%	11.4%	.0%
		% of Total	5.2%	5.0%	.0%
	administrative	Count	6	10	1
		Expected Count	6.6	8.3	.2
		% within occupation	31.6%	52.6%	5.3%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	3.4%	4.6%	20.0%
		% of Total	1.2%	2.0%	.2%
	managerial	Count	5	9	0
		Expected Count	4.9	6.1	.1
		% within occupation	35.7%	64.3%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.9%	4.1%	.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	1.8%	.0%
	professional	Count	72	102	1
		Expected Count	67.0	84.4	1.9
		% within occupation	37.3%	52.8%	.5%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	41.4%	46.6%	20.0%
		% of Total	14.4%	20.4%	.2%
	specialist	Count	4	4	0
		Expected Count	3.5	4.4	.1
		% within occupation	40.0%	40.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	2.3%	1.8%	.0%
		% of Total	.8%	.8%	.0%

occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 1996		
			Rawlings	Kuffour	Mahama
occupation student	Count		18	22	2
	Expected Count		38.9	49.0	1.1
	% within occupation		16.1%	19.6%	1.8%
	% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		10.3%	10.0%	40.0%
	% of Total		3.6%	4.4%	.4%
Total	Count		174	219	5
	Expected Count		174.0	219.0	5.0
	% within occupation		34.7%	43.7%	1.0%
	% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		34.7%	43.7%	1.0%

occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for		Total
			none	ineligible	
occupation	unskilled	Count	0	1	8
		Expected Count	.5	1.1	8.0
		% within occupation	.0%	12.5%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	1.4%	1.6%
		% of Total	.0%	.2%	1.6%
	semi-skilled	Count	1	2	20
		Expected Count	1.3	2.8	20.0
		% within occupation	5.0%	10.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	3.1%	2.8%	4.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.4%	4.0%
	skilled	Count	4	0	71
		Expected Count	4.5	10.1	71.0
		% within occupation	5.6%	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	12.5%	.0%	14.2%
		% of Total	.8%	.0%	14.2%
	clerical	Count	2	1	54
		Expected Count	3.4	7.7	54.0
		% within occupation	3.7%	1.9%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	6.3%	1.4%	10.8%
		% of Total	.4%	.2%	10.8%
	administrative	Count	1	1	19
		Expected Count	1.2	2.7	19.0
		% within occupation	5.3%	5.3%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	3.1%	1.4%	3.8%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	3.8%
	managerial	Count	0	0	14
		Expected Count	.9	2.0	14.0
		% within occupation	.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	.0%	2.8%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	2.8%
	professional	Count	16	2	193
		Expected Count	12.3	27.4	193.0
		% within occupation	8.3%	1.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	50.0%	2.8%	38.5%
		% of Total	3.2%	.4%	38.5%
	specialist	Count	0	2	10
		Expected Count	.6	1.4	10.0
		% within occupation	.0%	20.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	.0%	2.8%	2.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.4%	2.0%

occupation * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for		Total
			none	ineligible	
occupation student	Count		8	62	112
	Expected Count		7.2	15.9	112.0
	% within occupation		7.1%	55.4%	100.0%
	% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		25.0%	87.3%	22.4%
	% of Total		1.6%	12.4%	22.4%
Total	Count		32	71	501
	Expected Count		32.0	71.0	501.0
	% within occupation		6.4%	14.2%	100.0%
	% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		6.4%	14.2%	100.0%

occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			Atta Mills	Kuffour	Tanor
occupation	unskilled	Count	3	2	0
		Expected Count	2.2	3.6	.1
		% within occupation	37.5%	25.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	2.2%	.9%	.0%
		% of Total	.6%	.4%	.0%
	semi-skilled	Count	5	10	0
		Expected Count	5.4	8.9	.2
		% within occupation	25.0%	50.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.7%	4.5%	.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	2.0%	.0%
	skilled	Count	18	28	3
		Expected Count	19.1	31.6	.7
		% within occupation	25.4%	39.4%	4.2%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	13.3%	12.6%	60.0%
		% of Total	3.6%	5.6%	.6%
	clerical	Count	16	20	0
		Expected Count	14.6	24.0	.5
		% within occupation	29.6%	37.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	11.9%	9.0%	.0%
		% of Total	3.2%	4.0%	.0%
	administrative	Count	3	10	0
		Expected Count	5.1	8.5	.2
		% within occupation	15.8%	52.6%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	2.2%	4.5%	.0%
		% of Total	.6%	2.0%	.0%
	managerial	Count	5	7	0
		Expected Count	3.8	6.2	.1
		% within occupation	35.7%	50.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.7%	3.1%	.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	1.4%	.0%
	professional	Count	48	95	2
		Expected Count	52.0	85.9	1.9
		% within occupation	24.9%	49.2%	1.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	35.6%	42.6%	40.0%
		% of Total	9.6%	19.0%	.4%
	specialist	Count	3	1	0
		Expected Count	2.7	4.5	.1
		% within occupation	30.0%	10.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	2.2%	.4%	.0%
		% of Total	.6%	.2%	.0%

occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			Atta Mills	Kuffour	Tanor
occupation student	Count		34	50	0
	Expected Count		30.2	49.9	1.1
	% within occupation		30.4%	44.6%	.0%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		25.2%	22.4%	.0%
	% of Total		6.8%	10.0%	.0%
Total	Count		135	223	5
	Expected Count		135.0	223.0	5.0
	% within occupation		26.9%	44.5%	1.0%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		26.9%	44.5%	1.0%

occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			other	none	ineligible
occupation	unskilled	Count	1	0	0
		Expected Count	.1	.4	.1
		% within occupation	12.5%	.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	.0%	.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.0%	.0%
	semi-skilled	Count	0	1	0
		Expected Count	.2	1.0	.2
		% within occupation	.0%	5.0%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	4.2%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.2%	.0%
	skilled	Count	0	5	1
		Expected Count	.7	3.4	.9
		% within occupation	.0%	7.0%	1.4%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	20.8%	16.7%
		% of Total	.0%	1.0%	.2%
	clerical	Count	1	2	0
		Expected Count	.5	2.6	.6
		% within occupation	1.9%	3.7%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	8.3%	.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.4%	.0%
	administrative	Count	1	1	0
		Expected Count	.2	.9	.2
		% within occupation	5.3%	5.3%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	4.2%	.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.2%	.0%
	managerial	Count	0	1	0
		Expected Count	.1	.7	.2
		% within occupation	.0%	7.1%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	4.2%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.2%	.0%
	professional	Count	1	7	0
		Expected Count	1.9	9.2	2.3
		% within occupation	.5%	3.6%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	29.2%	.0%
		% of Total	.2%	1.4%	.0%
	specialist	Count	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	.1
		% within occupation	.0%	20.0%	20.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	8.3%	33.3%
		% of Total	.0%	.4%	.4%

occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			other	none	ineligible
occupation student	Count		1	5	3
	Expected Count		1.1	5.4	1.3
	% within occupation		.9%	4.5%	2.7%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		20.0%	20.8%	50.0%
	% of Total		.2%	1.0%	.6%
Total	Count		5	24	6
	Expected Count		5.0	24.0	6.0
	% within occupation		1.0%	4.8%	1.2%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		1.0%	4.8%	1.2%

occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of	
			undecided	Total
occupation	unskilled	Count	2	8
		Expected Count	1.6	8.0
		% within occupation	25.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	1.9%	1.6%
		% of Total	.4%	1.6%
	semi-skilled	Count	4	20
		Expected Count	4.1	20.0
		% within occupation	20.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.9%	4.0%
		% of Total	.8%	4.0%
	skilled	Count	16	71
		Expected Count	14.6	71.0
		% within occupation	22.5%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	15.5%	14.2%
		% of Total	3.2%	14.2%
	clerical	Count	15	54
		Expected Count	11.1	54.0
		% within occupation	27.8%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	14.6%	10.8%
		% of Total	3.0%	10.8%
	administrative	Count	4	19
		Expected Count	3.9	19.0
		% within occupation	21.1%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.9%	3.8%
		% of Total	.8%	3.8%
	managerial	Count	1	14
		Expected Count	2.9	14.0
		% within occupation	7.1%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	1.0%	2.8%
		% of Total	.2%	2.8%
	professional	Count	40	193
		Expected Count	39.7	193.0
		% within occupation	20.7%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	38.8%	38.5%
		% of Total	8.0%	38.5%
	specialist	Count	2	10
		Expected Count	2.1	10.0
		% within occupation	20.0%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	1.9%	2.0%
		% of Total	.4%	2.0%

occupation * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000			Total
			none	ineligible	undecided	
occupation student	Count		5	3	19	112
	Expected Count		5.4	1.3	23.0	112.0
	% within occupation		4.5%	2.7%	17.0%	100.0%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		20.8%	50.0%	18.4%	22.4%
	% of Total		1.0%	.6%	3.8%	22.4%
Total	Count		24	6	103	501
	Expected Count		24.0	6.0	103.0	501.0
	% within occupation		4.8%	1.2%	20.6%	100.0%
	% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total		4.8%	1.2%	20.6%	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases	
	Valid	
	N	Percent
level of education * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	501	100.0%
level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	501	100.0%

Case Processing Summary

	Cases			
	Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
level of education * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%
level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	0	.0%	501	100.0%

level of education * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 1996		
			Rawlings	Kuffour	Mahama
level of education	primary	Count	11	12	0
		Expected Count	9.0	11.4	.3
		% within level of education	42.3%	46.2%	.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	6.3%	5.5%	.0%
		% of Total	2.2%	2.4%	.0%
	secondary	Count	74	88	2
		Expected Count	82.7	104.0	2.4
		% within level of education	31.1%	37.0%	.8%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	42.5%	40.2%	40.0%
		% of Total	14.8%	17.6%	.4%
	tertiary	Count	89	119	3
		Expected Count	82.3	103.6	2.4
		% within level of education	37.6%	50.2%	1.3%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	51.1%	54.3%	60.0%
		% of Total	17.8%	23.8%	.6%
	Total	Count	174	219	5
		Expected Count	174.0	219.0	5.0
		% within level of education	34.7%	43.7%	1.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	34.7%	43.7%	1.0%

level of education * choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for		Total
			none	ineligible	
level of education	primary	Count	1	2	26
		Expected Count	1.7	3.7	26.0
		% within level of education	3.8%	7.7%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	3.1%	2.8%	5.2%
		% of Total	.2%	.4%	5.2%
	secondary	Count	13	61	238
		Expected Count	15.2	33.7	238.0
		% within level of education	5.5%	25.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	40.6%	85.9%	47.5%
		% of Total	2.6%	12.2%	47.5%
	tertiary	Count	18	8	237
		Expected Count	15.1	33.6	237.0
		% within level of education	7.6%	3.4%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	56.3%	11.3%	47.3%
		% of Total	3.6%	1.6%	47.3%
	Total	Count	32	71	501
		Expected Count	32.0	71.0	501.0
		% within level of education	6.4%	14.2%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 1996 Presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	6.4%	14.2%	100.0%

level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			Atta Mills	Kuffour	Tanor
level of education	primary	Count	4	14	1
		Expected Count	7.0	11.6	.3
		% within level of education	15.4%	53.8%	3.8%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.0%	6.3%	20.0%
		% of Total	.8%	2.8%	.2%
	secondary	Count	66	106	1
		Expected Count	64.1	105.9	2.4
		% within level of education	27.7%	44.5%	.4%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	48.9%	47.5%	20.0%
		% of Total	13.2%	21.2%	.2%
	tertiary	Count	65	103	3
		Expected Count	63.9	105.5	2.4
		% within level of education	27.4%	43.5%	1.3%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	48.1%	46.2%	60.0%
		% of Total	13.0%	20.6%	.6%
	Total	Count	135	223	5
		Expected Count	135.0	223.0	5.0
		% within level of education	26.9%	44.5%	1.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	26.9%	44.5%	1.0%

level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of President for 2000		
			other	none	ineligible
level of education	primary	Count	0	2	1
		Expected Count	.3	1.2	.3
		% within level of education	.0%	7.7%	3.8%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	.0%	8.3%	16.7%
		% of Total	.0%	.4%	.2%
	secondary	Count	4	11	3
		Expected Count	2.4	11.4	2.9
		% within level of education	1.7%	4.6%	1.3%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	80.0%	45.8%	50.0%
		% of Total	.8%	2.2%	.6%
	tertiary	Count	1	11	2
		Expected Count	2.4	11.4	2.8
		% within level of education	.4%	4.6%	.8%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	20.0%	45.8%	33.3%
		% of Total	.2%	2.2%	.4%
	Total	Count	5	24	6
		Expected Count	5.0	24.0	6.0
		% within level of education	1.0%	4.8%	1.2%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	4.8%	1.2%

level of education * choice of President for 2000 presidential elections Crosstabulation

			choice of	
			undecided	Total
level of education	primary	Count	4	26
		Expected Count	5.3	26.0
		% within level of education	15.4%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	3.9%	5.2%
		% of Total	.8%	5.2%
	secondary	Count	47	238
		Expected Count	48.9	238.0
		% within level of education	19.7%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	45.6%	47.5%
		% of Total	9.4%	47.5%
	tertiary	Count	52	237
		Expected Count	48.7	237.0
		% within level of education	21.9%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	50.5%	47.3%
		% of Total	10.4%	47.3%
	Total	Count	103	501
		Expected Count	103.0	501.0
		% within level of education	20.6%	100.0%
		% within choice of President for 2000 presidential elections	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.6%	100.0%

APPENDIX XXII

THE APPOINTMENTS UPDATE

The following Ministerial Appointments have been made by President Kufour: as at 7 March 2001.

1. Presidential Affairs: Jake Obetsebi-Lampitey – (Ga-Adangbe)
2. Government Business and Chairman of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC): J H Mensah – (Akan)
3. Finance: Yaw Osafo-Maafo – (Akan)
4. Defence: Dr K Addo-Kufour – (Akan)
5. Foreign Affairs: Hackman Owusu-Agyeman – (Akan)
6. Attorney-General: Nana Akuffo-Addo – (Akan)
7. Interior: Alhaji Malik Yakubu Alhassan – (Northerner)
8. Local Government and Rural Development: K Baah Wiredu – (Akan)
9. Education: Christopher Ameyaw Akumfi - (Akan)
10. Education (Primary, Secondary and Girl Child): Christine Churcher – (Akan)
11. Agriculture: Major Courage Quarshigah – (Ewe)
12. Agriculture (Fisheries): Ishmael Ayittey – (Ga-Adangbe)
13. Health: Dr Richard W Anane – (Akan)
14. Roads and Transport: K Adjei-Darko – (Akan)
15. Communications: Felix Owusu-Agyapong – (Akan)
16. Lands, Forestry and Mines: Dr K Afriyie – (Akan)
17. Employment and Manpower Development: Cecilia Bannerman – (Akan)
18. Energy: Albert Ken-Dapaah – (Akan)
19. Science, Technology and Environment: Professor Dominic K Fobih – (Akan)
20. Women's Affairs: Gladys Asmah – (Akan)
21. Works and Housing: Kwamena Bartels – (Akan)
22. Tourism: Hawa Yakubu – (Northerner)
23. Economic Planning and Regional Cooperation: Dr Kwesi Nduom – (Akan)
24. Presidency – Private Sector Development – C O Nyanor – (Akan)
25. Presidency – Media Relations: Elizabeth Ohene – (Akan)
26. Trade and Industry: Dr Kofi Konadu Apraku – (Akan)
27. Ashanti Region: S K Bofo – (Akan)
28. Brong-Ahafo Region: Ernest K Debrah – (Akan)
29. Eastern Region: Dr Osafo Mensah – (Akan)
30. Greater-Accra Region: Sheikh I C Quaye – (Ga-Adangbe)
31. Northern Region: Ben Salifu – (Northerner)
32. Central Region: Isaac Edumadze – (Akan)
33. Western Region: Joseph Boahene Aidoo – (Nzima)
34. Upper-West: Salifu Mahami – (Northerner)
35. Volta Region: Owusu-Yeboah – (Akan)
36. Upper-East Region: Moktar Sahanoon – (Northerner)

Akan – 72%; Ga-Adangbe – 8.3%; Northerners – 14%; Ewe – 3%; Nzima – 3%

NOMINEES FOR DEPUTY MINISTERIAL POSITIONS

37. Presidential Affairs: Edward Osei Kwaku – (Akan)
38. Presidential Affairs: Alhaji Moctar Musah – (Northerner)
39. Parliamentary Affairs: Paapa Owusu-Ankomah – (Akan)
40. Finance: Grace Coleman – (Akan)
41. Finance: Dr G Adombila Agambila – (Northerner)
42. Defence: Eddie Akita – (Ewe)
43. Foreign Affairs: Alhaji Iddrisu Mustapha Ali – (Northerner)
44. Justice and Attorney General's Office: Captain Effah Dartey-Nkrabea (Rtd) – (Akan)
45. Interior: Yaw Barimah – (Akan)
46. Local Government and Rural Development: Alima Mahama – (Northerner)
47. Education: Rashid Bawa – (Northerner)
48. Health: Moses Baah Dani – (Northerner)
49. Agriculture – Soil Science: Dr K Antwi – (Akan)
50. Agriculture – Agricultural Economy: Dr Abel-Majeed Haroun – (Northerner)
51. Roads and Highways: Alex Seidu Sofo – (Northerner)
52. Transport and Communications: Agyeman Manu – (Akan)
53. Transport and Communications: John Setuni Achiliwor – (Northerner)
54. Trade and Industry: Akwasi Osei Agyei – (Akan)
55. Trade and Industry: Boniface Abubakr Saddique – (Northerner)
56. Land, Forestry and Mines: Benjamin Osei Kufuor – (Akan)
57. Land, Forestry and Mines: Clement Eledi – (Ewe)
58. Environment, Science and Technology: Anna Nyemekye – (Akan)
59. Manpower Development: Joe Donkor – (Akan)
60. Manpower Development: John Jebbah – (Northerner)
61. Economic Planning: Professor Abena Busia – (Akan)
62. Energy: K T Hammond – (Akan)
63. Youth and Sports: Joe Aggrey – (Akan)
64. Works and Housing: Theresa Tagoe – (Ga-Adangbe)
65. Tourism: Nana Akomea – (Akan)
66. Northern Region: Issah Ketekewu – (Northerner)
67. Brong-Ahafo: Agyei Duffour – (Akan)
68. Eastern Region: Naa Dometey – (Ga- Adangbe)
69. Volta Region: Kofi Djamasse – (Akan)
70. Western Region: Sophia Honer-Sam – (Akan)

Akan – 53%; Ga-Adangbe – 6%; Northerners – 35%; Ewe – 6%; Nzima – 0%

TOTALS FOR APPOINTMENTS AND NOMINEES:

Akan – 63%; Ga-Adangbe – 7.1%; Northerners – 24.2%; Ewe – 4.2%; Nzima – 1.4%

Source: Ghana Review International E-mail News Service.